Whether the Acting Minister could not deport the first naned arplicant becaus of his family relaticnsrip with Ot the second named applicant - whether the Acting Minister was bound br the International Covenant for Civil and Folitiacal Rights - whether the covenant is pert of the law of Lustecalia - the effect of the covenant on a Aecreian made geursuant toa the lave of Ausrcralia. t MINISTER FOr VG No. 153 of 1983 + Smithers c. 21 Octcber 1°B2 Ielbourne. Rae teats wae we re we a Rn Aes De A en Smee te en ee fee ee nD eee ee ee or we ere IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VG No. 153 of 1983 GDINERAL DIVISION et ee ee re EX TENPORE JUDGMENT Betveen: LIGOR SEZDIRIDZOGLU and PENELOPE DROKOS ra (Applicants) And: THE ACTING MINFSTOR FOR IMMIGRATION & Mt WiC APFALRS (Respondent) Coram: Smithers J. 21 October 1983 REASONS FOR JULGAHENT HIS HONOUR: When this matter was heard in September I made an order that the third ground of the order to review be dealt with separately from the other grounds. I have handed down a judgment in relation to the other grounds and it is the third ground which is now before the Court. The third ground was in these terms: " . "That insofar as the deportation of the first-named applicant would be likely to Ce en at ee as - ~ -- -- eee -- ne a a SE Oe aT eS eT eee ee ne a he be neta nN . seriously impair the exercise by the second named applicant, an Australian citizen, of her rights including her rights to maintenance for the child en ventre sa mere of the applicants, 1f£ 1s not within the power of the Commonwealth officer so to order, that is to say to make the deportation order." That ground was particularised by Mr. Little this morning in the following terms, namely, that in the exercise of the discretion of the Acting Minister, the Acting Minister could not deport the applicant because of his family relationship with Mrs. Drokos, that relationship being a genuine de _ facto relationship, he being the father of her child about to be born and also being accepted as in loco parentis by Mrs. Drokos' d@aughter, that 1s, the daughter of Mrs. Drokos by her previous marriage. The relevant facts are, shortly, that the applicant and Mrs. Drokos arrived in Australia from Greece and took up again a de facto rejJationship which according to them had commenced in Greece at least some 12 months before they arrived in Australia. Mrs. Drokos arrived in Australia shortly before the applicant. Mrs. Drokos is about to be divorced in Greece and intends to marry the applicant. As previously mentioned there jis a daughter from Drokos' previous marriage who has lived with Drokos and the applicant sd ee ate ok ere we eta a Ne rn ee ea rN eta he lead eld Se er ROE rede mene ae at all times when they have been living together and who regards the applicant in the position of her parent. Mrs. Drokos 1s with child to the applicant and expects the baby 1o be born in about two months time. She is an Australlan citizen. The applicant 1s Turkish. There 1s, therefore, so it is said, a Family situation in existence consisting of the applicant, Mcs. Drokos, and her daughter, which has been further enhanced by the existence of the pregnancy in relation to the child of the applicant and Drokos. In the first instance Mr. Little contended that Australia having acceded to the Internationa] Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (the covenant) the provisions of the covenant are binding on the Acting Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in this case in the sense that he is restrained from making an order for deportation which would invade, or fail to protect, the family . situation. The Human Rights Commission Act 1981 indicates that ict is desirable thet the laws of the Commonwealth and the conduct of persons administering those laws a a ne es ene eee ee wee = tM ne ee a, tak ee re ee rn ee te rete ad Sate! "ot gle NE ee me te ny should conform with the provisious of the covenant and certain other international declarations, but of course such a recital stops short of enacting that the provisions of the covenant are part of the law of Australia, and in fact those provisions are not part of the law of Australia. The Migration Act 1958 is law in Australia on the subject of immigration. In that Act Parliament lays down, inter alia, the conditions according to which persons may be admitted to Australia and may be deported therefrom. lt 1s to those provisions that regard must be had. So far as the deportation of a prohibited immigrant is concerned, the Minister has a discretion, the width of which has been described in various decisions such as The Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Tagle (unreported decision of Sweeney, Woodward and Fitzgerald JJ., dated 28 September 1983; VG No. 53 of 1983) and Akpan v. The Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (unreported decision of Sheppard J. dated 7 April 1983). That discretion itself must be exercised according to law one provision of which is that the Minister must Pp consider all circumstances relevant to the position of the person with whose desire to remain in 2S kee Nae ee ee a ere ne ra ated ee tell ee ee tr ae Australia he 2s concerned. I do not say that he must apply the principles laid down tin the