Hellyer Drilling Company v MacDonald Hamilton & Company Pty Ltd [1983] FCA 283
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
TRADE PRACTICES ~ statements made by respondent concerning a
drilling rig's capacity material to applicant's decision as to
the rig's suitability - applicant caused a company to purchase
the rig from the respondent - applicant leased the rig from the
company - certain statements inaccurate and in the circumstances
were misleading or decestive when made (sub-s. 52(1) of the Trade
Practices Act) - claim under s 82 of the Act to recover loss or
damage suffered - claim for damages for alleqed breach of
contract - assegsment ot damages under s.82 of the Act.
Trade Practices Act, ss. 52(1), 53fa) and (c), 82
HELLYER DRILLING COMPANY v. MACDONALD HAMILTON & CO PTY LIMITED
Qld No. G37 of 1981
FITZGERALD 3.
BRISBANE
13 OCTOBER 1983
IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Qld G37 of 1981
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN :
HELLYER DRILLING COMPANY
Applicant
AND:
MACDONALD HAMILTON & CO PTY LIMITED
Respondent
ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: FITZGERALD J.
DATE OF ORDER: 13 OCTOBER 1983
WHERE MADE: BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. There be judgment for the applicant
against the respondent for $36,000.00.
IN THE FEDERAL COUPT OF AUSTRALIA)
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY )
GENERAL DIVISION )
OLD NO. G37 OF 1981
BETWEEN :
HELLYER DRILLING COMPANY
APPLICANT
AND:
MACDONALD HAMILTON & CQ PTY LIMITED
DEFENDANT
FITZGERALD J. 13 OCTOBER 1983
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant claims under s.82 of the Trade Practices
Act 1974 ("the Act") to recover loss or damage allegedly suffered
by conduct of the respondent in contravention of ss. 52(1), 53(a)
and 53(c) of the Act. Damages are also sought for alleged breach
of contract. Interest is aiso claimed.
The applicant, which is a firm consisting of two
companies controlled by Arthur Patrick Hellyer, carries on
business in Australia as a drilling contractor. The respondent
is a corporation within the meaning of the Act and carries on
business in Australia as a supplier of drilling rigs and
equipment under the name Seismic Supply International. The
respondent is the agent in Australia for the distribution of
Midway rotary drillina rios and equipment manufactured by Midway
Manufacturing and Suppiy Inc. of Odessa, Texas, U.S.A.
In 1980, the applicant's business consisted principally
of coal exploration drilling but also included exploration
drilling for other minerals and for water, and water bore
drilling. In August or September 1980, the applicant had
obtained a quote from the respondent for the supply of a Midway
LOM drilling rig but had not purchased the rig. In late
September 1980, a drilling rig owned by the applicant, a Bourne
1000R drilling rig, was destroyed by fire. At that time, a large
amount of work was available in the drilling industry and
suitable equipment was 1n heavy demand. The applicant required
another drilling vig urgently. There was no suitable and
suitably priced drilling rig available in Australia within an
acceptable period. However, a Midway 13M drilling rig was in
transit by sea to the respondent from the United States of
America.
A Midway 13M drilling rig consists of items manufactured
by Midway Manufacturing and Supply Inc., such as the frame, the
mast, the rotary table, the draw works, and the chain case, and
components made by other specialist manufacturers, for example,
the compressor, the mud pump, and the clutches. Such drilling
rigs are truck mounted for exploration drilling. The truck both
is the vehicle for transportaticn of the rig and provides power
for the operation of the r1g and associated equipment. Powex
passes from the truck engine through the truck gearbox into a
power take-off unit when the truck is stationary. A Midway 13M
drilling rig 1s larger and more expensive than either a Midway
10M or a Bourne 1000R, which arc of broadly comparable size and
drilling capacity.
On Friday 31 October 1980, Mr Hellyer telephoned the
business premises of the respondent and spoke first with Mr Allan
Davies, the respondent's Brisbane sales manager, and then with Mr
James Melville Cronshaw, the Brisbane sales representative of the
respondent who was responsible for sales of Midway drilling rigs.
In the course of that telephone conversation, Mr Hellyer
ascertained that the Midway 13M drilling rig which was soon to
arrive in Australia was available for sale. Mr Hellyer informed
Mr Cronshaw that he contemplated that, if he purchased the rig,
it would be mounted on a new Mack truck of a type which he
described to Mr Cronshaw. Mr Hellyer was informed by Mr Cronshaw
that the price of the Midway 13M drilling rig, unmounted, was
$212,950.00. Later, the price was increased to $225,000 to
include a quantity of drilling pipe which the applicant wished
included in the transaction to enable it to obtain finance ina
greater amount.
There is some dispute between Mr Hellyer and Mr Cronshaw
concerning the telephone conversation between them on 31 October
1980 but I do not consider that it is necessary to attempt to
resolve the detail of that conflict. It was not in contest that
Mr Hellyer asked questions concerning the Midway 13M drilling rig
which were answered by Mr Cronshaw. Mr Hellyer said that "he was
very careful to make specific enquiries of the specifications of
the 13M", but he also says that the "telephone conversation was a
very general one". Mr Cronshaw said that "1t was only a basic
conversation and his enquiries were not specifically directed".
He also said that the only details which he provided to Mr
oo
Hellyer were provided by reference to "Midway literature". In
any event, Mr Hellyer acknowledged that he was aware that Mr
Cronshaw had no drilling qualifications or experience and that he
was unwilling to make a decision to purchase until he had visited
the respondent's office and had gone over the specifications for
the Midway 13M drilling rig with Mr Cronshaw.
There 1S also some conflict between Mr Hellyer and Mr
Cronshaw concerning the exact order of events subsequent to the
telephone conversation of 31 October 1980, but many of the major
points are not in dispute. Tam satisfied that the applicants
paid a "holding deposit of $5000" in order to ensure that it had
a right of first refusal of the drilling rig until Mr Hellyer had
a chance to visit the respondent's office and make a decision
after considering the rig''s specifications. The respondent
furnished the applicant with a letter dated 31 October 1980,
accompanied by documentation which contained information relative
to the rig and associated equipment including specifications with
respect to various component items. The letter and accompanying
documentation is Exhibit 1 ain these proceedings. Statements
contained in the documentation were discussed at a meeting in the
Brishane City Office of the respondent in November 1980 between
Mr Cronshaw, Mr Hellyer and one Stephen Robert Reynolds, an
experienced driller who worked for the applicant on a
sub-contract basis and who was to operate the Midway 13M drilling
vig if it was purchased by the applicant. Mr Reynolds had not
previously operated a Midway 13M drilling rig.
