Wellcome Foundation Ltd v V.R. Laboratories (Australia) Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 33
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Practice - Discovery - Convention Patent - Whether experimental
work of inventor before priority date should be discovered.
THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION LIMITED v. V. R, LABORATORIES (AUST. )
PIy. LIMITED
No. G. 78 of 1979
Coram: Bowen C.J., Franki and Deane JJ.
24 March 1980
Sydney
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G. 78 of 1979
GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
BETWEEN: THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION
LIMITED
Appellant
(Plaintiff)
AND : V.R. LABORATORIES (AUST. )
PTY. LIMITED
Respondent
(Defendant)
Oo R DER
JUDGES MAKING ORDER: Bowen C.J., Franki and Deane JJ.
DATE OF ORDER 24 March 1980.
Sydney.
WHERE MADE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of
the appeal.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY) No. G78 of 1979
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL from the Supreme Court
of New South Wales Equity Division
BETWEEN:
THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION LIMITED
Appellant
(Plaintiff)
AND:
V.R. LABORATORIES (AUST.) PTY.
LIMITED
Respondent
(Defendant)
Coram: Bowen C.J., Franki and Deane JJ.
we March 1980.
JUDGMENT
BOWEN C.J.: I agree with the reasons given and conclusions
reached by Franki J. and would dismiss the appeal with costs.
I certify that this and the nil
preceding pxges are a Lrue copy of th
mon t
Reasons for Jucement herein of his Honout
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY } No. G 78 of 1979
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW
SOUTH WALES EQUITY DIVISION
BETWEEN: THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION
LIMITED
Appellant
(Plaintiff)
AND: V.R. LABORATORIES (AUST. )
PTY. LIMITED
Respondent
(Defendant)
CORAM: Bowen C.J., Franki and Deane JJ.
24 March, 1980.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DEANE J: I agree with the judgment of Franki J.
I cerlify that Us and the preceding panes «re a
true copy of the reasons fcr Judgment heroin of
His Honour Mr. Justice Deane.
KM bebe
ASSQCIATE
Data OY- 3 1/90
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY) No. G. 78 of 1979
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
BETWEEN: THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION LIMITED
Appellant
(Plaintiff)
AND: V.R. LABORATORIES (AUST.)PTY.
LIMITED
Respondent
(Defendant)
Coram: Bowen C.J., Franki and Deane JJ.
Sydney
24 March 1980
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FRANKI J.
This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in relation to discovery.
The appellant, the Wellcome Foundation Limited, is the
proprietor of patent no. 459109 for "Improvements in or relating
to injectable therapeutic compositions." The appellant is the
plaintiff in an action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
against the respondent, V.R. Laboratories (Aust.) Pty. Limited,
for infringement of the patent. The respondent has counter
Claimed for revocation of the patent and seeks a declaration that
it is and at ail material times has been invalid and an order
that it be revoked. The particulars given in support of the
counter claim, so far as is relevant to this appeal, are:
(a) that the complete specification does not comply with the
requirements of s. 40 of the Patents Act 1952,
(b) that the invention, so far as claimed in each claim, was
obvious and did not involve an inventive step, having
regard to what was known or used in Australia on or
before the priority date of each claim,
(c) the invention, so far as claimed in each claim, was not
novel in Australia on the priority date of each claim.
Particulars of prior publication were then given and
embraced eight Australian patent specifications and
specified pages of 32 other publications,
(da) the invention, so far as claimed in each claim, is not
useful.
No particulars were given in relation to the defence
that each claim was obvious. The first claim in the
specification is:
"l.An aqueous injectable preparation, as
herein defined, which comprises a
suspension of a finely divided
potentiator, as herein defined, at least
993 of the particles of potentiator in
the suspension having a largest dimension
less than 50p, in an aqueous solution of
a pharmceutically acceptable water
soluble salt of a sulphonamide with a
strong base, the ratio of sulphonamide to
potentiator being within the range from
20:1 to O.1:1 (W/W) and the pH of the
preparation being greater than 9.75."
