CATCHRORDS Industrial Law - registered organization - validity of rules - autonomy of branches - requirements as to federal and branch funds. Conciliati on_ and Arbitration Act 1904 s. 140(1)(a), =. 140(1)(d), s. 136A, s. Industrial 133A. Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972-1982 (S.A.) Moore v. Doyle (1969) 15 F.L.R. 59 Williams v. Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R. 36 Sherrif v. Townsend (1980) 48 F.L.R. 20 Allen v. Townsend (1977) 31 F.L.R. 431 Mapilone v. Maynes (1983) 4 1.R. 198 Morris v. Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Errlovees' Union of Austral ia (1978) 35 F.L.R. 60 AT HARRY DAVID KRANTZ v. THE FEDERATED CLERKS UNION OF AUSTRALIA GRAY J. 21ST DECEMBER 1984 MELBOURNE. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY S.A. No. 13 of 1984 INDUSTR DIVISION BETWEEN : HARRY_ DAVID KRANTZ, FREDERICK EDWARD PRIEST AND WILLIAM ALEX SMITH AND FEDERATED CLERKS' UNION OF AUSTRALIA ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER: GRAY J. DATE OF ORDER: 21ST DECEMBER 1984 WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The proceding is adjourned until Thursday 28th February 1985, at Adelaide, for the purpose of giving the Respondent an opportunity to alter its rules, so as make the provisions required by section 133A of Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. The Rule to Show Cause is otherwise discharged. ---* IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY S.A. No. 13 of 1984 INDUSTRIAL DIVISION BETWEEN HARRY DAVID KRANTZ, FREDERICK EDRAFD PRIEST AND WILLIAM ALEX SMITH AND FEDERATED CLEPKS' UNION OF AUSTRALIA JUDGE: GRAY J. DATE: 21ST DECEMBER 1984 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT On 12th July 1984, the Applicants sougnt and were granted a Rule to Show Cause pursuant to s. 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1994 ("the Act ). The Respondent, Federated Clerks' Union of Australia ("the Union") is an organization of employees registered pursuant to the Act. Each of the Applicants 1s a member of the Union. By its rules, the Union 1s divided into branches. Rule 12(1) provides for eight branches in North Queensland, Central and Southern Queensland, New South Wales, Broken Hill (within the county of Yancowinna), Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, ana West Australia, and for one branch consisting of taxaticn officers. Subject to ballots of the members under rule 32, the supreme control of the Union 1s vested by rule 16 ina National Council, composed of four national officers and councillors elected by branches, roughly in proportion to branch membership. By rule 27, the committee of management of the Union is the National Executive, which consists of the four national officers and one vice president from each branch, elected by and from the National Council. There is also a National Executive Committee, which consists of the four national officers and the vice presidents from the Central and Southern Gueensland, New South Wales and Victorian branches. This body is required to meet at least every two months, by virtue of rule 28. At the hearing, Mr. Heywood-Smith appeared for the Applicants and Dr. Jessup for the Union. A substantial amount of cral evidence was reccived from Bernadette Anne Callaghan, the branch secretary of the Central and Southern Queensland branch, the first Applicant, whois the former secretary of the South Australian Branch, and Ralph Desmond Clark, the current secretary of the South Australian branch. Numerous documents were also tendered. For reasons which will appear, it is unnecessary to make detailed findings on all of the i1sSues canvassed in the evidence. Some of those issues belonq more properly in proceedings under s. 141 of the Act than ina proceeding of the present kind. So far as the facts need to be canvassed, I propose to deal with them in relation to the specific challenges to the rules. As presented at the hearing, these challenges fall into two categories. The first category is based upon s. 140(1)(a) and s. 133A of the Act. The second category depends upon s. 140(1)(d) of the Act. The relevant parts of s. 140 as follows: "140. (1) The rules of an organization - (a) shall not be contrary to, or fail to make a provision required by, a provision of this Act, the requlations or an award or otherwise be contrary to a law; (d) shall be such as' to provide for the autonory cf a branch in matters affecting members of the branch only and matters concerning the particzpation of the branch in any State industrial conciliation and arbitration system." It 1s appropriate to set out s. 133A in full: 133A. (1) In addition tc the other conditions referred to in this Act, the conditions to be complied with by associations divided into branches applying for registration as organizations and by organizations divided into branches shall include a conditicn that the rules of the association or oraanization shall provide- (a) that there shall be a fund ('in this' section referred to as the Federal Fund) which snail be managed and controlled in accordance with rules relating to the association or crganization as a whole; and (b) that each branch shall have a fund (in this section referred to as a Branch Fund) of the particular branch which shall be managec and controlled in accordance with rules cf that branch, and shall make provision in relation to those Funds in accordance with subsections (2) and {3), as if references in those sub-sections to an organization included references to an association applying for registration as an organization. (2) The Federal Fund shall consist of- (a) any real or personal property of which the committee of management of the organization, by the rules or by any established practice not inconsistent