CATCHWORDS Appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Whether District Cane Growers! Executives or Queensland Dairymen's State Council are authorities of a State. Primary Producers' Organisation and Marketing Acts 1926 - 1973 (Q.), 8.30 Postal Services Act 1975, by-law 118(a). THE DELEGATE OF THE AUSTRALIAN POSTAL COMMISSION v. MACKAY DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' EXECUTIVE AND OTHERS G. Nos. 4-9 of 1978 Coram: Franki, Northrop and Brennan JJ. Sydney 14 June 1979 F t IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY } G. Nos. 4-9 of 1978 GENERAL DIVISION j BETWEEN H THE DELEGATE OF THE AUSTRALIAN POSTAL COMMISSION Plaintiff AND H MACKAY DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' EXECUTIVE G. No. 4 of 1978 Defendant AND 3 AYR DISTRICT CANE GROWERS'* EXECUTIVE G. No. 5 of 1978 Defendant AND : INNISFAIL DISTRICT CANE GROWERS! EXECUTIVE G. No. 6 of 1978 Defendant AND : CAIRNS DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' G. No. 7 of 1978 Defendant AND : HERBERT RIVER DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' EXECUTIVE G. No. 8 of 1978 Defendant AND : QUEENSLAND DAIRYMEN'S STATE COUNCIL G. No. 9 of 1978 Defendant ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER : Franki, Northrop and Brennan JJ. DATE OF ORDER: 14 June 1979 WHERE MADE: Sydney THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeals aredismissed. a ea. The decision of the Tribunal in each case is affirmed. 3. The plaintiff pay the defendants' costs. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION BETWEEN AND ) ee G.Nos. 4-9 of 1978 THE DELEGATE OF THRE AUSTRALTAN POSTAL COMMISSION Plaintiff MACKAY DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' EXECUTIVE G.No.4 of 1978 Det endant AYR DISTRICT CANE GROWERS' EXECUTIVE G. No.5 of 1978 Defendant INNISFAIL DISTRICT CANE GROWERS! EXECUTIVE G. No. 6 of 1978 Defendant CAIRNS DISTRICT CANE GROWERS? EXECUTIVE G. No. 7 of 1978 Defendant HERBERT RIVER DISTRICT CANE GROWERS! EXECUTIVE G. No. 8 of 1978 Defendant QUEENSLAND DATRYMEN'S STATE COUNCIL G. No. 9 of 1978 Defendant Coram: Franki, Northrop and Brennan JJ. 14 June 1979 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FRANKI J. These are proceedings brought by the Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission ("the plaintiff") in relation to six decisions of Smithers J. sitting as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The defendant in one of these proceedings is the Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive (G. No. 7 of 1978). The other decisions of Smithers J. were in respect of the Mackay District Cane Growers! Executive (G.No.4 of 1978), the Ayr District Cane Growers' Executive (G. No.5 of 1978), the Innisfail Distract Cane Growers! Executive (G. No.6 of 1978), the Herbert River District Cane Growers' Executive (G. No. 8 of 1978) and the Queensland Dairymen's State Council(G. No.9 of 1978). In each case the question at issue was whether any of the five District Cane Growers! Executives, or the Queensland Dairymen's State Council was an authority of a State within the meaning of by-law 118(a) made by the Australian Postal Commission under the Postal Services Act 1975. Smithers J. held that the District Cane Growers! Executives and the Queensland Dairymen's State Council were not authorities of a State. All these proceedings were heard together by consent because of the similarity of the questionsin issue. I will deal first with the position in relation to the Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive although the position is precisely the same with the other District Cane Growers! Executives involved. -3- I will consider separately the question in relation to the Queensland Dairymen's State Council. Section 30 of the Primary Producers' Organisation and Marketing Act 1926 - 1973 (Q.) ("the Act") provides, inter alia, that sugar cane is declared a commodity under and for the purposes of the Act and that for the sugar industry there shall be constituted (a) Mill suppliers' committees (b) District cane growers' executives and (c) the Queensland Cane Growers' Council. Provision is made for a mill suppliers' committee for each mill to be elected by the growers of sugar cane whoare the suppliers of sugar to each mill respectively. Provision is made in s.30(5) for a number of district cane growers! executives. The Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive, for example, is constituted by six members being two representatives elected by and being growers who are suppliers to each of the three mills in the district. Provision is made in the section declaring the Queensland Cane Growers' Council to be a body corporate and a commodity board but it is not a marketing board (s.30(3) and (7A)). It is to consist of representatives of district cane growers' executives (s.30(7)). It does not represent the Crown for any purpose whatsoever (s.11(2)). It was argued for the plaintiff that the -i- various district cane growers! executives should be looked at as so closely associated with the Queensland Cane Growers' Council that any functions of a governmental nature performed by it should be at least in part attributed to the cane growers' executives. The duties and functions of the Council are, 1n general, set out in an Order in Council under the Act published in the Queensland Government Gazette of 19 October 1929. Those duties and functions differ considerably from those which I have discussed in my judgment in the proceedings between the Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing and the Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission. Whilst some of the duties and functions may be somewhat analogous to those of the Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing, the Queensland Cane Growers' Council is not a marketing board, and does not display any attributes which point to it being an authority of a State, nor does it possess exceptional powers of a nature not possessed by private individuals, except the power, with the approval of the Minister, to make certain levies (s.29(1) of the Act). It has no powers corresponding to ss.7 and 7A of the Fruit Marketing Organisation Acts 1923 to 1964 (Q.). Examples of duties and functions set out in the Order in Council are that it is "To take such action as it shall think desirable for and to co-operate with the Department of Agriculture and Stock, District Cane Growers! Executives, Mill Suppliers! Committees, Branches of Mill Suppliers! Committees, and other bodies and persons" in various activities typical of which are developing the sugar -5- industry, investigating and dealing with problems of any kind relating to the sugar industry, securing additional markets for the distribution of products and improved means of distribution. Whilst it 1s not necessary to decide whether the Queensland Cane Growers' Council is an authority of the State the features mentioned by counsel did not clearly point in that direction. Much less then can it be said that the Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive is itself an authority of the State. The objects, powers and functions of every District Executive are, in general, set out in the Order in Council of 13 August 1931. They include the power to appoint agents and employ servants, the objects and functions of securing co-operation amongst sugar cane growers who are suppliers of sugar cane to the mills of its district, the circulating amongst growers of information and advice generally in relation to the sugar industry and other similar powers, duties and functions. Section 30(8)(d) empowers the making of regulations to provide that any district cane growers' executive may, with the consent of the Queensland Cane Growers! Council, make a general levy for administrative purposes upon cane growersin its district without the necessity for a ballot. Reference was made to s.30(8)(e) of the Act providing that regulations may empower the Queensland Cane Growers' Council, any district cane growers! executive and any mill suppliers! committee to make a Wee te ee Reenter es on -6- particular levy, in the case of the Council in respect of the whole industry, or in the case of an executive on growers of cane in their district, or in the case of a committee on suppliers of cane to the particular m2il for which they are a mill suppliers! committee. The sums provided by a particular levy are to be expended only in the interests of the industry generally or in the locality concerned as the case may be. Provision is made for requesting a poll of relevant growers and no levy can be made if a majority of votes is against it. Section 33 of the Act also deals with regulations. We were not referred to any relevant regulations in relation to levies except to those dealing with the conduct of ballots pursuant to s.30(8)(e) of the Act. I do not think that the power to make regulations under the Act 1n respect of levies or any resulting power to make a levy is of great significance by itself. The Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive does not in any way represent the Crown. It is an unincorporated body, its members are not appointed by an arm of government, and it, like the Council, has no marketing powers or powers of compulsory acquisition or indeed (except possibly as to levies if any regulations permitting levies to be made exist) any powers of an exceptional nature not possessed by a private individual. I will not repeat what I have said in my -~-7- judgment in the proceedings between the Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing and the Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission concerning the relevant legal principles to be applied and which are equally applicable in these proceedings. I am satisfied that the Cairns District Cane