Subsequent to Mr Hellyer reading Exhibit 1 and the
discussion at the respondent's office between Messrs. Hellyer,
Reynolds and Cronshaw, the applicant caused United Dominions
Corporation Ltd to purchase the Midway 13M drilling rig from the
respondent and also to purchase a Mack R Model CAR 493 truck. By
an agreement dated 12 December 1980, United Dominions Corporation
Ltd leased the drilling rig and truck to the applicant fora
period of 60 months. The lease required an initial deposit of
$6,710.09 and 59 instalments, each of that same amount, payable
monthly on the 12th of each month. The residual value fixed by
the lease was $59,000. The lease required the applicant as
lessee to insure the drilling rig and the truck. The drilling
rig was mounted on the truck at an engineering works in Toowoomba
and the applicant took delivery of the drilling rig mounted on
the truck in mid-December 1980.
I am satisifed that Mr Hellyer, who made all relevant
decisions for the applicant, relied upon, and only upon,
statements in Exhibit 1 and made orally by Mr Cronshaw to the
effect that:
(i) the compressor, on application of the
power produced by the Mack truck which
was to be purchased, would produce air at
a pressure of 250 p.s.i. at a volume of
510 cubic feet per minute.
(ii) the drawworks had a maximum single line
pull of 10,000 lbs and the Wichita ATD
211 Air Clutches with which the drawworks
were equipped were rated for that
performance;
(iii)the mast of the rig had a static capacity
of 45,000 lbs;
(iv) the drilling rig was designed and
engineered for drilling depths up to
2,000 feet using two and three eighth
inch drill pipe. (Hellyer also knew that
the depths te which drilling is possible
depends upon drilling conditions and
reduces with increased pipe diameter.
Exhibit 1 shows a reduced drilling depth
of 1300 feet for 2-7/8 drill pipe in
favourable conditions. I do not accept
that there was a further statement upon
which Hellyer relied that the drilling
rig had the capacity to drill at least to
a depth of 1500 ft.
Each of these statements was material to a decision as to the
drilling rig's suitability for the purpose for which it was
required by the applicant and was intended to be and was a
relevant factor which formed an integral part of the applicant's
decision to proceed with the acquisition of the rig and truck and
to enter into the transactions which it did, by which it
committed itself to various expenditures and obligations. Each
of the statements was a statement of existing fact. Further, the
fact that all or some of the statements were also made in the
"Midway literature" by the manufacturer of the drilling rig or
the respective manufacturers of component parts by no means
supports the conclusion in this case that the statements were not
also made by the respondent. The respondent did not simply put
such statements forward as statements by the manufacturers but,
by the statements and conduct of Mr Cronshaw and the use of its
own documentation in conjunction with the "Midway literature",
itself adopted them and made them a basis for its dealings with
the applicant. Aqain, 1n this case, it 1s appropriate to
conclude, as I do, that the statements were not merely related to
Midway 13M drilling rigs generally but extended in particular in
the individual drilling rig which was on route to Australia at
the time of the discussions between the parties and which was
identified as the subject of those discussions and became the
subject of the presently material transactions, or at least a
Midway 13M drilling rig comprising the particular components
contained in that rig. Not all Midway 13M drilling riqs are
identical in all respects and the rig in question was an
individual rig which included optional corponents which had been
selected by the respondent.
It does not of course follow that subsequent events
showed that the statements were inaccurate although, 1f they
were, I am satisfied that 1t follows in the circumstances of this
case that they were misleading or deceptive when made. I have
expressed the matter thus by reference to sub-s. 52(1) of the Act
because, in the circumstances of this case, nothing has emerged
to suggest that the applicant might succeed under sub-s. 53(a) or
sub-s. 53(c) of the Act if it cannot succeed under sub-s. 52(1),
although 1t vas conceded by the respondent that all three
sub-sections were capable of applying.
The applicant aiso asserted a cause of action for
damages for breach of contract The respondent disputed that
there was any contract between the parties, relying upon J.J.
Savage and Sons Ptv. Ltd v. Blakzney (1970) 119 C.L.R. 435, and
Ross v. Allis-Chalmers Australia Pty Ltd (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 8.
The respondent seems to me probably correct so far as concerns
the basis upon which the applicant claims damages for breach of
contract as pleaded in paragraph 6B of the final version of the
Statement of Clain, namely,, that, by exhibit 1 and the
conversation between Messrs Hellyer and Reynolds' and Cronshaw,
the applicant and the respondent entered into a collateral
agreement whereby, in consideration of the statements made by the
respondent orally by Mr Cronshaw and in Exhibit 1, "the applicant
would arrange to have the purchase of the said rig and certain
drilling pipe financed by a leasing company and the amount of
$225,000 being the price of the rig and the said drilling pipe
paid to the respondent". The applicant alternatively alleged, in
paragraph 6A of its Statement of Claim, that there was an
agreement entered into in terms of Exhibit 1 and the conversation
between Messrs Hellyer and Reynolds and Cronshaw "that the
respondent would, for the sum of Two hundred and twelve thousand,
nine hundred and fifty dollars ($212,950.00) supply a Midway
Model 13M drilling rig to be mounted on a truck to be supplied by
the applicant". It seems to me that, if any such agreement had
been entered into, 1t would have been superseded by the
subsequent transaction involving the acquisition of the drilling
rig by United Dominions Corporations Limited and the lease by
that company of the rig to the applicant, and accordingly was
never carried into effect: cf. Beaton v. Moore Acceptance
Corporation Pty Ltd (1960) 104 C.L.R. 107, 118.
In any event, I am content to approach the matter on the
basis that there was no contract between the parties. Such an
approach involves no disadvantage to the applicant. In the
circumstances of this case, the applicant would need to prove
precisely the same matters to establish either a breach of
contract, if one existed, or a contravention of the Act, and no
alleged loss claimed by the applicant would be recoverable as
damages for breach cf contract, if a contract existed and was
breached by the respondent, which is not recoverable under the
Act if a contravention is established. Further, the absence of
any contractual force in the statements made by the respondent
seems to me, in this case at least, an essential ingredient of
any assertion by the applicant that such statements constituted
misleading or deceptive conduct or false representations: cf.
Gates v. The City Mutual Life Insurance Society Limited (1983) 5
T.P.R. 1.
A summary of the alleged departures from the statements
which I have held caused the applicant to acquire the drilling
vig, is as follows:
(i) The compressor could not deliver air
pressure of 250 p.s.i. and the volume
of 510 cubic feet per minute. The
clutches in the compressor drive train
could only transmit 100 brake horse
power and not the 156 brake horse power
required. The clutches overheated, the
adrive-belts from the drive train to the
compressor slipped and burnt, and the
bearings adjacent to the clutches and
the drive belts overheated.
