Allshorn, David Scott v Stapleton, Damien & Ors [1984] FCA 293
Federal Court of Australia
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a93
CATCHWORDS
Industrial law - conciliation and arbitration - construction
of rules - Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees
Association - whether rule permitting overholding of office
until the declaration of a subsequent poll for that office is
contrary to s.140, Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1901 -
rule providing that only branch secretaries shall be eligible
to hold position of Federal Secretary - meaning of "eligible
to hold" - whether Federal Secretary entitled to remain in
office when no longer a branch secretary - Court's discretion
in proceedings under s.141 where there is delay by applicant.
$8.133(1)(db), 140 and
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DAVID SCOTT ALLSHORN v. |
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Smithers A.C.J., Woodward 'wad poche 7
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20 September 1984
Melbourne
IN
ICTO
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN
CORAM:
DATE:
PLACE:
ory
OF AUSTRALIA
STRI EGISTRY V No. 21 of 1984
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DAVID SCOTT LSHORN Appellant
(Applicant)
and
DAMIEN STAPLETON, CLIFFORD JOHN FIELD,
SIMON J. NS, JOHN WILLIAM SMITH,
PETER HULL, HEC WHITE, ELIZABETH BRYAN,
REGINALD STARR, HARRY BLUCK, ROBERT
CAKEBREAD, EDWARD GOLDSWORTHY, WYNNE
WILSON, DENIS SHELVERTON and THE
AUSTRALIAN THEATRICAL AND AMUSEMENT
EMPLO S ASSOCIATION Respondents
(Respondents)
Smithers, Woodward and Northrop JJ.
20 Sevtember 1984
Melbourne
ORDER
OURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V. No. 21 of 1984
we www
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN :
DAVID SCOTT ALLSHORN Appellant
(Applicant)
and
DAMIEN STAPLETON, CLIFFORD JOHN FIELD,
SIMON JENKINS, JOHN WILLIAM SMITH,
PETER HULL, HEC WHITE, ELIZABETH BRYAN,
REGINALD STARR, HARRY BLUCK, ROBERT
CAKEBREAD, EDWARD GOLDSWORTHY, WYNNE
WILSON, DENIS SHELVERTON and THE
AUSTRALIAN THEATRICAL AND AMUSEMENT
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION Respondents
(Respondents)
COURT: Smithers ACJ, Woodward and Northrop Jd.
DATE: 20 September 1984
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Smithers ACJ: I have had the benefit of reading the joint
reasons of my brothers Woodward and Northrop JJ. and I agree
with their reasons and the orders proposed.
I certify that this page is a true copy
of the Reasons for Judgment herein of
the Honourable Mr. Justice Smithers
Dated: 20/9/84 SAtanns fe
Associate
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) V. No. 21 of 1984
)
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN :
DAVID SCOTT ALLSHORN Appellant
(Applicant)
and
DAMIEN STAPLETON, CLIFFORD JOHN FIELD,
SIMON JENKINS, JOHN WILLIAM SMITH,
PETER HULL, HEC WHITE, ELIZABETH BRYAN,
REGINALD STARR, HARRY BLUCK, ROBERT
CAKEBREAD, EDWARD GOLDSWORTHY, WYNNE
WILSON, DENIS SHELVERTON and THE
AUSTRALIAN THEATRICAL, AND AMUSEMENT
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION Respondents
(Respondents)
COURT: Smithers, Woodward and Northrop Jd.
DATE: 20 September 1984
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Woodward and Northrop JJ.:
This appeal involves a challenge to the validity of
part of Rule 18 of Rules of The Australian Theatrical and
Amusement Employees Association ("the Association"), an
organization of employees under the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904 ("the Act") and a challenge to the
entitlement of Damien Stapleton to hold office as Federal
Secretary of the Association.
Rule 18 provides:
"(a) The Federal Officers shall be the
Federal President, Federal
Vice-President, Federal Secretary.
Such Officers shall be elected from
the Federal Councillors by the
national membership in accordance
with Rule 42 of these Rules and
shall hold office for a_ period of
three years from the date of
declaration of the ballot provided
that the incumbent Officer shall be
deemed to remain in office until
such declaration occurs. Only
branch Secretaries shall be
eligible to hold the position of
Federal Secretary.