Growers! Executive is not an authority of a State nor is any other District Cane Growers' Executive which is a defendant in this matter. I pass now to consider the position of the Queensland Dairymen's State Council ("the Dairymen's Council"). Section 30(9) of the Act provides : "The Governor in Council may from time to time, by Order in Council, extend the provisions - of this section, with such modifications thereof or additions thereto as are deemed by him to be necessary in the particular circumstances, so that the same shall also become applicable to any primary industry other than the sugar industry." By a series of Orders in Council the Act has been so extended to milk and cream, the produce of any dairy, and provisions have been made in relation to the Darrymen's Council. The first relevant Orcer in Council was that of 15 November 1945. It provided, inter alia, for objects of the Dairymen's Council. Typical of these were to organise all dairy farmers into a comprehensive body and give every dairy farmer in the State an opportunity to voice an opinion and have a definite say in all matters affecting the industry, and to do everything possible to ensure for dairy farmers a fair return for their capital and labour. The Dairymen's Council was declared to be a board but not a marketing board. It was also declared to be a body corporate. Provision was also made for regulations under the Act to empower the Dairymen's Council, with the approval of the Minister in each year, to make a general levy on growers for administrative purposes in respect of the whole industry. No provision was made for a prior poll of growers. However, the Council has no power to acquire milk or cream. Regulations of 17 February 1947, since amended, cover details of the power to make levies. These regulations also provide for the proprietor of a factory to which growers deliver milk to deduct the levy and forward it to the Dairymen's Council. Penalties are provided. While the plaintiff's case is somewhat stronger than in the case of the Cane Growers' Executives, beyond the power to make levies with the approval of the Minister directed to financing the expenses of the council and district councils and local dairymen's branches, al caensea teenie tee Bi canedcaliod etna demmenadinetieedimenetatiedattanaateatlietatet ante iene tne aenneme ind Rene neenamenm ea ae eee I find insufficient in the structure, powers, duties or functions of the Dairymen's Council to lead me to the conclusion that it is an authority of the State. It has no marketing powers or power to acquire milk or cream, and no power to carry on any function which might be said to be of a governmental nature or, apart from the question of levies, to do acts which a private individual generally may not do. In general the control afthe supply of milk and cream in Queensland is regulated by the Milk Supply Act 1977 - 1978 (aQ.) in my opinion Smithers J. reached the correct conclusion in each of these matters. I am satisfied that neither any of the District Cane Growers! Executives nor the Queensland Dairymen's State Council falls within the description of an authority of a State in by-law 118(a) of the by~laws made under the Postal Services Act 1975 and I propose that the decision of the Tribunal in each case be affirmed and that each of these applications be dismissed and that the plaintiff pay the costs of each of the defendants, re ernment rennet I certify 'hat tho vend the Lye precedin: Fares ' nw eory of the Reasers ou ave .ef his Honou. Mr. Justacu FAANK Kills deon- cll f) AuyOU_ate Dated: | jun (474 a Cee eee 8 . - te ee meen ene J "IN TUE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY Nos, G 4 to G 9 inclusive of 1978, GENERAL DIVISION BETWEEN: THE DELEGATE OF TIIE AUSTRALIAN POSTAL COMMISSION Plaintiff and MACKAY DISTRICT CANEGROWERS! EXECUTIVE, AYR DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE, INNISFATL DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE, CAIRNS DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE, HERBERT RIVER DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE and QUEENSLAND DAIRYMEN'S STATE COUNCIL Defendants NORTHROP J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 14 June, 1979. These six proceedings, with the consent of the parties, were heard concurrently and immediately following the conclusion of the hearing of The Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v. The Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission. Each of the six proceedings is an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by a presidential member given on 23 March 1978. In its decisions the Tribunal held that each of the defendants, each of which jis the proprietor of a publication, was not an "authority of a State" within Postal By-Law 118 made by the Australian Postal Commission under the Postal Services Act 1975, as amended, and remitted each of the matters to the Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that each of the defendants is not an authority of the State of Queensland. The question of law raised on each appeal is whether the defendant is an "authority of a State" within Postal By-law 118(a). 