(ii) The draw works did not have a maximum
single line pull of 10,000 lbs. The
clutches in the draw works were
incapable of delivering the required
power to the draw works and slipped and
burnt out under operational load. The
power transmitted in the draw works
through 1ts clutches to the winch drum
permitted no more than a maximim single
line pull of the order of 3850-3900
lbs.
(111i) The mast of the rig did not have a
static capacity of 45,000 lbs. Under
loads of much less than 45,000 lbs. the
mast would twist to such an extent that
it became difficult and dangerous to
operate. The static capacity of the
mast was 10,000 lbs.
nee ee =e — Nee ere WRNTEL CLT TW CTE ti Ss ment Ween
10.
(iv) The rig was incapable of drilling to
2,000 ft. The air pressure from the
compressor was insufficient to clear
material effectively from such a drill
hole. The draw works could not pull
out drilling pipe which was in the
ground more than 300 ft. by a single
line pull or more than 940 ft. bya
triple line pull.
It is convenient to state immediately that there was no
evidence on which I am prepared to rely that the mast of the rig
did not have a static capacity of 45,000 lbs. That disposes of
paragraph (111) supra. Paragraph (iv) also requires no further
reference. It is related to and dependent upon paragraphs (i)
and (ii), rather than a separate matter of complaint.
As has already been mentioned, the applicant purchased
the Midway 13M drilling rig to replace a Bourne 1000R drilling
rig which had been destroyed by fire. Bourne drilling rigs are
manufactured and supplied by a local company ("Bourne
Engineering"), controlled by a gentleman of the same name. The
applicant has had a long standing business relationship with
Bourne Engineering and Mr Hellyer and Mr Bourne have known each
other for quite some years.
The connection between Mr Hellyer and Mr Bourne, and
their respective personalities, played a highly significant role
in the events which have led to this expensive, protracted and
complex litigation. Mr Hellyer was afforded less than
satisfactory treatment by the respondent when problems with the
drilling rig were encountered virtually immediately after the
applicant received 1t, and he had justification for
disappointment and annoyance. However, he would have been
difficult to satisfy. He 1s intransigent and given to
exaggeration. Within a little more than a month the parties were
in serious dispute, not without fault on both sides. Mr Hellyer
then turned to Mr Bourne, who seems to have built up a successful
engineering business despite formal qualification only as a
fitter and turner. Mr Bourne appeared to be strongly opinionated
and anstinctively critical of drilling rigs which possess
features different from those in his own company's range. This
attitude greatly influenced the course which was followed in the
repair and modification of the rigq. Another major factor was
also important. The represented capacity of the Midway 13M
drilling rig was 1n excess of the applicant's real needs; the
work for which the applicant required the drilling rig was work
for which arig of the rated capacity of a Bourne 1000R ora
Midway 10M was quite adequate. Finally, of course, the
respondent and Bourne Engineering were business rivals, and the
applicant and the respondent were completely at odds. The
respondent was, accordingly, completely ignored in the steps
which were taken.
After Mr Reynolds collected the Midway 13M drilling rig
from the respondent on 11 December 1980, he took it to Bourne
Engineering where he was to collect further equipment before
proceeding to Wandoan to undertake coal test drilling. Mr
Reynolds gave the drilling rig a "quick run in" while at the
Bourne Engineering premises. His evidence was that he noticed
12.
the drive belts slipped and smoked but, although he thought that
was unusual, he assumed that the belts were loose. Mr Bourne
gave evidence that he gave the rig a cursory inspection on that
occasion, but could not remember it being operated.
Mr Reynolds took the rig to Wandoan where it was used
from 14-17 December 1980. Problems were experienced. The
compressor forming part of the rig, another American product, a
two-stage Le Roi 256SDSB compressor, did not produce the pressure
which had been stated. Further, once drilling reached a depth of
about 70 meters, the belts in the compressor drive train slipped
and screeched and the belt drive and the bearings and the
clutches in the compressor drive train overheated, smoked, and
smelt.
On 18 December 1980, the rig was brought back to
Brisbane. Some modifications and relatively minor repairs were
performed by H.M.G. Engineering. In addition, Mr Cronshaw
arranged for a Mr Hopper of "Allair", a compressor specialist, to
travel to H.M.G. Engineering to inspect the compressor and to
advise what ought be done. When Mr Hopper removed the high
pressure inlet valves in the compressor, small pieces of welding
wire were discovered. The complete unit, including the truck,
the riq and the compressor, was then removed to Allair's
workshop. Mr Bourne was the iocal representative for Le Roi
compressors, but he was not consulted.
Mr Hopper gave evidence that he ascertained that the
welding wire had damaged valve plates in the compressor and also
had marked, but in his opinion not significantly damaged, the top
of a piston. According to Mr Hopper, all necessary repairs were
effected and full working tests were carried out, which showed
that the compressor was fully operational at 50 p.s.i. in the low
stage and 250 p.s.i. in the high stage. The unloader valves were
then adjusted to ensure that the compressor did not exceed 230
p.s.i. in the high stage. No adequate explanation was offered as
to why that was done. I do not accept that the compressor was
adequately repaired on that occasion by Mr Hopper, nor do [I
accept Mr Hopper''s evidence that 1t was apparent to him that Mr
Reynolds was not familiar with the correct procedure for
operating the compressor.
The drilling rig was re-delivered to the applicant on 20
December 1980, and taken by Mr Reynolds to Toowoomba where an
incomplete modification was completed on about 23 December.
After a single water bore was drilled in Toowoomba, the
drilling rig was taken to Maryvale to drill more water bores.
Again the rig did not perform satisfactorily. The drive shaft
and the drive shaft cover were modified. Although the compressor
did achieve up to 250 p.s.i., the belts in the compressor drive
slipped and smoked and became damaged and worn, and the bearings
an the compressor drive train became very hot. Evidence for the
applicant suggested that, while the rig was at Maryvale, the
single line pull from the draw works was inadequate and less than
had been stated prior to the acquisition of the rig, but I am
14.
satisfied that at that, time, the applicant's concern did not
relate to the draw works but to the compressor and the compressor
drive train.
The drilling rig was returned to the respondent on 10
January 1981 and, oni12 January 1981, Mr Cronshaw directed
another of the respondent's employees, Mr Cilento, to inspect the
rig and to perform any necessary repairs. Mr Cilento satisfied
himself that there was no substance to the applicant's concern
that the compressor drive bearings had been damaged but
considered that other problems did exist. Mr Reynolds had been
using a large amount of grease in the compressor drive bearings,
but I do not accept that he caused or contributed to the problem.
The compressor had not been rendered defect free by Mr Hopper
earlier, in December 1980.