with the rules, has, or in the absence of any limited term lease, bailment or arrangement, would have, the right of custody, control or management ; (b) ain the case of an organization the rules of which provide for the payment of capitation tees by a are branch to the organization-fees so paid. (c) in the case of an organization the rules of which provide for the payment of the whole or part of any entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies by a branch to the organization-the amounts of such payments; (d) any interest, rents, dividends or other income derived from the investment or use of the Fund; (e@) any superannuation or long service leave or other fund operated or controlled in accordance with rules relating to the organization as a whole for the benefit of its officers or employees; {f) any sick pay fund, accident pay fund, funeral fund, tool benefit fund or like fund operated in accordance with rules relating to the organization as a whole for the benefit of its members; (g) any property acquired wholly or mainly by expenditure of the moneys for the Fund or derived from other assets of the Fund; and (h) the proceeds of any disposal of parts of the Fund. (3) A Branch Fund shall consist of- (a) any real or personal property of which the branch ef the organization, by the rules or by any established practice not inconsistent with the rules, has cor in the absence of anv limited term lease, bailment or arrangement, would have, the right cf custody, control or management; (b) the amounts of entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies received by a branch, less so much of those amounts as 1s payable Ey the branch to the organization; (c) any interest, rents or dividends derived from the investment of the Fund; (d) any superannuation or long service leave fund operated or controlled by the branch for the benefit of its officers or employees; (e) any sick pay fund, accident pay fund, funeral fund, tool benefit fund or like fund operated or controlled by the branch for the benefit of its members; : (f) any property acquired wholly or mainly by expenditure of the moneys of the Fund or derived from other assets of the Fund; and (g) the proceeds of any disposal of parts of the Fund. (4) Rules relating to a Branch Fund shall not be altered except with the consent of the branch concerned. (5) The Registrar may grant to an association or organization exemption from this section or any provision of this section on the ground that its rules make adequate and reasonable provision for its funds, including branch funds, having regard to its functioning under this Act and its participation in any State system of industrial conciliation and arbitration." An understanding of the provisions of s. 133A and s. 140(1)(d) requires an examination of their history. Each was first enacted by Act No. 89 of 1974, which also first enacted a number of other provisions now found in the Act. Act No. 8&9 of 1974 resulted from the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry on Co-ordinated Industrial Organizations, which was constituted by the late Mr. Justice J.B. Sweeney. That committee had been appointed by the then government inan attempt to resolve problems which had become apparent as a result of the decision of the Commonwealth Industrial Court in Moore v. Dovle (1969) 15 F.L.R. 59. In substance, these problems arose where erganizations registered under the Act had branches in the States of Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia. The legislation of each of those States previded for reqistration of associations or unions, and gave to such associations or unions corporate status. It was assumed in the case of many organizations registered under the Act that they were capable of having, and did have, their branches in those States registered under the State legislation. As a result of the judgment in Moore v. Doyle, 1t became well known that an association or union redqistered under the legislation of those States was in law an entirely separate entity from the branch of an organization operating within that State. Such a branch could have no existence independent of the organization: see Williars v. Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R. 30, at pages 53-55, in the judgment of Fullagar J. As a consequence of the attempt, which occurred in many cases, to operate a branch of an organization and a union cr association registered under State law as if they were one and the same legal entity, it was thought to be the case that one such body, either the State union or association, or the branch of the organization, would cease to exist or to function effectively, after the lapse of some time, As a result of the decision in Moore v. Doyle, the view was taken that the Transport Workers' Union of Australia did not have a branch in New South Wales: the body which operated under the name "Transport Workers' Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch" was a trade union registered under State legislation, and not a branch of the organization registered under the Act. The task of the Sweeney Committee was to find a solution to these problems, 1f such a_ solution could be found. The solution proposed was in substance that the Act should be amended to permit a branch of an organization to be registered under State law, where that State law did not operate to incorporate a body registered under it. For such a system of non-corporate registration to operate effectively, two things were necessary. One was to amend the Act so as to permit a branch of an organization to operate within a State industrial system, so as to ensure that local officers had sufficient authority and funds to participate effectively. The other was for the States to