It is not, however, necessary in these proceedings to
consider the technical aspects of the patent.
The learned judge of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales had before him a motion by the defendant for certain orders
in relation to discovery and he made orders in the following
terms:
"1. The Plaintiff file and serve a
further and better affidavit of discovery
in these proceedings.
2. The said further and better affidavit
of discovery shall include inter alia
documents in the following classes:-
(a) Documents relating to research and
development and experimental work of
the claimed invention both before and
after the priority date of the
subject letters patent;
(b) Documents relating to the
provisionsal application for the
patent and documents relating to the
application for the complete patent,
as the case may be, both in the
United Kingdom and in Australia
insofar as they contain matters
relevant to (a) above. -
3. Costs shall be costs in the cause."
In addition his Honour limited the second order which he made by
the following statement:
"Documents coming into existence after
the priority date should be discovered if
they refer to research and development
and experimental work of the claimed
invention before that date; and if the
order 2(a) sought is so understood it
should properly be made. But the making
of such an order will not oblige the
plaintiff to discover documents not
relevant to work before the priority
date."
The patent was obtained under those provisions of the
Patents Act relating to convention applications and the basic
application was made in Great Britain and had a convention
priority date of 13 March 1970.
The appellant's main argument in the appeal was that
there was no evidence before the primary judge and therefore
before this Court concerning the state of the art at the relevant
time in England even though there was evidence concerning the
state of the art at the relevant time in Australia. The argument
then proceeded that the evidence of any experimental work carried
out for the patentee was irrelevant unless it could be shown that
at the priority date the state of the art in England was
substantially the same as the state of the art in Australia.
The second argument advanced by the appellant was that
it was also necessary to show how close the inventor was to "an
unimaginative skilled technician" so that the relevance of his
experiments could be evaluated. The third argument was based on
the submission that the primary judge had a discretion in the
matter and he should not have exercised his discretion in favour
of the respondent.
The Court of first instance had before it not only the
pleadings and particulars but also affidavits from witnesses,
apparently expert in the field, dealing with technical matters
and filed by both parties as relevant on the question of
obviousness. These affidavits were filed pursuant to an order of
the Court that expert evidence be given upon affidavit.
It is first necessary to consider the principles
applicable in relation to discovery. The Court of Appeal in The
Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. The Peruvian
Guano Company (1882) 11 9.B.D. 55 considered the matter and Brett
L.J. at p. 63 formulated the test as follows:
"Tt seems to me that every document
relates to the matters in question in the
action, which not only would be evidence
upon any issue, but also which, it is
reasonable to suppose, contains
information which may - not which must-
either directly or indirectly enable the
parties requiring the affidavit either to
advance his own case or to damage the
case of his adversary."
In Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth ed. Vol. 13 para. 38 the
above passage is cited and it is followed by the following:
"Documents relate to matters in question
in the action whether they are capable of
being given in evidence or not, so long
as they are likely to throw light on the
case."
In Temmler v. Knoll Laboratories (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.
(1969) 43 A.L.J.R. 363 Windeyer J. had to consider this question
of discovery in relation to an action for infringement of a
convention patent. His Honour referred to High Court Rules order
32 rr. 8 and 18 and pointed out that it was essential to the
obtaining of an order for discovery and for inspection that the
documents in respect of which it was sought must be related to
the matter in question in the proceedings. His Honour then
continued:
"Tt may be that documents can be said to
relate to a matter in question in the
proceeding if they may fairly lead to a
train of enquiry which would help to
establish the case of the parties seeking
discovery...But the documents to be
discoverable must be related in some way
to some question in issue. What matters
are in question in the proceedings must
depend upon the pleadings, including of
course the particulars of objection."
In Mulley v. Manifold (1959) 103 C.L.R. 341 at p. 345
Menzies J. stated the following test:
"Only a document which relates in some
way to a matter in issue is discoverable,
but it is sufficient if it would, or
would lead to a train of enquiry which
would, either advance a party's own case
or damage that of his adversary."