Under Mr Cilento's supervision, the compressor under
drive was removed, anew seai was fitted, and the compressor
under drive was reassembled. Other incidental work was also
performed. After the belt drives were tensioned, Mr Cilento ran
the compressor. Because of what occurred during the testing, he
found it necessary to adjust the low stage (50 p.s.i.) unloader
valve. He alsa adjusted the high stage (250 p.s.i.) unloader
valve to about "240, 245 because at that stage it was fluctuating
a little and was going over the 250 ...".
Mr Hopper attended at the respondent's premises on 12
January 1981. He gave evidence that there appeared to be nothing
wrong with the compressor on his inspection. However, I am
satisfied that new valves were known to be required and that both
applicant and respondent also knew that the compressor ought not
be operating until that had been done. Parts were ordered by the
respondent from the United States of America but, after 3 or 4
days, the rig with the compressor on board was taken from the
respondent's premises by the applicant. Because the compressor
was inoperable, an auxiliary compressor from another of the
applicant's rigs was taken to Maryvale and the rig with the
auxiliary compressor was used on 20 January 1981. More problems
were experienced and the riq was returned to Brisbane and taken
to the respondent's premises again an 27 January 1981.
Within the next few days, the compressor was removed
from the rig and transferred to Allair's premises and the rig was
taken to an equipment parking yard at Rocklea, Brisbane.
According to Mr Reynolds, the applicant did not have a spare
auxiliary air compressor ta use with the rig. Further, by then,
the applicant either had purchased 4 Bourne 1000R drilling rig or
had its damaged Bourne i1000R driiling rig repaired and the Bourne
1000R was taken to Wandoan to drill. Mr Hellyer sought to trade
the Le Rol compressor on the M:dway 13M rig in ona smaller Le
Roi compressor which would provide 125 p.s.i. but the respondent
refused to do so.
16.
There was delay in the necessary parts being obtained
from America and the compressor was not available for collection
by the applicant from Allair until 6 February 1981. According to
Allair's records, 41 hours of work had been dane onit anda
number of parts had been replaced. It had been tested, but not
beyond 120-150 p.s.1. because ait was not mounted on the drilling
rig.
By the time Mr Cronshaw notified the applicant that the
compressor was again ready for collection from Allair on or about
6 February 1981, contentious correspondence was being exchanged.
It was not until 11 March 1981 that the compressor was collected
from the respondent's premises by a representative of the
applicant's solicitors. The compressor was then taken to Bourne
Engineering to be remounted on the truck and, so it is said by
the applicant, "for inspection to ascertain, if possible, why the
compressor and draw works and other components were either not
operating properly or not operating at all". Ido not accept
that assertion. I find that, at that time, apart from a litany
of presently immaterial complaints, some relatively minor and
some unjustified, the focus of the applicant's concern was the
compressor and the compressor drive train.
By 11 March 1981, the compressor had not been used with
the rig for more than 2 or 3 weeks in total. I am satisfied that
the compressor which was supplied to the applicant by the
respondent as part of the Midway 13M drilling rig was faulty and
did not accord with the statements which had been made to the
applicant by the respondent and upon which the applicant relied,
17.
as IT have earlier indicated. However, I also find that, by the
time the applicant's solicitors collected the compressor on 11
March 1981 and delivered it to Bourne Engineering, the compressor
had been repaired. It was only thereafter that it really came to
be considered that the compressor might not be the only major
problen.
Once the compressor was collected and taken to Bourne
Engineering, it was remounted on the rig and tested using the
compressor drive belts which were on the rid. When the
compressor was cold, a maximum pressure of 220 p.s.1. was
initially achieved in the hich pressure stage. But, when the
compressor had heen operating for approximately 15 minutes, the
belts and clutches beqan to slip, smoke and a distinct smell of
burning rubber and asbestos clutch material was emitted from the
compressor drive train, a cumbling sound emitted from the bearing
housing, and, shortly after the sound commenced, sparks began to
fly out of the housing. Mr Bourne's opinion was that the
bearings adjacent to the belt drive were overheating due to the
load which it was necessary to place upon it in order to provide
the power required to the compressor. By then, the compressor
was in working order and capable of operating satisfactorily to
produce 250 p.s.i. The problem was not in the compressor but in
the compressor drive train, which was inadequate to transmit the
power required for the compressor to produce 250 p.s.i.
18.
I accept that new clutches were required if the existing
drive system was to be utilized, irrespective of whether a
two-stage Le Roi compressor supplying 250 p.s.i. or one supplying
a lesser pressure was to form part of the rig. The applicant
asserted that the flywheel pulley also was deficient. I am
satisfied that that was 30. Further, I am content to make that
finding without reliance upon the statement concerning the Le Roi
recommended fly wheel effect contained in a telex, dated 25 July
1983 from the Product Manager of Le Roi, Exhibit 30 (Annexure
"B"), or upon the opinion of Mr Bourne and other witnesses
insofar as they were based on that statement in that telex.
Technically, it is probably correct that the statement in the
telex was inadmissible as hearsay and that opinions based upon it
were either inadmissible or, if admissible, entitled to little if
any weight. However, T am satisfied that there was other
evidence which at least inferentially warranted the conclusion
that the fly wheel pulley was inadequate having regard to the
demands of the compressor drive train. Although he did not stand
alone on the issue, it does not seem to me insignificant that Mr
Bourne was a man of considerable experience in relation to Le Roi
compressors and the local representative for that product. The
telex was only obtained from Le Roi on the day on which the trial
began, presumably for evidentiary purposes. The statement in it,
were it to be relied on, could serve to confirm Mr Bourne's
opinion, but it did not in fact constitute the foundation for his
opinion at the time when it was formed.
Qn 12 March i981, the compressor was removed from the
vig which was taken away for use with another compressor. On the
applicant's instructions, Bourne Engineering dismantled the high
pressure cylinders of the compressor and rebuilt it, derating it
to a maximum pressure of 125 p.s.i. Other modifications were
also effected, including the upgrading of the clutch in the
compressor drive train. Bourne Engineering's charges, which were
contained in two invoices three months apart, are the subject of
claims by the applicant which are dealt with within paragraph 13A
of its final Statement of Claim in the following terms:
"(a) the applicant has been obliged to expend
moneys on the repair and modification of the
rig.
Particulars
(1) By Bourne Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd
DATE PAID DESCRIPTION
31.03.81 329.00 Refit compressor test and
run, Remove compressor
from rig for repairs.
30.06.81 8662.87 Rework Dressor Le Roi high
pressure 256828 air
compressor toa 100 SDS
standard Upgrade air
compressor drive clutch by
new sintered iron clutch
to increase horsepower
rating.
Supply and fit new power
band drive belts to uH.P.
To manufacture new
compressor base and belt
tensioner system."
