ry 428 CATCHWORDS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Natural justice - Aboriginal Development Commission - Grant of "interest" in land under Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974 - Nature of interest - Subsequent grant of lease - Whether estopped from making grant - Relief against third parties - Indefeasibility of title. Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974 - s.20 Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980 - 3s.8, 27, 28 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 RALKON_ AGRICULTURAL COMPANY PTY. LTD. v. ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION and ANOR No. G.9 of 1984 Fox, Woodward and Davies JJ. 14 December 1984 Sydney ~~ IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISTON ) ) ) No. G.9 of 1984 ) ) ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN : RALKON AGRICULTURAL COMPANY Pry. LTD. Appellant AND: ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION and POINT McLEAY COMMUNITY COUNCIL INC. Respondent ORDER JUDGES: Fox, Woodward and Davies JJ. DATE OF ORDER: 14 December 1984 WHERE MADE: Sydney. THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal be dismissed. 2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. rh) IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SQUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G.9 of 1984 ddan GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN : RALKON AGRICULTURAL COMPANY Pry. LTD. Appellant AND: ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION and POINT McLEAY COMMUNITY COUNCIL INC. Respondents CORAM: FOX, WOODWARD and DAVIES JJ. DATE: 14 December 1984 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FOX and WOODWARD Jd. This appeal from a judge of the Court (Fisher J.) brings into question under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ("the Judicial Review Act"), a decision of the Aboriginal Development Commission ("the A.D.C.") to grant a lease of land, known as Bartlett's Farm, to the Point McLeay Community Council ("the Community Council"). The appellant ("Ralkon") claims a competing interest in the same land under or in consequence of the grant of an "interest" made in September 1976 and otherwise challenges the validity of the decision. Ralkon has been in occupation of the land for some years and has carried on the business of farming (with Government support) both it and adjoining lands. The land in question is at Point McLeay, in the south east of South Australia. The decision to grant the lease to the Community Council is challenged as having been made by the A.D.C. without power (because of Ralkon's interest), in breach of the rules of natural justice, and as having been based on irrelevant considerations and as having fazrled to take account of relevant considerations. The facts are set out fully in the judgment of Fisher J., and we state here only the more salient features. Ralkon was incorporated in 1975, and has among its first objects the carrying on of the business of pastoralist, farmer and grazier. A purpose of its promotion was to farm lands at Point McLeay heid by the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission ("the A.L.F.C."), the predecessor in title to the A.D.C.. This appears ina letter dated 5 December 1975 from the Regional Director of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs to members of the Aboriginal Community at Point McLeay. The letter was written in simple terms and reads in part: "WHO OWNS THE COMPANY? The owners of the Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty. Ltd. are the people of Point McLeay over the age of 18 years. No-one else can be an owner, but any person at Point McLeay can refuse if he or she does not want to be an owner. That is his (or her) decision. The owners are called SHAREHOLDERS, and their shares are held for them in trust by the Council. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S JOB? The Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty. Ltd. isa company formed to do a certain job. That job is to make sure that the farm is run properly as a business, and that 1t makes a profit as soon as possible." Later, the letter contains these observations: "The Government has put ina lot of money, but the people of Point McLeay also are expected to help with their company. The Government has bought Bartlett's farm, and has paid a lot of money to start the Company, but now it is up to the people to give something in return. Very soon, you will be asked to pay something, perhaps $5.00 each, to show the Government that you are also prepared to help. When you pay this money, you will be a SHAREHOLDER. (You only pay once, not every year)." The Community Council took ninety-eight or one hundred ordinary shares of one dollar each (the evidence varies, but the difference is immaterial), and there were two subscriber shares. The share holding gave it control of the company. At its meeting of 16-17 September 1976 the A.L.F.C. purported to approve the grant of an "interest" in land to Ralkon in respect of Bartlett's Farm. Ralkon had already begun farming the land. The trial judge could find no evidence that Ralkon was formally notified of the grant of interest. In granting the "interest" the A.L.F.C. purported to act under s.20 of the Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974 ("the A.L.F. Act"). It will be necessary later to decide the effect of the action of the A.L.F.C. at this September 1976 meeting. In discussions between the A.L.F.C. and Ralkon after the grant, Ralkon made clear that it wished the freehold in Bartlett's Farm to be transferred from the A.L.F.C. to it. The directors of Ralkon passed a resolution to that effect on 7 September 1979. The A.L.F.C., on the other hand, made clear its plans to transfer title to the Farm to the Point McLeay Community Council upon