covenant. However, the declaration of Parliament in the Human Riqhts Commission Act 1981 that it as desirabJe that the conduct of persons administering the laws of Australia should conform with the provistons of the covenant may supply a ground for contending that the Minister should at least take into account the principles expressed therein. So far as I can see in this case, save that the order of the Acting Manister as previously made and at present under reconsideration may cause a separation, it appears that he has in an indirect way taken into consideration the provisions of the covenant. It is apparent that the Acting ifinister is apprised of and considers it his duty to have regard to the de facto relationship between these two parties and that he recognises that it is his duty to take that anto account with all other matters which bear upon the desirability or otherwise from the point of view of Australia that the applicant be deported or that some privileges arising out of the de facto relationship be extended to him. The duty, however, 1S no more than a duty to take all relevant considerations concerning the prohibited immigrant in relation to the interests of Australia into account. DET To era Ce et re ee ee " veo - . - eae - -~ ~ nee eae eae te an Li ental See Siete rie tS aD a EA te er pate ree The situation+for Mrs. Drokos, of course, is a very difficult one indeed from all points of view and at is noted that she is an Australian citizen. But it is going too far to suggest that as a separation between these parties might possibly arise if the order as previously made were carried into effect the possibility of that separation makes it unlawful for the Minister to make the order. The existence of the family and respect for what I call the rights thercof do not take effect to prohibit the exercise of all lawful acts which may work in a hostile manner towards the family. The family is still subject to law and not the reverse. This is made clear ain the covenant itself: see article 9(1), article 10(1), article 13 and article 17(1). If one reads, for example, article 13 1t states: "An alien lawfully in the territory of a state party to the present covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise reguire, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority." The principle that the law of the land as made by the law-making bodies of Australia shall operate qeeigQ en aR ee wee - ,- _. rn me en ke er re le ee leat ete Le nel Pa tn 7s notwithstanding any general provisions which appear \ " in the covenant seems to be supported by a number of decisions ~ indeed those dectsions which Mr. Little himself submittcd ~ and I refer in particular to Rv. Home Secretarv ox parte Bhajar Sinoh [19376] 1 Q.B. 198; Rv. Home Secretary ex parte Phan Sopxar [1976] 1 Q.B. 606; Rv. The Chief Immiqretion Officer cer parte Salamat Bibi [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979. Reference . may also be made to In re Simsek (1981-1982) 40 ALR 6L. To my mind it 1s perfectly clear that nothing in the Human Rights Commission Act 1981 or the covenant, so far as it 1s called in aad in that Act, 1s effective to modify 1m any way the powers of the Minister under ss.16 and 18 of the Migration Act. The only way in which the Act is relevant is that 1t makes clear that it is the desire of Parliament that the conduct of the Minister in performing his duties shall conform with the provisions of the covenant, and the fact that the covenant refers to the entitlement of the family to be protected, but it 1s a right for the family to be protected in the context of the law of the country concerned and, of course, subject to those qualifications which are to be found in the covenant itself. a ak dee eh ue ee 8. I have said that in this case 1t would appear that the Acting Minister 1s quite well aware of the duty to consider all relevant matters and no doubt, will in his reconsideration, take into account the desirability of the protection of this family unil so far as that protection is compatible with the other considerations which it 1s necessary that the Acting Minister should take anto account which, of course, relate to the interests of Australia, the interest of the maintenance of its laws and various other considerations which appear from the reasons of the Acting Minister. The substance of the argument put by Mr. Little would really mean that the provisions of s.51(27) of the Constitution dealing with immigration, would have to be read subject to a qualification that the Parliament was unable to authorise the Minister to take action in certain situations where his action might be incompatible with the full protection of the family. I think it is impossible so to argue and that matter is made clear in those authorities to which Dr. Jessup has referred eg: Osborne v. The Commonwealth & Anor (1910-1911) 12 CLR 321; especially at pp.334, 343, 346 and 358, and the recent case of The Commonyvealth v. Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR, in the judgments of Mason J. at 713 and 714; we gr nt ea te pre ee er ee oe - woe - aos eee fe an ee tle meta ee N 9. Murphy J. at 736; Deane J. at 813 and 814. OF course, it 1s-quite clJear that once ss.16 and 18 are shown to be laws with respect to immigration pursuant to s.51(27) of the Constitution they remain laws relating to immigration although their operation may have an impact on an ancillary matter. On the general question of the influence of a Family situation and the significance of a family situation on the administration of the laws of immigration it is useful to refer to Ah Yin v. Christie (1912) 4 CLR 1428 where a boy of 15, cenvicted of a charge of being a prohibited immigrant, sought entry to this country on the basis that he was domiciled in this country his father being already domiciled and resident in this country. It was said by Griffiths C.J. at p.1431: "lt as a question of a right of a stranger to claim admission to a foreign country. That is a matter depending upon political, not upon civil status. Sec per Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny L.R. 1 H.L. Sc., 441, at p.457. It 1s settled law, as pointed out by this Court in the case of Robteimes v. Brenan 4 C.L.R., 395, quoting the decision of the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain and Gilhnula (190G) A.C., 512, that one oF the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, and to annex what conditions 1t pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport him from the State at plcasure. ee een pane nen ne ae er eee te te ee eee ee pes ewe wee weg nant dean tee eam ERT eee et et ate ohm A AGA eet et te a Thee Re ete eee Uri Dak a eet ey de A weitere 10. The Commonwealth Constitution power has to exclude whether @n alien or not." So far as the application the order to review, I give I will reserve the costs. Nene ye te . ' + (? ~~ depends under th c any person, upon no relief. ground 3 of ene ed Aw ent eee fares sent CATCHWORDS Administrative Law - judicial review - whether decision to discontinue action vitiated by apparently generous offer to pay cests. evidence on matter veculiarly within knowledge of party. VISY BOARD PTY. LTD. v TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION VG No. 281 of 1683 Woodward J. Melbourne 22 December 1983 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION BETWEEN : ) ) ) VG No. ) ) VISY BOARD PTY. LTD. TRADE and PRACTICES COMMISSION JUDGE MAKING ORDER DATE OF ORDER WHERE MADE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: The application ORDER Woodward J. 22 December 1983 Melbourne be dismissed with costs. 281 of 1983 Applicant Respondent IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VG No. 281 of 1983 GENERAL DIVISION BETWEEN: VISY BOARD PTY. LTD. Applicant and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION Respondent CORAM: Woodward J. DATE: 22 December 1983 WOODWARD J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT This action, pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ('the ADJR Act'), relates to an application by the Trade Practices Commission ('TPC') for leave to discontinue proceedings it has brought under s.50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ('the TP Act'), to prevent the take-over of Fibre Containers Ltd. ('FCL') by APM Investments Pty. Ltd. ('APM'). That action has had a chequered career, involving a number of interlocutory applications, and there has been no hearing on the merits of the matter. Three of the interlocutory applications have related to attempts by parties other than APM to obtain release from undertakings given to the court, so that the principal shareholders in FCL ('Amatiil') could sell their shares to a rival bidder to APM, SCI Packaging Pty. Ltd. ('SCI'). The Board of Directors of Amatil has formally resolved that iat will not sell . : its shares to APM "at any time or in any circumstances or for any price". I refused the last of those applications on 15 November (where I dealt with the effect of the Amatil resolution) and an appeal was taken to a Full Court on 13 December. In the course of those proceedings counsel for FCL and Amatil offered to consent to judgment for injunctions to prevent Amatil selling to APM and offered also to pay the costs of TPC including any costs it might be ordered to pay to APM when it discontinued its action against that company. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned to enable the TPC to apply to a single judge in accordance with that offer, which it indicated it would accept. In the event the TPC has sought leave to discontinue against all parties, with an order for costs against FCL and Amatil. That application has been heard and I have reserved judgment. In the course of that hearing the present applicant sought leave to intervene, which was refused. At the same time it served and filed the present application under the ADJR Act, challenging the TPC's decision to discontinue its action against APM. It has not been disputed that the applicant, as a trade ; . competitor of APM, has standing to bring the action. Nor has it been contended that the decision in question cannot be challenged under the ADJR Act. The main contention of the applicant is that the decision to discontinue was vitiated because, in reaching 1t, the TPC wrongly took into consideration the offer to pay its costs. It was further argued that the decision was unlawful because 1t involved the TPC fettering its discretion as to its future actions. —- This second point can be disposed