Federal Court of Australia
A
RECEIVED
10 JUN 1999 FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
seeveue weeveccevoel secscsesseee
JUDameni ive.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE
) ; No. 2076 of 1980 ) )
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
RE: ALLAN CLIFFORD SWEET, JANET ANN
SWEET, ADRIAN LAWRENCE SHEPHERD HEATHER MARY SHEPHERD
EX PARTE: ALLAN CLIFFORD SWEET, JANET ANN SWEET, ADRIAN LAWRENCE SHEPHERD HEATHER MARY SHEPHERD
Applicats REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LOCKHART J. 16 July 1980 At Sydney
On 17 August 1979 the respondent Kevin Davison ("the respondent") signed judgment against the applicants, Allan Clifford Sweet, Janet Ann Sweet, Adrian Lawrence Shepherd and Heather Mary Shepherd ("the applicants") in the District Court of New South Wales at Wollongong in the sum of $11,600.16. On 2 May 1980 the Deputy Registrar issued a bankruptcy notice directed to the applicants. .
It is common ground that before the expiration of the time fixed for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice the applicants filed with the Registrar two affidavits. It was intended by the applicants that the affidavits were affidavits of the kind referred to in sub-s. 41 (7) and paragraph 40 (1) (g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act").
The Registrar duly gave notice to the applicants and
the respondent in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules that
the matter had been set down for hearing by the Court. The matter came on for hearing before me yesterday. Counsel for the parties submitted that the case fell conveniently into two parts: first, the question whether the affidavits were of the kind mentioned in sub-section 41 (7) and para. 40 (1) (g) and, second, if they were such affidavits, whether the Court is satisfied that the applicants have the requisite counter-clain, set-off or cross—demand.
Counsel informed me that they wished to deal with the first question as a preliminary point, so that, if I answered it against the applicants, that would be an end of the matter; but, if I answered it against the respondent, then probably there should be an adjournment of the case to abide the outcome of an application to be made by the applicants in the District Court at Wollongong to set aside the judgment. In Re Brink; Ex_parte Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Limited judgment delivered 27 June 1980, I considered the construction and operation of sub-s. 41 (7) and para. 40e(1) (g) of the Act, and
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