Kavvadias, Dimitrious v Commonwealth Ombudsman [1984] FCA 53
Federal Court of Australia
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALZS DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G429 of 1983
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
DIMITRIOUS KAVVADIAS
Applicant
AND:
COMMONWEALTH' OMBUDSMAN
Respondent
c ORRIGENODA
Amendment to the judgment of the Court of 23 March 1984.
Page 1i Line 1: Insert the following before the "provision
"Ombudsman in s.35A. There 1s certainly no
absolute or final".
Ft,
Associate to Mr. Justice Fox
DATED: 6 April 1984
CATCHWORDS
Administrative Law - Freedom of Information ~ Appeal from
Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Whether document exempt under
s.38 of Freedom of Information Act 1982 ~ Whether Ombudsman Act +
1976 prohibits disclosure of information of the kind contained in
document.
Freedom of Information Act 1982 - ss.1l, 38, 41, 45.
Ombudsman Act 1976 - ss.4(2), 5(1), 8(2), 12(3), 35, 35A.
Ombudsman Amendment Act 1983
DIMITRIOUS KAVVADIAS v. COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN
No. G429 of 1983
Bowen C.d., Fox and Sheppard JJ.
23 March 1984
Sydney.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTPY ) No. G429 of 1983
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN :
DIMITRIOUS KAVVADTAS
Applicant
AND:
COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN
Respondent
ORDER
JUDGES : Bowen C.J., Fox and Sheppard JJ.
DATE OF ORDER: 23 March 1984
WHERE MADE: Sydney
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Tribunal be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for further
hearing.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G429 of 1983
wee we
GENERAL DIVISTON
ON APPEAL FROM THE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN :
DIMITRIOUS KAVVADTAS
Applicant
AND:
COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN
Respondent
CORAM: BOWEN C.J., FOX AND SHEPPARD JJ.
DATE: 23 March 1984
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BOWEN C.J., FOX AND SHEPPARD JJ.
This appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
concerns the question whether a draft report made by the
Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to certain complaints made to
him is exempt from access under the provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act 1982. In these proceedings before us exemption
is claimed under s.38 of the Act, which is as follows:
2.
"38. A document is an exempt document if there is in
force an enactment applying specifically to information
of a kind contained in the document and prohibiting
persons referred to in the enactment from disclosing
information of that kind, whether the prohibition is
absolute or is subject to exceptions or qualifications."
The draft report is a document held on a file desiqnated
$2/507, that file being described in the evidence as follows:
"This file comprises four sequential parts and five annex
files containing supplementary material. It relates to
the Ombudsman's investigation of a complaint by Dr
Lucire about the actions of the Department of Social
Security in relation to the cancellation of invalid
pensions."
(Attachment B to letter of Ombudsman and letter of
Acting Senior Assistant Ombudsman, dated 10 March 1983.)
The enactment said to apply "specifically to information
of a kind contained in the document" (vide s.38 above) is the
Ombudsman Act 1976. There were extensive amendments to this Act
made by Act No. 61 of 1983. Except for some provisions not
material to the present case, the amending Act came into force on
12 October 1983. The decision of the Tribunal was given on 2
November 1983, but the reasons given were based on the unamended
Act and no reference was made to the amendments. Apparently
counsel did not draw the attention of the Tribunal to them. The
result is that in part, the Tribunal applied the wrong statutory
provisions. In' these reasons we refer to, and set out relevant
provisions of the Ombudsman Act 1976 as amended:
"A. wee
3.
(2) The functions of the Commonwealth Ombudsman are
to investigate complaints made to him under this Act and
to perform such other functions as are conferred on him
by this Act."
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"5, (1) Subject to this Act, the Ombudsman -
(a) shall investigate action, being action that
relates to a matter of administration, taken
either before or after the commencement of this
Act by a Department, or by a prescribed
authority, and in respect of which a complaint
has been made to the Ombudsman;"
"Be eee
(2) An investigation under this Act shall be
conducted in private and, subject to this Act, in such
Manner as the Ombudsman thinks fit."
"12. wos
(3) Where the Ombudsman completes an investigation of
action taken by a Department or by aie prescribed
authority in respect of which a complaint has been made
to him, the Ombudsman shall, in such manner and at such
times as he thinks fit, furnish to the complainant and
to the Department or authority particulars of the
investigation."
"35. ...
(2) Subject to this section, an officer shall not,
either directly or indirectly, and either while he is,
or after he ceases to be, an officer, make a record of,
or divulge or communicate to any person, any information
acquired by him by reason of his being an officer, being
information that was disclosed or obtained under the
provisions of this Act, including information furnished
by the Ombudsman of a State or information disclosed to
or obtained by the Commonwealth Ombudsman in the
exercise of a power of the Ombudsman of a State
delegated to him as provided by sub-section 34(7).
Penalty: $500.
4.