of quickly. In my view it has no substance because under ss.80 and 81 of the TP Act the TPC has a clear choice whether to proceed by way of application for an injunction to prevent a threatened takeover or to wait and see what happens in the market place and then move to secure appropriate divestiture. There 1s no reason in principle why it should not begin the former action, change its mind and discontinue, relying upon its right to sue for divestiture later if necessary. It would be a normal incidence of leave to discontinue in such a case that a Court would impose the condition that the applicant would not recommence the same action for an injunction. To offer such an undertaking does not represent a fettering of discretion when the matter is looked at within the overall scheme of the TP Act, and I believe that is the proper way to approach the issue. So far as the applicant's main contention 1s concerned, it alleges that 1t was an improper exercise of power within the meaning of s.5(1)(e) of the ADJR Act because the question of costs was an irrelevant consideration which was taken into account contrary to s.5(2)(a). It was said further that the TPC placed undue weight upon the decision of Amatil never to sell to APM. Although, as I said in my judgment of 15 November, that decision cannot be accepted without reservation in. the longer term, there is no reason why it should not be given great weight in the short term. In any event, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for TPC (in this context) and not a f2t subject for review. It was also argued that the TPC did not give any weight to its often-repeated view that a takeover by APM would be unlawful. However there is nothing to suggest that the TPC has resiled from this view. It has simply decided, as a matter of commercial reality, that APM almost certainly cannot acquire shares, and so the question of legitimacy of such a takeover cannot arise. There is, in my view, no substance in either of these subsidiary arguments of the applicant. It 1s not practicable for me in this judgment to give all the background to this matter which I set out in my judgment of 15 November in TPC v APM and Others (VG 84 of 1983). Suffice it to say that in the course of that hearing before me the TPC was urged, by parties other than APM, to take appropriate steps to pring the proceedings to an end because they had become academic and futile, since APM could not now acquire FCL shares. The TPC took no action at the time, or after considering my Judgment of 15 November in which I declined to put any pressure on TPC to terminate proceedings. When the appeal against my decision came before another Full Court on December 13, it was not surprising that the judges of that Court, coming fresh to this complex matter, started asking questions as to why the matter was proceeding, since all the parties other than APM, including the TPC, seemed convinced that APM could not acquire shares in FCL. It was against this background that FCL and Amatil made their offer to submit to judgment and pay costs, so as to bring the action to an end and thus terminate the undertakings, leaving them free to deal with SCI. In the event the TPC sought only discontinuance, no doubt because s.80(1) of the TP Act did not permit a consent judgment unless the Court could be satisfied that the facts justifying it had been established - and this was not possible without an extensive hearing. On the face of it, the TPC's decision to discontinue, an order that the ownership of FCL should first be determined in the market place and action against APM resumed only if, against all the odds, it succeeded in obtaining FCL shares, would seem entirely reasonable from the point of view of everyone except APM. That company has the right to argue against leave being given to discontinue and has done so forcefully in separate proceedings. But the present applicant maintains that the decision to discontinue represents a change of heart by TPC and that there 1s a strong inference from the sequence of events that the offer to pay costs played a part in this decision. It says that this view is supported by the way the matter was explained to me by counsel for the TPC when leave to discontinue was sought. Having carefully considered all the evidence, and the inferences I am asked to draw from that evidence, I find that I am left quite uncertain as to whether the offer to pay costs played any part in the decision of the commission. However I am inclined to the view that it did not. Certainly the offer was made at a critical time in the course of the Full Court hearing, when the Court, having indicated some reactions to the facts put before 1t, adjourned at lunch-time in the understanding that the parties would be considering their positions. I have little doubt that the offer was made in the hope that it would impress the Commission (and perhaps the Court) with the strength of feeling of FCL and Amatil about the matter, an@ also with the thought that it might just sway the balance of the TPC's judgment on the matter. I am not, however, satisfied that 1t was in fact taken into account by the TPC. It is clear from the transcript of the Full Court hearing that FCL and Amatil had filed and served a notice of motion seeking, in