S.L. Williams & ors v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] FCA 467
Federal Court of Australia
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to Alc] FURTHER DISTRIBUTION UNNECESSARY
THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY No. VG 331 of 1984
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
S.L. WILLIAMS and OTHERS
AND
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
21 DECEMBER, 1984 KEELY J.
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Sate
wy eee
a
HIS HONOUR: The applicants have lodged an application under
section 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act to review what I see to be eight decisions
made by the Minister of State for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (The Respondent) and/or by his officers
and/or by his delegates, including the making of
deportation orders in respect of the first and second
named applicants. The three applicants are persons
aggrieved and they seek various orders including
an order that the deportation orders are void or
invalid. The applicants have taken out a notice
of motion seeking orders that:
1. The operation of the decision of the respondent
or his delegate made the 14th day of November that the
first-named and second=named applicants be deported
from Australia be stayed and suspended until further
order.
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2. All proceedings to deport the first-named
and second-named applicants from Australia
be stayed until further order.
I accept that the harmful consequences to the
applicants of a failure to make an order staying
the orders of deportation would outweigh any
harmful consequences to the respondent, if such
a stay were granted, and that it may well be that
the enforcement of the deportation orders would
render nugatory any success by the applicants
in the proceedings.
However, as the full court said in Faingold
and Others versus Zammit and Another, in an
unreported decision on 20 January 1984, I quote
from that decision at page 10:
In our opinion it will be difficult
for an applicant to show that reasons
or circumstances exist-which make 1t
just that the court should make the
order sought unless it 1s demonstrated
that the applicant has a point of
substance to argue which, 1f successful,
will result in judgment in his favour.
There are two broad bases on which Mr Rose
of Counsel for the applicants contends that there
is "a point of substance to argue". The first is
that the first-named applicant was the holder of
an entry permit for some years. On the present
state of the evidence, it is not entirely clear
whether she was formally the holder of such an
entry permit or whether she was simply permitted
to reside in Australia with her mother.
However, the respondent conceded that she
had validly entered Australia in 1967 and remained
here until 1972. Accordingly, for present purposes,
I shall assume that she was the holder of a valid
entry permit during that period. Mr Moshinsky of
counsel, on behalf of the respondent, submitted that
section 9(1) of the Migration Act 1958 operated to
deprive the first-named applicant of any benefit
for present purposes flowing from the holding of
such a valid entry permit in those earlier years.
Section 91 is in the following terms:
Where a non-citizen who is the holder
of an entry permit leaves Australia,
the entry permit has no force or effect
in relation to him upon-or after his
re-entry into Australia.
wilmin 21.12.84 39
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Notwithstanding the submissions to the contrary,
put by Mr Rose, I accept Mr Moshinsky''s submission
that the first-named applicant at the material time
fell within the words of section 9(1):
~--- who is the holder of an entry
permit leaves Australia ........
and accordingly that her entry permit had "no force
or effect in relation to her upon or after her
re-entry into Australia."
It appears that since the period 1967 to
1972 the first-named applicant has, on three occasions,
been granted an entry permit, each for a period of
six months. Those permits were granted in 1974,
1975 and 1983 respectively. In my opinion, neither
the material presently before the court, nor the
submissions put on behalf of the applicant, -show
any point of substance to be argued on this aspect.
Secondly, Mr Rose relies upon a number of grounds,
which are the same as or substantially the same
as the grounds rejected by this court in Kioa versus
the Minister for Ethnic Affairs 1984 53 Australian
Law Reports 658. An appeal from that decision was
dismissed unanimously by a full court on 3 October
1984. See also a decision of another full court in
Smith versus the Minister, reported in 1984 53
Australian Law Reports 551.
Mr Rose has sought to rely upon the fact that
special leave to appeal from the decision of the
full court of this court in Kioa's was granted by the
High Court of Australia on 16 November 1984 and that
that appeal is to be heard by the full court on
5 February 1985. However, in my opinion, the
application for a stay must be determined upon the
matters at present before the court and upon a
present state of the law.
The law, on those matters, dealt with by the
full court in Kioa's case, and in Smith's case,
1s binding upon me as a single judge of this court,
and -that law is contrary to the proposed contentions
of the applicants. In my view, it would not be proper
for this court to stay the operation of a deportation
order made under the Migration Act simply on the basis
that the full Haigh Court might at some future date
authoritatively determine that the relevant law is
different from that acted upon by the full court in
those two cases.
wilmin 21.12.84 40
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In those circumstances it is not necessary
for me to consider the other submission put by
Mr Moshinsky on behalf of the respondent, namely,
that the material before the court does not
support the contention that there was in fact any
denial of natural justice to the applicants. As
to that submission it was made clear from the bar
table that there would be a dispute as to the facts.
Accordingly the motion by the applicants 1s dismissed.
HIS HONOUR: (The applicants are ordered to pay the respondents
costs of and incidental to this notice of motion.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you, gentlemen. The court 1s adjourned
Sine die.
AT 4.52 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
INDEFINITELY
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