20,
It will be necessary to come back to these claims in
more detail ata iater stage, but some further matters can
conveniently be noted at this point. Most, but not all, of the
first invoice, for an amount of $320.00, related to the mounting
and testing of the compressor; only a relatively small sum
should be attributed to the further removal of the compressor
from the rig for derating. With respect to the second invoice,
for $8662.87, evidence was given that $6697.12 related to parts
and $1965.75 was for lapour at $24.00 per hour. Approximately 50
hours were spent derating the compressor, another 15 hours
approximately were otherwise spent "in the compressor area", and
about 17 hours were spent removing the clutch and installing the
substitute clutches, installing new belts, and testing and
running the compressor. IT am satisified that the upgraded
clutches installed were appropriate, given the other steps taken
by Mr Bourne including the derating of the compressor which will
be further discussed below, and that the new belts were necessary
because the previous belts had deteriorated by reason of the
problems which had been experienced with the compressor drive
train and the compressor. However, f£ am not satisfied that there
was any need to instal the new compressor base and belt
tensioning system to facilitate the adjustment of the belts to
permit proper tensioning to be obtained and maintained; I find
that this modification was no more than a matter of preference on
the part of the applicant and Mr Bourne. On the other hand, I
find that neither the modifications to the compressor base and
belt tensioning system nor any cther modification effected by the
applicant or on its behalf in any way caused or contributed to
any of the problems with or in the drilling rig. Indeed, I am
satisfied that neither the applicant's modifications, repairs,
maintenance, service, adjustments, nor method or circumstances of
operation, caused or contributed to any problems which were
experienced prior to the derating of the compressor and I accept
that the applicant and its operators and those who carried out
work onits behalf were relevantly competent and experienced,
although I do not in consequence accept either all their
evidence or the wisdom or reasonableness of everything which they
did. Further, I reject the respondent's allegation, insofar as
it is related to this or other of the applicant's claims, that
the applicant should have made the rig available for repair by
the respondent. In my opinion, in the circumstances as they
existed in March 1981 and thereafter, it was open to the
applicant to seek advice and assistance from any competent person
and it was not obliged ta resort to the respondent. But, of
course, it does not follow that the applicant was free to do
whatever it chose to the rig and to charge the respondent with
the consequences.
An obvious result of the compressor derating which
Bourne effected would seem to have been to reduce the value of
the compressor, viewed in isolation. The evidence suggests that
a Le Roi two stage 250 p.s.1. compressor at the time cost about
$23,000.00 while a similar 125 p.s.1. compressor cost about
$19,000.00. However, that loss of value does not, as such, form
any part of the applacant's claim which underwent a number of
radical changes during the history of the litigation. The major
component of the claim, in its ultimate form, may be shortly
stated.
22.
No attempt was made to establish any loss by reference
to any lack of utility of the rig, or any diminution in the
applicant's earnings or profits by reason of its deficiencies.
The applicant's case founded instead on the proposition that, by
reason of the rig's deficiencies (and/or consequential
modifications of the rig), 1ts performance could have been
matched by a smaller less expensive rig (a Gardner 500M) mounted
ona smaller less expensive truck (a Toyota DAIS). From that
premise it was argued that the Midway rig''s value on the Mack
truck was equivalent to the cost of a Gardner rig on a Toyota
truck. A comparison was then attempted between the cost to the
applicant of the Midway 13M on the Mack truck under the lease
with United Dominions Corporation Limited (rental payments,
insurance premiums and residual value), and what would have been
the cost of leasing the Gardner rig and Toyota truck on a similar
basis. Implicit in the applicant's argument was the proposition
that, at the end of the Midway lease and the hypothetical lease,
the equipment under each will be valueless or of similar value.
The payments made and to be made by the applicant to United
Dominions Corporation Limited and for insurance in accordance
with the present lease of the Midway 13, including payment of the
regidual value at the end of that lease, were said to exceed the
comparative figure for the Gardner rig and the Toyota truck by
$251,530.80, which was alleged to be loss for which the
respondent is liable. It may be noted immediately that the
Midway rig figures were erroneously based on a cost price of
$225,000.00, instead of the correct $212,950.00; the higher
figure included an amount for additional pipe.
Other considerations aside, this approach by the
applicant is obviously dependent upon the validity of the
comparison which was sought to be made by the applicant, which
comparison was in turn founded on the proposition that the
capacity of the Midway 13M drilling rig was limited in the manner
and to the extent contended. There was considerable confusion
surrounding what the applicant did in and after March 1981, the
reasons for what was done, and the way in which the applicant now
seeks to use what was done against the respondent. Most, at
least, of the confusion appears to be related to the derating of
the compressor, an inevitable consequence of which was to limit
the drilling capacity of the rig when that compressor and no
other was used, irrespective of the rig's capacity otherwise, and
more particularly to the derating of the compressor to 125 p.s.i.
I will come back in some detail to this, the applicant's largest
claim, but first it is convenient to notice briefly the
subsequent history of the rig. and other claims made.
In paragraph 13A(b) of ats Statement of Claim, the
applicant made the following claim:
"The applicant has been obliged to hire other
compressors and has incurred expense in
relation to such hire; namely $6,617.50 paid
to Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd, for hire
from time to time between 19 March 1981 and 15
July 1981.
Particulars
(i) Invoice No. H89291 $1,759.29
(ii) Invoice No. H89360 1,536.21
(iii) Part Invoice No. H89611 3,454.00
Less Credit being 50% pro rata
of Stamp Duty and Insurance on
Invoice No. H89611 132.00
SUB TOTAL 56,617.50
a
This aspect of the applicant's case related in part to
the alleged need for a substitute compressor because the Le Roi
compressor was unavailable when work was being performed upon it,
including the period of derating, and in part to the need for an
auxiliary compressor to supplement the operation of the derated
compressor. There is no reason in, principle why, in a case such
as this, hire charges for substitute or additional equipment
should not be recoverable provided that care 1s taken to ensure
that the claim is consistent with other claims and involves no
duplication, and provided also that the claim is supported by
appropriate evidence. The evidence adduced was extremely
confused concerning the terms of the arrangements between the
applicant and Atlas Copco, the capacity of the hired compressors,
the uses to which the hired compressors were put, and which of
the applicant's rigs the hired compressors were used with, but,
despite the manifest confusion, no witness from Atlas Copco was
called.
25.
The applicant also claimed the cost of other repairs and
modifications. In addition to matters already referred to and
the drawworks, to which I will come, the applicant alleged that
belts and bearings required replacement, that the transfer case
was an inadequate design and did not allow for normal adjustments
to the workings within the transfer case to be made, and that the
compressor drive belts were unable to be finely adjusted.