(b) Elections for Federal Officers
shall take place immediately
following the declaration of state
branch elections and the Returning
Officer shall call for nominations
for Federal Officers within
twenty-one days of such
declaration. Such election shall
be conducted in accordance with
Rule 42 of these Rules.
(c) Only those members financial at the
date of calling for nominations and
who were financial on the last day
of the preceding quarter, shall be
eligible to be included on the Roll
of Voters for Federal elections."
David Scott Allshorn is a member of the
Association. He sought a declaration under sub-section 140
(5D) of the Act that part of Rule 18(a), namely the words
"provided that the incumbent Officer shall be deemed to
remain in office until such declaration occurs", contravenes
sub-section 140(1) of the Act. In addition Mr. Allshorn
sought orders under s.141 of the Act, which in substance were
directions that Mr. Stapleton cease to hold himself out as
Federal Secretary and other directions consequential thereto.
Mr. Stapleton is holding office under that part of Rule 18
which is challenged by Mr. Allshorn and thus, if that part of
the Rule is deemed to be void ( see sub-section 140(5G) ),
Mr. Stapleton cannot rely upon it to hold himself out as
Federal Secretary. In addition Mr. Allshorn contends that
since Mr. Stapleton does not now hold a_ position of branch
Secretary he cannot hold the position of Federal Secretary by
reason of the application of the last sentence in Rule 18(a).
The orders sought by Mr. Allshorn were refused by
the learned trial judge and Mr. Allshorn appeals therefrom.
The challenge to the validity of part of Rule 18
can be disposed of shortly. Counsel for Mr. Allshorn
contended that the challenged part of Rule 18 contravenes
Paragraph (a) of sub-section 140(1) of the Act in that it is
contrary to a provision of the Act namely paragraph (db) of
sub-section 133(1). The relevant part of that paragraph is
set out:
"...the conditions to be complied
with...by organizations include a
condition that the rules of
the...organization...shall not
permit a person to be elected to
hold an office within
the...organization for a period
exceeding 4 years without being
re-elected..."
Counsel contended that the challenged proviso to
Rule 18(a) enabled a person to be elected to hold an office
within the Association for a period exceeding 4 years without
being re-elected. This, he contended, was illustrated by the
facts relating to Mr. Stapleton. In recent years elections
within the Association have been in a state of disarray.
Elections were held in some States late in 1981 but were not
held in the State of South Australia. Since then, the New
South Wales elections have been found by this Court to have
been conducted invalidly and directions have been given for
fresh elections to be conducted. The Rules of the
Association make provision for the election of Officers but
those Rules have not always been followed at the times when
elections should have been held. In November 1978 Mr.
Stapleton was duly elected Federal Secretary pursuant to Rule
18 and since November 1981 has been holding office pursuant
to the challenged proviso to Rule 18(a).
In our opinion it cannot be said that Rule 18
contravenes paragraph (db) of sub-section 133(1) of the Act.
That paragraph is concerned with the form of the rules of an
organization, not with possible but unintended results of
their application or, in this case, their non-application.
The requirement of the paragraph is that the rules of an
organization do not permit a person to be elected to hold
office for a period exceeding 4 years without being
re-elected. Rule 18 clearly provides for the Federal
Officers to be elected for a period of 3 years. The proviso
that the retiring office holder continues in office until his
successor has been elected obviously is sensible to assure
that, if an election is delayed, there is no interregnun.
Such a provision is in keeping with both the letter and the
spirit of the Act, particularly since the prescribed period
for holding office under Rule 18 is 3 years only. We agree
with the learned trial judge when he said:
",..-the inclusion of the "holding
over" provision does not mean that
the person is ""elected" to hold
office for that additional
("holding over") period of
uncertain duration."
For these reasons Rule 18 is not, in our view,
contrary to paragraph (db) of sub-section 133(1) of the Act
and the learned trial judge was correct in so finding.
