CATCHWORDS REPATRIATION - pension payable toa dependants - death of former member of the Forces from astrocytoma right cerebral hemisphere - aetiology of cerebral astrocytoma unknown - whether astrocytoma "connected with" war service - failure of Commission and Tribunal to implement the statutory process - no proper investigation of claim - error of law. Repatriation Act, 1920 - ss. 47(2), 48, 101, 107Vg, 107VH, 1LO7VH(2) REPATRIATION COMMISSION v. NANCY MARY CAMPRELI, (QLD G2 OF 1984) FITZGERALD J. BRISBANE 30 MARCH 1984 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA } QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD 2 of 1984 GENERAL DIVISION ) BETWEEN : REPATRIATION COMMISSION Applicant AND: NANCY MARY CAMPBELL Respondent ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER: FITZGERALD d. DATE OF ORDER: WHERE MADE: 30 MARCH 1984 BRISBANE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. 2. The appeal be allowed. The decision of the Repatriation Review Tribunal given on 12 December 1983 be set aside. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law after the hearing of appropriate further evidence. The Repatriation Commission pay to the respondent her costs in connection with the appeal to be taxed if not agreed upon. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD 2 of 1984 GENERAL DIVISTON ) BETWEEN: REPATRIATION COMMISSION Applicant AND: NANCY MARY CAMPBELL Respondent FITZGERALD J. 30 MARCH 1984 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The Repatriation Commission has appealed from a decision of the Repatriation Review Tribunal given on 12 December 1983. The Tribunal set aside a decision of a delegate of the Repatriation Commission made on 12 August 1983 and substituted for that decision a decision that the Commonwealth is liable, pursuant to $.101 of the Repatriation Act 1920 ("the Act"), to pay to the dependants of Lawrence Cyril Campbell the pension payable in accordance with Division 1 of Part III of the Act in the case of the death of a member of the Forces with effect on and from 14 March 1983. This ig still another of the numerous cases brought to this Court in which it is contended that a body appointed by the Act to determine claims under the Act has erred in law in the application of the statutory requirement that the claim he allowed unless the adjudicating body is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there are insufficient grounds for granting the claim: sub-ss. 47(2) and 107VH(2). The primary cause of Mr Campbell's death was astrocytoma right cerebral hemisphere. The cause of Mr Campbell's astrocytoma is unknown. The only dispute concerns the Tribunal's conclusion that it was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Campbell's death was not or might not have been "connected with" his war service in a way which satisfied s.101 of the Act. Mr Campbell was knocked down by a car on 12 April 1943 during his war service. It seems to have been accepted that trauma may cause cerebral astrocytoma. However, the Tribunal held that the head injury which he then suffered was not related to the development of the incapacity which caused his death. It did not explain the basis of that conclusion other than to say that it accepted the medical evidence that theré was no relationship. There was no exoress consideration given to the possibility that Mr Campbell might have suffered some other trauma during his war service. However, there was medical 'evidence dealing with Mr Campbell's head injury in his accident which was equally applicable to any trauma during that period. Mr Campbell's war service concluded on 30 August 1946. There was evidence from Mrs Campbell that her husband had suffered from headaches for very many years since the war. The Tribunal gave no indication whether it accepted or rejected that evidence. Apart from the evidence of Mrs Campbell concerning her husband's headaches, there was evidence that Mr Campbell had significant headaches for at least four years prior to his death on 30 October 1975. There was no evidence that there were other symptoms suggestive of astrocytoma until April 1975. A departmental medical officer prepared a report pursuant to 5.48 of the Act. There is nothing to indicate that he was aware of Mrs Campbell's evidence concerning her hushand's headaches. In any event, it is clear that the Tribunal was unimpressed with the departmental medical officer's opinions. The departmental medical officer's report suffers the common vice that it contains some passages which are mere assertions of generalised and unreasoned conclusions which car. add nothing to such opinions, if any, as are elsewhere expressed and explained: cf. Miller v. Minister of Pensions £19471 2 All E.R. 372,374. See also Mansfield v. Minister of Pensions C19473 1 W.P.A.R. 489, 493. Even when he did deacend to detail, the departmental medical officer failed to address himself fully to the correct issues. In dealing with the period which had elapsed since Mr 'Campbell's war service, he concerned himself with the maximum possible period between the development or the manifestation of symptoms of a cerebral astrocytoma ana diagnosis, and concentrated his attention on excluding the possibility that "the tumor could have developed during or been first manifested during his war service". His report did not address the possibility that a cerebral astrocytoma might not develop or the symptoms might not become manifest until after war service although caused or contributed to by war service. In dealing with the departmental medical officer's report, the Tribunal said: ",..evidence has been given in cases before the Full Federal Court and the High Court concerning the development of cancers, and this evidence is to the effect that there can be a long lead time between an initial insult to acell and the actual diagnosis of the cancer. It 1s admitted that the cause of the disease is unknown, and the Tribunal cannot see how it can truly be said that time lapse since war service has excluded war service from being involved in the initial insult;" While I do not suggest that in an appropriate case the Tribunal can never have regard to material not proved before it in respect of the particular claim (see ss. 107VG and 107VH), there are obvious limitations, including the need, required by natural justice,that those affected be given an opportunity to comment. In Repatriation Commission v. Evans, unreported judgment delivered on 21 December 1983, the Tribunal relied on evidence given in Lennell. Northrop J. said: "The Court does not know whether any member of the Tribunal possesses specialist medical skill or qualifications which would enable it to determine the relevance of the evidence. In the absence of such medical expertise, due caution should be exercised and, in my opinion, the evidence should not he regarded as relevant of atself. It is true that inevitably the Tribunal will acquire through practice a degree of understanding of these matters. Indeed, the evidence led in re Lennell was familiar to the members of the Tribunal and had been applied in a number of cases. However, mere familiarity does not of itself amount to expertise or skill and the reference to the evidence ted in that case, rather than to the general medical propositions, may indicate a lack of such expertise in the Tribunal such that it should, in exercising due caution, have placed no reliance on that evidence." 