a CATCHYORDS Trade Practices — Interim injunction ~ Published statements alleged to be misleading and deceptive - Principles applicable to interim injunctrons. Trade Practices Act 1974, ss.52 and 80(2). Commercial Bank of Australia Limited & Anor. v. Insurance Brokers Associacion oF Australia c Ors. No. G63 of 1977. . CORAM: Bowen, C.J. Sydney, 2nd November, 1977. " IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G63 of 1977 GENERAL DIVISION j. IN THE MATTER of the Trade Practices Act 1974 AUSTRALIA PRICE Ii TCHELL PT¥, LIMITED BETWEEN: THE INSURANCE BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF Plaintiffs AND: THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMIT) - 7 B.A. IRSURAKCE SERVICES LindTioo Defendants THE COMMERCIAL B&NK OF AUSTRALT!. LIMIT C.B.A, INSURA CE SamviteS Llit sn Cross-Claimants TH INSURANCE BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA PRICE it (YCHELL PTY. LIMITED JAMES Me livantiby SPECIALISY lUeWSLATTERS PTY. LITITED Cross—Defendante ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Bowen C.J. DATE OF ORDER: 2nd November, 1977. WHERE WADE: Sydney: THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Order that the Insurance Brokers Association of Australia and James McInerney be restrained pending the determination of these proceedings or further order from publishing any statement to the effect that the Commercial Bank of Austial La Limited is involved in an entry or attempted entry into the insurance market which is illegal or any stateinen& to the effect that the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited 1s using mee en eee tere | l | its branch managers to exert pressure on customers to arrange insurance with its subsidiary, C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited. Order that Specialist Newsletters Pty. Limated be restrained pending the determination of these proceedings or further order from publishing any such statements PROVIDFD that this order shall not prevent Specialist Newsletters Pty. Limited from publishing a fair report of any part of these current proceedings. Order the costs of all parties of these proceedings be costs in the cause. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT RECISTRY No. G63 of 1977 GENERAI, DIVISION . . IN THE MATTER of the Trade Practices Act 1974 BETWEEN: THE INSURANCE BROKERS ASSOCTATION OF AUSTRALIA PRICE MITCHELL PTY. LIMITED Plaintiffs AND: THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED C.B.A, INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED Defendants THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED C.B.A. INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED Cross~Claimants THE INSURAKCE BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA PRICE MITCHEIL PTY. LIMITED JAMES McINERNEY SPECIALIST NEWSLETTERS PTY. LIiiT=b) Cross—Defendants CORAM: Bowen C.d. 2nd November, 1977. JUDGMENT This is a motion for injunctions brought by the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited and C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited against the Insurance Brokers Association of Australia, Price Mitchell Pty. Limited, James McInerney and Specialast Newsletters Pty. Limited. Stating the matter broadly, the applicants seek orders restraining the respondents from ae ee eee wet ~ engaging in conduct in contraventioa of the provisions. of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. In particular, they complain that the respondents have published untrue allegations to the Following effect:-— 1. (a) that the Bank is involved in an attempted entry into the insurance market, which is illegal; (b) that the Bank is using its branch managers to exert pressure on customers to arrange insurance with its subsidiary; (c) that confidential information 1n the hands of the Bank is being used otherwise than in a proper manner. In the notice of motion filed, injunctions were also sought to restrain the respondents from engaging in conduct in contravention of ss.45D and 55A of the Act, but in the course of the hearing, these ceased to be matters in issve and reliance was placed upon s.52. «lhe circumstances in which the notice of motion has been brought are that the Insurance Brokers Association of Australia and Price Mitchell Pty. Limited issued a writ of summons and a statement of claim against the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited and C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited on the 22ad August 1977 alleging that the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited had engaged in the practice of exclusive dealing contrary to s.47 of the Act. This allegation was amplified in a variety of ways. It was further alleged that C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited hed aided, abetted, counselled, procured, induced or attempted to induce the Bank to engage in the practice of exclusive dealing, and various other allegations were made related to this matter. In the relief sought, \declarations were asked for that the Commercial. Bank of Australia Limited had been engaged 1n the practice of exclusive dealing or had attempted to engage in the practice and that C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited had aided, abetted, counselled, procured, induced or attempted to induce it to engage in that practice. Injunctions were asked for to prevent either of these defendants from further engaging in such conduct. By their statement of defence filed on 21st September 1977, the defendants dcnied the allegations