Accordingly, it was said, the transfer case required extensive
repairs and modifications and, in addition to the need to replace
the compressor drive belts, the system of adjustment required
modification. Details of the items claimed appear within
paragraph 13A(a)(1) of the final Statement of Claim in the
following terms:
""(a) the applicant has been obliged to expend
moneys on the repair and modification of
the rig.
Particulars
(i) By Bourne Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd
28.04.81 104.00 Supply 20 gallons 68 hydraulic oil
(hydraulic oil tank split required
to be emptied, welded and refilled)
16.07.81 220.35 Supply compressor drive train
bearings (excluding pillar blocks)
31.07.81 678.00 Supply compressor drive train
bearings (including pillar blocks)
11.01.82 450.00 Repair and rectify rust in mast
31.01.82 588.00 Replace bearings in compressor drive
shaft and supply bearings
31.01.82 810.60 Rectify noise and jumping out of
gear in spicer power take off unit
04.02.82 588.90 Supply compressor drive shaft
bearings
26.
30.04.82 3253.00 Repairs to Midway. Remove power
take off. Dismantle repair and
refit to truck. Fit air charge to
unit. Check air compressor drive.
Fit new bearings. Remove transfer
case. Dismantle fit new bearings
and seals.
Drill caps for cam adjustment.
Machine new hydraulic pump drive
shaft. Fit new drive chain to mud
pump. Refill with gear ofl and
hydraulic oil. Parts $1713 Labour
$1540.
The repetitious bearing failures subsequent to the
derating of the compressor were never explained to my
satisfaction. Whether or not all or any of the claims now under
consideration were related to the method of installation,
operation, or maintenance of the rig by or on behalf of the
applicant, I am not persuaded that any basis exists upon which
responsibility can be attributed to the respondent. In my
opinion, these charges relate to operational repairs and
maintenance and elective modifications requested by the applicant
and do not constitute loss or damage suffered by the applicant by
the conduct of the respondent. Other considerations aside, both
the work done and associated steps such as the efforts to obtain
parts, and thus of course the cost, were affected by Mr Bourne's
attitude to drilling rigs which differed from his own, a matter
to which I will return below. I have not, in the circumstances,
found it necessary to consider in relation to these claims the
possibility that some at least could not, in any event he
sufficiently causally related to the contraventions of the Act by
the respondent which I have found to fall within s.82.
The applicant's remaining claim, which 15 also contained
in para 13A(a)(1) of the Statement of Claim, is for another
invoice by Bourne Engineering expressed as follows:
"17.01.83 8270.00 Remove and dismantle draworks.
Clean and check drawworks.
Re-machining shaft and drums to
fit new twin disc clutches.
Fit new bearing wheels,
locknuts, washers. Re-assemble
drawworks re fit to rig. Run
and test unit."
As appears from the date of the invoice, the work the
subject of that claim was not done until January this year,
considerably more than a year after these proceedings were
commenced. I do not accept that problems with the drawworks were
encountered prior to March 1981, or indeed at any time with the
possible exception of an isolated occurrence in June or July
1981. No doubt, the work for which the rig was then used
reflected that its capacity had been severely decreased by the
derating of the compressor, although there is no proof that,
otherwise, the rig would have been called upon to drill deeper
holes. Tests took place in January and August 1982 but these
were primarily occasioned by a search for complaints for the
litigation, rather than past events: it is not now material if
the tests were ineffectual because it was not recognized that a
valve setting limited the drawworks pull, quite apart from any
deficiencies in the drawworks.
28.
Nonetheless, although the inadequacy did not in the
event affect the applicant's use of the rig, I find that the
drawworks did not accord with their represented capacity because
the drawworks clutches were inadequate. Part of the work done in
January this year related to the cost of inserting heavier
drawworks clutches and associated work. However, the balance of
the applicant's claim in relation to the drawworks falls into the
same category as the list of repairs and modifications to which I
have referred above.
It is appropriate at this point to revert to a more
general consideration of the basis of the applicant's claims.
In Frith v. Gold Coast Mineral Springs Pty Ltd (1983)
A.T.P.R. 44-072; (1983) 5 T.P.R 44, I suggested that, while the
common law may provide useful guidance, ultimately it is a
question of statutory construction what damages are recoverable
under s.82 of the Act. One question which will no doubt fall for
consideration on occasion is what, if any, relevance
foreseeability has in relation te s.82. Some analogy to the
major claim made by the applicant in these proceedings may be
found in Doobay v. Mohabeer [196571 2 A.C. 278, which may be
contrasted with Millar v. Candy (1981) 38 A.L.R. 299, although
each involved a different cause of action, neither of which was a
claim under the Act. In the present case, the respondent had
actual knowledge at all material times of the relationship
between the applicant and United Dominions Corporation Limited.
In principle, there is no reason why it was not open to the
applicant to formulate its case as 1t did and the respondent did
not really call that in question. There seems to me no reason,
in principle, why the applicant's claim in this case should not
include components for the constituent elements which it
includes, namely:
(i) repairs
(ii) hire of substitute or auxillary
equipment;
and
(iii) the extent to which payments under the
lease are excessive by reason of the
diminished value of the rig.
Further, I can perceive no reason why, in principle, the cost of
any modification may not be included or why diminished value may
not be assessed by reference to the modified equipment.
The common law has developed "connected doctrines"
(McGregor on Damages), 14th ed. para. 181) in relation to issues
of remoteness, mitigation, intervening acts or events, and
contributory negligence with respect to damages both in tort and,
more recently, for breach of contract: (ibid). It may be
anticipated with some confidence that similar questions to those
which have given rise to such doctrines will fall for
consideration in due course in proceedings for relief under 3.82.
The ultimate test under s.82 is likely to be one of causation.
There is no present need to seek to elaborate upon that
observation beyond commenting that there seems no reason to doubt
that, in general, loss or damage may not necessarily be
irrecoverable because its immediate cause is not the
contravention complained of; for example, if it is some action
reasonably taken by the applicant in the circumstances in which
he finds himself in consequence of the contravention, including
such action taken in an attempt to mitigate loss or damage.
Reasonableness is a question of fact and I have, for the purposes
of this case, proceeded on the footing that, while reasonableness
is to be determined in all the circumstances including the
interests of the respondent as well as the applicant, the
standard required of the applicant is not high and must he
assessed by reference to the circumstances at the time not as
they appeared with the advantage of hindsight, and that the
applicant 1s not required to risk his money too far; neither
steps which prove to have been mistakenly taken nor the fact that
other measures would have proved less burdensome to a respondent
necessarily mean a loss 1s not recoverable. Conversely, there
seems no reason to doubt that, in general, it will be open toa
respondent not merely to contest the elements of an applicant's
claim, including the reasonableness of any action taken by the
applicant, but to set up a positive case that the applicant ought
have mitigated the loss or damage by other steps asserted to have
been reasonably open. Again speaking only generally, it seems
likely that the onus of proof of a particular issue, including
reasonableness of conduct, will depend upon whether the applicant
asserts that issue as a constituent element of its damages claim
or whether the issue is raised only by the nature of the
respondent's defence.