(3) Sub-section (2) does not prevent an officer -
(a) from making a record of, or divulging or
'communicating to any person, information acquired
by him in the performance of his duties as an
officer for purposes connected with the exercise
of the powers and the performance of the
functions of the Ombudsman under this Act: or
(b) from divulging or communicating information to a
person -
(i) if the information was furnished by an
officer of a Department or prescribed
authority in the performance of his
duties as such an officer - with the
consent of the principal officer of the
Department or authority or of the
responsible Minister; or
(ii) 1f the information was furnished by a
person otherwise than as set out in
sub-paragraph (i) - with the consent of
the person who furnished the information.
(4) Subject to sub-section (5), sub-section (2) does
not prevent the Ombudsman or a Deputy Ombudsman from
disclosing, in a report made under this Act, such
matters as, in his opinion, ought to be disclosed in the
course of setting out the grounds for the conclusions
and recommendations contained in the report.
(5) Where the Attorney-General furnishes to the
Ombudsman a certificate in writing certifying that -
(a) the disclosure of information or documents
concerning a specified matter or matters included
in a specified class of matters: or
(b) the disclosure of a specified document or of
documents included in a specified class of
documents ,-
would, for a reason specified in the certificate, being
a reason referred to in paragraph 9(3)(a),(b),(c) or
(a), be contrary to the public interest, an officer
shall not, either directly or indirectly and either
while he is. or after he ceases to be, an officer,
except as provided in sub-section (6) -
(c) divulge or communicate to any person any
information acquired by him under the provisions
of this Act concerning such a matter or sucha
document ;
5.
(d) divulge or communicate any of the contents of
such a document to any person; or
(e) furnish such a document, or a copy of, or an
extract from, such a document, to any person.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.
{6) Sub-section (5) does not prevent an officer. in
the performance of his duties as an officer -
(a) from divulging or communicating information
referred to in that sub-section to another
officer;
(b) from furnishing any of the contents of, a copy of
or an extract from a document referred to in that
sub-section to another officer; or
(c) from returning such a document that has been
produced to him to the person lawfully entitled
to the custody of the document.
(7) Subject to sub-section (7A), where the Ombudsman
proposes, for purposes connected with the exercise of
his powers or performance of his functions under this
Act, to furnish information, or to send a document, or a
copy of, or extract from, a document, to the Ombudsman
of a State, the Ombudsman shall satisfy himself that a
law of the State makes provision corresponding to the
provision made by this section with respect to the
confidentiality of information acquired by the Ombudsman
of the State.
(7A) Sub-section (7) does not apply in relation to
any information or document obtained by the Ombudsman in
the exercise of a power of the Ombudsman of the State
that the Ombudsman was authorized to exercise in
pursuance of sub-section 34(7).
(8) A person who is or has been an officer is not
compellable, in any proceedings before a court (whether
exercising federal jurisdiction or not) or before a
person authorized by a law of the Commonwealth or of a
State or Territory, or by consent of parties, to hear,
receive and examine evidence, to disclose any
information acquired by him by reason of his being or
having been an officer, being information that was
disclosed or obtained under the provisions of this Act.
35A. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be taken to
preciude the Ombudsman from disclosing information, or
6.
making a statement, to any person or to the public or a
section of the public with respect to the performance of
the functions of, or an investigation by, the Ombudsman
under this Act if, in the opinion of the Ombudsman, it
is in the interests of any Department, prescribed
authority or person, or is otherwise in the public
interest, so to disclose that information or to make
that statement.
(2) The Ombudsman shall not disclose information or
make a statement under sub-section (1) with respect toa
particular investigation where the disclosure of that
information, or the making of that statement, is likely
to interfere with the carrying out of that or any other
investigation or the making of a report under this Act.
(3) The Ombudsman shall not, in disclosing
information or making a statement under sub-section (1)
with respect to a particular investigation -
(a) set out opinions that are, either expressly or
impliedly, critical of a Department, prescribed
authority or person unless the Ombudsman has
complied with sub-section 8(5) in relation to the
investigation; or
(b) disclose the name of a complainant or any other
matter that would enable a complainant to be
identified unless it is fair and reasonable in
all the circumstances to do so.
(4) This section has effect notwithstanding
sub-section 8(2) and section 35 (other than sub-section
(5) of that section)."
The right to obtain access to a document is found in
s.1l of the Freedom of Information Act ("the Act") which is as
follows:
"11. Subject to this Act, every person has a legally
enforceable right to obtain access in accordance with
this Act to -
(a) a document of an agency, other than an exempt
document; or
(b) an official document of a Minister. other than an
exempt document."
7.
The extent to which this provision overcomes or affects
specific provisions in other enactments prohibiting the
disclosure of documents or information is a matter which will
have to be decided when the other enactments fall for
consideration. Obviously, s.38 is a section designed to relate
the operation of the Act to other legislation. This is done by ao
general provision, intended, one assumes, to avoid the necessity
of referring to each piece of legislation. The respondent,
arguing in support of the decision of the Tribunal. submits that
s.38 applies to the Ombudsman Act. To achieve the inter-relation
particular reliance is placed on s.35 of the Ombudsman Act, but
the whole tenor of that Act is called in aid. The Tribunal found
that there was in effect a code in the Ombudsman _ Act,
constituting a prohibition within the meaning of s.38.
