Langham, John William v Commonwealth [1984] FCA 426
Federal Court of Australia
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
. PRINCIPAL REGISTRY
Tel: 2308111 Queens Square
Our Ref Sydney 2000
28 December, 1984
Ne. 4ab
JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V. No. G220f 84
Please substitute attached page of the above judgment
of Woodward, Northrop and Keely JJ. delivered on
12 December 84. A copy of page 7 of the Reasons, which
records the correct date.
Yours Faithfully,
Michele. Garrett.
Mbt Qui
PRINCIPAL /REGISTRY
f
The appeal must be allowed, the decision of the
Tribunal set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal to
be heard and determined according to law after the hearing of
such further evidence as it may decide to receive, The
applicant's costs of the appeal are to be paid by the
Commonwealth.
31x
; , . Keely
(2 December (18.
CATCHWORDS we che oe
Workers Compensation (CGith) - compensation under Compensation
(Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 - aggravation of
disease arising out of or in the course of employment by the
Commonwealth - termination of weekly payments - appeal from
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971
5B.5,27,29,45
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V. No. G 22 of 1934
Woodward, Northrop and Keely JJ.
Melbourne
12 December 1984
IN_ THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
7 )
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) V. No. G 22 of 1984
)
)
GENERAL DIVISTON
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY
MR. I.R. THOMPSON, DEPUTY PRESTDENT
BETWEEN :
JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Respondent
CORAM: Woodward, Northrop and Keely Jd.
DATE: 12 December 1984
PLACE: Melbourne
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
i. The appeal be allowed and the decision of the
Tribunal be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing
and determination according to law after hearing such
further evidence it may decide to receive.
3. The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the
appeal.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY . _.. - V. No. G 22 of 1984
~~ eww
GENERAL DIVISION --
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY
MR. I.R. THOMPSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Respondent
CORAM: Woodward, Northrop and Keely JJ.
DATE: 12 December 1984
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Woodward and Northrop Jd.
The applicant, John William Langham, appeals from a
decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the
Tribunal") affirming a determination of a delegate of the
Commissioner for Employees' Compensation. The delegate
determined that:
(1) any incapacity for -work- suffered -by ~- the -
applicant on and from 5 January 1981 was not
the result of personal injury arising out of
or in the course of his employment by the
Commonweaith,
(2) any incapacity for work suffered by the
applicant_on and from 5 January 1981 was not
the result of a disease or the aggravation,
acceleration or recurrence of a disease to
which his employment was a contributing
factor, and
(3) on and from 5 January 1981 the Commonwealth
was not liable to pay compensation to the
applicant in respect of any incapacity for
work.
Under sub-section 44(1) Administrative Appeais Tribunal Act
1975 ("the A.A.T. Act") the appeal is limited to a question
of law and is within the original jurisdiction of the Court,
but under sub-section 44(3) the Court must be constituted as
a Full Court.
The applicant is 59 years of age. In February 1974
he was employed as a civilian steward by the Commonwealth in
the Department of Defence. On 15 February 1974, in the
course of his employment, while bending down to remove a
plate from a food warmer he experienced severe pain in his
back. He was unable to continue his work. On 20 February
1974 he was referred to Mr. A.W. Searle, an orthopaedic
surgeon, for treatment. Mr. Searle diagnosed ligamentous
strain of the lumbar region caused by the lifting injury -at
work. He prescribed physiotherapy including short wave and
back extension exercises. On 721 March 1974 the applicant
made a claim for compensation under the Compensation
(Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 ("the Act").
The claim was made with respect to an injury, namely a "Back
(Sprained Ligament)", arising out of or in the course of his
employment by the Commonwealth. Under the Act, the
Commissioner for Employees' Compensation, or his delegate, is
empowered to determine all matters and questions under the
Act; see 5.20 of the Act. On 9 April 1974 a delegate made a
determination that the applicant "sustained personal injury
arising out of or in the course of his employment by the
Department of Defence (Army Office) on 15 February 1974
namely:- BACK STRAIN", and made provision for the payment of
compensation under s.45 of the Act from 20 February 1974 to
13 March 1974. The material before the Tribunal did not
include any other determination relating to the applicant
except the determination of 5 January 1981. Of necessity,
there must have been other determinations as the applicant
continued to receive payment of compensation under s.45 of
the Act until 5 January 1981.