the Council becoming incorporated under s.78 of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976. The learned trial judge found that, in his words, "the A.L.F.C. made, in my opinion, its attitude very plain. It contemplated that a superior title to Bartlett's Farm would be vested in the Community Council, with Ralkon 'continuing to manage and operate' the property". This seems to us correctly to summarize the position. The Articles of Ralkon were amended on 14 November 1979. The amendment created a class of shares designated "Residents' Preference Shares" and these were allotted, as determined by the directors, to Aboriginal residents of the Point McLeay Reserve. It appears that some thirty to forty of these shares were allotted. As, by these amendments, each shareholder had one vote regardless of the number of shares held, control of Ralkon passed to the holders of the preference shares. On 3 January 1980 a joint meeting of Ralkon's Board and the Councillors of the Community Council passed a resolution that "Bartlett's Farm be vested in the Point McLeay Community in the name of the Ralkon Agricultural Company by purchase if necessary". In March 1980 the A.L.F.C. decided to rescind its purported grant of an "interest" in land to Ralkon and to substitute a grant of "interest" to the Point McLeay Aboriginal Community Council. The A.L.F.C. advised Ralkon and the Community Council of this by letter of 13 May 1980. On 1 July 1980 the A.L.F.C. ceased to exist and was replaced by the A.D.C., pursuant to the Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980 ("the A.D.C. Act"). That Act repealed the A.L.F. Act. Section 51 of the A.D.C. Act provides for the transfer to the A.D.C. of all rights, property and assets, and all debts, liabilities and obligations held by the A.L.F.C. On 23 March 1981 the A.D.C. made to the Community Council a formal offer of a lease of Bartlett's Farm. This was rejected on 30 March 1981, and on 27 April 1981 the Council sought the title for Ralkon. However, on 9 July 1981 the Council accepted the lease; a lease was entered into, and was registered in the Lands Titles Office on 25 September 1981. In granting the lease the A.D.C. acted under Part IV of the A.D.C. Act. Ralkon challenges the A.D.C.'s decision to grant a lease to the Community Council, being a decision in, as it were, two parts: the decision expressed in the letter of 23 March 1981, and the decision in July 1981 to proceed, arising from the acceptance by the Community Council. Ralkon's Interest: Ralkon's primary submission is that the grant to the Community Council could not be made, because it was inconsistent "with Ralkon's interest. We mention later some considerations concerning the place in the operation of the Judicial Review Act of submissions of this nature, but it is desirable that we examine the substance of the argument. The first question is the nature of Ralkon's interest pursuant to the A.L.F.C.'s decision of 16 or 17 September 1976. Section 20(1) of the A.L.F. Act provided as follows: "The Commission may, on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit - (a) grant to an Aboriginal corporation an interest in land for the purpose of enabling the members of that corporation to occupy that land; and (b) grant to an Aboriginal land trust an interest in land for the purpose of enabling Aboriginals to occupy that land." Any grant to Ralkon could not have been made pursuant to 8.20(1)(b); therefore only s.20(1)(a) is appropriate. We are of the view that Ralkon was ineligible to receive a grant under that paragraph, as it was not an "Aboriginal corporation" within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 defined "Aboriginal corporation" as "a body corporate of which all the members for the time being are persons as to whom the Minister is satisfied that they are members of a community of Aboriginals". Ralkon is a body corporate, but at the material time, September 1976, it had three members: two subscriber shareholders and the Community Council. For Ralkon to be eligible for a grant it would be necessary to find that the Community Council isa "person" within the meaning of the section and that, in our opinion, is not the case. The reference is clearly to natural persons. The Community Council is not itself a member of the community, it is an entirely separate body. Ralkon being ineligible for a grant, the purported action of September 1976 was of no effect. At the time of the grant to the Community Council, Ralkon's interest was as a licensee only. Because of the view just expressed, it is not necessary to decide the correct characterization of the interest purportedly given by the A.L.F.C. to Ralkon, but we shall deal briefly with it. The minutes of the meeting of the A.L.F.C. in September 1976 indicate that the A.L.F.C. regarded the statutory term "an interest in land" as creating a class of interest wholly separate from those known to the law. This was not correct. Section 3 defined "interest", in this context, as "a legal or equitable estate or interest (including a licence) in the land". On its correct interpretation s.20(1)(a) gave to the A.L.P.C. the power to grant to any eligible party an interest in land which was known in law or equity. It did not create a new species of interest. Accordingly, apart from the fact that Ralkon was ineligible for a grant, the resolution of September 1976 could not go beyond stating that the A.L.F.C. would grant to Ralkon an uncertain and undetermined interest. No such interest was registered, or registrable, nor was any caveat entered to protect it. Undoubtedly Ralkon secured a Licence to occupy the land, but it did not in terms of grant acquire any greater interest. In our view Ralkon fails on its primary submission. We doubt whether this licence to Ralkon has been revoked by the A.D.C.: the lessee took with notice