We do not have precise information about the contents of
the draft report here in question. It has been accepted that it
is a document to which the Ombudsman Act applies, and to which,
if it is not an exempt document, access will have to be given.
Since the present case was argued before us, a Full
Court of this Court, constituted by Bowen C.J., St. John and
Fisher JdJ., has delivered judgment in a similar case, raising
virtually the same considerations concerning the construction and
operation of s.38 (The News Corporation Limited v. National
Companies and Securities Commission, unreported, 1 March 1984).
We are thus relieved from the necessity of discussing the matter
8.
as fully as we otherwise would have done. Nevertheless, out of
respect for the submissions addressed to us, we will deal briefly
with them.
It is not in our view a correct approach to the question
raised to examine separately a few words of the relevant sections -
of the Act and to attempt a mosaic of chosen meanings of then.
For present purposes, the prohibition is to be found. if at all,
by considering the totality of ss. 35 and 35A. Attention has
been directed principally to sub-s.35(2), and it is undoubtedly
of major importance. However, it is expressed to be "subject to
this section" and in any event its operation is qualified by
sub~-s.35A(4) which says that that section has effect
notwithstanding s.35 (other than sub-s.35(5)).
Section 38 of the Act deals with information in a
document. We do not doubt that what is in the document,
including indications of its source, and how it came into the
possession of the person who has it, is ail information in the
sense of s.38. It may be thought adequate for the purposes of
the section that the enactment to which it refers should prohibit
disclosure of information by reference to it having been received
by officers in the course of their duty. Such a prohibition
would say nothing directly as to the kind of information in
question, which, depending upon the role of the officers, may be
of a very wide, almost limitless nature.
9.
It seems to us that s.38 requires that there be a more
direct and explicit reference to the nature of the information
itself. Information is the commodity being dealt with in the
Act, not the discipline or integrity of officers. Bowen C.J. and
Fisher J. in their joint judgment in The News Corporation Case
expressed much the same thought as follows:
"We are firmly of the opinion that s.38 expressly and
intentionally directs attention to the nature of the
information contained in the document and not to the
capacity of the person who has received the
information."
Moreover, to apply s.38 in the way suggested, would be largely to
destroy the objects of the Act. It is said in sub-s.3(1) that
its object "is to extend as far as possible the right of the
Australian community to access to information in the possession
of the Government of the Commonwealth". In the public interest,
there are numerous long-standing provisions which preclude the
disclosure of information (in documentary form or otherwise)
received by officers of the Government and its agencies, but to
hold that they are all prohibitions within the meaning of the Act
is plainly not intended. As we have already noted, effect is to
be given to s.1l.
If there is an apparent conflict between s.11 and some
other provisions of the law, it will have to be resolved
according to ordinary principles. Section 11 is expressed to be
subject to the Act and there are many provisions of the Act which
10.
would go to maintain the policy against disclosure displayed in
other enactments. Section 38 is one of these. As we have
already intimated, it seems, obviously enough, to be designed to
avoid identifying in a list a number of existing enactments, and
also the necessity of adding to the list from time to time by
amendment. Reference to the other sections of the Act dealing
with exempt documents, such as, for example, s.41, dealing with
protection where personal privacy is concerned, or s.45, dealing
with protection where confidentiality is involved, shows at the
one time that the policy of other Acts in relevant respects is
preserved, and that this is done by the operation of the Act.
The scope of other provisions restraining disclosure by officers
is not to be given an expansive construction so that they are
brought within s.38.
So far as concerns the provisions found in s.35 and
$.352 of the Ombudsman Act, it seems to us that the range of
information there dealt with is qualified only by the fact that
the Ombudsman has it in documentary form. His duty is to
investigate, and what he may regard as relevant to an
investigation cannot sensibly be comprehended as a genus. To say
that it is of a kind that the Ombudsman acquired or has is not
only uninstructive, it is a misuse of lanquage.
It is further to be noted that there are not only the
relaxations of the prohibition set out in s.35 of the Ombudsman
Act, there is the wide discretion to disclose given to the
ll.
provision imposing a relevant prohibition (we leave aside the
special situation under sub-s.35(5) which relates to a
certificate being given by the Attorney-General). It is
unnecessary for this case to determine whether there being a
qualified prohibition only, there is a prohibition within the
meaning of s.38. 3
In the result we are of the view that s.38 does not
avail the Ombudsman. For reasons which we think are sufficiently
apparent from what we have said, it is also our view that the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act, read as a whole, cannot be taken
as constituting a code which brings s.38 into operation.
Doubtless, if it is thought that the investigations of the
Ombudsman should be free from the operation of the Freedom of
Information Act appropriate legislative attention will be given
to the matter. Other sections, notably s.36 (internal working
documents) were relied upon before the Tribunal, but because of
its view of s.38, it was not necessary for it to deal with these.
It was agreed that in the event of a different view of s.38 being
taken in this Court, the matter should be remitted to the
Tribunal for further hearing, and this we will do.
At the request of the parties made at the hearing, we
postpone the making of an order for costs, so that, if desired,
—~ ~:
rt.
IT certify that this and the ten (10)
preceding pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of the
Court.
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ZA March IGS
we can be addressed on that subje
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