Wood, Colin Keith (on behalf of the Industrial Relations Bureau) v Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne [1979] FCA 81 | Legal Lookup
Wood, Colin Keith (on behalf of the Industrial Relations Bureau) v Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne [1979] FCA 81
Federal Court of Australia
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BEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA .
VV. No, 19 of 1979
V. No, 20 of 1979
V. No. 21 of 1979
MELBOURNE DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
COLIN KEITH WOOD (ON BEHALF OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BUREAU Appellant
and
LORD MAYOR, COUNCILLORS AND CITIZENS
OF THE CITY OF MELBOURNE Respondent
CATCHWORDS
Jurisdiction - appeals to Full Court of Federal Court from
acquittal on criminal charges after hearing on merits -
doctrine of precedent - applicability of decisions of
different full courts where appeal lies to High Court,
Federal Court of Australia Act 5,24,
Py te pee ae ee ee ae re
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MELBOURNE DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
Vv. No. 19 of 1979
V. No. 20 of 1979
V. No. 21 of 1979
COLIN? KEITH WOOD (ON BEHALF OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BUREAU ) Appellant
and
LORD MAYOR, COUNCILLORS AND CITIZENS
OF THE CITY OF MELBOURNE Respondent
ORDER
JUDGES MAKING ORDER:
DATE OF ORDER:
WHERE MADE:
—ORDER:
Sweeney, Evatt and Northrop Jd.
6 August 1979.
Melbourne
That the Appealsbe struck out
as incompetent,
SWEENEY J: The court notes that these matters are appeals
against orders by his Honour Mr Justice Smithers in
which he dismissed after a hearitig on the mérits
summonses issued by the present appellant against the
respondent. The matters were clearly in our view
criminal matters. Objection is now taken to the
competency of the appeal. As has been said there have
been recent decisions of this court on that question
of law. The court has held in Thompson v Mastertouch
and again in Burgess'scase that an appeal against
dismissal of a summons alleging a criminal offence
where there has been a hearing on the merits is
incompetent,
We feel as a court that we should follow
those previous decisions. A further objection was
PP/BR/la . 6 MR MARKS 6/8/79
Citizen '
¢ -
J taken as to the time of service of the appeal documents
: " but we note that counsel for the respondent has made
1 oR claim that that point is not now pressed. In the
VA circumstances, Mr Ormiston for the appellant, has taken
t
in our view a proper course of agreeing that it would
be the appropriate course for this court to follow
the previous decisions. His client's attitude is that
the appeal is competent and we are informed that further
proceedings are contemplated. In the circumstances the
only order we propose to make is that the appeals be
struck out as incompetent. There is no application
for costs, Mr Marks, but we assume there is no question
under section 197A.
'MR "MARES: We would assume that, if the court pleases.
SWEENEY J: Yes.
EVATT J: I coneur that the appeals should be struck out and
-have nothing further to -add.
NORTHROP J: I likewise concur that the appeals should be
struck out for want of competency and concur in the
remarks made by the presiding judge, but there are
some comments of a general nature that I desire to
add to what has already been said.
. On 9 July 1979 the Federal Court of Australia
constituted by a single judge, in the exercise of
jurisdiction conferred by section 19 of the Federal
Court of Australia Act 1976, as amended, and by section
. 118A Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, as amended,
made orders dismissing 3 informations brought by the
4 appellant against the respondent alleging breaches of
section 5 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act,
see sections 118D and section 191 of the Conciliation
and Arbitration Act. The appellant, relying upon
section 24 sub-section 1 paragraph (a), Federal Court
of Australia Act, seeks to appeal from the orders so
made. The respondent has given notice of objection
to competency of the appeals and relies upon
Thompson v Mastertouch TV Service Pty Led (1978)
19 ALR 547, a decision of a full court of the Federal
Court of Australia. The substance of that decision was
that section 24 sub-section 1 paragraph (a) of the
Federal Court Act does net confer jurisdiction upon
the Federal Court to hear and determine an appeal from
a judgment, order or decree which constituted an
acquittal on a criminal charge after a hearing on the
PP/BR/2a 7 6/8/79
Citizen
merits. In the present case the orders made
constitute acquittals on criminal charges after a
hearing on the merits.
The doctrine of precedent which has application
to the Federal Court of Australia is stated in
Viro v The Queen (1977) 18 ALR 257, and I quote
the following passage from the judgment of Stephen J
at pages 289 to 290:
The first duty of a court is to administer
justice according to law. However in the
case of an inferior court operating within
a system where the doctrine of precedent applies,
the existence of authority binding upon it
determines for it what it must understand to be
the law. It must accept the law to be as that
precedent authority has declared it to be,
whatever may be its own inclinations in the
"matter. The sanction implicit in the doctrine
of precedent is simple and effective; if an
inferior court fails to observe the doctrine
the superior court will correct its decision on
appeal. Thus the existence of an anpeal is
inherent in and essential to the doctrine.