Mr. Searle gave a number of medical reports to the
Commonwealth relating to the condition of the applicant. The
first report was dated 23 April 1974. The applicant did not
respond to treatment. He remained totally incapacitated for
work. Other medical reports were sought and obtained by a
delegate from Mr. W. Stenning, an orthopaedic surgeon. Mr.
Searle ceased treating the applicant ~in October 1976. - In
November 1976 the applicant was admitted to the Mt. Wiliga
Rehabilitation Centre. In June 1977 he was discharged from
that centre. On 6 dune 1977 he commenced employment with the
Australian Bureau of Statistice but after three days left
that employment because of the pain in his back. Thereafter
he attended a number of-doctors and received treatment from
some of them, but the pain persisted. Some of those doctors .
submitted medical reports to the Commonwealth relating to the
applicant. The Commonwealth received reports from Dr. Jd.
Galati and Dr. H. Rivett.
During 1980, a delegate, pursuant to the provisions
of the Act, required the applicant to be medically examined
by Mr. E. Hedberg, an orthopaedic surgeon. Mr. Hedberg
submitted a report to the delegate containing the opinion
that any current incapacity for work resulting to the
applicant was not related to the incident of 15 February
1974. On 28 July 1980 the delegate forwarded a copy of Mr.
Hedberg's report to the applicant, notified him of his
proposal to make a determination to give effect to the
opinion expressed therein and gave the applicant an
opportunity to present material to show why the compensation
payments should continue. The applicant presented voluminous
material including a report from Mr. Searle dated 9 October
1980. That report followed an examination of the applicant
by Mr. Searle on 30 September 1980. Mr. Searle had not' seen
the applicant since 12 October 1976. In that report Mr.
Searle said:
"He continues to - suffer from lumbar
spondylosis which is sufficient to prevent him
carry (sic) out such activities as ilifting and
bending, and especially makes it difficult for him
to maintain the slightly flexed posture."
On 5 January 1981, the delegate issued
determination which forms the basis of the appeal before
Court. It is desirable that the determination be set out
full:
"COMPENSATION (COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES)
ACT 1971, AS AMENDED
John William LANGHAM, formerly Temporary Steward
Department of Defence
In the matter of the claim of John William
LANGHAM for compensation in respect of "back"
(injury).
DETERMINATION
(1) On the evidence before me, including
specialist medical opinion, I am unabie to
find that any incapacity for work suffered
by the said John William Langham on and
from the date of this determination, is the
result of either, personal injury arising
out of or in the course of his employment,
or, a disease, or the aggravation,
acceleration, or recurrence of a disease,
to which his employment was a contributing
factor.
(2) NOW THEREFORE, in pursuance of the
provisions of the Compensation
(Commonwealth Government Employees) Act
1971, as amended, including sections 27 and
29 of that Act, and further to the
determinations previously made in this
matter, I hereby determine:-
(a} any incapacity for work suffered by
the said John William Langham on and
from the date of this determination,
is not the result of personal injury
arising out of or in the course of his
employment;
(b) any incapacity for work suffered by
the said John William Langham on and
from the date of this determination,
is not the result of a disease, or the
aggravation, acceleration, or
recurrence of a disease, to which his
employment was a contributing factor;
the
the
in
(c) therefore, on and from the date of
this determination, the Department of
Defence is -'not liable to pay
compensation to the said John William
Langham in respect of any incapacity
for work.
(signed)
Delegate of the Commissioner
for Employees' Compensation.
-5 JAN 1981"
That determination, together with other documents
including a notice about rights given to the applicant under
the Act, was forwarded to the applicant under cover of a
letter which included the following paragraph:
"The medical evidence available, including
Dr Searle's report, indicates that you are not
totally incapacited for work. In his report, Dr
Searle has stated that you suffer from iumbar
spondylosis which imposes certain restrictions upon
some activities. However, Dr Searle does not
mention any link between the lumbar spondylosis and
your employment by the Department of Defence. Even
if 1t was shown that the restrictions mentioned by
Dr Searle resulted from your employment by the
Department of Defence, it would still be necessary
to determine that you are not entitled to receive
payments under section 45 of the Act in respect of
total incapacity for work (the section under which
you have been receiving payments)."