in the statement of claim relating to exclusive dealing and included a counter-claim in which they alleged that Insurance Brokers ere ee Association of Australia, Price [liz tchell Pty. Limited, James McInerney and Specialist Nevsletters Pty. Limited had engaged in canduct which haridered or prevented the supply of insurance | broking services in a manner contrary to s.45D of the Act; that the first, second and fourth of these cross-defendents had engaged in conduct in trade and commerce which was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, contrary to s.52 of the Ack; and, that the first, second and fourth cross-defendants had also in trade or commerce engaged in conduct that was liable to mislead the public in contravention of s.55A of the Act. It was further alleged that each of the cross-defendants, including the third eross—defendant, had in various ways, arded each of the other cross— defendants in these activities. In the relief sought, there was a request for declarations that the cross-defendants and each of them had been engaged in conduct in contravention of ss.45D, 52 and 55A of the Act; a declaration that the,second, thard and fourth cross-defendants had aided, abetted, counselled, procured, induced or attempted to induce the first named cross-— defendant to engage in conduct 1n contravention of these sections; and permanent and interim injunctions were sought to prevent each of the cross-defendants from further engaging in such conduct. By notice of motion also filed on 21st September 1977, interim relief was sought by the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited and C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited as has already been mentioned. The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited (hereafter called "the C.B.A. Bank") 1s a corporation duly incorporated which carries on the business of banking throughout Australia. C.B.A. Insurance Services Limited (hereafter called "C,.B.A. Insurance") is a company which was incorporated in December 1976. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of the C.B.A. Bank and, after ists incorporation, took over an insurance business which had previously been conducted as a department of the C.B.A. Bank itself. The Insurance Brokers Association of Austral1ra (hereafter called "Insurance Brokers") is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated in the State of Victoria which has at all ee bet see eee material times, been the holder of a licence granted by the Attorney-General of Victoria pursuant to s.24 of the Companies Act 1961 (Vic.). It is a non-profit association, the members of which are insurance brokers carrying on business in Australia. Price Mitchell Pty. Limited (hereafter called "Price Mitchell") is a company duly incorporated which carries on the business of insurance broker in Australia. It is one of the members of Insurance Brokers. James McInerney is the President and a director of Insurance Brokers and a director of Price Mitchell. Specialist Newsletters Pty. Limited (hereafter called "Specialist Newsletters") is a company duly incorporated in Australia which carries on a business of a newsletter publisher. It publishes and distributes in the insurance industry a newsletter called "Cover Wote", The complaint made by the C.B.A. Bank and C.B.A. Insurance on the motion, concerns a number of publications issued by Insurance 'Brokers. The first of these is a letter dated 23rd August 1977 over the signature of Mr. McInerney as President, which was circulated to members of Parliament. The material. part of this letter is as follows: "Re: Confidentiality and Coercion The Insurance Brokers Association of Australia today commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against the COMMERCIAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD., alleging that their attempted entry into the Insurance Market is illegal and ought to be stopped. We have taken this course because we believe that the C.B.4. 1s using its Branch Manarers to exert pressure on customers to arrange their Insurances through the bank and in so doing they are using confidential OO eet men ' 7 . ee customer information. You are in a position to protect bank customers by ensuring thet banks, which are licenced by Government, do not abuse their position. a We ask for your help in this matter." Included with the letter was material purporting to be the text of two letters written by the C.B.A. Bank to customers. The second document complained of is a eircular letter dated 23rd August 1977 written by Insurance Brokers over the signature of Mr. McInerney as President, which was sent to the branch managers of the C.B.A. Bank. After referring to the conmencement of proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia to restrain the C.B.A. Bank from "soliciteng insurance business from its customers unfairly", it stated that a declaration was sought that the bank's conduct contravened the Trade Practices Act. It then proceeded to discuss the relationship of bankerand customer and stated to the branch managers that the solution was in their hands. It included the paragraph, "You, through your professional association, are in a position to refuse to be compromised and to officially say 'No, I will not peddle insurance or use confidential information to sell any of the bank's goods or services'". Included with this was what purported to be the text of the same two letters said to be written by the C.B.A. Bank to customers and three' cartoons, generally