effect, an entry of judgment against themselves by way of permanent injunction. The possibility of such a judgment had been canvassed previously before me, but no such positive step had been taken. Alternatively an unqualified undertaking to the same effect was offered before the Full Court. It was also the first time that this had been done. Some time during the luncheon adjournment, costs must have been added to these offers. The Commission's decision to agree to the FCL and Amatil proposal must have been taken some time between the commencement of the luncheon adjournment and the time, not long after the Court resumed, when counsel announced the decision. It would be pure speculation on my part to assume that the offer for costs in fact played a role in that decision. As l said in my previous judgment of 15 November, the TPC had been urged to discontinue or to move for judgment by consent against FCL and Amatil, but had said that it would not do so, "at least until after this judgment has been delivered and considered". f went on to say, "No doubt the TPC has been influenced in this by the reasons for judgment of the Full Court [dismissing an earlier application for discharge of undertakings] and by a desire to carry out its responsibilities in as even-handed a way as possible." My judgment was entirely neutral as to the TPC's proper course, but it certainly did not dzuscourage the TPC from taking the kind of action it finally took. I said "I do not believe that I should say anything to influence it in the performance of its statutory functions ... I believe that the luncheon adjournment in the Full Court hearing represented a moment in time when the TPC could put off a decision no longer. Faced with a clear choice between a speedy resolution and a protracted hearing, with all eyes, including the Court's, on it, it had to decide. The basic and difficult decision was whether issues should be resolved first in the market place or in the Court. This was a complex matter which had already taken up my time on three occasions and was in the process of involving a Full Court for the second time. It called for a sensitive and highly responsible decision by the TPC. The TPC would clearly have been quite wrong to allow itself to be influenced in such an important decision by any generous or unusual offer to pay its costs. Much more important issues were at stake, involving very much larger sums of money and the future prosperity of several major companies. I can only say, as I have, that I am not satisfied that the TPC took such an obviously improper consideration as its own costs into account in making this vital decision. Certainly the offer must have been present to the mind of TPC when it made its decision. The packaged offer, inciuding costs, had just been made and it-must have been conscious of it. There was no reason in law or morality why the offer of costs, however generous (and this 1s a matter I deal with later), should not have been accepted. And it could hardly be said that the making of the offer automatically vitiated any decision favourable to FCL and Amatil which the TPC might then make. The sole question is whether or not the TPC allowed the offer to pay costs to influence the decision which it reached. I believe that in a case such as this, where the administrator cannot be required to give reasons (see ADJR Act Schedule 2 para (f)), the Court should not be astute to impute reasons that have not been stated. I have no doubt that, if the TPC had supplied a formal statement of its reasons, there would have been no reference to the subject of costs. And, on balance, I believe the genuine explanation for that would have been that costs played no part in the actual making of the decision. I nave been asked to infer, from the failure of the TPC to give evidence about its reasons, that the offer to pay costs was one of them. As Menzies J. said in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 278 at 312, ",.. when an inference is open from facts proved by direct evidence and the question 1s whether it should be drawn, the circumstance that the defendant disputing it might have proved the contrary had he chosen to give evidence 1s properly to be taken into account as a circumstance in favour of drawing the inference." I accept, of course, both the authority and what I might respectfully call the obvious good sense of this statement. But circumstances alter cases, and the weight to be attached to this consideration in a case which has been carefully prepared over a long period of time, or in which the relevant witness 1s in Court or readily available, may be much greater than in Other cases. -1ll- In this matter the application was filed and served on Thursday 15 December in the course of the hearing of the application for leave to discontinue to which it relates. An appearance was entered on Friday 16 December, the last day of term, and the hearing began and ended on Tuesday 20 December. The Trade Practices Commission has its head office in Canberra and the hearing was held in Melbourne. It was only as the hearing > : developed on Tuesday 20 December that the fundamental importance of the question of costs to the applicant's case became clear. The TPC is absolved from stating its reasons