Thereafter the solicitor for the applicant
requested further material from the delegate. Some of that
material was supplied under cover of a letter dated 7 May
i981.
At this stage it is necessary to make reference to
some of the provisions of the Act, but in doing this it -is
useful to refer to Ex parte Portelli (1981) 35 A.L.R. 207 in
which Northrop J. examined the nature of the Act and the
procedures to be followed by the Commissioner and (at that
time) by the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Tribunal.
The provisions' of Part_V of the Act which at that time
provided for the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation
Tribunal have since been repealed.
Section 27 of the Act provides that:
"If personal injury arising out of or in the course
of the employment of an employee by the
Commonwealth is caused to the employee, the
Commonwealth ... i5 liable to pay compensation in
respect of that injury ..."
For the purposes of the Act the word "anjury" is defined in
s.5 to exclude a "disease or the aggravation, acceleration or
recurrence of a disease". In the same section the word
"disease" is given no definitive definition but is to include
"any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid
condition, whether of sudden onset or gradual development".
Reference should be made also to sub-section 5(11) of the
Act. The difficulties arising from the meanings ascribed to
the words "disease" and "injury" in the Act are discussed by
Northrop J. in Commonwealth of Australia v. Whillock (1983)
48 A.L.R. 433 commencing at p.447. Section 29 of the Act
provides, for present purposes, that in the event that an
employee suffers "an aggravation, acceleration or recurrence
of a disease" and that any employment of the employee by the
Commonwealth was "a contributing factor" to the "aggravation,
acceleration or recurrence" of the disease, and that a "total
or partial incapacity for work by the employee" arises as a
result therefrom, the "aggravation, acceleration or
recurrence" shall be deemed to be a personal injury to the
employee arising out the employment of the employee by the
Commonwealth.
Section 45 of the Act provides that where an injury
to an employee results in the employee being totally
incapacitated for work, compensation payments shall be paid
to the employee in accordance with the provisions of that
section. Section 46 of the Act contains corresponding
provisions applying where an injury to an employee results in
the employee being partially incapacitated for work.
At this stage it should be noted that the claim for
compensation by the applicant and the determination of 9
April 1974 were based on s.27 of the Act and not on 5.29.
The claim was for strained ligaments and thus there was no
need for the delegate to consider the effect of s.29 of the
Act or to consider whether a discrete event in the course of
a progressive disease could in law amount to an "injury"
within the defined meaning of that word; see the differing
views on this issue expressed by Smithers and St. John JJ. on
the one hand and Northrop J. on the other in Whillock's case
above. Likewise there was no need to consider whether the
employment of the applicant by the Commonwealth was a
contributing factor: to the aggravation, acceleration or
recurrence of a disease.
Prior to 1 duly 1981, a party to a determination
made under the Act had the right to request the Commissioner
to refer the matter to the Commonwealth Employees'
Compensation Tribunal for consideration or to apply to a
prescribed Court for a judicial review of the determination.
The provisions prescribing those procedures, which were
contained in Part V of the Act, are discussed in Portelli's
Case above. Those provisions were repealed by the
Commonwealth Functions (Statutes Review) Act 1981, see 5.149
and the Second Schedule. Part V of the Act now comprises
s.62 to s.65 inclusive. Section 62 identifies the parties to
a determination. Under s.63 a party may make application to
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of the
determination. Section 65 contains modifications of the
A.A.T. Act with respect to reviews of determinations by the
Commissioner. The procedures and powers of the Tribunal,
when conducting a review, are contained in sections 33, 40
and 43 of the A.A.T. Act. Under the last section the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal has power to exercise all the
powers and discretions conferred upon the Commissioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and in
particular s.63 of the Act, the solicitor for the applicant
made application to the Tribunal for a review of the
determination made on 5 January 1981. The grounds of the
application appear to have been directed to as.27 injury
rather than to a 5.29 aggravation of a disease. The
- 10 -
application was contained ina letter dated 1B August 1981
and the relevant parts are set out:
"RE: MR. JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM
We refer to the determination .of the.Delegate of
the Commissioner for Commonwealth Employees
Compensation dated 5th January 1981 and aiso the
letter of the Commissioner dated 7th May 1981 in
which reasons for the determination were given, and '
hereby request that this matter be referred to the .
