Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & ors [1985] FCA 442
Federal Court of Australia
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NOT INTENDED FOR DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
No. WA G59 of 1984
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SWAN TELEVISION AND RADIO C /
BROADCASTERS LIMITED '
Appellant
and
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
and
WEST COAST TELECASTERS LIMITED
Second Respondent
and
PERTH TELEVISION LIMITED
Third Respondent
and
WESTERN TELEVISION LIMITED
Fourth Respondent
CORAM: TOOHEY J / : \
4 July 1985 ~4 Lote "og *
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By this motion, the appellant seeks a stay of a decision
made hy the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal ordering the
production of documents.
The first question that arises 15 the power of the Court
to grant a stay. if do not understand the Court's power to he in
issue, though some question has arisen as to whether the
appropriate exercise of jurisdiction is under 5.15 of the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or under 0.52
y.17 of the Federal Court Rules. That is a matter which I do not
think I need to resolve with any sort of finality this evening.
It would seem to me that 5.15 is wide enough to include
an application for a stay following upon a decision of the Court
in respect of an application under the Judicial Review Act though
Tam not to be taken as expressing a final view on that. In any
event, I am of the opinion that the principles to be applied are
much the same, whether the Court is being asked to grant a stay
under 5.15 or a stay under 0.52 r.17. In which case what the
Court is being asked todo is to stay proceedings under the
judgment appealed from.
I accept that the principles to he applied are not
identical with those to be applied in the case of an application
for an injunction. One perhaps is not directly concerned with
balance of convenience. On the other hand it seems to me that one
must look at the position of the parties to the appeal - in the
case of the appellant, to decide what weight should be given to
the argument that if there is no stay then the appeal is rendered
nugatory, or on the part of the respondents that to grant a stay
places them under a great disadvantage in what must be recognised
as a ocontinuing inquiry. This 1s rather different from the
tal
ordinary situation in which a court is being asked to grant a stay
in respect of a matter which has been finally concluded by the
court, subject, of course to any appeal that there may be.
These are questions which are not easy for me to resolve
on the material presently avallable, or perhaps more accurately,
without a more detailed consideration of the material. But I must
give weight to the submission by counsel for the appellant that a
disclosure of the material to certain persons to whom it has taken
objection, is fraught with some risk of prejudice to the
appellant, not by reason of a conscious breach of the undertaking
that surrounds access to those documents, but simply because the
persons in question will find it difficult to rid their minds of
any information which they receive through access.
On the other hand, I have to give weight to Mr. Owen's
submission that without access on the part of all the persons whom
his client has nominated, its task of presenting its case to the
Tribunal 15 made the more difficult, not only as against those who
oppose the grant of a third licence but as against those who seek
to be the successful applicant in respect of such a grant. In the
end, it seems to me that the matter is capable of resolution, at
least for atime, by reason of the timetable which the Tribunal
has set for itself. It seems clear that the question of the
disclosure or non-disclosure of documents, or more accurately, the
consequences of disclosure or non-disclosure, are not likely to
arise during the present sitting of the Tribunal and at the
earliest would arise when the Tribunal resumes on 29 duly. It may
not be for some time thereafter. In saying that, I do not lose
sight of Mr. Owen's submiseion that the matter is not to be judged
solely in terms of the day on which the matter surfaces before the
Tribunal, but that his client needs time to consider the impact of
the documents in order to prepare its case for presentation.
At this stage I am in no position ta say when, if a stay
is granted, the appeal will he heard. Certainly steps can be
taken to attempt to secure an expedited hearing, but as of this
evening I cannot say anything to counsel regarding the likely date
upon which the appeal will be heard. That, to my mind, is an
important consideration because if I were to grant a stay until
the hearing of the appeal and the appeal could not be heard for
some weeks, or perhaps not until the next sittings of the Full
Court in Western Australia which I think is some time in
September, it may be that events in the Tribunal will have
overtaken the parties.
For that reason, I am of the opinion that the
appropriate course for me to take is along these lines. It is to
recognise that to refuse a stay completely may cause injustice to
the appellant, an injustice which, if the appeal is successful,
May not be capable of being remedied; but at the same time to
recognise the position of the respondents, particularly of the
first, second and fourth respondents, and not to shut them out
from any chance of obtaining access to the material until the
appeal is heard. Having regard to those considerations, I am of
the opinion that there should be a stay but it should not he in
terms until the hearing of the appeal. It should be a finite
period, I would think 14 days, during which time the question of
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the hearing of the appeal can be explored and also more will be
known of the course of the inquiry before the Tribunal. If at
that time (and I put these matters only ina tentative way) it
seems that the appeal can be heard quite quickly, and in
particular if it appears that the appeal can he heard hefore the
issue of disclosure or non-disclosure becomes a live issue before
the Tribunal, then the arguments for continuing the stay until the
hearing of the appeal might well be compelling. If, on the other
hand, at that time it seems clear that an appeal cannot be heard
for some weeks, then the problems that beset the second and fourth
respondents might well be so persuasive as to justify no extension
of the stay at that stage.
What I propose is that there be a stay. I am of the
opinion that the appropriate form of order is not that the
Tribunal be restrained but rather that there be a stay of the
decision of the Tribunal made on 14 March that the appellant
produce certain documents, that that stay be until a date which I
fix as 14 days hence, being 18 July, subject to my checking my own
availability and also the availability of counsel. I take it from
what Miss Chong told me that the Tribunal will not be sitting on
that day.
Another reason for granting a stay in finite terms is to
permit the special interest parties an opportunity to hbe heard.
So far as they are concerned, I must treat the application today
a5 ex parte, I regard this as an additional reason for not
granting a stay, at least so far as affects those parties, until
6,
the hearing of the appeal. I direct that notice of today's order
be given to those special interest groups.
The form of stay I shall not attempt to formulate in
running, but it is a stay which is intended inno way to
interfere with the access presently offered by the appellant,
whether that access has been taken up, as it has at least in one
case, or not taken up, as I understand is the position at least in
the case of one of the other respondents.
Trying to draw these matters together, there will be a
stay for a finite period to one or other of the dates I shall
discuss with counsel in a moment. There will be a stay expressed
in terms to exclude the access presently offered by Swan. There
will be an order that the appellant give motice of the adjourned
hearing and serve a copy of the order made today on the special
interest groups, which is a term I use as a compendious way of
referring to those other persons not presently before the Court.
I certify that this and the five
preceding pages are a true copy
of the Ex Tempore Reasons for
Judgment herein of his Honour
Mr. Justice Toohey. | «
Associate
Dated: 14 huguat IBS