31.
In the end, what must be remembered is that it is only
loss or damage suffered by conduct of the respondent that an
applicant is entitled to recover under s.82 and it is essential
for an appropriate evidentiary basis to be established for the
claim. Costs and consequences of one of a number of possible
courses of conduct pursued by an applicant to meet a situation
occasioned by a respondent's contravention of s.52 cannot,
without more, be characterized as the result of an attempt to
mitigate the loss or ctherwise as loss or damage suffered by
conduct of a respondent.
The derating of the compressor was an essential element
of the applicant's case with respect to the alleged diminished
value of the rig upon which its major claim related to the
payments under the lease was founded. Derating would by no means
have been the obvious solution had the fault lain solely with the
compressor, which could have been replaced or used with an
auxiliary compressor. In any event, as I have indicated, I am
satisfied that, by March 1981 but prior to derating, the
compressor was able to produce 250 p.s.i. if supplied with
adequate power. The problem then was that the compressor drive
train was inadequate to transmit the power required for the
compressor to produce 250 p.s.1. The appropriateness, or at
least the reasonableness, of the derating is therefore of central
importance.
32.
In the circumstances as they existed in March 1981,
there were a number of possibilities. Accepting that the rig was
not to have been left as it was and valued on that basis, the
possibilities involved modification of the compressor drive train
and/or the compressor, and assessment of the value of the
modified rig. One theoretical possibility would have been to
derate the compressor so that it required only the power which
the compressor drive could transmit. Another would have been to
upgrade the compressor drive and derate the compressor so that it
required only the power which the upgraded compressor drive could
transmit. (It may be added that each of these theoretical
possibilities simply assumes that it would be necessary to derate
the compressor, and that the same result could not be achieved,
without modification; e.g., by appropriate valve settings.)
Still another possibility would have been to upgrade the
compressor drive so that it could transmit the power required by
the compressor to 250 p.s.1.
All these possibilities were explored to greater or
lesser deqree in the evidence. The burden of proof lay upon the
applicant. Had the respondent sought to show that another course
not revealed by the applicant's case was open to the applicant
snd should have been taken by it to mitigate its loss, the onus
in respect of the issue may well have rested upon the respondent;
for example, that the aprolicant could and should have effected a
different repair or modification not revealed as a possibility by
the applicant's evidence or that the applicant could and should
'
have terminated the lease and sold the rig. However, the
resolution of the issues which I have been discussing was called
33.
for by the method of presentation by the applicant of its claim
not some matter raised by the respondent. The appropriateness or
at least reasonableness of derating and the other steps taken was
an essential element of the applicant's claim, as was the
subsequent capacity of the rig and its value. The applicant
asserted the affirmative of these issues and necessarily raised
them by its Statement of Claim and the footing upon which it
sought to have its loss calculated. The denial of these issues
did not set up matters in mitigation of damage in respect of
which the probative burden lay upon the respondent; 1t merely
involved a contest as to an element of the plaintiff's claim.
Mr Bourne told Mr Hellyer that the compressor drive
train could be upgraded by taking the drive into a heavier duty
transfer case and that the compressor could be shaft-driven from
the transfer case to produce 250 p.s.i- Mr Hellyer rejected
this, allegedly because of the estimated cost of "some
$50,000.00". Difficult questions might have arisen had any
suggestion been raised that the course of derating the compressor
followed was or might have been influenced by the cost of any
alternative course and the applicant's financial or liquidity
positiion or its borrowing capacity: cf. Liesboch (Dredger) v.
Edison (§.5.) £19331 A.C. 449, 460-461; Dodd Properties (Kent)
Ltd v. Canterbury City Council (1980) 1 All E.R. 928; Companion
Financiera "Soleada" §.A. v. Hamoor Tanker Corporation Inc.
(1981) 1 W.L.R. 274; Fox v. Wood (1981) 35 A.L.R. 607, 613;
Egan v. State Transport Authority £1982] 31 8.A.S.R. 482, 524 ff.
In the event, none of these were questions fall for
consideration. Comparable Bourne rigs possess shaft drive and
34.
Mr Bourne had a bias against belt drives. The suggestion made by
Mr Bourne and rejected by Mr Hellyer was in no sense a practical
solution to the problem which existed.
I do not accept that there was insufficient room in the
compressor drive train as it stood to include the clutches and
flywheel pulleys which Mr Bourne considered would be needed if
the compressor was to be provided with sufficient power to
produce 250 p.s.1. by a belt-driven compressor drive train.
Further, I do not accept that Mr Bourne was correct in his
assessment of what was necessary in the compressor drive train
for the compressor to produce 250 p.s.i. I am satisfied that the
compressor drive train could have been upgraded without expensive
modification by the installation of clutches with a suitably
increased rating and a larger flywheel.
It may not automatically follow from what I have said
that the derating of the compressor was unreasonable. I have
earlier mentioned the latitude which is afforded the victim of
wrongdoing in the choice of which course should be followed. I
am prepared to assume in favour of the applicant that apparently
competent advice may be a factor to be brought to account in
assessing whether what was done was reasonable. However, in the
circumstances of this case, that does not avail the applicant.
The course which was followed was so radical and involved such a
dramatic effect upon the interests of the respondent-wrongdoer
that the applicant could not reasonably have acted on that
footing without a greater degree of certainty that it was
appropriate to do so than was possible on the basis of Mr
35.
Bourne's opinion. That 15 not to say that it was not open to the
applicant to act as it did. The limitation upon it relates only
to what it can charge against the respondent. The real
explanation for the derating of the compressor seems to me likely
to lie in the fact that that action, and such upgrading of the
clutches, as was carried cut, provided the applicant with a rig
of the capacity which 1t needed, although less than what had been
represented, at the minimum additional outlay.
Certainly, the applicant failed to adduce acceptable
evidence to support a conclusion that derating the compressor was
reasonable. Evidence as to vital matters, including details of
possible action and relative costs, was either missing or
unsatisfactory. The applicant failed to persuade me that, in
truth, the Midway rig mounted on the Mack truck was comparable in
value to the suggested smaller and less expensive rig and truck.
Accordingly, it did not prove a vital element of its claim.
The applicant did not attempt to establish any other
basis for a calculation of its loss and, in consequence, it has
been extremely difficult to assess any amount for damages.
In Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v.
