a. ee CATCHWORDS Practice - Leave to appeal out of time from Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Relevant considerations. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, sub-s.44(2A). ANTON _SULISTYANTO SUKARNO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS N.S.W. G 196 of 1984 CORAM: Bowen C.J., Sheppard and Morling J.J. 29 June 1984 Sydney. IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G 196 of 1984 GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL BETWEEN : ANTON SULISTYANTO SUKARNO Applicant THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS Respondent ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER: Bowen C.J., Sheppard and Morling J.J. DATE OF ORDER: 29 June 1984 WHERE MADE: Sydney. THE COURT ORDERS THAT: - The application be dismissed. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G 196 of 1984 ied GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL BETWEEN : ANTON SULISTYANTO SUKARNO Applicant ee — AND: THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS Respondent CORAM: Bowen C.J., Sheppard and Morling J.J. 29 June 1984 EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT THE COURT: This is an application by Anton Sulistyanto Sukarno for an order extending the time for appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, constituted by Beaumont J., given on 24 February 1984. The Tribunal decided that a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs that the applicant be deported from Australia be affirmed. The time for appeal which is fixed by sub-s.44(2A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 is 28 days from the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision of the Tribunal is furnished to the person concerned or within such further time as the Federal Court of Australia, whether before or after the expiration of that day, allows. 2. The applicant comes to us approximately four months after the date on Which the Tribunal's decision was conveyed to hin. In the circumstances of this particular case two matters arise for consideration. First, whether the reasons he has shown for his delay are such as to excuse the delay and would justify us in allowing him to institute an appeal beyond the time set down by the statute. The second question is whether the applicant has demonstrated that his appeal may have sufficient prospects of success to make it just that he should now be 7) allowed to proceed with it. As to the first question the evidence is somewhat sketchy but in the result we would take the view that in the circumstances of this case, the applicant should not, by his delay, be shut out from appealing if there appears to be substance in his appeal. As to the second question, Counsel for the applicant appears to us to have advanced every argument which may usefully be put in favour of the applicant's case and we have given careful consideration to the submissions which he has put to us. However, in our view there is not in any of those submissions sufficient substance to give rise to any reasonable prospect of success in the appeal. In the result we are of opinion that the application for extension of time must be dismissed. We have been advised by Counsel for the Minister that he does not seek any order for costs. The order of the Court will be that the application for an order extending the time for appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, given on 24 February 1984, be dismissed. ] cereify that this and the .2 preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of the Court Vs — Associate Dated 29 Jounw 198¢