pass complementary legislation, permitting the registration of branches without incorporation. Act No. 89 of 1974 was designed to accomplish the first of these objects. The second has never been accomplished. The legislation of Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia still provides for the attribution of corporate or other legal personality to a registered association or union. In Victoria and Tasmania, no provision is made for registration, but recognition 1s given to an organization itself, as distinct from a branch. Among the sections introduced into the Act by Act No. 89 of 1974 was s. 136A, which provides as follows: "136A. (1) Where 1t 18 not contrary to the rules cf an organization to do so, 1t may participate in the systems of conciliation and arbitration or of wages boards or like systems established under the law of a State, and for that purpose a branch of an organization may become registered under a law of a State so long as that registration does not involve the branch in becoming incorporated, or otherwise becoming a legal entity, under the law of a State. (2) Where an organization so participates, its rules May provide that the Secretary of the branch of the organization in the State shall be the person to sue oar to be sued under the law of the State in respect of any acts or omissions arising from that participation." Part VIIIB of the Act was also enacted at the same time. This is auntended to facilitate amalgamation between organizations and existing State registered unions and associations. Reference should also be made to s. 139(5), also first enacted by Act No. 89 of 1974. This provision is intended to make it easier for an organization to alter ats rules relating to eligibility for membership so as to enable it to represent persons already represented by a State registered union or association where the two bodies have been conducted in conjunction. All of this legislation was passed either entirely or substantially in the form in which it was recommended by the Sweeney Committee. It was clearly expected by the Sweeney Committee, and by the Parliament which enacted Act No. 89 of 1974, that State legislation would be passed which would complement the scheme introduced into the Act. That expectation 1s clearly revealed in the second reading speeches on the bill which became Act No. 89 of 1974, both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. It is an expectation which has not been fulfilled in any State. As a consequence, the intention of the Sweeney Committee, and of the Parliament has been frustrated. In the light of this history, Dr. Jessup submitted that neither s. 133A nor s. 140(1)(d) has any operation in relation to the rules of any organization. On this view, those provisions remain in the Act solely upon the footing that they will spring into effect when the necessary complementary legislation is enacted in any State. Support for this argument is found in the judgment of Northrop J. ain Sherrif v. Townsend (1980) 48 F.L.R. 20, at pages 56-57. In that case, the Full Court was called upon to deal with a number of issues arising from tne rules of an organization. One such rule permitted a branch committee of management to submit any local question or dispute toa State industrial tribunal after obtaining approval for such submission from the branch in general meeting and from the federal executive committee of the organization. Northrop J. held that s. 140(1)(d) dad not apply to branches not falling within s. 136A of the Act. At page 45, Evatt J. expressed his agreement with the conclusion of Northrop J., but limited his reasons to the second part of s. 140(1)(d), namely matters concerning the participation of the branch in any State industrial conciliation and arbitration system. At pages 34-35, the Presiding Judge, Smithers J., accepted the proposition that the rule concerned was a direct invasion of the autonomy of branches, and held that the rule offended s. 140(1)(d). It should be noted that, as is pointed out inthe judgment of Northrop gd. at page 56, full argument was not directed to the question whether s. 140(1)1{d) was effective. One of the issues to which the Full Court addressed itself in Sherrif v. Townsend was the question whether s. 140(1)(d) operated to compel the organization concerned to convert a sub-branch, set up under its rules, into a_ branch. Smithers J. held that it did not. His Honour did not discuss the question whether s. 140(1)(d) had effective operation. Gn this issue, the other two members of the Full Court contented themselves with agreeing with the conclusion and reasons of Smithers J. The provision was also considered briefly by Smithers J. in Allen v. Townsend (1977) 31 F.L.F. 431, at fages 458-9, where his Honour expressed the view that a rule which entitled the Federal Secretary to be a rember of all branch committees of management of an organization contravened the requirement of branch autonomy. The other two members of the Court, Evatt and Northrop JJ., did not express any view on this issue. Indeed, it does not appear that the Applicant in that case sought relief on the basis of s. 140(1)(d). In Morris v. Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union cf Australia (1978) 35 F.L.R. 60, a Full Court consistina of Smithers, J.B. Sweeney and Evatt JJ. was called upon to consider whether the power of an organization to amend rules, including branch rules, was required to be expressed to be subject to a requirement that any amendments not trespass upon branch autonomy. This contention was rejected by the Full Court. There was no suggestion that s. 140(1)(d) was not an effective provision. The view of Northrop J. ain Sherriff v. Townsend was rejected by Fitzgerald J. in Mapstone v. Maynes (1983) 4 I.R. 198, at page 205. On appeal from the decision of Fitzgerald J., the Full Court did not find it necessary to consider the question. See Nucifora v. Mapstone (4th November 1983, unreported). The authorities, therefore, do not assist to any great degree in determining whether s. 140(1)(d) operates with respect to all or any branches. Section 133A has not been the subject of any pronouncement by this Court or its predecessor, the Australian Industrial Court. Whilst the history of these provisions, and the information derived from the second reading speeches on the bill which became Act No. 893 of 1974, suggest strongly that the provisions were to operate with complementary State legislation, it is difficult to disregard the provisions altogether, even in the absence of such complementary legislation. It would have been easy for Parliament to make express provision that the new sections enacted by Act No. 8&9 of 1974 would not come into effect until certain leqislation was passed by one or more States, or even to delay the proclamation of such sections until such legislation was passed. Neither of these courses was adopted. The Parliament must also be taken to have been aware that the problems to which the Sweeney Committee addressed itself existed only in four States. Despite this, ss. 133A and 140(1)(d) were enacted so as to be applicable to branches in all States. These factors suggest that the provisions were intended to have some effect in relation to branches which could not participate in State industrial systems. This view 1s supported by the absence of any reference to such participation in s. 133A (except indirectly in sub-s. (5)), and by the fact that s. 140(1)(d) as expressed so as to apply to two types of "matters", namely those affecting members of the branch only, and those concerning the participation of the branch in any State industrial conciliation and arbitration system. It may be that the reasons advanced hy the Sweeney Committee, and accepted by the Parliament, do not justify the entirety of the leqislation which resulted. It is, however, an entirely different thing to say that, by reference to those reasons, the legislation should be teud as if it had not been passed. However inconvenient it may be, s. 133A and s. 140(1)(d) must be given some meaning in relation to all branches of organizations which have branches. Just what meaning is to be given to them is also a difficult question. It 1s entirely unnecessary under the Act that an organization should have branches at all; whether branches exist or not is a matter of the choice of an organization, expressed through its rules. If branches do exist, they do not exist separately from the organization, but simply as aggregations of members within the organization. They are no more than convenient divisions of the members of a corporate body, created for administrative purposes. See the passage from Williams v. Hursey to which I have already referred. Many organizations have branches which coincide with the States and, in some cases, Territories. Much of the reasoning which seems to underlie the Sweeney Report is based on the expectation that organizations will have State branches. Qn the other hand, as the Act does not require an organization to have branches at all, so 1t does not require an organization which has branches to make them coincide with the States. Branches may be based on smaller or larger geographical areas, or may be based on entirely different aggregations of members. Examples are members employed in particular industries, or by particular employers. The Union itself contains one branch which is employer based, rather than being geographically based. I refer to the Taxation Officers Branch. Several well known examples can be found of organizations which have availed themselves of the opportunity to form branches which are aggregations of members otherwise than on a State basis. Both the Sweeney Committee, and the Parliament which passed Act No. 89 of 1974, must be taken to have heen aware of the differences which could, and did, exist between branches, both within organizations, and among various crganizations. This reasoning suggests that s. 133A and s. 140(1)(d) cannot be applied in the same way to every branch of every organization. What are the appropriate elements of any fund, and what are matters affecting members of a branch only, must be determined by reference to the circumstances of the particular organization and, in some cases, the particular branch. The question of participation in any State industrial system will inevitably be one factor to be considered. The extent of coverage of members by awards made under the Act will be relevant, as will the question whether those awards are applicable within more than one branch. Of paramount importance will be the system of government which the organization has chosen, and which is expressed in its rules. Section 133A is flexible in its terms. Sub-sections (2) and (3) are not expressed to lay down hard and fast rules as to what the federal fund and the branch fund of an organization divided into branches should contain; in crucial respects, those sub-sections expressly defer to the rules of the organization. The financial requirements of a branch which has full-time officials will inevitably be different from those of one which does not. Similarly, the matters which can properly he considered to affect the members of a branch only will differ from organization to organization, and even from branch to branch within an organization. Whether a particular matter affects members of a branch only will usually have to be determined by looking at' the express terms of the rules, or the implications which necessarily arise from them. Accordingly, the