Berndon Investments Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island (SA) Pty Ltd [1983] FCA 261
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORODS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - interlocutory injunction to restrain
the respondent until the trial of the action from deterring or
preventing the applicant from having access to the jetty ona
resort island for the purpose of disembarking and embarking its
fare-paying passengers - applicant and respondent competitors
ina market - whether control which the respondent 1s asserted
to have with respect to the island jetty and resort could be
characterized as control of a market within s.46(1)(a) and (c) of
the Trade Practices Act - whether a serious question to be
tried - balance of convenience.
Trade Practices Act, s.46
BERNDON INVESTMENTS PTY LTD V. FITZROY ISLAND (S.A.) PTY LTD
(Qld G66 of 1983)
FITZGERALD J.
BRISBANE
6 SEPTEMBER 1983
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD G66 of 1983
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN :
BERNDON INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Applicant
FITZROY ISLAND (S.A.) PTY LIMITED
Respondent
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: PITZGERALD J.
DATE OF ORDER:
WHERE MADE:
6 SEPTEMBEP 19f~
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The interlocutory injunction is refused.
The applicant file and serve an amended statement
of claim on or before 20 September 1983.
The respondent. file and serve an amended defence on
or before 4 October 1983.
The applicant have leave to file and serve a reply
on or before 11 October 1983.
The further hearing of the application for
directions be adjourned to 9.15a.m. on Tuesday 18
October 1983.
The applicant to pay to the respondent the costs of
the proceedings on 5 and 6 September 1983.
The costs of the proceedings on 30 August 1983 be
costs in the cause.
IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD G66 of 1983
GENERAL DIVISTON )
BETWEEN :
BERNDON INVESTMENTS PLY LTD
Applicant
AND:
FITZROY ISLAND (S.A.) PTY LIMITED
Respondent
FITZGERALD J. . 6 SEPTEMBER 1983
EXTEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The business of each of the applicant and the respondent
includes day cruises from Cairns to and from nearby islands and
other locations in or near the Barrier Reef, and the hire of
equipment, including snorkelling equipment, to crulse passengers.
From about September 1982 to the end of July 1983, one of the
cruises conducted by the applicant, using a vessel which to ovr
now named the M.V. "Green Islander", included both [itere? To olond
and Green Island, with equal time spent at each. Vh. auppbie ant .
vessel would leave Cairns and call at Fitzroy Island in the
morning when the passengers would disembark. Then, at about
12.30pm, the applicant's vessel would again call at Fitzroy
Island and collect the passengers and take them to Green Island.
The passengers would not lunch at Fitzroy Island. Later the
passengers would be taken back to Cairns.
Part of the respondent's business also consists of day
trips from Cairns to Fitzroy Island, Green Island and return.
Since about April this year, the applicant and the
respondent were the only operators of such day trips to both
Fitzroy Island and Green Island. It is sufficiently established
for the present interlocutory purposes that such trips
constituted a significant part of the business of each.
The respondent conducts the only tourist resort on
Fitzroy Island, which is a coastal island near the Great Rarrter
Reef off Cairns. It is not necessary for present purposes to
distinguish between the respondent and its related corporations.
There are other islands close to Cairns which it has not yet heen
shown are not broadly comparable to Fitzroy Island in the
attractions which they possess, including Double Island and
Michaelmas Cay, neither of which has a resort upon it, and Green
Island, upon which there is a resort conducted by a stranger to
this litigation.
The respondent has constructed a jetty under licence on
Crown land, including the sea-bed, near its resort on Fitzroy
Island. The seaward end of the jetty extends beyond low water
mark and the landward end, which is above high water mark,
terminates on or near an esplanade which is also Crown land
located alongside the respondent's resort. There is evidence
upon which it is appropriate for me to act for present purposes
that the use of the jetty is important, although perhaps not
shrictly essential, Lo a business of conducting teu fe oat:
Island and landing passengers there, whether to go fo the
respondent's resort or otherwise to experience the island's
attractions.