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The grounds of
this appeal are as follows:-
q
'
1. That the Commissioner was wrong in law in .
making the determination of the 5th January
1981.
2. Was wrong in law in determining that Mr.
Langham was suffering from no incapacity as
a result of personal injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment.
3. Was wrong in law in that the incapacity
that Mr. Langham is, and still is,
suffering from was an injury suffered in
the course of his employment.
4. That the Commissioner should have taken
into account the medical evidence of Dr.
Allan Searle in coming to any determination
with respect to Mr. Langham's incapacity."
On 13 April 1983, in accordance with the
requirements of 5.37 A.A.T. Act, the Commissioner lodged with
the Tribunal a statement of findings on the material
questions of fact, evidence and reasons for decision. The
reasons for decision are set out:
"The Reasons for the decision are:-
20. The delegate had regard to Dr Hedberg's
report of 11.6.80 which indicated that the
condition suffered by the employee at the
time of his examination and his continued
incapacity for work was not related to his
employment with the agency, specifically
the incident of 15.22.74.
21. The delegate noted the contents of Dr
Searle's report of 9.10.80 which indicated
that the employee continued to suffer from
lumbar spondylosis, but noted also that Dr
- li-
Searle made no comment on the relationship
of this condition to his employment with ~
the Commonwealth.
22. The delegate noted that both Drs Hedberg
and Searle indicated the employee was -not
totally incapacitated for work. The
delegate therefore considered that even if
a link was conceded between the
restrictions imposed and the employee's
employment with the agency and this was not
conceded, it would still be necessary to
determine that the employee was not
entitied to payments pursuant to section 45
of the Act in respect of total incapacity
for work.
23. As the requirement had been stressed to the
employee that he should provide evidence to
show why liability should continue, and the
delegate considered that the evidence
supplied by the employee failed to satisfy
that requirement, the delegate considered
that the determination as proposed should
be made."
It is apparent from this summary, that the issues
raised before the Tribunal were limited to questions under
5.27 of the Act and not under s.29. In fact, during the
hearing of the appeal, counsel informed the Court that no
reference was made to s.29 of the Act during the hearing of
the review by the Tribunal. A reference to the transcript of
the evidence given before the Tribunal supports this
statement. No questions were directed to the medical
witnesses as to whether the back pain which manifested itself
on i5 February 1974 was an aggravation of the disease of
lumbar spondylosis from which the applicant was then
suffering, albeit without his knowledge. There was no
question directed to the pathology of any aggravation. There
was no -explicit evidence as to the nature of any aggravation
of the disease or how the employment by the Commonwealth
contributed to that aggravation. It is clear that the pain
- 12 -
which occurred on 15 February 1974 was caused by an
identifiable event which occurred in the course of the
applicant's employment by the Commonwealth. That may, of
itself, be sufficient to found a claim under 5.27 of the Act
but, without a causal connection, will not be sufficient to
found a claim under 5.29. On the material before it, the
Tribunal found that that event constituted an aggravation of
the disease of lumbar spondylosis and that the employment of
the applicant by the Commonwealth contributed to that
aggravation. On the appeal to this Court, the Commonwealth
has not challenged that finding. The opinions of the medical
witnesses called by the Commonwealth were directed to an
injury and incapacity resulting from that injury and not to
the aggravation of a disease and incapacity resulting from
that aggravation. The Tribunal asked some questions of one
of those medical witnesses, Mr. Dooley, an orthopaedic
surgeon, which suggested that 5.29 may have been relevant.
In re-examination, Mr. Searle, who was the last witness to be
called to give evidence before the Tribunal, expressed
opinions relating to activities that could have "aggravated
or accelerated a symptomatic spondylosis". Nevertheless,
these matters were not taken up and developed in relation to
a claim based upon 5.29 of the Act. Likewise, although in
one context Mr. Searle used the word "remission" in relation
to the cessation of pain, it was not in the context of
providing evidence of the ending of -incapacity resulting from
an aggravation of a disease. It was not expressly related to
problems arising from the application of 5.29 and 5.45 of the
Act.
