IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT 'THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE AUSTRALTAN CAPITAL TERRITORY' RE: ORDER JUDGE: Beaumont J. DATE OF ORDER: 14th September 1983 WHERE MADE: Sydney THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Objections to competency upheld. 2. Applications dismissed. No. 106 of 1983 DOUGLAS RONALD DAVIES JANN ELIZABETH DAVIES IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT 'THE STATE OF No. 106 of 1983 NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY' RE: DOUGLAS RONALD DAVIES JANN ELIZABETH DAVIES CORAM: BEAUMONT J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BEAUMONT J. On 22nd April 1983 each of the bankrupts in this matter made application for orders of discharge pursuant to s.150 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966 ("the Act"). Each was made bankrupt on 22nd February 1983. When the matter first came before the Court, the Official Trustee took a preliminary point by way of an objection to the competency of the applications on the qround that they were premature. I have now heard argument on the po2nt and at the conclusion of the argument I indicated that I would uphold the objection but give reasons later in the day. Section 150(1) of the Act provides: "150. (1) A person who becomes, or has before the commencement of this sub-section become, a bankrupt may apply to the Court for an order of discharge at any time after - (a) his public examination has been concluded; (b) the trustee has notified him in writing, that the trustee does nor intend to make an application for nis examination under section 69; or {c) the expiration of the period of 12 months commencing on the date of the bankruptcy." So far as para. (a) of s.150(1) 1s concerned, the public examinations have not been concluded. Examinations were held on 13th April 1983 and then adjourned tiundefinitely. Further examinations were held on 9 September 1983 and adjourned generally. The applicants argued that, as a matter of discretion at least, the Registrar should have concluded the examinations ether yon 13th April 1983 or on 9th September 1983. Section 69(5) of the Act provides: "(5) The Registrar or a magistrate may - (a) at any time adjourn the examination of the bankrupt either to a fixed date or generally; - (b) at any time adjourn the examination of _the bankrupt for further hearing before the Court; or {c)} conclude the examination of the bankrupt." It is clear that the power in fact exercised by the Registrar at the conclusion of both sets of examinations was that conferred by s.69(5)(a). It may conceivably be open to the applicants to persuade the Registrar to exercise his power under s.69(5)(c) at this stage but until, by some process or otherwise, the Registrar in fact concludes the examinations, the: provisions of s.150(1)(a)} have not been satisfied. It is common ground that the provisions of s.150(1)(b) and (c) have not been satisfied in the present case: The argument centred around the provisions of para. (a) thereof. For the reasons I have given, in the absence of an order under s.69(5}(c), the public examinations cannot be regarded as concluded. It follows that the provisions of s.150(1) have therefore not been complied with and the applications are therefore premature. In the circumstances nothing turns in this case upon the distinction adverted to in Re Deane (1947) 14 A.B.C. 122 at p.123, namely whether an application is made upon the filing of the application or at the later date when the bankrupt appears in court and requests an order of discharge. On either test, these applications are premature. I therefore propose to uphold the objection to competency and to dismiss both applications. T cerify that this crd the precedirg pages are a true copy c* 1.2 Yen380ns for Judigment herein cr, 7) 2 [-cnouraple Mr Justice Beaumcnt. Den Ge Associate Dated ]H Yeptarl > Hy?