representing the bank as having 2ls customers over a barrel or bazling them up at the point of a gun to take out insurance. ke errs The next publication complained of was a news release issued apparently by Mr. McInerney which was forwarded, inter alia, to Specialist Newsletters. It made the same general allegations against the C.B.A. Bank as had beetr made in the circulars. It was also dated 23rd August, 1977. Its opening paragraph was as follows: "Mr, Jim lKicInerney, Federal President of the Insurance Brokers Association of Australia, today accused an Australian Trading Bank of a "major comnercral rip-off". A further complaint concerned two issues of a newsletter circulated throughout Australie by post to subscribers by Specialist Newsletters called "Cover Note! The complaint related to the issues of 40th Avgust, 1977 and 6th September 1977. Broadly speaking, they conveyed the same allegations as were set forth in the circular letters and the news release. It appears that Specialist Newsletters, before publishing this material, telephoned both Insurance Brokers and the C.B.A. Bank on the subject matter of the news release. The C.B.A. Bank refused to make any comment. On behalf of the C.B.A. Bank and C.B.A. Insurance it was submitted that the first three respondents vere conducting a campaign against the C.B.A. Bank. It was pointed out that virtually contemporaneously with the filing of the statement of claim, the' circular letters were sent out to members of Parliament and to branch managers and the news release was 0 LA ANEMONE a oe, issued. It was suggested that the proceedings were being used as a vehicle to enable public criticism to be made of the C.B.A. Bank. It was submitted that the statements which were being circulated and published were in fact false and 'would mislead the public in the course of trade and commerce and that they related, in substantial measvre, to the issue to be determined in the proceedings. In the case of the circular to branch managers, it was contended ths could well have an improper influence on them, and that some of them might be witnesses at the trial. It was claimed that pending the hearing of the proceedings, the respondents to the motion should be restrained from making such misleading statements. It was further submitted that, far from being concerned to protect the interests of the public by calling attention to these matters, the first three respondents to the motion were concerned with business matters . and were endeavouring to impede the lawful competition in which they found themselves engaged in the insurance business with the C.B.A. Bank, and its subsidiary, that their actions were dictated by a profit motive. For the first three respondents to the motion, it was submitted that the allegations they were making were not misleading but were in fact true; that they were matters of public interest which it was desirable should be fully debated with a view to seeing whether the law should be altered as they claimed it should be. It was also argued that Insurance Brol-:ers was not a corporation within the meaning of s.52 of the Act since this was defined as referring to a trading or financial ee eee z corporation whereas it was an association of brokers of a non-profit character and was in no way engaged in trade. It was further submitted that the second respondent had not been shown to be taking an active part in the making of the statements; that Mr. McInerney was a private individual to whom s.52 did not address any prohibition; and, therefore, the relief sought should be refused. It was also argued that any statements by Insurance Brokers or Mr. McInerney were not made in trade or commerce. For Specialist Newsletters it was submitted that they acted in good faith and after reasonable enquiry on information supplied to them on a matter which appeared to them to be a matter of public interest; that they ought not to be restrained from publishing matter on the topics in question; and that to restrain them would be to interfere with the freedom of the press. -In answer to the submission that neither of the first two respondents was a corporation, it was argued for the applicants that the Court has power to grant an injunction at the suit of any person (s.80(1)(c)); that at may grant an injunction against any person (whether a corporation or not) from engaging 1n conduct that constitutes a contravention of a provision of Part V of the Act or from aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a person to contravene such a provision or being in any way directly or indtrectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention by a person of such a provision (s.80(4)(d) (f£) and (h)). It was further submitted that the matter was covered by s.6(2){h) which is as follows:- "6,(2) Thais Act, other than Part X, has, by force of this sub-section, the effect it would have if - (h) subject to paragraphs (d), (e)3 (f£) and (g), a reference in this Act to a corporation, except a reference in section 4, 48, 50ca°81 orsub-section 88(9), ancluded a reference to a person not being a corporation," There is no need to deal individvally with the various sections and paragraphs to which this provision refers. They are not relevant to this discussion. At this interlocutory stage, no argument was addressed on the constitutional validity of s.6(2)(h). It appears to me I am bound to assume its constitutional validity. The consequence of this is that the fact that Insurance Brokers and Mr. McInerney are not corporations as defined