W & K No 1 Pty Ltd v Great Outdoors Company Ltd [1983] FCA 227
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION No. G148 of 1983
BETWEEN : W. & K. NO. 1 PTY. LIMITED
Applicant
AND: THE GREAT OUTDOORS COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
ORDER
Judge making order: Beaumont, J.
Date of order: 26 July, 1983
Where made: Sydney.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Order that the applicant shall provide within twenty
one days of the date hereof security in the sum of $5,000
by way of bank bond in the form acceptable to the Court for
the goods of the respondent of these proceedings up to the
close of pleadings.
2. Order that these proceedings be stayed until the
provision of the security aforesaid.
3. Direct that the said bond be held in safe custody by
or on behalf of the Registrar of the Court subject to the
further order of this Court.
4. Order that the respondent have liberty to apply
from time to time for further security for its costs of the
proceedings after close of pleadings.
5. Order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs
of the motion for security up to and including today.
6. Order that the motion for security stand over generally
with liberty to the respondent to resolve by leave of the
Court to be applied for on two days' notice to the applicant.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION No. G148 of 1983
BETWEEN : W. & K. NO. 1 PTY. LIMITED
Applicant
AND: THE GREAT OUTDOORS COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM : Beaumont, J.
(ex tempore)
DATED: 21 July, 1983.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made under s.533 of the
Companies Code of New South Wales. Under that provision,
where a corporation 1s a plaintiff in any legal proceedings,
the Court, having jurisdiction in the matter may, 1f it
appears by credible testimony that there 1s reason to believe
that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the
defendant if successful in his defence, require sufficient
security to be given for those costs and make consequential
orders.
The application arises in the context of proceedings
in this Court based, amongst other things, upon alleged
breaches of s.52 and s.53 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974.
The evidence adduced by the respondent in the pro-
ceedings, the applicant in this application, in the first
instance, refers the Court to accounts filed within the
Corporate Affairs Commission in South Australia for the
year ended 30 June, 1982. It appears from those accounts
that the respondent to the application is a trading trust.
So much 1s stated in the directors report accompanying the
accounts. The accounts, therefore, throw little light upon
the ultimate financial position of the company. For example,
it shows as current assets the sum of $60.00, being cash at
bank, and current liabilities are shown as nil. However,
notes to the accounts make it clear that the real activity
of the company is to act as trustee of the Griffith Hospital
Trust and the Griffith Private Hospital Superannuation Fund.
In that respect, the notes to the accounts indicate that the
liabilities of the hospital trust total a sum in excess of
$2.4 million. However, there is a statement at the end of
the notes to the accounts in these terms, and I quote:
"The company as trustee as at 30 June, 1982 had
a right of indemnity against the assets of the
Griffith Hospital Trust which was valued by
the directors in excess of $2,405.404.00."
It thus appears that it was the opinion of the
directors that the right of indemnity would have more than
satisfied the liabilities incurred by the trustee company
in the course of its trading activities.
However, it 1S significant, 1n my opinion, that no
attempt was made on behalf of the respondent to this applic-
ation to call any director of the company, nor, indeed, to
adduce any evidence of its financial position; rather, the
respondent to the application was content to rest with the
position that the accounts, to which I have referred, would
be sought to be tendered. They say in this connection that
initially an objection was taken to that tender on the basis
that there was no proper evidence as to the source of the
material. That objection was later withdrawn after certain
further documents were tendered.
The applicant in the application further relies upon a
telex dated 13 May, 1983 passing from the respondent to the
application to the applicant. In that telex there is a state-
ment in these terms and I quote:
"Due to unexpected acquisition of Boots Camping
Sydney. plus large outlay required, we were not
able to meet year payments in May. These
payments will be made as soon as possible but
not later than 3 August, 1983."
There is a further statement in the telex that "certain
money problems being overcome previously explained". It is
said that these problems were caused by a number of matters
there specified. In my opinion, the telex alone constitutes
evidence upon which I could reasonably form the view that the
respondent to the application will be unable to pay the costs
of the other side 1f successful in its defence.
rs
'
However, the matter does not rest there. Without
going into further detail at this stage, it is sufficient
to say that there is other evidence in the form of conver-
sations that various parties deposed to by Mr. Roberts in
his affidavit sworn 7 July, 1983.
I must say that in the case of two paragraphs, namely,
paragraphs 8 and 9 of that affidavit, I am inclined to the
view that the evidence is of little weight. However, in
paragraph 4 of that affidavit Mr. Roberts deposes to a con-
versation with Mr. Kellie in which Mr. Kellie apparently said
in October last that the business carried on under the name
of Kellie Davis had not made a profit in its trading. :
Mr. Roberts was also informed at the tame that trading
from the hospitals was subsidising the losses of Kellie Davis.
In my opinion, it is significant that the respondent to the
application has made no attempt of any consequence to estab-
lish what its up-to-date financial position is. I am therefore
left in a situation where I must accept the evidence tendered
on behalf of the applicant in the application.
I am therefore of the view that in the words of the
section there is reason to believe that the respondent toa
the application would be unable to pay the costs of its
opponent 1f successful in its defence. I so hold.
| certify that this andthe 3 preceding
Pages are a truce ccxy of '3 reasons for
juagment here:n of
Pre Honcurable
Mr Justice Beaumont Ibetey
Asscciate
Nared D Septem, 1183, -