2. The relevant provisions of the postal by-laws and principles of law to be applied are set out in my reasons for judgment in the Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v. The Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission and need not be repeated. Each of the defendants is constituted under the provisions of the Primary Producers' Organisation and Marketing Acts 1926-1973, the Primary Producers' Act. The broad object of that Act is to develop rural industries in Queensland and to protect and advance the agricultural industry in Queensland and the interest of producers engaged in that industry. To give effect to this broad object, the Primary Producers' Act constitutes a Council of Agriculture, s.4, which is a body corporate, s,4(12), and confers on the Council of Agriculture the functions enumerated in s.7. Section 7(vi) 1s as follows:- "7, Functions of the Council. The functions of the Council shall be to co-operate with the Department, any Board or Boards, and other approved bodies and persons in - (1) ... (vi) Generally doing all such things and taking all such steps as may from time to time be approved for the protection, advancement, or furtherance of the agricultural industry and/or of the producers engaged in that industry." By Order-in-Council, the Governor-in-Council, in compliance with the prescribed procedures, 1S authorised to declare any product of the soil in Queensland a commodity and to constitute a Commodity Board in relation to that commodity, s.9, and when this occurs, the Minister of State is directed to appoint a Board, s.11, but a Board is not to be deemed to represent the Crown for any purpose whatsoever, s.11(2). The general duties and functions of a Board are concerned with the preservation, expansion and economic wellbeing of the industry which the Board represents and it shall be the medium of communication between the Government and the 3. Council of Agriculture on the one hand and all persons engaged in or associated with that industry on the other, s. 11A. The general powers of a Board are enumerated in s.13 and are consistent with the broad object of the Primary Producers' Act, c/f. s.7 and s.13. Section 13(iv) (b) 1S as follows:- "13. General powers of Board, A Board may, for the purposes of this Act, from time to time exercise all or any of the following powers:- (i)... (iv) Take such action as may be approved for, and co-operate with the Department of Primary Industries, the Council of Agriculture, and other approved bodies and persons in, - (b) Generally doing all such things and taking all such steps as may from time to time be approved for the protection, advancement or furtherance of the industry in respect of which it was constituted and/or of the producers engaged in that industry." A Board may be empowered to undertake the functions of marketing the commodity for which it was constituted and if this happens the Board is known as a Marketing Board and is able to exercise the powers conferred upon a Marketing Board. In the present case it is not necessary to make reference to any of the details of those powers. A Board has power to require growers of the commodity for which it was constituted to furnish returns showing details of the quantity of the commodity grown or held, s.25, and the persons acting in the execution of the Primary Producers' Act are granted protection from legal action, s.26. A Board has power to make a levy in respect of the commodity for which the Board is constituted, s.29, and the moneys so raised are to be expended in accordance with the powers of that section. Section 30 of the Primary Producers' Act nee ee es ee we 4, contains special provisions applicable to the sugar industry. For the purposes of that Act, sugar cane is declared to be a commodity, sub-sec. (1). Sub-section (2) 1s as follows: "(2) Constitution of Council, etc. For the sugar industry there shall be constituted - (a) M111 suppliers' committees; (b) District cane growers' executives; (c) The Queensland Cane Growers' Council." The Queensland Cane Growers' Council, the Council, 15 a Commodity Board constituted for the commodity of sugar cane but is not a Marketing Board, sub-sec. (3). Sub-section (4) lists a number of sugar mills and constitutes a separate mill suppliers' committee for each of those mills, the name of each committee to include the name of the appropriate sugar mill and the members of each committee are elected by the growers of sugar cane who are the suppliers of the sugar cane to each of the mills respectively. A proviso to the sub-section ensures that the elected representative on the district cane growers' executive