in the Aci does not exclude them from the operation of s.52. Counsel for the applicants did refer also to s.6(3). This is as follows:- "6,(3). In addition to the effect that this Act, other than Part X, has as provided by sub-section (2), Division 1 of Part V has, by force of this sub- section, the effect it wovld have if — (a) that Division (other than section 55) were, by express provision, confined in its operation to engaging in conduct to the extent to which the conduct involves the use of postal, telegraphic or telephonic services or takes place in a radio or television broadcast; (b) in section 60 the words "cause or permit a servant or agent of the corporation to" were omitted; and (c) subject to paragraph (b), a reference in that Division to a corporation included a refercnce to a person not being a corporation." eee ese RON + AA let TN OR NI - ert There is evidence from which it may be inferred that the two circular letters and the two issues of "Cover Note", which are said to contain the misleading statements, were sent by post. However, the applicants have not in their notace of motion sought any relief drawn in such a way as to restrain use of the postal services. Having regard to the view which I take concerning the other submissions on behalf of the applicants, it is unnecessary to deal further with the pestal services, In ansver to the submission that neither of the first two respondents had made statements in trade or commerce, the opposite was argued on behalf of the applicants. It was contended that indeed these statements were made in trade and commerce. 4s to the submission that there was no evidence linking Price Mitchell with the statements, it was pointed out on behaif of the applicants, that Mr. McInerney as well as being President of the Insurance Brokers is a director of Price Mitchell, that Price Mitchell was joined as one of the plaintiffs in the original statement of claim, that the published matter in "Cover Note" refers to them and when Mr. McInerney wrote a letter to Specialist Newsletters on 6th September 1977 as President of Insurance Brokers complaining of an aspect of the presentation of his case against the Bank, he gave Price Mitchell as the address for the reply. It is necessary to say something at the outset about the task of the Court in approaching a claim for interim relief. Under s.80 of the Trade Practices Act, it is provided that the Court may, on the application of the fianister, the Commission, or, subyect to an immaterial qualificetion, "any other person", grant an ingunction restraining a person from engaging in conduct that constitutes or would constitute a contravention of the provision of Part V of the Act which 1n. tudes s.52. It is apparent that in sone cases where a private person brings the proceedings, that person may be endeavouring to protect his own proprietary interest. This is so where, for example, a plaintiff seeks to restrain the misleading conduct in the course of trade or commerce which results in the goods of another being passed off as his goods, thereby causing hin loss and damaging his goodwill. On the other hand. there are cases where no proprietary interest is involved but what is sought to be protected is the interests of consumers, thet 1s, the public, and to protect them from being misled in the course of trade or commerce. "The nature of the claim which is made in any particular case will, of course, have a bearing on the approach which the Court has to make to the question whether or not it should grant an injunction. This is particularly so in relation to the matter of interim injunctions. Section 80 sub-section 2 is as follows: "Where in the opinion of the Court it is desirable to do so, the Court may grant an interim injunction pending determination of an application under sub-section (1)." It is clear that the Court has a wide discretion whether or not it will grant an interim ingunction under this provision. It is also clear, in my view, that the injunction referred to is not interim in the more limited sense in vhich this word is sometimes used, but empowers the Court, in effect, to grant an interlocutory injunction pending the final hearing and determination of the issues. Aithough the Court has a discretion, it is a discretion to be exercised not arbitrarily but in accordance with principle. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the Court, in dealing with the matter on an interim or interlocutory basis, is inevitably faced with the problems which Courts for some time have been faced with in this situation. The problem is one of having regard to all the interests involved in the interim period prior to the determination of the facts at the hearing of the matter in order to decide what should fazrly be done in the meantime. Where a proprietary interest, the svbgect of the proceeding is involved, the equitable principles which relate to the cases 1n which the Court will step in to protect 7 the proprietary interest so that 1t will not be destroyed prior ; to the hearing of the matter, would no doubt be relevant. (Indeed, this Court will pay considerable regard to the principles adopted by Courts of equity and other courts 1n considering whether interim relief by way of ingunction should be granted. The special consideration which enters into the matter sn the cases om nema ee dealt with by this Court 1s that it isdealing with interim relief in relation to sections which are designed to protect the public interest. In my opinion, the Court will approach the question whether an application for an interim injunction shovid succeed by seeing, in the first instance, whether the applicant has made ovt a prima facie case in the sense explained in the case of Beecham Grovp Limited v. Bristol Laboratories Pty. Limsted (1968) 118 C.L.R. 618. It will be noted that in that case the High Court vas considering the question of interim relief in the exercise of a statutory jurisdiction. As I understand the matter, in order to show a prima facie case in this sense, it 1s not ble than not that the it necessary to show that il is more prob applicant will succeed at the hearing. It is sufficient if the applicent establishes that it has a fair chance of success. What will be required will vary according to the nature of the case. 