choice cf matters which affect members of a branch only will be essentially that of the organization, and not that of the court. With these conclusions in mind, I turn to deal with the specific objections made by the Applicants to the rules of the Union. In the first place, an attack was made on the rules of the Union as a whole, on the basis that they failed to make a provision required by s. 133A of the Act, and therefore contravened s. 140(1)(a). As an alternative to, or perhaps in conjunction with, this attack, it was specifically alleged that rule 15(1) of the Federal rules of the Union was contrary to s. 133A, and therefore tos. 140(1)(a). Some examination of the rules is necessary, for the purpose of determining whether they are in conformity with s. 133A. I turn first to the Federal rules. Rule 7 deals with entrance fees and contributions. It permits branch rules to fix the amounts of entrance fees, and gives to a branch a discretion to waive payment of an entrance fee by an Applicant for membership. Rule 7(2) also leaves the fixing of the amounts cf contributions to the branch rules. It provides for payment to the National Secretary of contributions by any member not allocated to a branch: the implication is that all other members should pay to the branches to which they are allocated. Ruie 7(3) leaves to the branch rules the task of fixing the times and methods of payment of contributions, fees, fines and levies. It also deals with the categories of persons authorized to collect contributions, fees, fines and levies. Rule 8 permits the National Council or National Executive, or branches to levy merbers up to the maximum amounts laid down by the rule. Rule 15(1) provides as follows: "(1) Unless otherwise directed by National Council or the National Executive, Branches may retain for the maintenance thereof all monies received by them other than the sums hereinafter required to be forwarded to the National Executive." The remaining sub-rules of rule 15 deal with the fixing of what are called sustentation fees, which are fees payable by each branch to the National Secretary each year, and are calculated by reference to the total amount of contributions received by the branch concerned. Rule 27(3) deals with the powers of the National Executive. Its opening words are as follows: "(3) The National Executive shall, subject to the review of its actions by the National Council, have the care, control, custody, superintendence, management and administration in all respects of the affairs, business, funds and property of the Union..." The first three sub-rules of rule 37 are as follows: "(1) All funds and property held by any Branch shail be vested in the Union. (2) The Executive of a Branch shall not invest any funds for the time being in its possession in other than authorised trustee investments without the approval of the National Council or National Executive. (3) The funds of the union may be disbursed for ordinary purposes by such officer or officers as ray be authorised in that behalf and subject to such limitations as may be imposed. Funds may be disbursed for extraordinary purposes by decision of the National Council or National Executive." The rules of the branches of the Union are plainly relevant to the question of compliance with s. 133A. The Applicants did not seek to tender in evidence the rules cf any branch except the South Australian Branch. As a consequence, it is impossible for the Court to assess whether the Applicants would have made cut a case of non-compliance with s. 133A an respect of the branch rules of any branch other than the Scuth Australian Branch. The Union does not carry an onus to justify the rules of all its branches in a proceeding such as this, in which 1t is the Respondent. I turn now to the rules of the South Australian Branch of the Union. Rule 16 relates to the powers and duties of the branch council, which is the qoverning body of the branch. Under sub-rule (b), the branch council has the care, control ana - 16 - custody of the funds and property of the branch. Under sub-rule {p), it has the power to fix and alter the salaries and allowances of officers, to engage and dismiss cffice staff, and to pay such salaries and allowances as 1t may deem proper. Rule 18 deals with the powers and duties of the branch executive. The executive has power to authorize expenditure and Lo pass all accounts for payment, but not to incur an extraordinary expense exceeding $40.00 without the prior approval of the Eranch council. Under rule 24(d), the branch secretary 1s made responsible for the proper carrying on of the branch and is required to act as general supervisor for and on behalf of the branch. Under rule 24(h), the branch secretary 15 required to receive and bank all monies collected by and on behalf of the branch. Rule 27(1) obliges him to keep a correct account of all receipts and expenditure and submit a monthly statement to the branch executive. Rule 24(3) requires him to submit to the branch council half yearly and yearly audited inccme and expenditure accounts of the branch. Rule 28 provades for office representatives. Under sub-rule (c)(2) and (4), an office representative is required to collect all monies due to the branch and to pay the same within fourteen days, or on demand, to the secretary, or to other authorized persons at the office of the branch, and the office representative is responsible for any deficiencies in monies collected by him, and shall be authorized to give receipts for all monies collected by hin. Rule 36 relates to funds and disbursements; 1t is in the following terms: "(a) The funds of the Union shall consist of all entrance fees, contributions, levies, fines payable to the Union and other revenue acquired. It shall be