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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G 93 of 1985
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : MAFUBI PTY. LIMITED
Applicant
AND: WESTFIELD LIMITED
Respondent
29 JULY 1985
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LOCKHART J.
This case was specially fixed for hearing to commence today
by consent of the parties. When the matter was called on for hearing
this morning counsel for the applicant moved ona notice of motion
filed on 25 July 1985 seeking, so far as presently relevant, orders
that:
1. The applicant have leave to join as respondent to the
proceedings Foto [Island (NSW) Pty. Limited and Ephrain
Landes;
2. The applicant have leave to amend the statement of claim and
application;
3. The date for h®aring these proceedings on 29 July 1985 he
vacated; and
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2.
4, The evidence of any witness proposed to be called on behalf
of the applicant at the hearing who is unwilling to give
evidence by affidavit may be given orally in court.
It is common ground that, if the application to amend the
statement of claim and the application is acceded to, the hearing
could not, for all practical purposes, proceed today.
The order that is sought in relation to the calling of
witnesses who may be unwilling to give evidence by affidavit is,
perhaps, unnecessary. It arises from the form of the orders made by
consent by this Court on 30 May 1985 which were in quite usual form.
The intent of those orders, as I read them, is that the evidence of
the witnesses on both sides in this case should be primarily by
affidavit, subject, of course, to cross-examination. It was clearly
not the intent of that order to exclude the right of a party to call a
witness to give viva voce evidence in chief because plainly there are
circumstances when witnesses will not volunteer affidavits and they
cannot, of course, be forced to swear them. In these situations, the
only course that can be taken for all practical purposes is to have
the witnesses give their evidence in chief from the witness box. But
even if the order sought is not strictly necessary it is not opposed.
In these circumstances I think the most appropriate course for me is
to simply not make the order.
I turn next tO the application to amend the statement of
clain. The case was commenced by the filing of an application on 1
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3.
May 1985 and a statement of claim was filed that game day. In essence
that last mentioned document alleges that a shop in the Westfield
Shoppingtown Hurstville was leased by the respondent to the applicant
by a registered lease dated 5 December 1980. This lease was fora
term of five years, to expire on 7 September 1985. The stdtement of
claim then asserts that prior to the execution of the lease, which is
identified as being in or about July 1980, the respondent by its
servants or agent represented to the applicant that subject to the
applicant paying the rent for the premises the applicant would be
granted another lease for a term of five years.
Then it is said that, acting on the faith of the
representation, the applicant executed the lease and spent substantial
sums of money on fitting out the shop. Other allegations are then
made in the statement of claim to which I need not refer; but it is
said that in all the circumstances the respondent has engaged in
conduct that is misleading or deceptive within the meaning of s. 52 of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 and has made false or misleading
statements in contravention of s. 53(g) of the Trade Practices Act and
has made false or misleading statements in contravention of para.
53A(1)(b) of that Act. Wide relief is sought, including orders under
s. 87.
The statement of claim which the applicant now seeks to file
raises a case that is, in my opinion, materially different from the
case as presently pleadéd. Indeed it is not disputed that it raises
very different issues. What is said in essence by counsel for the
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applicant is that, notwithstanding the difference between the case as
it is and the case that is sought to he pleaded, there are common
elements of law and of fact and that much of the evidence that would
be given to support the case as presently pleaded would also be given
to support the proposed new case.
The case that it is proposed to make is, in substance, that
prior to the execution of the lease in 1980 from the respondent to the
applicant, the respondent by its servants or agent represented to the
applicant that:
(a) the respondent then had and for a number of years had had a
policy or practice that it would not include in any lease of
a retail specialty shop in any of its shopping centres an
option to renew the lease but would, upon expiry of the
lease, renew the lease for a further term as a matter of
course if the lessee had been a good tenant, had traded well
and had paid rent under the lease on time; and
(b) if the applicant had been a good tenant, had traded well and
had paid rent under the lease on time, the respondent would
in accordance with that policy or practice and as a matter of
course grant to the applicant, if it so requested, upon
expiry of the lease a new lease of the premises for a further
5 year term.
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It is sought to allege in para. 7 of the proposed statement
of claim that each of the representations to which I have referred was
misleading or deceptive in that:
(a) the respondent did not have at the time the representations
were made and had not had prior thereto any policy or
practice to the effect alleged;
(b) the respondent had at all material times reserved to itself a
complete discretion whether or not to renewa lease for a
further term regardless of whether or not the lessee
thereunder had performed his obligations under the lease; and
(c) the respondent failed to inform the applicant at the time the
representations were made of the discretion to which I have
just referred in paragraph (b) and that, if the applicant
performed its obligations under the lease, it could not on
the expiration thereof expect the grant of a new lease for a
further term of 5 years as a matter of course.
