Parsons, Hugh v Ad Astra Properties Pty Ltd & ors [1984] FCA 127
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Trade Practices ~- Application for Interlocutory Relief - Stay of
Proceedings in County Court of Victoria - Removal of Proceedings
from County Court to Federal Court - Power to Grant Orders -
Discretion to Grant Orders.
Trade Practices Act 1974 - ss. 52{1), 53A
HUGH PARSONS v. AD ASTRA PROPERTIES PTY. LTD. AND ORS.
No. VG116 of 1984
Jenkinson J.
Melbourne
14 May 1984
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG 116 of 1984
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: HUGH PARSONS
Applicant
AND: AD ASTRA PROPERTIES PTY. LTD.
Firstnamed Respondent
AND: BERNARD BRESLIN SPENCE
~ ROBERTSON
Secondnamed Respondent
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GRANT ROBERTSON
Thirdnamed Respondent
CORAM: Jenkinson J.
PLACE: Melbourne
DATE: 14 May, 1984
REASONS- FOR JUDGMENT
-
Application for an order restraining the first respondent
from prosecuting an action pending in the County Court of Victoria
until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.
By a summons issued on 13. December 1982 the first
respondent claimed against the applicant moneys alleged to be due
for rent and under other covenants of a lease of part of a
building by the first respondent to the applicant for a term of 7
years commencing on 1 July 1981. On 8 April 1983 the applicant
was granted leave to defend the action. The action is fixed for
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trial next Thursday. By application filed 1 May 1984 the
applicant claimed in this proceeding, in respect of conduct of the
second and third respondents on behalf of the first respondent
which is alleged to have been done in contravention of ss. 52(1)
and 53A of the Trade Practices Act 1974, damages and an order
varying the lease. The variation claimed is of a clause which
provides for annual adjustment of the amount of rent in accordance
with variation in a price index published by the Australian Bureau
of Statistics. The clause is so drawn that the variation is
calculated by reference to the amount payable for rent in the
month immediately preceding the commencement of the year in
respect of which the variation is to apply. In respect of the
first year of the term the rent was $5,220, payable not by equal
monthly instalments of one twelfth of that sum, but, to quote the
relevant provisions of the lease, "in the following manner:
nii for the period Ist July 1981 to 19th October
1981;
{b) $226.96 for the period 20th October 1981 to
3list October 1981; and
(ca) $624.13 per calendar month for the balance of
the first year of the term.
The rental thereafter shall be revised as in Item
10 of this Schedule provided.
The first rental payment shall be made on or before
the 20th October 1981 and thereafter on the Ist day
of each month during the term and any extension
thereof."
"Item 10" is the clause prescribing the method by which variation
of the annual rent is to be calculated. The applicant contends,
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and the respondents deny, that he was misled by conduct of the
second and third respondents into the belief that the lease he was
executing made provision for ascertainment of the rent payable in
respect of the year commencing 1 July 1982 by reference, not to
the $624.13 payable on 1 June 1982, but to one twelfth of $5,220,
namely $418.33. The respondents contend, but the applicant
denies, that express oral agreement on the point was reached
before the lease was sent to the applicant for execution and that
the executed lease gives faithful expression' to that oral
agreement.
The circumstances which the allegations of the applicant
disclose, no less than the circumstances which the allegations of
the second and third respondents disclose, hardly admit of the
supposition that it may hereafter be found that there had been a
contravention of s.52(1) and s.53A, whereby the applicant was
induced to execute the lease, but that there had not been such "a
degree of sharp practice" on the part of a director of the first
respondent as would result in rectification of the lease in
. exercise of the equitable jurisdiction conferred by s.42(d) of the
County Court Act 1958, were that jurisdiction invoked: Johnstone
v. Commerce Consolidated Pty. Ltd. [1976] V.R. 463, 724. If the
jurisdiction of that Court under s.42(d) were exceeded "in point
of ammount", s.63 of the County Court Act 1958 could be invoked.
It does not appear that the jurisdiction of the County Court to
rectify the lease has been invoked by the applicant. The
applicant has for more than a year failed to seek any curial
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relief in respect of the mistaken, as he alleges it was, execution
by him of the lease. But the powers of the County Court are
adequate to enable justice to be done, even to so dilatory a
litigant as the applicant : see ss. 45, 49 and 78 of the County
Court Act 1958 and the County Court Rujes. Costs estimated by the
first respondent's solicitor at $1,700 have been incurred by the
first respondent in the County Court action. -
: "The first and paramount consideration in the exercise
of" the discretionary power conferred on me to prevent the first
respondent from proceeding to trial of the County Court action
until further order "is to do what is best in the interests of the
litigants" : Bargal Pty. Ltd. v. Force (1983) 57 A.L.d.R. 731 at
744. I think that the application should be refused. In the
event, which I think to be very unlikely, that the learned County
Court judge who tries the action finds facts which may afford the
applicant an entitlement to.~relief which can be granted in
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by s.86 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974, but is unable to give in the exercise of the
jurisdiction conferred on him relief which does justice between
the parties, I have no reason to doubt that he would afford the
applicant an opportunity to make a further application to this
court before pronouncing judgment in the action. If I accede to
the present application substantial costs already incurred in the
County Court action will be thrown away, even if the respondents,
two of whom are not parties to that action, were willing to
consent to the use in this court's proceeding of documents filed
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in that action.
The orders claimed in the originating application by way
of interlocutory relief are:
"1. An order for a stay of the proceedings of the
County Court until the trial of this action.
2. An order that proceedings in the County Court
be removed into this Honourable Court for
~ hearing and determination.
3. An order that a date for hearing this
application be fixed forthwith.
4. An order that this application proceed
without further pleadings and without further
interlocutory steps."
I shall treat the claim numbered 1 as a claim for interlocutory
restraint of the parties to the County Court action from
proceeding in the action. There is of course no power in this
court to direct to the County- Court or to any of its judges or
officers any order of the kind claimed in paragraph 1 or 2.
It is ordered that each of the applicant's claims for
interlocucory relief specified in the application originating this
proceeding be dismissed and- that the applicant pay the
respondents' costs of the application for that interlocutory
relief and that the summons for directions be adjourned to a date
to be fixed by any party upon written notice to each other party
and that no defence be filed or served until further order.
I certify that this and the four (4) preceding pages are a true copy
of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Mr. Justice
Jenkinson.
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