YAN 8S of IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY No. ACT G77 of 1982 DISTRICT REGISTRY www ws GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY BETWEEN: WILLIAM GRENVILLE PIERCE Appellant AND: NUNTIYA GILES Respondent CORAM: Sweeney, Kelly & Neaves JJ. DATE: 25 March, 1983. EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT SWEENEY J. Under section 8 of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 provision may be made by Rules of Court for the jurisdiction of the court to be exercisable by the registrar in such cases and subject to such conditions as are specified 1n che Rules of Court. Under sub-section (4) a person dissatisfied with an order made by the registrar in the exercise of jurisdiction so conferred upon him may appeal as prescribed by Rules of Court to the court constituted by one judge. Order 6 Rule 5(1)(£) of those rules provides that an appeal under section 8(4) shall be by way of rehearing de novo of the application. Mr. Pierce, the defendant in an action brought against him in the Supreme Court appealed to a single judge pursuant to section 8(4) and Order 61, Rule 5(1)(£) against an order for costs made against him by the registrar. His Honour held that the registrar had no jurisdiction to make the order for costs and said:- "The appeal is therefore allowed and the registrar's order for costs is set aside. I would like to save time and costs by making the appropriate order for costs forthwith, but the substance of the matter was dealt with so slightly before me that I am obliged to adjourn the hearing to a day to be fixed for further submissions. The question of the costs of the appeal is reserved." By an order dated 29 October 1982 the following orders were made:- "L. The appeal be allowed and the registrar's order for costs be set aside; 2. The hearing be adjourned forthwith For further submissions; 3. The question of costs of the appeal be reserved." By notice of appeal dated 5 November 1982 Mr. Pierce appealed to this court from the whole of the judgment in the Supreme Court and sought the orders that are set out in his notice of appeal. In my opinion this notice of appeal is based upon a fundamental misconception of the nature of the proceedings before his Honour and the stage which those proceedings had reached. His Honour had embarked upon a rehearing de novo of the application which had been made to the registrar. He had reached the stage of holding that the registrar's order for costs be set aside, not on the merits, but for lack of jurisdiction. He had adjourned the hearing before him for further submissions and reserved the question of the costs of the appeal. That appeal was part heard before his Honour and upon its resumption, he would no doubt have considered the merits of the matter and decided, as he had complete jurisdiction to do, what order he should make upon the merits of the case. This court in my opinion should not entertain an appeal instituted against his Honour's order of 29 October 1982 but should dismiss it, leaving his Honour free to complete his hearing. I would dismiss the appeal and hear the parties on the question of costs. Such a dismissal would, of course, involve no finding on the merits. Submissions by Counsel SWEENEY J: The court thinks it appropriate to make no order as to costs. The order of the court is that the appeal herein be dismissed.