As to discovery see generally American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd. [1978] R.P.C. 667; Halcon International Inc. v. The
Shell Transport and Trading Co. Ltd. [1979] R.P.c. 459 at pp.
464-465 and Beecham Group Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Co. (1979) V.R.
273. The question of what documents must be discovered is a
different question to what interrogatories must be answered. The
unreported case of Pulbrook Bros. Pty. Ltd. v. C.W. Donney & Son
Pty. Limited before Barwick C.J. deals with interrogatories.
There is no doubt that the pleadings and affidavits
which were before the primary judge show that the patentee is
alleging that the relevant invention claimed was arrived at after
experimentation. No argument to the contrary was addressed to
us.
At least in a case where the patentee claims that an
invention has been made after relevant experiments have been
conducted there is ample authority for the proposition that the
evidence of the inventor concerning the work he did before he
arrived at the invention is admissible. In Lightning Fastener Co.
Ltd. v. Colonial Fastener Co. Ltd. [1934] 51 R.P.cC. 349 at p.
367, Lord Tomlin in the Privy Council said:
"Tt is certain. that the general
mechanical idea of combining in this
class of work ail the necessary
operations in one machine was novel and a
perusal of the evidence of the inventor
Sundback given before the Trial Judge
satisfies their Lordships that, so far
from the combination being obvious, it
was only after years of work at the
problem of how to produce stringers that
the combination was recognised to be
desirable or found to be possible, and
that the inventive element necessary to
constitute subject-matter is made
sufficiently evident.
See also Sunbeam Corporation v. Morphy~Richards (Australia) Pty.
Ltd (1961) 35 A.L.J.R. 212 at p. 219 (Windeyer J.) and Howaldt
Ltd. v. Condrup Ltd. [1937] 54 R.P.C. 119 at pp. 131-132 (Farwell
Je).
In addition, at this stage, we do not have to consider
whether any of the material for which discovery is sought would
be admissible or not at the trial. The knowledge of the
experiments conducted by the inventor may be very useful in the
formulation of a line of cross-examination of technical witnesses
called by the appellant in the action. The question of whether
any documents discovered are admissible in evidence would be a
matter for the trial judge at the relevant time. I see some
difficulty in a view that the admissibility would necessarily
depend upon knowing the state of the art in Great Britain, or
establishing that the state of the art there was the same as in
Australia at the relevant date, or the extent to which the
inventor could be classified as an "unimaginative skilled
technician." The question now before us is not as to the
admissibility' of the evidence of the inventor in relation to
obviousness but whether what the inventor did should be
discovered. This is very different to the question which arose
in Lucas Industries Ltd. v. Chloride Batteries Australia Ltd.
(1978) 18 A.L.R. 579.
Certainly so far as discovery is concerned I am
satisfied that it is, relevant for the respondent to know what
experiments the inventor 'carried out in Great Britain. This
knowledge would assist the respondent in examining the alleged
invention against the background of the state of the art in
Australia as particularised in the particulars of objection.
Because of the view I'take "it is not necessary to consider
whether there was any evidence before the primary judge of the
state of the ,art in Great Britain. For the same reason it is not
necessary to consider whether the order of the primary judge
would be justified because of the allegations in the particulars
of objection of inutility or that the specification did not
comply with the requirements of s.40 of the Patents Act 1952.
I pass now to the third argument that the primary judge
should have declined to make the orders he made because the
Material sought to be discovered was of insufficient importance.
For the reasons I have expressed it seems to me that the
respondent was entitled to the orders made and that the judge
properly exercised any discretion which he had. This is
certainly not a case where this Court would be justified in
substituting its discretion for that of the primary judge.
No point was taken before the primary judge of any
possible difference between experiments carried out by the
patentee and those carried out by the inventor.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
[ certify that this and the -an MAC 09) '
oreceding pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour
wr. Justice Fyoanbe'
oe ae
Associate 7
24 Mek, 190
Dated: o<