Federal Court of Australia
CATCHWORDS
Administrative Law - Judicial review - Freedom of Information
Act - Order that access be given to third respondent to so
much of interim reports as consists of "purely factual material" -
Dispute as to what is "purely factual material" - Access to be
given to factual material only if it is severable from its
context - Categories of material which may properly be charac-
terised as "purely factual" for purposes of order considered.
JENNIFER MAY McDONALD HARRIS v.
No. G189 of 1983
Beaumont, J. Sydney 31 October, 1983.
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and KEITHE+ CAMERON MACKRIELL and MICHAEL H. COSBY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
No. G189 of 1983
BETWEEN JENNIFER MAY McDONALD HARRIS Applicant AND AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING
MACKRIELL
CORPORATION and KEITH CAMERON
and MICHAEL H. COSBY
Respondents
ORDER
Judge making order: Beaumont, J. Date order made: 31 October, 1983.
Where made: sydney
j THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. In accordance with order No.
2 made on 4 October,
1983 direct that the first respondent give the third
respondent access to the following:
(a) the whole of the first interim report (including
its annexures) other than the
in Division 4 Part I thereof;
Material contained
(b) the material headed "Introduction" and Annexures
"1" and "3" only in the second interim report.
2. Make no order as to costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION No. G189 of 1983
BETWEEN JENNIFER MAY McDONALD HARRIS
Applicant
AND AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and KEITH CAMERON MACKRIELL and MICHAEL H. COSBY
Respondents
CORAM: Beaumont, J.
DATED: 31 October, 1983.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (No. 2) ih
On 4 October, 1983, for the reasons I then gave, I directed that the first respondent give the third respondent access to so much of the first and second interim reports prepared by Mahla L. Pearlman ("the reports") as consists of "purely factual material" (see order No. 2), I reserved general liberty to any party to apply. In my reasons for judgment {at p.33) I indicated that my reason for reserving general liberty to apply was that I had in mind, in particular, the possibility that a question may arise as to what is purely factual material and, if so, as to its severability from other
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