Counsel for Mr. Allshorn contended further that the
challenged part of Rule 18 contravenes paragraph (c) of
sub-section 140(1) of the Act in that it imposes upon members
of the Association conditions which are unreasonable or
unjust within the meaning of paragraph (c) of sub-section
140(1) of the Act. We respectfully adopt what the learned
trial judge said in rejecting that contention. His Honour
said:
: "As to the applicant's contention
in relation to 5.140(1)(c) of the
Act, a rule does not necessarily
contravene s.140(1)(c) merely
because it is capable of being
misused in such a way as to operate
unreasonably - see the observations
of Dethridge C.J. in O'Sullivan v
The Australian Workers Union (1938)
39 C.A.R. 323 at 325, cited by
O'Mara J. in Hay v_ The Australian
Workers Union (1944) 53 C.A.R. 674
and by Kelly J. in Bowden wv The
Australian Workers Union (1946) 56
C.A.R. 530 at 531. Doubtless some
rules of many organizations could
be misused. The remedy for any
such misuse does not lie in the
making of an order under s.140 in
respect of the rule itself, but in
the making of an order under s.141
giving directions for the
performance or observance of the
rules in such @ manner as to
prevent, or to overcome the effects
of, any such misuse."
For these reasons the challenge to the validity of
part of Rule 18 fails. It follows that, 1n so far as the
claim by Mr. Allshorn under s.141 of the Act depends upon a
successful attack on the validity of Rule 18, that claim must
fail also.
There remains to be considered, the other claim
under s.141 of the Act. This claim is based on that part of
Rule 18 which provides that all the Federal Officers shall be
elected from the Federal Councillors and that only branch
Secretaries "shall be eligible to hold the position of
Federal Secretary".
Under Rule 11 of the Rules of the Association, the
Federal Councillors consist of the branch Secretary and
branch President from each state branch. In November 1978
when he was elected Federal Secretary, Mr. Stapleton was a
Federal Councillor, being the branch Secretary of the New
South Wales branch of the Association. In the 1981 elections
for the position of New South Wales branch Secretary he was
defeated. He successfully challenged the validity of the
election but the Court ordered that his challenger continue
to carry out the duties of the office of branch Secretary
until a further election could be held. The Court gave
directions for the holding of those elections. Mr. Stapleton
has not carried out the duties of the office of New South
Wales branch Secretary since March 1982. In this appeal no
question arises as to whether he has continued to hold office
as a Federal Councillor or whether the person who is carrying
out the duties of the New South Wales branch Secretary is or
should be a Federal Councilor under Rule 11.
The first question to be decided is whether the
rules merely require that the Federal Secretary should be a
branch Secretary at the time of his election or whether they
produce the result that he ceases to be eligible to retain
the position if he ceases to be a branch Secretary.
In our view, the latter is the case. In the first
Place the rule speaks of eligibility "to hold" the position
rather than to be elected to the position. More important is
the basic scheme of the rules relating to Federal office
bearers. They are all to be chosen from among the Federal
Councillors, and the branch Secretaries and Presidents are
the Federal Councillors. In addition, a number of the powers
conferred upon the Federal Secretary by Rule 26 appear to be
incompatable with the Federal Secretary not being a Federal
Councillor. In this respect paragraphs (g) and (h) of Rule
26 are of importance in conferring the following powers upon
the Federal Secretary:
" (g) He shall be an ex-officio member
of any Committee formed by the
Federal Council or Federal
Executive to advise the
Association on any subject, and
shall have the right to attend
and speak at any Executive,
General or special Committee
meeting of any branch.
(h) He shall have the right to vote
as a branch representative at
meetings of the Federal Council
and Federal Executive, shall be
allowed free speech on all
occasions and shall be entitled
to move or second and speak to
motions. "
It is clear that the intention of the scheme is
that the Federal Secretary shall be a serving branch
Secretary as well as being a Federal Councillor. This of
course makes sense from an administrative point of view ina
moderate-sized organization having a large turnover of
members. However, as the solicitor for the respondents
pointed out, the underlying intention of the framers of the
Rules, does not necessarily govern their proper construction
and effect when unexpected events occur.
This short question of construction is, in the
words of the learned trial judge, "one of some difficulty".
We regret that we have come to a conclusion which differs
from his Honour's; but we are not persuaded, as he was, that
a contrast with the word 'entitled', used compendiously ina
different rule, is helpful in construing the word 'eligible'.