in such cases by the ADJR Act. Although I have been troubled by the failure of the TPC to put evidence before me on the matter, when I take into account all the circumstances of the hearing I fand that the applicant has still failed to satisfy me that the TPC did in fact take the payment of its costs into account in reaching its decision. Of course the TPC was—entitled to have regard to the very large costs which would have been incurred by itself and others 1f the hearing had proceeded pointlessly. The difficulty about the costs offered was that the TPC would not have been able to obtain them, as events turned out, if they had not been offered. However the situation is more complex than this bald statement suggests. When the offer was made and accepted, an uncontested judgment against FCL and Amatil was in contemplation. If no agreement about costs had been reached, TPC would have had a -12- respectable argument that costs should follow the event. It was only the next day, when it became clear that such a judgment was inappropriate and probably unobtainable, that the decision to apply for leave to discontinue against all parties was reached. The TPC assumed that the offer to pay costs stood, but it was only in the course of the hearing before me on 15 December that counsel for FCL and Amatil confirmed that this was so. e At that point what I might call the generosity of the offer to pay costs stood out in stark relief for the first time. The applicant has relied upon the way in which counsel for the TPC put to me, on 18 December, the circumstances leading up to the application to discontinue. It is true that counsel referred to "several very significant events", one of which was that "three propositions were put [to the Full Court] by senior counsel representing FCL and Amatil". These three propositions were a willingness to give undertakings, an offer to consent to judgment, and the offer to pay costs. However counsel did not describe any of these matters as constituting reasons for the TPC decision. What he said on that subject was "Now, the position that has been reached is that I am instructed the Commmission is of the view, or our submission to your Honour is, that if Amatil were to remain firm in its resolution, by that I mean its general resolve not to sell to APM under any circumstances, then it would obviously be unnecessary for the Commission to continue proceedings against APM to restrain it from acquiring shares which would not be available to it. So the question then 1s what view does one take of Amatil's resolve in that respect? In theory, of course, as has been said on a number of occasions and must be right, that short of an order of the court, it must be open to the directors to change their mind, but having regard to the events which I have described, and most especially the events of this week ...... the Trade Practices Commission accepts that as a matter of commercial reality - and we submit to your Honour fhat as a matter of commercial reality - Amatil will not sell its shares to APM. I am instructed to inform the Court that in recognition of what the Commission perceives to be the commercial reality of the situation the Commission no longer wishes to continue its proceedings to restrain APM. If I might be permitted to paraphrase words that were used by his Honour Mr Justice Sweeney on Tuesday, the Commission's position now is that it accepts that there is no longer a commercial possibility of Amatil selling to APM and thus there is no commercial possibility of APM infringing the Act. It will not be put into a position where 1t can. The result therefore should be that the proceedings should be brought to an end. The Commission no longer seeks an injunction because to seek an injunction, in_our submission, would be to seek to restrain APM from doing what has become a commercial impossibility. Now my learned friend Mr Shaw [counsel for APM], and perhaps even more strongly my learned friend Mr Merkel [counsel for Visy Board Pty. Ltd.], might seek to argue that the Commission is wrong in its assessment, but the Commission has reached the point where it 158 desired to put to your Honour that commercial reality should prevail and, in our submission, the commercial reality, upon the assessment that has been made by my clients, is that it would indeed be pointless to seek to pursue an injunction in relation to something that is not going to happen." I believe that, on a fair reading of the material before me, that passage contains the reasons of TPC for its decision. I believe they were genuine reasons, responsibly arrived at after a great deal of careful consideration both of the circumstances of the case and of what had been said by the Court, variously constituted. As I have said earlier, I believe that the final decision was made at a time when pressure on the TPC was mounting and it could delay a decision no further. This explains its timing. The applicant has failed to satisfy me that the decision was based on any improper consideration. Accordingly the application should be dismissed, with costs. I certify that this and the 13 preceding pages are a true and accurate copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of The Hon. Mr. Justice Woodward ociate . Dated: 22 December 1983