of a mill concerned is ex officio a member of the mill suppliers' committee. Sub-section (5) constitutes the district cane growers' executives. Each executive is given a name by reference to a district within Queensland and generally each executive has to be elected by suppliers of sugar cane to the mills specified in the paragraph constituting that executive. For example, paragraph (a) of the sub-section constitutes the Cairns District Cane Growers' Executive as "Two representatives each of the suppliers to the Hambledon, Babinda Central, and Mulgrave Central Sugar Mills respectively". By way of contrast under paragraph (al) of the sub-section, the Mossman Central Sugar Mill Suppliers' Committee is deemed to be the Mossman District Cane Growers'Executive. Each of the mills enumerated in sub-sec. (4) is mentioned in sub-sec. (5) and of necessity each grower elected to a district cane growers' executive is ex officio a member of the appropriate mill suppliers' committee, sub-sec. (4), To be eligible for election to a mill suppliers' committee or a district cane growers' 5. executive, a person must be a bona fide grower and a bona fide supplier to the mill in respect of which he is a candidate. Sub-section (7) constitutes the Council which consists of representatives of the district cane growers' executives appointed by and from the respective executives. In addition, the sub-section makes provisions for a sugar industry conference and provides that the powers, authorities, jurisdiction, duties and obligations of the Council shall be those imposed by the Governor-in-Council by Order-in-Council. The Council is a body corporate, sub-sec,(7A). Under sub-sec. (7B), the books of account of each district cane growers' executive are audited by an officer of the Department of the Auditor-General. Sub-section (8) empowers regulations to be made by the Governor-in-Council, see s.33, relating to elections to district cane growers' executives. On the recommendation of the Council, the regulations may define the functions of the district cane growers' executives and mill suppliers' committees and define the mutual relationships between the Council, the executives and the committees or anv of them, sub-sec. (8) (Cc). The regulations may empower the Council, any executive or any committee to make a general levy on growers of sugar cane for administrative purposes, in the case of the Council, in respect of the whole industry, in the case of an executive, on growers of cane in their district and in the case of committees, on suppliers of cane to the particular mill for which they are a mill suppliers' committee, but an executive or committee must obtain the consent of the Council to the imposition of such levy, but no poll is required, sub-sec. (8) (d). Particular levics may be made but subject to the procedures therein set out including the provisions for a poll of growers affected, sub-sec. (8) (e). The regulations may prescribe methods of recovery or collections of levies, and the imposition of fines for non-payment, sub-sec. (8) (h) and (i). ~ Extensive duties and functions are conferred upon the Council by Orders-in-Council made by the Governor-in-Council on 16 October 1929 and by subsequent Orders. Likewise, Governor-in-Council Regulations have been made 6. 6. respecting the Council. There is no need to refer to any of the details of those Orders-in-Council and Governor-in- Council Regulations. The Queensland Cane Growers' Council Regulations of 1931, as amended, include regulations with respect to district cane growers' executives. Reg. 324 enumerates the objects, powers and functions of the executives. Each executive is empowered to employ agents, officers and servants for the efficient discharge of its duties and functions and to pay salaries, wages, fees and allowances out of the funds administered by it, to secure co-operation amongst sugar cane growers who are suppliers of sugar cane to the mills in its district, to advise and assist the Council in developing schemes in regard to the production and marketing of sugar cane and sugar, to comply with instructions and directions of the Council, to deal with and resolve legitimate grievances of the growers within its district, to attend to all industrial matters affecting cane growers in 1ts district, to make rules and regulations for the carrying out of its functions, but subject to their being approval by the Council, and with the consent of the Council to borrow money. Reg. 324 1s as follows:- "The objects, powers, and functions of every District Executive shall be :- '{a)e.. (1) Generally to do all such things and to take all such steps as it may from time to time consider necessary for the protection, advancement, or furtherance of the sugar industry and/or growers engaged in that industry in its district." This general power is similar to the general power conferred on the Council of Agriculture and a Board, s.7(vi) and s.13(iv) (b) of the Primary Producers' Act. The regulations confer an indemnity on a member of an executive in relation to acts done while exercising the functions of the executive, Reg.347. The regulations make similar provisions with respect to the mill suppliers' committees, Reg. 350 et. seq. For present purposes reference is made to the objects, powers and functions 7. 