- 13 -
The distinction between a 5.27 injury anda 5.29
aggravation of a disease is of great importance in this case
because of the way the Tribunal expressed its reasons for
decision, particularly with respect to incapacity resulting
from the aggravation of a disease.
In its reasons the Tribunal referred to the history
of the claim. It referred to the fact that, at the hearing,
it had before it not only ali the reports available to the
delegate who made the determination, but further reports from
Mr. Searle and Mr. Hedberg dated 22 September 1981 and 31
August 1983 respectively and a report from Mr. Dooley who had
examined the applicant on 29 August 1983. There were
tendered in evidence the files on the applicant kept by the
Western General Hospital, Footscray, by the Commonwealth
Employment Service at Yarraville and the records of the
Department of Social Security relating to the applicant's
attendance and treatment at the Mt. Wilga Rehabilitation
Centre. In addition, evidence was given by the applicant,
Mr. Searle, Mr. Dooley, Mr. Hedberg and an officer of the
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations.
The Tribunal made reference to 5.29 of the Act and
stated, correctly in our view, that if an employee suffered
an aggravation of a disease, and his employment by the
Commonwealth was a contributing factor to that aggravation,
and as a result of that aggravation the employee was
- 14 -
incapacitated for work, the Commonwealth was liable to make
payments of compensation.under the provisions of 5.45 or 5.46
of the Act.
The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Mr. Searle
that in February 1974 the applicant suffered an aggravation
of a disease and that his employment by the Commonwealth was
a contributing factor to that aggravation. In this regard
the Tribunal preferred the evidence of Mr. Searle to that of
Mr.-Hedberg and Mr. Dooley who expressed the opinion-that the
applicant had suffered an injury in February 1974. The
Tribunal accepted that the aggravation resulted in the total
incapacity of the applicant. It then stated the question
that had to be decided as follows:
"There is no doubt that the aggravation of the
disease incapacitated the applicant totally for
some time at least. What is in issue 15 whether it
continued to do so on 5 January 1981."
The Tribunal then considered the material relating
to the continuation or otherwise of the pain in the
applicant's back. The Tribunal acted on the basis that if
there had been a "complete remission" or a "total remission"
of pain since February 1974, that would be sufficient to show
that thereafter any incapacity for work did not result from
the aggravation of the disease which occurred on 15 February
1974 but from the disease itself. On this issue the Tribunal
made the following finding:
"I have, therefore, come to the conclusion
. that, certainly by the time that he completed the
rehabilitation course at the Mt Wilga
Rehabilitation Centre in June 1977, the aggravation
of the disease which he suffered on 15 February
1974 had ceased to have effect and that thereafter
- 15 -
any pain which he has suffered has been the result
of the disease in its natural progression and not
of the aggravation which occurred on that day."
Before this Court the applicant challenges that
finding. The questions of law raised by the applicant were
formulated in different terms but are illustrated by the
following formulations which were accepted by counsel in the
course of argument:
"1. Whether the Tribunal, on the material
before it and properly directing itself as
to the relevant law, could reasonably have
reached the conclusion that it was
satisfied that any incapacity for work
suffered by the applicant, John William
Langham, on and from 5 January 1981 was not
the result of personal injury arising out
of or in the course of his employment.
2. Whether the Tribunal, on the material
before it and properly directing itself as
to the relevant law, could reasonably have
reached the conclusion that it was
satisfied that any incapacity for work
suffered by the applicant, John William
Langham, on and from 5 January 1981 was not
the result of a disease or the aggravation,
acceleration or recurrence of a disease to
which his employment was a contributing
factor."
At the hearing before the Court counsel for the
applicant contended that the Tribunal was in error in making
the finding that the aggravation of the disease had ceased to
have effect by June 1977. Counsel submitted that improper
use of material contained in the file of the Mt. Wilga
Rehabilitation Centre had been made and that the Tribunal had
erred in not accepting the sworn evidence of the applicant
that since February 1974 he had never been entirely free from
pain, and frequently the pain was too severe for him to he
able to do any work.
- 16 -
That contention raised by counsel for the applicant
raises serious questions - concerning the entitlement of . the
Tribunal to act upon unsupported hearsay file material in the
face of contrary direct sworn evidence from a credible
witness. But those questions arise only on the assumption
that the correct test was applied by the 'Tribunal in
accepting that incapacity for work resulting from the
aggravation of the disease on 15 February 1974 ceased upon
there being a "complete remission" or a "total remission" of
pain. The validity of such a test was not put to any of the
medical witnesses. The test itself is ambiguous. For what
period must there be a complete or total remission of pain?
Under what conditions must there be a complete or total
remission of pain? In any event is that the relevant test?
The answer to these questions, and possibly many other
questions, must depend upon medical evidence as to the nature
of the aggravation of the disease suffered by the applicant
in February 1974, the pathology of that aggravation, whether
incapacity for work arising from the aggravation was of a
temporary nature and whether subsequent incapacity for work
resulted from that aggravation or from the disease itself,
These are not easy questions to determine and they cannot be
determined in the absence of medical evidence.
In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in
applying a test for which the evidence laid no foundation. A
layman may consider that the aggravation of a disease would
result in temporary incapacity only, but appropriate medical
evidence might establish that a particular aggravation could
- 17 -
itself result in permanent incapacity. In the present case
it is easy to see how the error arose. The presentation and
hearing of the applicant's case in the Tribunal was hased on
the assumption that the case involved an injury under 5.27 of
the Act. Questions relating to the aggravation of a disease
under 5.29 of the Act and the consequences of any incapacity
arising therefrom were not directed to the medical witnesses.
Accordingly there was no evidence to support the test applied
by the Tribunal.
It follows therefore that the appeal must he
allowed and the decision of the Tribunal be set aside. The
matter should be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and
determined according to law after the hearing of such further
evidence as it may decide to receive. The Commonwealth
should pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
I certify that this and the sixteen (16)
preceding pages aie a true copy of the
Reasons for judgment herein of the
[
| Honomable Mr. Justice Woodware + the i
Honourable Mn. Tuthce Norturop. k
i Associate N aa
| Dated: |2 December 1984
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA }
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY . 2 -No. VG. 22 of 1984
~~ ww
GENERAL DIVISION -. -
ON APPEAL FROM THE
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
JOHN WILLIAM LANGHAM
Applicant
AND:
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
CORAM : WOODWARD, NORTHROP and KEELY dd.
DATE : i2 DECEMBER, 1984
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KEELY J. :
I have had the benefit of reading, in draft form,
the joint reasons for judgment of Woodward and Northrop JJ.
and it is unnecessary to repeat the factual matters, the
statutory provisions and the terms of the determination of
the delegate of the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation,
dated 5 January, -1981 which are there_set cout. <i agree with
them that there .Was..no ..medical, evidence: - upon csmhich: the...
Tribunal could reasonably have reached the conclusion that,
from the time when he completed a rehabilitation course at
the Mt. Wilga Rehabilitation Centre {the Rehabilitation
lan ae
2.
Centre) in June 1977, any incapacity for work suffered by the
applicant was «not. the - result of the aggravation, on 15
February, 1974, of a disease. _
The applicant's counsel submitted that, on the
material before it, the Tribunal properly directing itself as
to the relevant law, could not reasonably have reached the
conclusion that the applicant had been "pain-free at the end
of his course of treatment" at the Rehabilitation Centre in
dune 1977. As that was the applicant's primary submission,
it is desirable to refer to it, notwithstanding what has
already been said as to the absence of medical evidence
dealing with the significance of a period of freedom from
pain, if such a period ever occurred.
The finding that the applicant was "pain-free" was
based upon two documents :
1. An entry, dated 10 June, 1977, in the Australian
Department of Social Security file (the file
entry), in the following terms :-
"John Langham
I did not see him during his stay at
Mount Wilga but have been told that his -
programme was |. successful. At the
completion of 'his: stay:at*Mount Wilga: he: ue -
was symptom free and: was participating -in "
full activities at Mount Wilga.
R.J. Oakeshott"
3.
2. A letter written by the applicant on 14 June,
1977 to the Rehabilitation Centre-which the
Tribunal said "appears to support what was
stated" in the file entry (i.e. that the '
applicant "was symptom free").