These proceedings have been conducted to date on the
basis that the respondent is able to control access to and use of
the jetty and its resort on Fitzroy Island.
By letter dated 25 June 1983, the respondent wrote to
the applicant as follows:
"Dear Sirs,
Further to our letters of 24th September, 1982
(copy enclosed) and 20th March, 1983, I wish
to advise the following.
Permission was given to your company by The
Fitzroy Island Trust subject to certain
conditions that could be terminated or varied
if the Trust considered the arrangement of
your Two Island Cruise detrimental to our
operation. One month's notice was required
according to our original letter, which means
the following applies as from ist August.
1. Berthing times to come alongside our
private jetty at Fitzroy Island between
9.45 am and 10.00 am to put down
passengers and to pick up same between
1.00 pm and 1.15 pm. These are the only
times your vessel can use the jetty.
2. A jetty fee of $5.00 per person (adult or
child) will apply for all passengers
arriving on Fitzroy Island, payable
within 7 days of each month.
3. All passengers travelling on your vessels
will be advised that lunch is to be
partaken on Fitzroy Island. You will not
sell inclusive tickets to your passengers
and all tours carried will be sold a
lunch in our restaurant - tours luncheons
$7.00 nett per person. Restaurant open
to the public $8.00 adults, $4.00
children.
4. Your passengers cannot bring ashore Hire
Gear, i.e. only personal snorkelling
equipment to he carried by your guests.
5. We will give you permission to sell our
Glass-bottom boat rides and pay you 15
per cent commission for this privilege -
times 10.30 am, 11.30 am and 12.30 pm.
We will issue you with tickets for same -
you may not pre-sell Glass-bottom boat
rides on Green Island.
The fureqoing arrangement may be terminat+:| or
varied at anv time by The Fitzroy Istend 'lr. |
if they consider That it 15 detrimental Lu Lin
total operation. One month*s notice will be
given of any intended variation.
If you accept the conditions, please notify
the Trust, in writing, by 7th July 1983.
If we do not receive your acceptance by that
date we will know that you will no longer be
bringing customers to Fitzroy Tsland and will
be discontinuing the Two Island Cruise.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd) G. Wales
THE FITZROY TSLAND TRUST"
It is unnecessary to cefer in detail to other
communications exchanged hetween the parties. TL ais not in
dispute that the applicant did not accept the terms of the offer
contained in the letter dated 25 June 1983 and that the
respondent. accordingly refuses to permit the applicant to
disembark passengers from its vessel at the Fitzroy Tsland jetty
in order to use that jetty to go ashore at Fitzroy Island. The
applicant no longer conducts day tours both to Fitzroy Island and
to Green Island, although it continues to conduct tours to Green
Island.
The applicant took no step prior to 31 July 1983 when
its previous "rights" in respect of the Fitzroy Island jetty
disappeared. However, some weeks later, on 25 August 1983, Ehe
applicant commenced these proceedings against the respondent
claiming injunctive relief and damages, alleging a
contravention of section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the
Act"). According to the applicant, its loss is the diminution in
revenue which it is receiving by reason of not conducting day
tours to or including Fitzroy Island, notwithstanding as I have
stated that it is able to conduct other tours, including tours to
Green Island. The evidence suggests that the current months
constitute the height of the relevant tourist season.
Presently before me is an application by the applicant
for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent until
the trial of the action from deterring or preventing ine
applicant from having access to the jetty at Fitzroy (slared for
the purpose at disembarking and embarking ats tare re tes
passengers.
According to the recent statement of Gibbs C.J. in
Australian Coarse Grain Pool Pty Ltd v. Barley Marketing Board
(Qld) £19833 57 A.L.J.R. 425; £19837 A.L.M.D. 1944, it is
necessary for the applicant to establish at least that there is a
serious
whether
question to be tried. If that is established, then
or not an interlocutory injunction should be
depends upon the balance of convenience.
yranted
The applicant relies upon paras. 46(1)(a) and (c) of the
Act which provide, so far as presently material:
"A corporation that is in a position
substantially to control a market for .
services shall not take advantage of the power
in relation to that market that it has by
virtue of being in that position for the
purpose of -
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a
person, being a competitor in that market
or in any other market of the corporation
or of a body corporate related to the
corporation;
(b) ... or
(c) deterring or preventing a person from
engaging in competitive conduct in that
market or any other market.