7. of every such committee and in particular to Reg. 350(i) and (h). Under paragraph (i) a committee is required to comply with the instructions and directions of the Council and of the district cane growers' executive while paragraph (1) confers on the committees general powers similar to those contained in Reg. 324(1) and s.7 (v1) and s.13(1v)(b) of the Primary Producers' _ Act. Each of the first five defendants is a district cane growers' executive performing the functions and exercising the powers conferred by and under the Primary Producers' Act. Being an unincorporated body does not prevent an executive from being an "authority". Western Australian Turf Club v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1978) 19 A.L.R. 167. Not being a servant or agent of the Crown does not prevent an executive from being an "authority", General Steel Industries Inc. v. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 C.L.R. 125. The functions and powers of the executives are conferred by and under the statute which constitutes them. Other functions, powers and duties may be conferred and imposed upon the executives by other statutes of the State of Queensland, but the executives do not perform functions of a private nature. The executives are not armed with statutory powers for the purpose of enabling them to carry on any other activity whether of a profit making nature or of a recreational nature. The statutory powers are not conferred upon existing bodies which continue thereafter to perform the functions carried on prior to the statutory powers being conferred. It follows that there is no need to "balance" the statutory functions and powers against any other functions being performed and powers being exercised by the executives, c/f. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v._ Silverton Tramway Co. Ltd. (1953)88 C.L.R. 559 and Western Australian Turf Club v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, supra. The only functions and powers of the executives are statutory and in the performance of their functions and the exercise of their powers, the executives are carrying on an undertaking of a public nature for the benefit of the community or of some section or geographical division of the community, Renmark Hotel Inc. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 79 C.L.R. 10. In this regard the observations of Stephen J. in 8. Western Australian Turf Club v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Supra, at p.172 are applicable, These factors do not mean that the executives, of necessity, are "authorities", Western Australian Turf Club v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, supra, per Aickin J. at pp.185-6. An illustration 6f:an incorporated body which is performing functions and exercising powers conferred by the statute constituting it but which, in all probability, is not an "authority of a State" is given in Clark v. University of Melbourne (No.2) [1979] V.R. 66. There the trial Judge ([1978] V.R. 457) had likened the University of Melbourne to a public authority and held that since 1t had no express statutory power to impose a fee on students for certain purposes, a statute of the University imposing such a fee was invalid since it was in the nature of a levy or tax by a public authority, which was not authorised by statute. In forming that opinion, the trial Judge relied upon authorities such as "A-G. v. Wilts United Dairies (1922) 91 L.J.K.B. 897, Commonwealth and Central Wool Committee v. Colonial Combing Spinning and Waaving Co. Ltd. (1922) 31 C.L.R. 421 and Schilling v. Caty of Melbourne [1928] V.L.R. 302. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Young C.J., Lush, and Jenkinson JJ., allowed an appeal from that part of the judgment. After referring to the basis on which the trial Judge had formed his opinion, the Full Court, in a joint judgment, said at pp.72-3: "we find ourselves, with respect, unable to accept this reasoning. The public authorities whose activities may attract the application of this branch of the law are bodies which exercise some governmental function of administration, licensing, planning or of other kinds affecting activities of members of the public. The essence of the University's powers 1s that they are powers of self-government affecting only those who choose to become members by enrolment or the acceptance of employment or office within the University. Their origin in an Act of Parliament places them on a different footing from the powers of the Committee of a voluntary association or of a corporation formed by the action of its members, but they have this in common with the latter powers that they cannot 9. 