of the occupation and appears not to have planned itself to evict Ralkon, as distinct from any action the specific terms of the lease might require (see later). The interposition of a lessee between the holder of a fee-simple and a licensee does not simpliciter revoke the licence. We note that eviction proceedings have been commenced by the Community Council but counsel informed the Court that these had been stayed pending the outcome of this case. Estoppel: In relation to this and other arguments concerning the proprietary rights of the parties, we should note a submission made by counsel for the A.D.C. It is that this Court, on an application such as the present, cannot or should not be concerned with private rights alleged to affect the title to, or possession of, the land. R. v. Ross- Jones; Ex parte Beaumont (1979) 141 C.L.R. 504, and Ascot Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Harper (1981) 148 C.L.R. 337 were referred to, but there is danger in seeking to apply what was said in those cases to the present case. As we have stated it, the proposition does not permit of a simple, unqualified answer. There must certainly be an area, in most cases, where the proprietary rights of the parties affecting land, should be left to be determined by the courts of the place where the land is situated. The Judicial Review Act is concerned with the validity of administrative decisions, and an inquiry into such rights may not, in a particular case, be properly incidental to that. In the present case the various matters concerning proprietary rights have been argued on both sides, and we shall deal with them without attempting any further answer to the general question posed. -~ 10 - The appellants contend that whatever interest they had in the land, that was in the circumstances enough to give rise to what is commonly called a "proprietary" estoppel. The A.D.C., it submits, was estopped from dealing with the land inconsistently with that interest, It seems to us that there is no adequate basis for any estoppel, and there are a number of factors that tell against an estoppel which would preclude the grant of the lease which was actually made. As we have already indicated, there was no misinterpretation and no representation or promise to which effect could be given. When the A.D.C. succeeded the A.L.F.C. it held the land as owner, and the appellant was a licensee. The latter was allowed, one would say encouraged, to use the land for agricultural purposes, but this did not create an estoppel, nor an irrevocable licence. There was not a promise or a representation, express or implied, that if Ralkon carried on agricultural pursuits a lease would be granted to it, let alone a lease for ninety-nine years as claimed by Ralkon. It spent money on improvements, but this money came largely, if not entirely, from public funds and the expenditure was incidental to the use it was making of the land. The disposition of the land, and of a leasehold interest in it, remained in the discretion of the Commission, to be exercised in accordance with the requirements of the A.D.C. Act. The A.D.C. is empowered to grant interests in land pursuant to ss.27 and 28 of the A.D.C. Act. These sections provide as follows: - ]1 - "27. (1) The Commission may acquire by agreement any interests in land or personal property and may, on such terms and conditions as it determines, grant any interests so acquired, or any interests derived from interests so acquired, to Aboriginal land trusts for the object of enabling Aboriginals to occupy land or to Aboriginal corporations for the object of enabling members of those corporations to occupy land. (2) No payment shall be due to the Commission in respect of a grant made under sub-section (1). 28. For the purposes of section 24, the Commission may acquire by agreement any real or personal property, and may grant, sell, lease or otherwise make available property so acquired to an Aboriginal or Aboriginals, or to an Aboriginal body, on such terms and conditions (if any) as are determined by the Commission." An "Aboriginal corporation" (8.27) is a corporation in respect of which a declaration under s.43 of the A.D.C. Act has been made, but no such declaration has been made in relation to Ralkon. An "Aboriginal body" (8.28) means a body corporate that is controlled, whether directly or indirectly, by Aboriginals and the principal objects of which are conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals (s.4(1)). We note that the powers given to the Commission are to be exercised for furthering "the economic and social development of Aboriginals" (s.8). It may be doubted whether, in any event, there could be an estoppel against the exercise of the discretion given to it, for that purpose. -12- Natural Justice: The appellant submits that if the grant to the Community Council could in law be made, the decision was reached in such circumstances as to make it null and void. This was so because, it was submitted, the A.D.C. did not accord to Ralkon natural justice when making the decision. Ralikon was not eligible to receive a grant of an interest in land from the A.D.C. As counsel for the appellant conceded, it could only be eligible if it was an "Aboriginal body" within the meaning of s.28. As mentioned above, there are three tests of an "Aboriginal body" under s.4(1), all of which must be satisfied: the incorporation test, the control test, and the principal objects test. Raikon cannot succeed on the third of these tests. Ralkon's principal object was the carrying on of the business of pastoralist, farmer and grazier. That is not of itself "conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals". It may well be that there are methods of carrying out those objects which are conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals, but that is not a sufficient. In