Paramasivam v Shier [2002] FCAFC 142

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Paramasivam v Shier [2002] FCAFC 142

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v JONATHAN SHIER & ANOR N 580 of 2001 O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ 21 MAY 2002 SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY N 580 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN: GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM

APPELLANT

AND: JONATHAN SHIER

FIRST RESPONDENT

GARRY LINNANE

SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES: O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ

DATE OF ORDER: 21 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE: SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Leave to appeal be granted. 2. The appeal be dismissed. 3. The appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY N 580 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN: GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM

APPELLANT

AND: JONATHAN SHIER

FIRST RESPONDENT

GARRY LINNANE

SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES: O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ

DATE: 21 MAY 2002

PLACE: SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT 1 This is an appeal from the judgment of Lindgren J of 4 May 2001. His Honour dismissed the appellant's application pursuant to O 20 r 2 of the Rules of Court. The application was made pursuant to s 46PO of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986. 2 The appellant made a complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") about certain conduct of the respondents. The complaint was terminated by the President of HREOC. That termination entitled the appellant to bring her application to the Court. 3 The appellant had alleged that the respondents had discriminated against her on the grounds of race on account of their failure to respond to what she described as "my expressions of Ethnic Knowledge". 4 The first respondent was, at all material times, the Managing Director of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ("the ABC"). The second respondent was, at all material times, the Director of Corporate Affairs of the ABC. 5 The complaint arose as a consequence of certain correspondence between the appellant and the second respondent concerning the appellant's views about an intended restructuring of the ABC. That correspondence is referred to at [5] to [17] of Lindgren J's judgment. It is unnecessary to repeat it. 6 The primary judge observed that the appellant's claim that she had been the subject of unlawful discrimination depended on the correspondence. He considered that "no reasonable cause of action of unlawful discrimination" was made out. We agree. There is nothing in any of the material before his Honour which would support a contrary conclusion. 7 Counsel for the respondents contended that his Honour's judgment was interlocutory in nature and that leave to appeal was required. That may well be so. However, in view of the effective finality of his Honour's disposition of the matter, the simplest course is to grant leave to appeal and to dismiss the appeal.