3. touch anyone who does not voluntarily bring himself within their reach. Both ina university and an a voluntary association or corporation formed by action of its members there will be those who consider that a particular statute, regulation or rule should not exist or should not be passed, and may on enrolment or joining hold such a view. They are, however, bound, but only because they are or become members. There 1s no right under the general law in members of the public to be admitted to the University (though the University's own statutes and regulations May provide that defined persons will be admitted) which the University is regulating or controlling, or upon the exercise of which it is imposing conditions." The executives are not statutory bodies of the kind illustrated by that case. Each executive 1s a statutory body forming an integral part of a complex group of interlocking bodies constituted by statute to achieve a broad object of a public nature. As a public function of Licensing horse races throughout Western Australia affects all persons who may desire to conduct horse races in that State, the public functions conferred on each executive affect all persons who, being growers of sugar cane, sell sugar cane to a mill within the district assigned to each executive respectively. The executives are performing public functions and in so doing are exercising statutory powers not possessed by the ordinary citizen. Each executive, being the defendant in the first five appeals, is I think, clearly an "authority of a State" within Postal By-law 118. The position of the Queensland Dairymen's State Council can be dealt with very shortly. Under s.30(9) Primary Producers' Act, the Governor-in-Council, by Order-in-Council, is empowered to extend the provisions of that section so that the same shall become applicable to any primary industry other than the sugar industry. The Governor- in-Council, by Order-in-Council, has exercised that power and as a result the section applies to the dairying industry. Section 30 has been modified so that s.30(2) reads as follows: "(2) For the dairying industry there shall be constituted - 10. Mae Va bare aan De Neel ee ie Tae ti A nena SS ret, 10, (a) Local dairvmen's branches: (b) Dastrict dairvmen's councils: (c) The Queensland Dairvmen's State Council," Under the same section the Queensland Dairymen's State Council is declared to be a Board, under and for the purpose of the Primary Producers' Act, constituted for the commodities milk and cream, the produce of dairies, but not a Marketing Board. Likewise it is incorporated. For the present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the Queensland Dairymen's State Council is performing statutory functions and exercising statutory powers Similar to those of the Queensland Cane Growers' Council. The Queensland Dairymen's State Council is a statutory body forming an integral part of a complex group of interlocking bodies constituted by statute to achieve a broad object of a public nature. It is performing public functions and in so doing is exercising statutory powers not possessed by the ordinary citizen. For reasons similar to those expressed with respect to a District Cane Growers' Executive, the Queensland Dairymen's State Council, 1s I think, an "authority of a State" within Postal By-law 118. I would allow each appeal with costs, set aside each of the decisions of the Tribunal and remit each case to the Tribunal to be reconsidered in accordance with the direction that each of the defendants is, and 1s to be regarded as, an authority of a State within Postal By-law 118 (a). I certify that this and the Aco : -opy of the preceding pages ale a trie copy Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honomable Mi. Justice Me ohne IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT hEGISTRY ) ) ) GENERAL DIVISION Nos. G4 ~- G9 of 1978 BETWEEN : THE DELEGATE OF TERE AUSTRALIAN POSTAL COMMISSION Plaintiff AND : MACKAY DISTRICT CANEGROWERS'! EXECUTIVE Defendant No. G4 of 1978 AND : AYR DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE - ~ Defendant No. G5 of 1978 AND 3 INNISFAIL DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE Defendant No. G6 of 1978 AND : CAIRNS DISTRICT CANEGROWERS'" EXECUTIVE nefendant No. G7 of 1978 AND : HERBERT RIVER DISTRICT CANEGROWERS' EXECUTIVE Defendant No. G8 of 1978 AND : QUECNSLAND DAIRYMEN'S STATE COUNCIL Defendant No. G9 of 1978 CORAM : Franki, Northrop and Brennan JJ. 14 June 1979 BRENNAN J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Franki J. JI concur in that judgment and I have nothing to add. I certify that this 1s a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment hercin of his a Phan Honour Mr. Justion Brennan fetioe e Cavawme