used only in furthering the objects of the Union as laid down in Rule 3. (b) All accounts not exceeding, ~L20 in connection with the ordinary managements expenses of the Union shall be authorised by the Executive. All other accounts of Expenditure shall be authorised by the Council. {c) The funds of the Union may be anvested in such investments as shall be decided upon by the Council and the control of such investments be vested in the Council. (d) All cheques for the withdrawal of moneys from the bank shall be signed by either the President, Deputy President or Vice-President and countersigned by either the Secretary or Assistant Secretary and shall bear the seal of the Union. (e) The Branch Council may where it deems necessary authorise Section banking and shall arrange for the opening of Section bank accounts and shall give and May withdraw or change the authority for persons, not being less than two, to operate such accounts. All funds to the credit of such accounts plus interest shall be the property of the Unicn as provided by this rule and shall cnly be expended for purposes authorised by the Rules. The authority for Section Banking given By Branch Ceuncil in accordance with this rule may be included in the rules of the Section." Rule 37 deals with the imposition of levies. Dr. Jessup relied upon the rules to which I have referred, together with rules providing for the audit of federal and branch accounts, as the rules which satisfy the requirements of s. 133A of the Act. He pointed to the flexibility of the terms used in that section, particularly as to the elements which are required to make up the federal fund and the branch fund respectively. It 1s correct, as Dr. Jessup pointed out, that the rules of an organization are not required to echo the precise words of sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 133A. If some of the subjects of those sub-sections do not exist in an organization or a branch, it would plainly be absurd fer the rules to make - 18 - provision for such subjects to be part of a fund. An obvious example of such absurdity would be the making of a provision in the rules of the Union for a tool benefit fund, such as is referred to in s. 133A(2)(f) and (3)(e). The rules of the Union and of its South Australian branch do make the distinction between funds and property under the control of the federal governing bodies, and those under the control of the branch governing bodies. In this sense, they do establish a federal fund and a branch fund, as contemplated by s. 133A. At the heart of the objection taken by the Applicants to these rules was the proposition that rule 15(1) permits the National Council or the National Executive of the Union to take from a branch all of the monies of the branch. This follows, so Mr. Heywood-Smith argued, from the opening words of the rule. So far as entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies are concerned, there 1s no limit expressed in s. 133A upon the amount of those monies which the rules of an organization can provide should be paid by branches to the federal governing body. Indeed, s. 133A(2)(c) expressly contemplates that the rules of an organization might provide for the payment "of the whole or part of any entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies by a4 branch to the organization". Nothing about the section as a whole suggests that the amount or percentage payable by a branch of these monies should be expressed with precision in the rules, or should be ascertainable in advance. It 1s permissible that the rules of an organization provide for the ability of a federal governing body to call up the whole or any part of those monies at any time. It 1s for the organization to choose what system it - 19 - wishes for the allocation of particular sums of entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies to the federal fund or to the branch fund. Rule 15(1), however, goes further than is contemplated by s. 133A(2)(c) and (3)(b). On its face, 1t would permit the National Council or National Executive of the Union to require a branch to pay over monies which fell within paragraphs (c) to (q) of sub-section (3). The rule would permit the National Council or National Executive, for instance, to call upon monies which included interest derived from investment of monies by a branch, or the proceeds of disposal of branch assets. These monies could be called upon specifically, by reference to the fact that they constituted such interest or proceeds, or generally, by a demand for so large a sum of money as would require the branch tc pay over interest or proceeds cf disposal, in order to satisfy the demand. In this respect, it appears to me that the rules fail tc make the provision required by s. 133A. That section does require that there be distinct funds, and that they be controlled under separate rules. Where it is contemplated that a branch shall be required to pay monies to the Federal fund, this is specifically provided for in s. 133A(3)(b), which relates only to entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies. The remaining paragraphs of sub-section (3) do not contain such an expression. If the power in rule 15(1) for the National Council or National Executive to call up monies from the branches were restricted to monies coming to the branches by way of entrance fees, subscriptions, fines, fees or levies, the rules would be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. As they stand, they fail to make the provision required by s. 133A and, accordingly, contravene s. 140(1)(a). In the Rule to Show Cause, specific attention was directed to the power of the National Executive over the funds and property of the Union, given by rule 27(3), and toa the provision in