(See also sub-sections (2) and (4) of s.46.)
By sub-s. 4(1) of the Act, unless the contrary
appears -
"'Services' includes any rights (including
rights in relation to, and interest in, real
or personal property), benefits, privileges or
facilities that are, or are to be, provided
granted or conferred in trade or commerce, and
without limiting the qenerality of the
foregoing, includes the rights, benefits,
privileges, or facilities that are, or are to
be provided, granted or conferred under ~-
intention
(a) a contract for or in relation to -
(1)
(iL) the provision of, or of the use
of enjoyment of facilities for,
amusement, entertainment,
recreation or instruction; or
Section 4E of the Act provides:
"For the purposes of this Act, "market" means
a market in Australia and, when used in
relation to... services, includes a market
for those ... services and other ... services
that are substitutable for, or otherwise
competitive with, the firstmentioned ...
services."
By sub-s. 4F(b) a person is deemed to have engaged or to
engage in conduct for a particular purpose if that purpose tus
one of the purposes and was a substantial purpose.
It is sufficiently established for present . ue po: rat
the applicant and the respondent are and at all material iimes
were competitors in a market in Australia within the meaning of
the Act. It would also be appropriate for present purposes to
conclude that the applicant has established that there is a
serious question to be tried as to whether or not a substantial
purpose of the conduct of the respondent was either to eliminate
or substantially damage the applicant or to deter or prevent the
applicant from engaging in competitive conduct.
As the evidence stands, and considering the
interlocutory nature of the present application, the conditions
set out in the letter of 25 June 1983 from the respondent te the
applicant, apart from condition 2, can safely be oiored, ' hh
not think that it is seriously asserted for the uy hican flo,
L£ it cannot succeed by reference to condition 2, 1st can
otherwise succeed. Some of the other conditions, for example,
concerning timing of jetty use and the condition with respect to
the lunches, may go more to the applicant's convenience than to
its competitiveness although no doubt the two are not entirely
discrete, and it may be accepted for the moment that some of the
other conditions, if implemented, would diminish the attraction
of the applicant's tours.
Be that as it may, the issue is sufficiently raised for
present purposes that the demanded payment will either make the
applicant's day tours to Fitzroy Island and Green Island
unprofitable if the charge is not passed on to passengers, and
uncompetitive if it is. T do not mean by those comments to
suggest that the respondent's insistence upon a charge of $5 per
passenger for the use of the jetty or for access to the resorts
may not bear a quite different complexion when investigated more
fully at the trial. There may well be other aspects of the
charge to be considered including the cost to the respondent of
constructing, operating, and maintaining the jetty and the
resort. Whatever may be the situation at the trial, this is not
however the occasion for a cost benefit analysis in respect of
the position of either party.
In addition to what has thus far been mentioned, in
order to succeed the applicant must also show that there 13 a
serious question to be tried concerning its allegation ther the
respondent is in a position to substantially contrel a marbot and
that, by the conduct complained of, the respondent ha !eon
advantage of that power in relation to that market for the above
described purposes or one of them. In the application, the
market is described as the "market for transporting persons by
boat, ship or other sea-going vessels from the City of Cairns or
Green Island to Fitzroy Tsland and back in the State of
Queensland".
In the submissions before me counsel for the applicant
also founded upon the proposition that trips to, or including
Fitzroy Island, constituted a separate market.
It is by no means clear to me that the control which the
respondent is asserted to have with respect to the Fitzroy Island
jetty and resort could properly be characterized as control of
such a market, if one exists, but it 15 umnecessary to pursue
that question.