Raikon Agricultural Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 A.L.R. 535, the present appellant was an applicant before Keely J. His Honour said, at 543, that a corporate body does not fall within the words of the definition of "Aboriginal body" in s.4(1) umless its formal - 13 - objects can be said to tend ina positive way towards the advancement of Aboriginais; it is not sufficient if the objects are simply not inconsistent with the advancement of Aboriginals. His Honour held, in our view correctly, that Ralkon was not an Aboriginal body as defined in s.4(1). This being so, it was not eligible for the receipt of a grant. Counsel for Ralkon submitted that, on the grounds of natural justice, it should have been given the opportunity to make itself eligible to receive a grant, or at least should have been heard on the question whether it could make itself eligible. There was not, in our view, any obligation on the A.D.C. to hear what it might have been able to say to that end. The submission is put on the basis that arising from what had happened in the past, Ralkon had a "legitimate expectation" that it would be granted a lease, and it therefore had a right to be heard before the land was dealt with in a way inconsistent with that expectation (F.A.I. Insurances Utd. v. Winneke (1982) 41 A.L.R. 1). The short answer to this submission is that no such legitimate expectation existed at or about the tame of the decision to grant the lease to the Community Council. There might have been a hope, but it would have been a hope maintained despite contrary intentions, and its current ineligibility. The situation was not at ail analogous to that existing in F.A.I. Insurances (supra), which was a case in which an insurer under existing statutory authority was told that its authority would not be renewed. The present case is one in which a statutory body had a power to exercise as owner of land and, in - 14 - doing so, provided that it remained within the scope and purpose and particular provisions of the statute (see ss.8, 24, 27 and 28), it was free to decide that it would grant a lease, and to whom. In fact, the argument proceeded on the footing that Ralkon should be heard before a lease was granted to another. This is put on the basis that Ralkon did not know in advance that a lease would, or might, go to the Community Council. The proposition is simply one of being heard to oppose a grant to another, and in our view there was no right of such a kind. It has been submitted that even if Ralkon was not entitled to be heard on the question of the grant of the lease, it was entitled to be heard in relation to the insertion in it of clause (3), or at least the first sub-clause of it, which provided that the A.D.C. would not permit the assignment of the lease to Ralkon, unless certain conditions, inciuding the preparation of proper accounts, were met. We do not think this is so. Once it was open to grant a lease to another, the terms of the lease were a matter for agreement between lessor and lessee. Ralkon did not have a right to remain in occupation and the lessee was free to have it ejected. What sub-clause (i) does is recognise. that it could stay if certain conditions were fulfilled. Moreover, these conditions recognise situations concerning the control of the company and the farming operations conducted by it which had for years been the subject of correspondence and discussion between the A.D.C. (and before that the A.L.F.C.) on the one hand, and Ralkon on the other. There had in other words been a fully adequate hearing. As an early indication of the dispute, we set out a minute of a meeting of the A.L.F.C. in 1977: "The Regional Office stated that they were most concerned that the property was being permanently damaged by the manager, but they were unable to gain access to the farm to verify these doubts. They advised that, inan effort to force the manager's compliance and because of the persistent breach of departmental funding rules, no funds had been released to the Ralkon Agricultural Company since May 1976. Despite this, the manager continued to be intransigent and apparently supported himself and the farm by selling assets and stock and generally running down the property. The Regional Office also advised that the Company had been repeatedly in breach of the South Australian Companies Act and had been fined several times for this. The Department had attempted to use these ; breaches to have the Company deregistered. In addition, the major shareholder in the Company, the Point McLeay Community Council (98%), had attempted 1 several times to exert its position to force a ' dismissal of the manager. Unfortunately, because of peculiarities in the Company's Articles and Memorandum of Association, and because of statutory delays in prosecuting procedures under the Companies Act, these attempts had so far been unsuccessful." The sub-clause sets out, in one way, an intention previously communicated by the A.D.C., and by the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. At the centre of the debate there was, and is, the desire of Ralkon to operate in relation to the land as an independent commercial enterprise. It desires to have a fee simple. - 16- Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations In the final ground of challenge it is submitted that irrelevant considerations were taken into account by the A.D.C. and that it failed to take relevant considerations into account. The discretion given to the A.D.C. is a wide one. We have already referred to part of the opening language of s.8 of the A.D.C. Act, which section deals with its functions. Reference can also be had to s.27 ("grants of interests in property") and 3.28 ("grants, etc. of property for purposes of business enterprises") in respect of the width of the discretion conferred by those sections. A number of matters were raised, but they are in our view without substance. In general, the allegations amounted to saying that some matters adverse to Ralkon and the interest it was claiming were taken into account, and some matters favourable to it were not. The particular focus of the allegation was Ralkon. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that the A.D.C. was fully informed about Ralkon and its activities and made a deliberate decision adverse to it and favourable to the Community Council. There is no evidence to show that in so doing it failed to exercise its discretion properly. -17- Relief: The principal relief sought by the applicant in these proceedings is an order quashing the decision of the A.D.C. to grant the lease to the Community Council, and an order that the farm be transferred to the applicant. Three submissions were made by counsel for the A.D.C., on the assumption that earlier arguments failed. It was put that the court had no power to make orders against third parties, and in this connection Ascot Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Harper (1981) 148 C.L.R. 337 was relied upon. It was then submitted, for slightly different reasons, that if third parties were involved, appropriate orders could only be made by State (or Territory) Courts. The third submission was that the Community Council had an indefeasible title, even if the decision to grant the lease (and the lease) were void. It should be recorded that the Community Council became a party as a consequence of the interlocutory order of a judge made on the application of the applicant. There was no appeal against that order, but at the conclusion of his argument counsel for the Community Council said that his client had been wrongly joined. The question of whether it should have been joined is of course largely circular. In our view it was properly joined, if for no other reason than that, vis-a-vis each other, 1t and the applicant would be bound by the decision of the Court. We are also of the view that in appropriate circumstances orders can be made against what were called "third parties". One basis, which on - 18 - we think is available in most judicial proceedings, is to secure, or make good, relief given or which may be given against a principal party. An additional consideration is that the issue under the Judicial Review Act going to legality cannot he re-litigated in a State or Territory Court. We have already commented on the extent of the Court's power to deal with private law rights arising between the parties, and the present submissions do not require closer consideration of that matter. There is no doubt that the Court's power to set aside a decision includes power to make consequential orders respecting acts done in pursuance of .that decision. In the present case the act of the A.D.C. has been followed by the acts of others, and particularly the registration of the lease. Under South Australian law, as it has been construed, (Palais Parking Station Pty. Ltd. v. Shea (1980) 24 S.A.S.R. 425) registration results in indefeasibility, even for a dealing which is void for want of power in a statutory body, in that case the resuming authority. The occasion does not arise to express a concluded opinion on the matter but it may be that this Court's power would not extend to making an order for the assignment or surrender of the lease. Our view 1s that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs. I certify that this and the I7 ! preceding pages are a true copy, of the Cc Reasons for Judgment herein of mes Honours Mr. Justice Fex aud Mr Sushice 2 eae Va hrcia Kiev ' Associate | Dated: 4/12] $4 ; } — IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) SOUTH AUSTRALIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY) No. SAG.9 of 1984 ) GENERAL DIVISION ) ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN : RALKON AGRICULTURAL COMPANY PTY LIMITED Appellant AND : ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT. COMMISSTON and POINT McLEAY COMMUNITY COUNCIL INC Respondents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CORAM : Fox, Woodward and Davies Jd 14 December 1984 DAVIES J : I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by Mr Justice Fox and Mr Justice Woodward. In general I agree with them, but I would add a few words of my own. In my opinion, at the relevant dates in 1981, Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Limited ("Ralkon") was not an "Aboriginal body" as defined in s.4({1) of the Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980 (Cth) ("the Act") or an "Aboriginal corporation" as defined therein. The latter position is clear, for Ralkon was not declared by the Commission under s.43 of the Act to be an aboriginal corporation. As to the former, I am of the view that the principal objects of Ralkon were not "conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals". At the time of the decisions which are under review, the memorandum and articles of association were not directed to the advancement of aboriginals. Ralkon was established and maintained as a company to carry on the business of primary production. There was no provision in the memorandum or articles of association, other than the provision introduced in 1979 for "residents' preference shares", which required the shareholders to be aboriginals or which required the company to be carried on in a manner conducive to the advancement of aboriginals. In my opinion, Ralkon satisfied only paragraph (a) of the definition, that is to say, it was controlled by aboriginals. [It did not satisfy paragraph (b) of the definition, for its principal objects were not conducive to the advancement of aboriginals. Its principal objects were conducive to the advancement of its shareholders, whoever they might be. In my opinion, this conclusion is fatal