4a The Tribunal's approach in the present case also contains other difficulties. The departmental medical officer's report noted that Mr Campbell was in the age group which showed the highest incidence of cerebral astrocytomas in adult life. The Trinunal said, quite correctly in my view, that that did not prove that Mr Campbell's astrocytoma could not have been connected with war service - the "not" was omitted, obviously by inadvertence, from the Tribunal's reasons. However, it does not fallow that the fact that Mr Campbell was 1n the age group which showed the highest incidence of cerebral astrocytomas in adult life was not an appropriate factor to be brought into account by the Tribunal with other matters (inciuding the period which had elavsed since Mr 'Campbell's war service) in arriving at its conclusion. Further, the Tribunal did not discuss or make any express finding in relation to the evidence of Professar John H. Tyrer, Head of the Department of Medicine, University of Queensland. Professor Tyrer thought that the possibility that a head injury during Mr Campbell's war service might have been a factor in the subsequent development of a cerebral astrocytoma was "extremely remote". However, there is nothing to indicate whether Professor Tyrer was made aware of Mrs Campbell's evidence that her husband had suffered from headaches for very many yeacs since the war. As is by no means uncommon, a specific possibility connected with war service, namely that Mr Campbeil's cerebral astrocytoma may have been caused or contributed to by a particular trauma during the war, was impermissibly allowed ta become the central if not the sole issue, and most at least of the medical experts' attention was concentrated on the incident in which Mr Campbell was struck by a car in 1943. Were it the case that cerebral astrocytoma must always be traced to trauma, for the reasons which I have mentioned the expert evidence might have been a questionable basis for excluding trauma during the war as a real possibility, particularly without any investigation directed to establishing whether there was any other trauma at another time which could have caused Mr Campbelli's astrocytoma. In any event, the Repatriation Commission could contend at most that the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the cause of the astrocytoma was not a trauma during Mr Campbell's war service. It is unnecessary to consider that further because it is insufficient. The Tribunal did not refer to any evidence before it concerning whether cerebral astrocytoma could be caused other than by trauma but it was apparently convinced of that possibility. It said: ",..no mention has been made of all the other causes of So far as can b Professor Tyrer n any direct opini trauma can cause concerning the manifestation of death and there connection between astrocytoma, eith particular. The Tribu "ee aif evidence the pres service a This is discharge caused by astrocytoma." e told from the Tribunal's ceasons, neither or the departmental medical officer expressed on concerning what, if anything, other than or contribute to cerebral astracytoma ocr possible period until the development or symptoms of that incapacity and/or resultant was no exploration of the possibility of a war service (apart from trauma) and cerebral er generally or in Mr Camrbell's case in mal said: the Commission fails to produce to disprove beyond reasonable doubt ence of a relationship between war nd death, the claim must be granted. a heavy burden for the Commission to , especially where the death is disease of unknown aetiology." \ Later it described the issue as being: ",.. notwithstanding that the cause of the disease Which led to the member's death is unknown, has the Commission demonstrated beyond reasonabie doubt that the cause could not have been related to war service." The Tribunal's conclusion was expressed as follows: "Having considered the evidence in its entirety, the Tribunal finds that the cause of Mr Campbell's astrocytoma, which was the cause of his death, is unknown. The cause being unknowm, the Tribunal, for the reasons set out above, 1s not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the possibility of a velationship between his death and his war service has been excluded." On che state of the material as it appears from the Tribunal''s decision, 1t was not an adequate performance by the Tribunal of its statutory function to proceed on the footing that the proceedings were adversary and the Commiss~on had failed to discharge the onus upon it. There was no proper investigation of the claim. Insofar as it could be said that, on the material, the Tribunal could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, whatever the cause of Mr Campbell's astrocytoma, it was not "connected with" war service, that inability presently stems not from the material but from the failure of the Commission and the Tribunal to implement the statutory process. For reasons which I have given in Repatriation Commission v. Williams, judgment delivered today, it follows that the Tribunal's decision 1s affected by error of law. The Court orders that the appeal be allowed, the decision appealed from be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according ta law after the hearing of appropriate further evidence, and that the Repatriation Commission pay to the respondent her costs in connection with the appeal to be taxed if not agreed upon. hoes ES ine webs El caritfy that this and the & Préceding >) a Pages ere @ true copy of the reasons for judgment hevem of His Honour Mr. Justice F; . tzgerald Js AsSociate Dated SO 3 fi