Nor are we persuaded to a different view by a broader study
of the Rules in the light of policy considerations or
convenience, We can see arguments both ways, but nothing
which would cause us to look beyond the simple words "Only
branch Secretaries shall be eligible to hold the position of
Federal Secretary". We believe the natural meaning of this
is that if a Federal Secretary ceases to be a branch
Secretary he is no longer 'eligible' to be Federal Secretary.
It then becomes necessary to consider what steps
can and should be taken to deal with that situation. This
was a matter which the learned trial judge did not find it
necessary to determine. Rules 20 and 38, so far as they are
relevant for present purposes, provide as follows:
"20. EXTRAORDINARY VACANCIES
An Extraordinary Vacancy is a
vacancy caused by:
(i) Death
(1i) Resignation
(iii) Removal from office in
accordance with Rule 38 of
these Rules.
(a) Should any extraordinary vacancy
occur in the positions of Federal
President, Federal Vice-President,
or Federal Secretary, the vacancy
shall be filled by appointment of
the Federal Council from the
members of the Federal Council
provided that the unexpired portion
of the term is not more than twelve
months. If the unexpired portion
of the term is more than twelve
months, an election shall be held
in accordance with these Rules and
in this case there will be no
obligation to comply with Rule 42A
(b) (ii) (aa-hh) of these Rules.
Pending the declaration of such
election the Federal Council may
appoint any member of the Federal
Council to carry out the duties of
the vacant position in an acting
capacity."
"38. REMOVAL OR DISMISSAL FROM
OFFICE
(a) The Federal President, Federal
Vice-President, Federal Secretary,
members of the Federal Executive or
any branch President,
Vice-President or Secretary may be
removed or dismissed from office by
the Federal Council if found guilty
of misappropriation of Association
funds, a_ substantial breach of the
Rules or gross misbehaviour, gross
neglect of duty or has ceased to be
eligible to hold the office
provided that such person shall not
be removed or dismissed until he
has been properly charged and has
had an opportunity of being heard
in his defence py Federal Council
in accordance with this Rule."
Rule 38 seems to suggest that if it appears that a
person has ceased to be eligible for a particular office, he
must be 'charged' and given a chance to defend himself before
he is removed from that office. Such a course would
obviously be appropriate where it was suggested that an
officer was unfinancial. It would also, in our view, be
appropriate in a case such as the present where an officer
appeared to have been defeated in an election which affected
his eligibility, but wished to challenge the election. We
can see no sufficient reason for denying the right of
'charge' and hearing to a person alleged to be ineligible
when it is clearly available to one alleged to have committed
a serious offence or dereliction of duty.
id
The notion that such eligibility requirements are
not self-executing under the rules is confirmed by Rule 20
which lists the ways in which extraordinary vacancies may be
caused. It makes no separate provision for ineligibility.
In our view a fair reading of the Rules produces
the result that, if a person appears to lose his or her
eligibility for office, the matter falls to be determined by
the Federal Council, and if the Federal Council decides, on
proper grounds, to take no action, the apparent loss of
eligibility does not prevent the person concerned from
continuing in office. On the other hand, if the Federal
Council appears to be not performing or observing the Rules,
the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter if its
powers are invoked. In the present case, the Federal Council
has taken no steps to have Mr. Stapleton removed from his
office of Federal Secretary.
Whatever the Court might otherwise decide, in the
exercise of its discretion under sub-section 141(1G) the
Court has power to make no order. In the present case the
learned trial judge said that, if he had found it necessary
to do so, he would have exercised his discretion against the
making of an order. His reasons for so finding, briefly
expressed, were that the applicant had delayed in seeking a
remedy and, in any case, the Association was now well
advanced towards holding the State elections in New South
Wales and South Australia which were seen as necessary
preliminary steps to the holding of an election for Federal
- 12 -
officers. We can detect no error in the reasoning which led
his Honour to this conclusion and so, even if we had been
persuaded by the appellant's arguments on the legal issues
involved, we would have refused the orders sought.
For all these reasons the appeal should be
dismissed.
I certify that this and the eleven
preceding pages are a true copy of
the Reasons for Judgment herein of
The Hon. Mr. Justice Woodward and
The Hon. Mr. Justice Northrop
Asso
The Hon. Mr. Justice Woodward
Dated: 20 September 1984