to the contention put forward by the appellant. The functions of the Aboriginal Development Commission ("the Commission") are set out in s.8 of the Act as, inter alia, "8. The functions of the Commission are, subject to and in accordance with this Act, to further the economic and social development of Aboriginals and, in particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing - (a) to assist communities and groups of Aboriginals to acquire land; (b) to assist Aboriginals to engage in business enterprises; . Section 23(1) of the Act provides that moneys of the General Fund of the Commission may be applied in certain ways for the purpose of enabling aboriginals to occupy land. Section 24(1) of the Act provides that moneys of the General Fund of the Commission may be applied in certain ways for the purpose of enabling aboriginals to engage in business enterprises. Section 27(1) provides : "27.(1) The Commission may acquire by agreement any interests in land or personal property and may, on such terms and conditions as it determines, grant any interests so acquired, or any interests derived from interests so acquired, to Aboriginal land trusts for the object of enabling Aboriginals to occupy land or to Aboriginal corporations for the object of enabling members of those corporations to occupy land." Section 28 provides "28. For the purposes of section 24, the Commission may acquire by agreement any real or personal property, and may grant, sell, lease or otherwise make available property so acquired to an Aboriginal or Aboriginals, or toan Aboriginal body, on such terms and conditions (if any) as are determined by the Commission." The decision under review was a decision by the Commission to grant to the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated a lease of certain farming property at Point McLeay which was occupied on licence by Ralkon. Also under review was the grant of that lease, it being said that that grant was itself a decision. The Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated was and is without question an aboriginal body as defined by the Act. Its members are aboriginals and its objects require it to be carried on in the interests of aboriginals. It is a body set up for the advancement of the aboriginal community at Point McLeay. For several years, the Commission, or its predecessor, the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, endeavoured to persuade Ralkon, which was in occupation of the subject land, to ensure that it was representative of and would be carried on solely in the interests of the members of the Point McLeay community of aboriginals. Ralkon resisted the requests, contending that it was in the interests of aboriginals that ordinary corporations controlled by aboriginais should conduct business and should be able to seek loans in the ordinary manner, that is to say, by mortgaging property owned by the company. There were years of negotiation, which included discussions, letters, representations and an inquiry by the Commonwealth Ombudsman into the whole affair. In 1981, the Commission decided to act. At the time when it did so, the Commission could not, in my opinion, consistently with the Act have granted either a lease or freehold title to Ralkon. Ralkon was not an aboriginal body as defined. In my opinion, the Commission took the most appropriate step that was open to it having regard to the terms of its Act, namely, to grant a lease of the property to the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated. It was submitted that the Commission acquired its interest in the land subject to any interest held by Ralkon, and that it was only that residual interest of which the Commission could dispose, In my opinion, however, the Commission was the proprietor of the land and was entitled to exercise its powers as such under the Real Property Act, 1886-1980 (SA). Any interest which Ralkon had was an undefined interest which had not been declared by any court. Provided the Commission exercised its statutory powers properly, as in my view it did, the extent of that interest was not a matter to be determined in the application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Nor was the Court asked to exercise, in relation to that interest, its associated jurisdiction under s.32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It was next submitted that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice, that Ralkon had not been givena fair opportunity to be heard. I have perused carefully all the material before the Court. It seems to me that the matter in dispute had been thrashed out at great length between Ralkon and the Commission, between Ralkon and the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated, between the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated and the Commission and between the aboriginals and State and Federal officials and Ministers and that everyone was perfectly well aware of what were the issues involved. In my opinion, Ralkon was given a fair opportunity to present its case. Finally, it was said that there was a specific matter with respect to which Ralkon ought to have been given an opportunity to be heard, namely, on the terms of the lease, as between the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated and Ralkon. But the terms of that lease did not derogate from any legal entitlement which Ralkon had to use the iand. The lease was a lease between the Commission and the Point McLeay Community Council Incorporated. It does not seem to me that Ralkon had any call to be heard with respect to the specific terms of that lease. For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. vcermty that this andthe = #. ze Cs) preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of The Hofiour- able Mr. Justice JI, 7 Paves Cheer @— * Assoclate Dated ~ (4/121