The position of a final court of appeal
-its decisions subject to no appeal to a court
superior to it, is otherwise. It too must
: administer justice according to law; as Isaacs J
said in Australian Agricultural Co v Federated
Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Association of
Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 26! at 278, "our sworn
loyalty is to the law itself". .But it may neither
surrender, nor be relieved of, its responsibility
to find what is the law by an involuntary
adoption of the decisions of any other court.
It may impose upon itself a rule that it will
accept as absolute the binding force of its
own past decisions, a course which, for the
several reasons referred to by Dixon J in
Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee
Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 244, the High
Court has not done. Subject only to that
possibility, it must otherwise wholly accept
the responsibility of itself declaring what it
regards to be the law, even if the views
of other tribunals, however respected, are
_ PP/BR/3a ; 8 6/8/79
Citizen
G/BR/la
Citizen
to a contrary effect. Their views will, of -
course, be of great force in the formation
of its own conclusion but at the end of
the day what must prevail must be its own
conclusion, ,
The application of the doctrine of precedent in its
application between decisions of different full courts
of the Federal Court of Australia has yet to be
authoritatively stated, but in this regard very
helpful opinions have been expressed by the English
Gourt of Appeal in Young v The Bristol Aeroplane
Company Ltd (1944) K.B, 718.
In the present case counsel for the appellant
has stated that this would be an appropriate case to
question the decision in Mastertouch but that it would
not be appropriate to make more submissions to this
-court. Where, as in-this case, an appeal lies to
the High Court from a judgment or order made under
the Conciliation and Arbitration Act by a full court
of the Federal Court of Australia either if the High
Court grants leave to appeal under section 118B of
that act or if the High Court gives special leave to
appeal under section 33 Federal Court of Australia Act,
I am not prepared to consider whether Mastertouch was
wrongly decided. This approach is similar to that
adopted by me in Henderson v Pioneer Homes Pty Ltd, a
decision of a full court of the Federal Court of
Australia given on 2 May 1979 where, as a member of
a full court, I applied Mastertouch although pointing
out that it was unfortunate that Cockle v Isaacson
(1957) 99 CLR 152, was not mentioned in the reasons
- for judgment in Mastértouch and made a refefence to English
legislation in a materially different form to section 24
of the Federal Court of Australia Act and with respect
to which the stated principle of common law was applied,
see Bensor v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942)
AC 250. This approach is similar to that adopted by
a full court of the Federal Court of Australia in
Thompson v Riley-Mackay Pty Ltd, a decision given on
22 June 1979, and by a full court of the Federal Court
of Australia in Burgess v John Connell-Mott Hay and
Anderson Pty Ltd a decision given on 24 July 1979. In
each of those three cases an appeal lay to the High Court.
9 6/8/79
In the absence of any authoritative decision
given by the High Court on this matter, it is my opinion
that in cases where an appeal can be taken to the High
Court, a full court of the Federal Court of Australia
should apply the decision in Mastertouch. This does
not mean that in other cases where no appeal can be
taken to the High Court from a judgment or order of
a full court of the Federal Court of Australia that
full court will, of necessity, refuse to consider whether
Mastertouch was wrongly decided. Both the High Court
of Australia and the House of Lords in England, being
final courts of appeal, will, in appropriate cases
consider whether an earlier decision has been wrongly
decided.
An analagous type of problem was referred to
. over 100 years ago by Chief Baron Pollock in Taylor
. v Burgess, 1859 5 Hurlstone and Normans Exchequer
Reports 1 at page 15, and I quote:
When a case can be taken to a court of error,
the decision of one court of co-ordinate
jurisdiction ought to be binding on the
others. When, however, there is no means
of appealing to a court of*'error there is
not the same obligation to follow the decision
of another court; and accordingly we sometimes
find courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction
differing from each other.
_ I refer also to what was said by Stephen J
in Viro's case and which I quoted earlier.
Since in this case the appellant, if so advised,
may appeal to the High Court from-the -order this court
proposes to make I agree in the order being made.
Finally, I would note that the respondent does
not propose to proceed with the grounds of objection to
competency insofar as they relate to the failure to
serve the notice of appeal within time.
I concur in the order suggested by the
presiding judge.
; SWEENEY J: The order of the court will be in the terms I
' announced earlier. The court will now adjourn sine
' die. .
AT 10.48 A.M. THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
INDEFINITELY
" G/BR/2a 10 6/8/79
.
IT certify that this and the /eur
preceding pages are a true copy of the
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Reasons for Judgment herein of Bss Honours
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