rule 37(3), which I have set out earlier. As the case was put at the trial, Mr. Heywood-Smith relied upon these provisions to support the attack on the rules as awhole as failing to comply with s. 133A. It is sufficient to say that the provisions of those rules do not cause the rules as a whole to fail to comply with s. 133A. In support of the Applicants' case, Mr. Heywood-Smith also relied upon evidence of specific instances of funds from branches being called up by the National Council or National Executive. At its meeting in November 1984, after the proceeding had been commenced, the National Council passed a number of resolutions calling up monies from branches. One resoluticn involved the raising of an additional $250,000.00 as sustentation fees from branches for the year ended 30th June 1984, in proportion to sustentation fees already paid by branches in respect of that financial year. Another resolution required the Central and Southern Queensland branch to pay $40,000.00, which approximated the amount claimed by the national officers as sustentation fees from that branch, there being a dispute between the branch and the national officers as to the correct interpretation of the sustentation fees provisions in rule 15. A further resolution called upon the Central and Southern Queensland and South Australian branches to pay the costs of litigation which had arisen in those branches and had involved the joinder of the Union itself or its mational councillors as Respondents. In each case, the resolution fixed a date by which the amount concerned was payable. Reliance was also placed upon the fact that the National Executive had called upon the Central and Southern Queensland branch of the Union to pay the salaries of former employees of the Union within that branch, who had been dismissed by the branch council, and re-employed by the National Executive in the area of the -ranch concerned. Lastly, reliance was place upon a resolution directing all branches to make payments to an overseas fund, the purpose of which is to finance the sending of representatives of the Union to conferences and like functions outside Australia. Some of these resolutions may raise issues which it would he appropriate for the Court to examine in proceedings under s. 141 of the Act. It 1s, however, unnecessary for me to make specific findings of fact about the resolutions, or to indicate whether orders would be likely to be made under s. 141. Even aif the allegations made by the Applicants are true, they do not indicate the existence in the rules of the Union of powers of the National Council or National Executive which would render the rules in disconformity with s. 133A of the Act. The second complaint of the Applicants was that rule 12(2)(a) of the rules of the Union was in contravention of s. 140(1)(d) of the Act. That rule is in the following terms: (2) (a) Subject to these Rules and to the approval of the National Executive, a Branch shall have power to make Rules from time to time fcr its own internal management. All Branch rules made pursuant to this sub-rule shall form part of and shall not be inconsistent with these rules. Such Branch rules shall be subject to these rules. The power qiven to the Branches by this sub-rule to make rules for their own internal management shall not be taken as a delegation of power to the Branches to make rules precluding the exercise by the National Executive of any of its powers under Rule 27 hereof. Mr. Heywood-Smith argued that the requirement that the National Executive approve the rules of the branch involved an invasion of the autonomy of the branch in matters affecting members of the branch only. On the view which I have taken of the proper construction of s. 140(1)(d), the very existence in the rules of the Union of the requirement that branch rules be subject to the appreval of the National Executive is sufficient to indicate that such rules are not a matter affecting members of the branch only. The Union has chesen to make such rules matters which affect it as a whole. Even if my approach to s. 140(1)(d) is incorrect, I am still of the view that the makina and alteration cf branch rules are not subjects which fall within s. 140(1)(d). There is nothing in the Act, either express or by implication, to suaqgest that the power to make branch rules need be committed to branches at all. So far as i1t 1s possible to draw inferences from the provisions of the Act, s. 133A(4) suggests strongly that rules relating to a branch fund may be altered by somebody other than the governing body or the members of a branch. If this 1s so, it 1s difficult to see how the decision to commit part of the - 23 - process of making branch rules to a branch, i.e. to commit the initial decision as to the form of such rules to a branch, can be said to make a failure to commit the whole of the process to the branch objectionable. The general reasoning of the Full Court in Morris v. Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union of Australia, referred to above, supports this conclusion. Even if it were possible toa discern from the provisions of s. 140(1)(d) the existence of some objectively determined class of matters which the Parliament intended cculd be classed as matters affecting members of a branch only, it is hard to see how the making of branch rules could be said to fall within that class. It is not unreasonable that an organization should require that the rules of all its branches be consistent with its federal rules. If this view is taken, there 1s obviously a necessity to have some body atle to make a decision whether such consistency exists, even if such a decision 15 afterwards overturned by the court. It is proper that the body chosen to exercise this discretion should be the committee of management at the federal level. More importantly, ait is the organization itself which has ultimate responsibility for its rules. To be valid, and to be accepted by the Industrial Registrar for certification under s. 139 of the Act, all rules, including branch rules must comply with s. 140(1) of the Act. If its rules do not so comply, but are nevertheless certified by the Industrial Registrar, the organization may face litigation by one of its members under s. 140(2), or possible de-registration upon the ground referred to in s. 143(1)(b). The form of the rules of a branch is, therefore, a matter which affects the organization as a whole, and upon which it is appropriate that the committee of management of the organization at the federal level should have a say. An attempt was made by evidence to demonstrate that the National Executive of the Union has frustrated and delayed attempts by the South Australian branch and the Central and Southern Queensland branch to alter their branch rules, since the coming into operation of s. 140(1)(d). Aqain, 1t 18 unnecessary for me to make specific findings of fact about these matters. It is also unnecessary for me to consider whether the evidence discloses breaches of the rules by members of the National Executive, which might provide grounds for an application under s. 141 of the Act. On any view which could be taken of the rule amendments the subject of the evidence, they were matters upon which it was proper for the National Executive cf the Union to have the final say. The challenge to the validity of rule 12(2)(a) fails. The final attack by the Applicants was made on rule 12(4) of the rules of the Union, which 1s in the following terms: "(4) No Branch shall send delegates to, be represented in any other manner, on or affiliate with any National or International Organisation, Body or Meeting without first receiving permission fron National Council or the full National Executive." It was contended that this rule involves an interference with matters affecting members of branches only, and accordingly that the rule is in contravention of s. 140(1)(d). Some evidence was given of actual attendances by officers of the South Australian Branch, including the first Applicant, at conferences outside South Australia, and of affiliation with bodies which might be described as "National". The evidence was, however, inconclusive as to whether these attendances and affiliations were in breach of the rules of the Union, or whether they involved acticn by or on behalf of the Federated Clerks Union of Australia, South Australian branch, an association registered under the Industrial Concilation and Arbitration Act 1972-1983 (South Australia), which would be beyond the reach of the rules of the Union. Whatever be the true position, so far as the rules of the Union are concerned, it has been determined by the Union that the question cf representation of the kinds referred to in rule 12(4) 1s not a matter affecting the members of any branch only, but is a matter affecting the organization itself. In my view, this is sufficient to dispose of the challenge to rule 12(4). Even 1£ this approach is incorrect, the question of representation of any Branch outside its area is one cn which it 15 appropriate that the National Executive of the Union should be entitled to express aview which prevails against that of any branch. It 1s inevitable that delegates or representatives of a branch will be seen as delegates or representatives cof an organization, if attending conferences or being involved in activities outside the area of the branch concerned. It 1S appropriate that the committee of management of an organization at the national level should have the final say as to who represents the organization in this fashion. The challenge to rule 12(4) is rejected. Although, in form, the Rule to Show Cause may have permitted the Applicants to pursue a challenge to the rules of the Union as a whole, based upon s. 140(1)(d), the challenges which were in fact pursued were limited to those relating to the specific rules 12(2)(a) and 12(4). In the result, the Applicants have failed, to make out a case for the invalidity of the rules of the Union, accept in so far as those rules fall adequately to make the provision required by ¢. 133A. In the event that the Court took the view that any contravention cf s. 140 of the Act existed, Dr. Jessup submitted that it was appropriate that the Court should not make any declaration of a kind contemplated by s. 140(5D), hut that the Court should exercise the power given by s. 140(6) to adjourn proceedings for the purpose of giving the crqganization an opportunity to alter its rules. Mr. Heywood-Smith did not dispute that this course would be appropriate. In ry view, it is appropriate to grant an adjournment. To wake ary declaraticn under sub-section (5D) might have the effect of leaving the Union powerless in some respect in the management cf its funds and Property, until such time as amended rules could be made and certified pursuant to s. 139(4) of the Act. This would be an undesirable situation. Accordingly, the Court will order that the proceeding be adjourned until Thursday, 28th February i985, for the purpose of giving the Respondent an opportunity to alter its rules, so as to make the provisions required by s. 133A of the Act. If, upon the matter being mentioned on that date, further time is necessary to enable alterations to be finalised or certified, consideration can then be given to a further adjournment. Otherwise, the Rule ta Show Cause will be discharged. I certify that this and the QS Tue fe preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein \ tw of his Honour Mr. Justice (@v ; Dated :)rjffAssociate: