Tait v Harris [2003] FCAFC 117

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tait v Harris [2003] FCAFC 117 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32 The Constitution s 77(i) Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 39 Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (Qld) Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld)

Phillip Morris Incorporated v Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 WILLIAM "BILLY" PETER TAIT v ELISA HARRIS (DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT) No Q 47 of 2003 SPENDER, COOPER, KIEFEL JJ BRISBANE 27 MAY 2003

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY Q 47 OF 2003

BETWEEN: WILLIAM "BILLY" PETER TAIT

APPLICANT

AND: ELISA HARRIS (DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT)

RESPONDENT

JUDGES: SPENDER, COOPER, KIEFEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER: 27 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE: BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT: The application for leave to appeal filed 14 April 2003 be refused. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY Q 47 OF 2003

BETWEEN: WILLIAM "BILLY" PETER TAIT

APPLICANT

AND: ELISA HARRIS (DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT)

RESPONDENT

JUDGES: SPENDER, COOPER, KIEFEL JJ

DATE: 27 MAY 2003

PLACE: BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application by William (Billy) Peter Tait filed on 14 April 2003, for leave to appeal from orders pronounced by Coker FM on 2 April 2003 at Townsville where his Honour ordered: '(1) that the urgent oral application for stay of an order of the Magistrates Court at Townsville be dismissed; (2) that pursuant to the provisions of section 39(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act all outstanding applications be transferred to the Federal Court of Australia for hearing.' 2 Mr Tait describes himself in the affidavits filed in support of his application for leave as 'an independent advocate for, and representative of, the interests of, members of the wider community, and the public generally'. Wilson J in the Supreme Court of Queensland has declared Mr Tait to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (Qld). 3 The order dismissing an application for stay of an order of the Magistrates Court at Townsville was in relation to a conviction of Mr Tait by the Magistrates Court at Townsville for the possession of a dangerous drug, namely cannabis sativa, pursuant to the provisions of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld); that he be fined $400 in respect of that drug conviction; and that, in default of payment within a period of two months, he be gaoled for a period of eight days. What possible jurisdiction the Federal Magistrates Court had, or the source of any power it might have to stay an order of conviction in respect of a State offence, and the imposition of a fine with default provisions made by a State court, is not at all apparent. 4 The second order of Coker FM, it seems, relates to proceedings filed in the Federal Magistrates Court on 20 January 2003 by Mr Tait against the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, Elisa Harris, which seems to seek orders pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) in relation to a refusal on the part of the respondent to file certain documents which Mr Tait had sought to be lodged in the High Court. Apparently those documents relate to an application for special leave which, according to Coker FM's reasons, Mr Tait says are a result of the determination made by the Magistrates Court in Townsville, and also from an order by Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of Queensland declaring Mr Tait a vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (Qld). How a refusal to receive documents lodged in the High Court prior to the issue of proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court on 20 January 2003 can relate to a determination by the Magistrates Court made on 5 February 2003 is, likewise, impossible to comprehend. 5 Mr Tait labours under a misapprehension that the associated jurisdiction of the Court somehow permits all of his grievances in whatever court to be rolled into one proceeding. His understanding involves a fundamental misconception of the associated jurisdiction of the Court and, in particular, what is comprehended by "a matter". The associated jurisdiction of the Federal Court simply means that the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all facets of a matter, be they Federal or non-Federal. A matter is a single, justiciable controversy: Phillip Morris Incorporated v Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 ('Phillip Morris'). 6 The Court's associated jurisdiction, which is referred to in s 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), enables it to hear and determine federal claims otherwise outside its jurisdiction but which are associated with a claim within its primary jurisdiction, although per Gibbs J in Phillip Morris at 494: 'This subsection cannot validly confer on the Federal Court jurisdiction in respect of matters other than those enumerated in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution.' On the other hand, the Court's accrued jurisdiction enables it to hear and determine certain non-federal claims which are part of the same matter 'as the claim within jurisdiction.' 7 In Phillip Morris the High Court held, with Aickin J dissenting, that a court exercising federal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to determine a non-federal matter in the following circumstances: (a) where the determination of the non-federal question is essential to the resolution of the federal matter in respect of which there is jurisdiction, per Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ, or where there is a common substratum of facts or transactions, per Stephen and Mason JJ; (b) provided the question is not a separate and distinct matter, per Barwick CJ and Murphy J; (c) where there is an identity of facts, per Gibbs J. 8 As to s 32, the High Court per Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ, with Stephen J concurring and with Aickin and Wilson JJ dissenting, held that s 32 gives the Federal Court jurisdiction to determine an associated matter arising under a federal law. Murphy J considered that s 32 extends the jurisdiction also to non-federal matters provided they are not separate and distinct; while Barwick CJ expressly stated that s 32 is invalid, to the extent that it purports to vest jurisdiction in relation to non-federal matters. 9 Members of the High Court made observations to the effect that s 32 can go no wider than s 77(i) of the Constitution permits. 10 Federal Magistrate Coker, in respect of the oral application for a stay of the conviction and fine orders, said: 'There is, in my view, no basis whatsoever upon which there could be a finding that this Court has, by associated or accrued jurisdiction, a power to make the findings and, in particular, to make the order with regard to stay that is sought by the applicant.' 11 Federal Magistrate Coker noted that Mr Tait had power to appeal or seek a review in relation to the determination of the Magistrates Court in relation to the conviction under the provisions of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld)and noted: '… whilst the applicant has the right to challenge the determination of him being a vexatious litigant it is of the character of "simple bloody-mindedness" on his part to refuse to consider other avenues with regard to the determination and conviction made in the Magistrates Court at Townsville.' 12 The conviction and imposition of a penalty in respect of possession of cannabis sativa under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) can in no way be part of any suggested "matter", within the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court. Federal Magistrate Coker was plainly right in refusing to stay the orders of the Magistrates Court of Queensland made on 5 February 2003. Nor can there be any argument that error attended the other order of Federal Magistrate Coker pursuant to s 39 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth). The application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. 13 In the affidavit in support of his application for leave, Mr Tait asserts, amongst other things, that the orders sought to be appealed from are against: 'the, statutorily prescribed, and customary common law, principles and objectives of Ecologically Sustainable Development - eg public participation in decision making processes of government, social equity, inter-generational equity, etc.' Mr Tait also said: 'the applicant is a bona-fide, representative of, and, advocate for, the interests of members of the wider community, and the public generally, and, the matters at issue in the appeal sought to be made are of, significance to the public's interests, and, some general importance;' 14 These claims are time-wasting humbug, and Mr Tait, it has to be said, has delusions of adequacy about his competence as an advocate. 15 The respondent to the application for leave to appeal has indicated to the Court that she will not be participating in the litigation, and will abide any order of the Federal Court save as to costs.