Halton and Ors (1979) 25 A.L.R. 639, Aickin J., whose judgment
was affirmed on appeal, (33 A.L.R.) said at p.669:
ua] 2 i re ftyy!
qe on tepid | Ln
ieowte, '
"It has long been settled that the difficulty
of ascertaining an amount of damages does not
warrant their denial. This was established at
least by the time of the decision in Chaplin
v. Hicks €19111 2 K.B. 786; £19114 13 All
E.R. Rep. 224 .... On the other hand, the
ascertainment of damages is not an exercise in
imagination. It is therefore necessary to
examine the material in order to see what
assumptions are involved and, insofar as they
are not justifiable, to see what adjustments
can be made which will enable a reasonable
approximation to be obtained."
In Thurston v. Dodd £1966] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 321, Jacobs J.A.
at p. 327 quoted with approval the following passage from
Callaghan v. Walliam W.M.C. Lynch Pty Ltd £19621 N.S.W.R. 871;
79 W.N. (N.S.W.) 830 at p.834:
"Lack of relevant evidence may of course make
it impossible to assess damages at all, for
example, when there are a number of other
contingencies on which the loss may depend.
But where it is established that damage has
been incurred for which a defendant should be
held liable, the plaintiff may be accorded the
benefit of every reasonable presumption as to
the loss suffered. Thus a jury doing the best
it can, may have to form conclusions on maters
of slender material and to make allowances for
contingencies even to the extent of guesswork
or speculation. Specific authority is not
readily found as the matter is so taken for
granted and it is unnecessary. For it is
clear on principle that damages for future or
prospective loss may be recovered if such is
reasonably to be anticipated as a result of a
defendant's wrong whether such damages certain
or contingent ..."
and continued:
"The words 'quesswork or speculation' must be
carefully read in their limited context but in
my view the passage correctly states the law
and correctly states the principle applicable
in the present case."
37.
In Gamser v. Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 C.L.R. 145,
Stephen J. at p.149 in the context of the need to reveal the
process of reasoning leading to an assessment of damages, spoke
against the intuitive assessment of damages. See also Andrews v.
John Fairfax and Sons Ltd £1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 225, at 262E and
263E, where Mahoney J.A. discussed the limitations which exist in
the drawing of inferences.
Nonetheless, the respondent in its final address
substantially conceded that, while an alternative would be to
direct a further hearing in respect of damages, the possibility
existed of an estimate based on all the evidence. Although the
assessment must of necessity be somewhat broad and imprecise, I
have concluded that I am able to do more than guess and that I
can arrive at a sufficiently reasoned estimate.
The commencing point for the final stage of the
ascertainment of the applicant's damages is to be found in the
basic findings in favour of the applicant that the compressor
drive clutches and fly wheel pulley and the drawworks clutches
were inadequate. I have no doubt that, in consequence, the rig
was worth less than $212,950.00. The difficulty lies in
quantifying the reduced value of the rig and extrapolating the
difference to reflect the applicant's overall loss.
Much of the available evidence has already been referred
to. There 1s evidence of the cost of the Midway 13M rig and of
the respective costs of certain smaller rigs. There is evidence
of the cost of various components and parts in the Midway 13M
34.
rig. There is evidence of the charges made for various repairs
and modifications, although there was dispute as to the
reasonableness of some of these charges. There is evidence that
the derated rig is presently for sale for $145,000.00 although
Bourne claims that it is worthless. There is evidence that the
compressor drive train could have been replaced for "some
$50,000" (which can I think be safely taken as an absolute
maximum diminution in value related to the compressor drive
train), and there 1s evidence from which a decrease in value
relative to the drawworks clutches can be arrived at. There is
evidence relating to the cost of testing by Bourne in March 1981.
There is evidence with respect to both the rate of compressor
hire charges and the "lease costs", and the range of interest
rates in respect of loans during the relevant period are
sufficiently a matter of common knowledge.
Any attempt to approach the assessment of damages by
reference to the principle underlying the formulation of the
applicant's major claim is fraught with difficulty. For example,
the Midway rig is presently for sale, with two years of the lease
still to run. I infer that the applicant does not intend to
retain the rig and continue to make payments under the lease
until the lease term expires. There is no evidence of the
current payout figure under the lease or how that compares to the
residual value, or of the present value of the rig assuming that
it had neither been derated nor fitted with upgraded components.
The cost of modification necessary to remove the
deficiencies which I have found existed would afford at least
some evidence of diminution in value, as has been recognized in
other contexts which I do not, however, suggest provide a clear
analogy: see McGregor on Damages, supra, para. 998. On this
approach the applicant would aliso be entitled to an increment to
the diminution in value by reference to the cost to the applicant
of borrowing to effect the modifications and some amount for hire
of a substitute compressor while the ria was being modified.
And, the applicant would also be entitled to amounts actually
incurred in respect of testina to investigate the cause of the
problems with the rida. Again, the cost of borrowing to make
expenditures must be kept in mind. Not all the cost of borrowing
should, however, be made the responsibility of the respondent.
There has been significant delay in bringing this matter to trial
on the part of the applicant and it must bear its share of the
responsibility.
It is not practical as tne evidence stands to attempt to
attribute a specific amount to the cost of supply and
installation of each individual item. I have arrived at an en
globo amount from the available evidence as a whole, in the
manner of a jury assessment of qeneral damages. I fix the costs
of the modifications needed to the compressor drive train and the
drawworks at $30,000; included in such amount is an element for
the cost of testing and an element for compressor hire. The
amount of $6,000 should be added for interest on the cost of
borrowing to pay for the modifications, tests, and compressor
40.
hire. Accordingly, I assess the applicant's loss at $36,000. It
was not suqgested by either party that any adjustment should be
made by reference to imcome tax considerations.
The applicant has succeeded in obtaining a verdict
and, as at present advised, I perceive no reason why the costs of
the trial should not follow the event. However, at the hearing,
1t was aqreed that the costs of the trial should be left until
after judament. The parties have 4 days within which to submit
written submissions on the issue. Written submissions may also
be made within the same time concerning the applicant's claim for
interest, which was not made the subject of arqument, although I
doubt whether it remains a live 1ssue in view of the basis upon
which I have assessed the aprlicant's loss. Further, I repeat
that, other considerations aside, much of the delay which has
been occasioned in bringing this case to trial has been
occasioned by the applicant. During the course of the numerous
interlocutory applications in this matter, various costs were
reserved. The parties have erovided written submissions
concerning the orders which should be made with respect to those
costs. I have no doubk but that they must be taxed and paid by
the applicant.
The only formal order which I make at this time is that
there be judament for the applicant against the respondent for
$36,000.00.
J certify that this andthe 39 preceding
pages are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment herein of His Honour
Mr, Justice Fitzgerald
Jk 2 Davee Associate
Dated /? Ceftoter, /PP7