Deputy Commission of Taxation v Robert Graham Douglas Hill [1980] FCA 161
Federal Court of Australia
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY S.A. No. G13 of 1980
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF INSOLVENCY OF THE
TATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA RALRCISING FEDSRAL
JURISDICTION IN BANKRUFLCY
BETWEEN:
ROBERT GRAHAM DOUGLAS HILL Appellant
and
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Respondent
ORDER
JUDGES : Northrop, Deane, McGregor, JJ.
DATE: 14 October 1980
WHERE MADE: Adelaide
ORDER: The appeal be dismissed with costs.
\
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY S.A. No. G13 of 1980
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF INSOLVENCY OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA EXERCISING FEDERAL
JURISDICTI IN BANKRUPTCY
BETWEEN:
ROBERT GRAHAM DOUGLAS HILL Appellant
and
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Respondent
NORTHROP, DEANE,
McGREGOR, JJ. EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT 14 OCTOBER 1980
Se TE RE EET A FO AE Se mame
NORTHROP J: This 1s an appeal from the Court of Insolvency
of the State of South Australia, his Honour Judge
Rogerson, exercising federal jurisdiction in
bankruptcy. His Honour refused to set aside a
bankruptcy notice which had been served upon the
appellant requiring the appellant to pay, secure
or compound the sum of $10,450.39 payable under
a judgment of the Local Court of Adelaide delivered
in May 1978 1n an action commenced in 1976 in favour
of the respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.
The appellant had, in accordance with section 40(1) (g)
of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 filed an affidavit claiming
that he had a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand
against the respondent in the amount of $15,000.
His Honour found that he was not satisfied that there
was any basis for the alleged counter-claim, set-off
or cross-demand.
The appellant appeals against the substance of
his Honour's findings. He also appeals on the ground
that his Honour was 1n error in refusing an application
for an adjournment of the proceedings which had been
made to him. By ground 2 of the further grounds of
appeal, the appellant raised as an issue the question
of whether the Registrar-1in-Bankruptcy was purporting
to exercise judicial powers which he in law was not
empowered to exercise. At the beginning of the hearing
ef the appeal the appellant withdrew that ground of
appeal and accordingly no notice was required to be
given under section 78B Judiciary Act 1903. During
the course of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant
withdrew ground 7 of the grounds of appeal.
There was some discussion before us as to
whether the appellant had in fact been refused an
adjournment. On the basis that he was, the appellant
has failed to show that there are grounds for interfering
with the refusal of his Honour, in the exercise of his
dascretion, to grant an adjournment of the proceedings
on 18 June 1980. In this regard, it should be
mentioned that the only prejudice which the appellant
has suggested he suffered as a result of the refusal
of an adjournment was the absence of access to certain
categories of documents. On the hearing of the
appeal, the appellant was unable to specify any
particular additional document which he desired to
adduce in evidence either before this court or
before the court of first instance on any re-hearing.
As regards the substance of the appeal, it 1s
@ifficult to comprehend even an argument that the
appellant has a cross-claim in the amount of $15,000
against the respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.
Doing the best that I can, it would seem that the
appellant's argument is that a company, Mineral
Fertilizer Proprietary Limited (formerly Primary
Fertilizer Proprietary Limited) was shown in its books
as being indebted to the appellant, that the appellant,
who claims this book debt in his favour was "spurious",
assigned the book debt to the Deputy Commissioner of
Taxation and that the appellant then, acting on behalf
of Mineral Fertilizer Proprietary Limited, purported
to issue in his own favour a group certificate showing
total deductions as having been made from salary or
wages in the amount of $15,000. On this basis it was
claimed that the Deputy Commissioner was indebted to
the appellant in the amount of $15,000.
Taking into account, as best I can, all of the
arguments advanced by the appellant, I am unpersuaded
that his Honour was in error in finding that He was
not satisfied, on the evidence before him, that there
was any basis for the appellant's claim that the
respondent was indebted to him in the amount of
$15,000. Insofar as the appellant relies on the
provisions of section 221H of the Income Tax Assessment
Act 1936, I am of the view that the section refers to
a group certificate issued in respect of deductions
which have actually been made from an employee's
salary or wages. Sub-section (7) of the section
plainly indicates that the section is not intended
to operate so as to entitle an employee to claim
credit or payment of the amount shown in a document
in the form of a group certificate where that amount
has neither been received by the Commissioner nor
deducted from his salary or wages.
It should be mentioned that a number of particular
criticisms of his Honour's judgment were made by the
appellant. Some of those particular criticisms would
appear to have some substance. In particular, there
would appear to be no adequate basis in the evidence
set out in the appeal book for his Honour's statement
that Mineral Fertilizers Proprietary Limited was
itself in such serious financial difficulties that
recourse to 1t might be useless. Any such matters
are, however, of peripheral importance and do not
affect the substance of the appeal.
It should be mentioned also that when the appeal
was called on for hearing the appellant requested
an adjournment to enable him to obtain legal
representation. Subsequently, after the court
indicated 1t was prepared to accede to that application,
he withdrew it.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
rm ee ee ee ee ere
DEANE J: I agree.
MCGREGOR J: I concur with the order proposed by the learned
presiding judge and for the reasons he gives.
NORTHROP J: The order of the court is that the appeal is
dismissed with costs.
I certify that this and the foree
preceding pages are a true copy of the
Reesons for Judgment herem of the
Honourable Mr. Justice VerMrop, Pe Horrcruable
Mr Sestc~e Peune ancl thé Hong rbhi
Mr, Sesto LAG epur Associate
Met Mawr
Dated: /4 Cove =e /IKO
RTS A EA NE nee nett Ae ee ee oe
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