The applicant's counsel submitted that neither
document was sufficient to support the Tribunal's finding
that the applicant was "pain free". As to the applicant's
letter of 14 June, 1977, he pointed out that the mere fact
that the applicant applied for work could not he read as
meaning that the applicant had no pain in his back -
particularly when regard was had to the express references in
the letter to his "injured back" and also to the effect upon
his back of working as a clerical assistant in the preceding
days. As to the file entry, counsel pointed out that it was
made by Dr. Oakeshott, a Rehabilitation Medical Consultant,
who had never seen the applicant and accordingly had no
personal knowledge of the facts and that it did not disclose
who had told Dr. Oakeshott that "the programme was
successful" or who had told him that Mr. Langham "was symptom
free; further, that neither the file entry nor any other
evidence explained the meaning of those statements in the
file entry.
The Tribunal in -expressing its finding said that
"1t is much more likely that in fact it (the file entry) was
correct". As to that issue, the only information to which
the Court was referred as a possible basis for the file entry
4.
is a hand-written entry in the file, dated 3 June, 1977,
stating that Mr. 'Langham "was symptom free". 'However, the
respondent's counsel did not deny that that.entry appeared to
be another entry by Dr. Oakeshott-and it also-'stated "I have
not seen him".
The respondent's counsel relied upon s. 33(1)(c) of
the Administrative appeals Tribunal Act 1975 which provides
that "the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but
may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks
appropriate". However, paragraph (b) of that section
requires "a proper consideration of the matters before the
Tribunal". The Tribunal, in considering whether the
applicant was symptom free at the end of his course of
treatment at the Rehabilitation Centre, was required to give
proper consideration to the material before it and to take
into account all relevant considerations including the
following matters :
(L) The file entry showed on its face that the maker
of the statement had no personal knowledge of
the information recorded in it.
(2) The source of that information was not disclosed
by the file or by any other material before the
Tribunal and it was not known by the Tribunal
whether that source - was a medical -practitioner -:-
or some other member of the staff e.g. the
statement that "the programme was successful"
may have been made by an occupational therapist.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
5.
Neither the maker of the entry on the file nor
the person who was the source of it was called
aB a witness. .
No explanation was given as to the reason why
neither of those persons was called as a
witness.
The entry on the file that the applicant was
"symptom free" had "surprised" Dr. Searle, the
specialist physician who had heen treating the
applicant and whose opinion on another aspect
had been preferred by the Tribunal to those of
other specialists called as witnesses by the
respondent.
The file disclosed that, while the applicant was
attending the Rehabilitation Centre, it had been
arranged that there would be an orthopaedic
examination of him on 28 duly, 1977; an attempt
was made to have that examination held earlier
but the file recorded that it had been decided
"to cancel the orthopaedic examination and
deciare (Mr. Langham) fit to commence
employment". No oral evidence was called as to
this aspect.
The applicant on leaving the Rehabilitation
Centre commenced working in a clerical _- capacity
but said, in the letter of 14 June, 1977, which
was one of the two bases for the Tribunal's
finding, that "the constant sitting and bending
forward which my position requires is
undermining the good work done at Mount Wilga
for my injured back". In this connexion it may
be noted that the Tribunal described the
applicant "as a person who genuinely wishes to
work",
(8) During a well prepared cross-examination of some
length, the correctness of the file entry was
specifically denied by the applicant. It would,
of course, have been open to the Tribunal to
reject the applicant's sworn evidence as being
unreliable. However, the Tribunal said
"although he impressed me as generally an honest
witness and was adamant that (Dr. Oakeshott's
file entry) was incorrect, I think that it is
much more likely that in fact it (the file
entry) was correct".
The Tribunal's reasons for decision carefully
reviewed the medical evidence and the history of the matter
but expressed rather briefly the reasons for making the
finding that the applicant "was pain-free at the end of his
course of treatment" at the Rehabilitation Centre. Having
regard to the opinion expressed earlier as to the absence of
relevant medical evidence, it is not necessary for me to
express a concluded opinion' as:.to the applicant's . submission
that the Tribunal could not reasonably have found, on the
material before it, that the applicant was "pain-free at the
end of his course of treatment" at the Rehabilitation Centre.
7.
The appeal must be allowed, the decision of the
Tribunal set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal to
be heard and determined according to law after the hearing of
such further evidence as it may decide to receive. The
applicant's costs of the appeal are to he paid by the
Commonwealth.
, +31
ee pene
wr ere wo
- . Keely
tore. (2 December C4EY