Draper, John Alexander v Brosalco Pty Ltd [1983] FCA 203
Federal Court of Australia
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
No. G 192 of 1983
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE
eee ee
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
BETWEEN JOHN ALEXANDER DRAPER
Applicant- Debtor
AND BROSALCO PTY. LIMITED
Respondent
Petitioning
Creditor
Morling J.
10 August 1983
.
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
This is an application for a stay of further
proceedings under a sequestration order made by McGregor J.
on 1 July 1983. After his Honour made the sequestration
order he granted a stay of proceedings under it for 21 days.
I have read his Honour's judgment which was given after a
contested hearing in which the sole issue seems to have
been whether or not the debtor was in fact indebted to
the petitioning creditor for the amount of a debt in respect
of which a judgment had been recovered in the District Court.
I would have thought that the task of demonstrating
that his Honour's decision on that issue was erroneous will
be almost insuperable. However, at the very heel of the hunt
in the proceedings before McGregor J a question was raised
as to whether or not the petition had in fact expired.
The appeal which has been brought to the Full
Court raises for consideration not only the correctness of
his Honour's decision that the debtor was in fact indebted
to the petitioning creditor but also the question whether
some fairly recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act gives
the court power to extend the life of a petition after the
expiration of twelve months from its presentation. That
question may well be arguable and I am not prepared to say
that there is no substantial question of law to be argued
on the hearing of the appeal. °
- The stay granted by McGregor J ran*out-on 22
July or thereabouts. It was apparently allowed to run out
without an extension of it being obtained and a notice of
motion for continuation of the stay was filed in court on
23 July. It came before Neaves J on 28 July and was stood
over until today.
I have been informed that on 5 August the petition-
ing creditor filed and presented a sequestration order for
sealing by the court and that on the same day Beaumont J
granted an interim stay of proceedings under the sequestration
order until today. I am further informed that the trustee
has been served with today's application but has indicated
he does not wish to be heard.
There 1s no evidence before the court as to what
assets, if any, the debtor possesses. Miss McSpedden who
put her client's case with admirable clarity, said her
instructions were that the debtor owned a grazing property.
However, in view of the fact that it was expressly disclaimed
on his behalf before McGregor J that he could meet his debts
I think there must be some doubt as to the extent of the
debtor's assets.
It seems to me that by force of the operation of
s.58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act the property of the debtor now
vests in the trustee. Miss McSpedden did not present a
contrary argument. In those circumstances she correctly
identified the purpose of the present application to be to
restrain the trustee from dealing with the assets vested in
him pending the determination of the appeal.
Mr Hourigan has, not unreasonably, expressed
concern on behalf of the petitioning creditor that the
assets of the debtor may be dissipated pending the hearing
of the appeal. However, in my view any concern of that
kind can be overcome by the making of appropriate orders.
or
The debtor is not in a position to give title
to any of his former assets as they now vest in his trustee
and should he attempt to dispose of them he would in my view
be unable to give title to them. Nevertheless it is desirable
that if he seeks some indulgence from the court he should
undertake that he will not attempt to deal with any of his
assets pending the outcome of the appeal.
Moreover I can see no reason why the debtor would
be prejudiced if he complies with s.54 of the Act by filing
a statement of his affairs. If the appeal succeeds no harm
will be done from such a statement having been filed. If
it fails, it will relieve him of the obligation of then
filing a statement of affairs.
Accordingly I indicate as follows: that if the
appellant undertakes to prosecute his appeal with expedition
and to apply for an expedited hearing of the appeal, and if
he undertakes that he will not dispose of or attempt to
dispose of any of his assets pending the hearing of the appeal
and if he further undertakes to comply with the requirements
of s.54(1) of the Act by filing a statement of his affairs
within 14 days then I would propose to grant his application
and to order a stay of any further proceedings in the bankruptcy
pending the hearing of the appeal.
In my view as today's application has been
brought about solely by the failure of the debtor to move
for an extension of the stay before the expiration of the
earlie- stay he should pay the petitioning creditor's costs
of this application. I would also propose to reserve
liberty to the petitioning creditor to apply on 24 hours notice
for a rescision of the order which I propose to make in the
event that any undertaking given by the debtor is not
honoured.
The only order I make now is that I grant a stay
of proceedings under the sequestration order up to and
including 17 August. I stand the present application over
until 9.30 a.m. on that date. I will make no further formal
orders at this stage, but I indicate that I will continue
the stay until the hearing of the appeal if the undertakings
to which I have just referred are then given and I will make
formal orders as to costs on 17 August.
I certify that this and the /gur (4)
preceding pages are a true Copy or the
Reasons for Judgment i of his Honour
Mr. Justice Norling. Mf Li,
ciate O
Keso
Dated: /O [8/8 3
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