'If a prima facie case is shown, the Court will then move to consider the balance of convenience. In some cases, the considerations which then apply for determining the balance of convenience, will be very similar to those whach apply in a court of equity. In other cases, where Uhe public interest is involved, it may be necessary to weigh the public interest against a countervailing public interest or a private interest. In a case such as the present, as 1t applies to Specialist Newsletters, there vould be room at that point for considering the public interest in relation to freedom of speech, which comnuon lawyers have adverted to in relation to the grant of interim ingunctions 1n defamation cases. en en cn einrermememraperenyaeene Meemete pasta tyenien nara wee on wets wey One of the matters to be considered here is whether an undertaking as to damages is offered by the applicant. It 1s'provided in s.80(6) that where the Minister or the Coinmaission makes an application for the grant of an injuné tion under the section the Court shall not require the applicant or any other person as a condition of granting an interim injunction, to give any undertakings as to damages. There is no such restriction in the Act against requiring an undertaking from a private person applying for an snjgunction under s.80. However, it 1s to be noted that such a person may from one point of view be regarded as seeking, by injunction, to enforce compliance with the lav. Where the Attorney-General seeks to enforce compliance with the law, in this sense, it is not customary to require an undertaking as to damages from him. On the other hand, where a private person brings such proceedings having the fiat of the Attorney-General he may be required to give an undertaking as to damages (Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A-G v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) A.C. 295 at p.363). Under s.80, a private person has statutory authority to bring the proceeding and this appears to absolve him from the necessity of obtaining the fiat of the Attorney~ General. Whether this should assimilate his position to that of the Attorney-General suing to enforce the public interest or to a private individual suing by relation is not entirely clear. The approach of the Court I think should be that it will enquire from a private person seeking an interim 2njunction whether he is willing to give an undertaking as to damages. The Court shovld then take into account on the balance of convenience the presence or absence of such an undertaking as one of the factors to be considered in exercising its discretion, Turning to the facts of thé present case, a good deal of evidence has been tendered on the issues arising on the application for interim relief but it is clear that something far less than the complete evidence which might be available at the final hearing of the proceedings, is availeble at this stage. Since ny task is to determine whether the applicant for the injunction has made out a prima facie case in the relevant sense, I do not propose to canvass in detail the evidence given on the various issues but rather to express iny conclusion as to whether a prima facie case has been made out, leaving a closer assessment of the evidence to be made at the final hearing of the proceedings. Adopting this approach, I have come to the conclusion that the applicant has made out a prima facie case that the allegation" that the Bank is involved in an attempted entry into the insurance market which is illegal would be shown to be misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. Furthermore, I consider that a prima facie case has been made oul that the statement that the bank is using 1ts branch managers to exert pressure on customers to arrange insurance with its subsidiary is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or Geccive. On the other-hand I have come to the conclusion that the applicants have not established a prima facie case that 1t is ' misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive to state that confidential information in the hands of the bank is being used otherwise than in connection with the banker and customer erelationship. On none of these three issues is my conclusion intended to represent a final determination of the issue. It is quite possible that at the hearing it may be found, as a final fact, to the opposite effect of anything which I have now said in relation to the prima facie case. I have also come to the conclusion that the applicants have established a prima facie case that these statements vere made by Insurance Brokers, Mr. McInerney and Specialist Newsletters in trade or commerce; and, further, that Insurance Brokers and Ilr. McInerney are parties against