Even assuming in favour of the applicant that trips
commencing and terminating in Cairns or nearby locations ought to
be considered a separate market, in my opinion there is wholly
insufficient evidence, including details of the various islands
and resorts accessible from Cairns or other nearby commencing
points, and the various businesses conducted, tours offered,
10.
services provided, charges made, etc. to permit a conclusion that
there is a still further separate sub-market relating to or
including Fitzroy Island and, in effect, centred upon tours to
that island.
It is tnappropriate to say more, particularly sin: 7 1
likely to be the trial judge. J have an open mind as fo wn bo omie
emerge. The evidence at this point is understandably less than
complete and the evidence at the trial could well present a
different picture after additional witnesses are called and
examined. I can only decide the present application by reference
to the evidence as it now stands. For immediate purposes, I have
generally assumed in favour of the applicant that the material
relied on by it is correct and have not resolved any disputed
question of credibility.
It is possible to formulate hypothetically a number of
possible markets which might theoretically be controlled by the
respondent, given that its control of the jetty and the resort at
Fitzroy Island is properly to be considered market control. It
does not follow that there is in fact any market which the
respondent does control, and it is insufficient for the applicant
simply to assert, without sufficiently detailed proof to permit a
conclusion to be formed otherwise than by speculation, that there
is a separate market related to Fitzroy Island. Such a
conclusion, even at a prima facie level, would not be warranted
11.
in the absence of considerable evidence concerning at least the
various locations to which day trips are or might be able to be
taken from Cairns and the various businesses which do in fact
operate such trips with details, including details of prices etc.
Evidence that conduct has both an anti-competitive
purpose and effect does not of itself attract the operation of
s.46 of the Act, even if the result is to eliminate a competitor
from the market. Section 46 only operates when the conduct is
performed by a corporation that is in a position substantially to
control a market in the exercise of that power.
The inadequacy of the evidence to support the
applicant's case that there is a market which the respondent is
substantially in a position to control, and that the respondent
has taken advantage of that power, is emphasized by the
difficulty which exists in the absence of suitable detail in
formulating an injunction in appropriate terms to restrain the
conduct alleged to constitute a contravention of sub-,. 4° |:
The assumption which underlies the applicant's case is
that the respondent has the right to control the jetty and the
resort on Fitzoy Island, subject at least to the Act. The
applicant accepted and still does not deny, as I. understand
submissions made on its behalf, the right of the respondent to
control the jetty and resort and to impose appropriate terms on
12.
those seeking to use them. No doubt, in an appropriate case, the
Court could fix terms as a condition of the Injunction, but I do
not feel that the material in this case is sufficient to permit
that to be done.
Nor, subject to one possible qualification, does the
applicant show any sufficient balance of convenience in its
favour. The trial can be held in the reasonably mar Culture ie
if 15 correct in its assertions, 1t may well have an ented) vent
to damages under s.82 of the Act. The respondent on the evidence
has the capacity to pay any such damages.
There will be no greater and possibly considerably less
difficulty in quantifying the applicant's damages under s.82, if
it is entitled to damages, then there would be in quantifying the
respondent's damages under an undertaking from the applicant, and
the applicant's financial capacity to pay seems less certain than
that of the respondent.
The one matter of concern which I have felt is that the
respondent may not have the asserted right to control access to
the jetty and the resort on Fitzroy Island and that the
applicant may have no cause of action for damages even if it can
obtain an injunction for the future at the trial on some other
basis. However, in the end I have attached little weight to that
Du isas
ty ba
eS
consideration. The applicant presently places its claim on no
basis other than s.46 of the Act, and indeed, itself asserts as a
foundation for that claim that the respondent does have the
necessary control. For the reasons I have given therefore the
interlocutory injunction is refused.
I certify thai thes ar | the /Z tore
Feges ure a tue caps of the reaane tt
judyment herein cf Tlie Float
Mr Justice Fitzgerald
Seek LeDerwor, Acc
Dated 3 Octater, /?F?
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