vhom a prima facie case for interim relief has been made out notwithstanding Insurance Brokers is a non-profit association and Tir. McInerney is an individual. In my opinion no sufficient prima facie case has been established linking Price Mitchell with the statements 2n question. My conclusion as to there being a prima facie case in relation to two of the types of statement complazned of, leads me to a consideration of the balance of convenience to determine whether an interim injunction should be granted or not. In this regard, it is my opinion that the statements in question, 1f, at the final hearing, it turns out they vere ' false, might, if in the meantime they were made, cause conside: able ' damage to the bank and that this damage would be difficult to quantify or redress. On the other hand, it may be said that the Bank's competition free of these verbal assaults pending the hearing might lead to some loss of business on the part : of Price Mitchell, which conducts an insurance business. It might further be said that any undertaking offered by the C.B.A. Bank as to damages, would be difficult to take advantage of. These, however, would not appear to be significant factors. Another matter to be considered is that in bringing their motion for an injunction, the applicants may be regarded as seeking to protect the public interest 1n preventing the making of false statements, but it is difficult to attach much weight to this in advance of a final determination being arrived at as to whether the statements are in fact false or not. Another element of public interest is that matters of this type shovld, it is submitted, be open for public discussion, particularly in view of the fact that some persons may consider that an amendment of the law is required. However, where the statement relates to a matter which is in issue in proceedings, there is, I think, less force in this consideration. The two statements 1n respect of which I have held that there is a prina facie case established are, to some degree, related to the 1ssue whether the bank is contravening s.47 of the Act, though it may contravene that section by obtaining the insertion of a condition by agreement with its customer. I understand that the applicants do offer an undertaking as to damages, although as I have said, 1t does not appear that this is particularly significant from the point of view of the respondents pending the hearing. In the result, T have come to the conclusion that on the balance of convenience in respect of the two matters where a prima facie case has been established, an interim R injunction should go to operate until the determination of the matters in dispute in the proceedings. Turning to the position of Specialist Newsletters, it would appear that this 1s a trading corporation, which wovld fall wichin the provisions of s.52 and that, alb=izt in good faith, they have published the offending statements. The question is whether, on the balance of convenience, they should be restrained pending the hearing of the matter. It 1s argued, on behaif of that company, that it acted reasonably and sought to check its information, but while this may be a defence under s.85 if the company were being prosecuted, 16 does not appear to avail the company in proceedings for an anjunction, although it may perhaps be taken into account on the question of whegher the Court should exercise its discretion an favour of granting an interim injunction. On the balance of convenience, as it offects Specialist Newsletters, it may be suggested thet it would lose some interest and circulation which otherwise it might have secured by publishing the material in question should it be subjected to an injunction, but weighed against the damage to the applicants if the statements prove to be false on the final hearing of the matter, this would appear be of a relatively lesser weight 1n the scales. On the othe: hand, the plea that freedom of speech or freedom of the press requires that they should be able to discuss this matter freely Cota ion . has some substance in relation to this respondent. However, since the tyro subject matters are related to issues which , will be before the Court at the final hearing of the matter, there is no overwhelming weight to be attached to this consideration of restricting publication in the meantime. made — I propose that the following orders be Order that the Insurance Brokers Association of Australia end James McInerney be restrained pending the determination of these proceedings or further order from publishing any statement to the effect that the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited is involved in an entry or attempted entry into the insurence market which is illegal or any statement to the effect that the Commercial Bank of Australia Limited is using its branch managers to exert pressure on customers to arrange insurance with its subsidiary, C.B.A. Insuvrence Services Limited, Order that Specialist Newsletters Pty. Limited be restrained pending the determination of these procecdings or further order from publishing any such statements PROVIDED that this order shall not prevent Specialist Newsletters Pty. Limited from publishing a fair report of any part of these current proceedings. Order the costs of all parties of these proceedings be costs in the cause. 'Teertify that eed the A2¢ receding pages are a true cony of the Reasons for Jutares. heroin of his Honour the Cniet Judes, Sir Nigel Lowen } fh, uf 0 ae wh WivAw { Assocrate Yated: ak Warren bre 1997