However, the proposed pleading then alleges in essence that
the representations made by the respondent to the applicant were made
in pursuance of a course of conduct engaged in by the respondent in
relation to all shopping centres owned and managed by it throughout
Australia prior to andvat the time of the representations to the
applicant wherein the respondent, knowing that such representations
were false or misleading or deceptive: : .
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(a)
(b)
(c)
made to prospective lessees of speciality shop premises in
shopping centres owned or managed by the respondent,
representations to the same or similar effect as those
alleged in paras. 6{a) and (b) of the pleading;
instructed the servants and agents of the respondent to make
the representations aforesaid in the course of negotiations
with prospective lessees of the premises; and
permitted the servants and agents of the respondent to make
representations as aforesaid in the course of negotiations
with prospective lessees of the premises in order to induce
the prospective lessee to enter into leases of specialty shop
premises within shopping centres owned and managed by the
respondent which did not contain express options to renew
upon expiry of the terms granted thereunder.
It is then sought to be alleged in para. 9 that at the time
the respondent made the representations to which I have referred, it
knew or ought to have known that the applicant would rely upon their
truth and accuracy in determining whether to enter into the lease.
The pleading then proceeds to cover matters to which I need not refer,
except those in relation to a proposal to join Foto Island (NSW) Pty.
Limited as a third party. I shali deal with that later as a separate
matter.
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In my opinion the case which is presently propounded by the
applicant is one where it is said that the respondent made a
representation to the applicant from which the respondent has, in the
events pleaded, departed. The case which it is proposed to propound
is a case of the respondent ' falsely representing that it has a policy
in relation to leasing which, in fact, the respondent at no material
time ever had.
There are affidavits before the Court which supports the case
as presently pleaded and, so far as I can discern at this stage of the
matter, do not support the case that it is proposed to propound. Long
Innes J. in Levy v. Norton-Culhane (1928) 28 S.R. (N.S.W.) 302, said,
at pp. 305-306, in respect of an application under the Equity Rules of
1902 of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a decree on
admissions of fact made by the plaintiff and a consequent application
for leave to amend the statement of claim:
"Speaking generally I think it is correct to say
that an application for leave to amend will asa
general rule be granted in cases where the
applicant is not acting male fide and where it can
be granted without injustice to the other' party."
~
After reference to certain authorities, his Honour continued: -
"But the rule is subject to the exception that the
amendment will be refused which will change the
suit into a suit of a substantially different
character and raise issues which can be more
conveniently tried in another suit."
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In my opinion the proposed amendment would, if allowed,
fashion the present proceeding into one which is substantially
different in character and raise issues which may be tried more
conveniently in other proceedings between the parties.
I am conscious, of course, of the provisions of Order 13 rule
2 of this Court's Rules which are, as the rule itself states, designed
to allow necessary amendments to pleadings for the purpose of
determining the real questions in issue between the parties and to
avoid multiplicity of proceedings. I am also aware of the fact that
there may be some common elements in the case as presently pleaded
with the case that would exist if the proposed amendments were to be
allowed.
I turn then to certain other matters bearing on discretion.
The case is one which has proceeded fairly rapidly from its
institution to "trial. It has been the subject of various directions
by the Court, s0 far as I can discern always with consent, and
timetables were laid down by the Court with the consent of the parties
for the filing of affidavits, pleadings, and carrying out the various
interlocutory processes that are customary in cases of this nature.
Also as is customary, regrettably, the timetables have not been
adhered to but, nevertheless, on 27 June 1985 the trial was fixed to
commence today on the application of both parties. Indeed, on 18 July
1985 the solicitor for the applicant informed the Court that there
should be no bar to the 'case proceeding today. What has happened is,
and counsel for the applicant has frankly informed me, that there has
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been a change in fairly recent times. Senior and junior counsel
appearing for the applicant have, with the benefit of fresh minds,
turned their attention to the case and decided that in the interests
of their client the case should be fashioned substantially differently
to its present forn.
The argument has been submitted by counsel for the respondent
that the statement of claim, even if allowed would not be in proper
form, that it has certain internal inconsistencies, and that it lacks
particularity in relation to most material allegations, including
those mentioned in para. 8 of the statement of claim. I need not
determine those matters because they would probably be capable of
being cured by 'the applicant. I prefer to rest my decision on other
grounds including the ones to which I have already adverted.
I turn, however, to a different aspect of the matter, namely,
that it is apparent from what has been said from the bar table and
from my examination of the pleadings and other documents to which I
have been referred, that the premises the subject of these proceedings
are already the subject of a lease from the respondent to Foto Island
(NSW) Pty. Limited, which apparently changed its name to its present
form from Basid Holdings Pty. Limited. It appears that this lease is
for 5 years to commence immediately upon the expiration of the lease
in suit, that is, on 8 September 1985. Foto Island (NSW) Pty. Limited
is not a party to the proceeding but it is & company which the
applicant seeks to have Joined.
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10.
There is no doubt in my mind that substantial prejudice would
be sustained by the respondent and by Foto Island (NSW) Pty. Limited
if the amendments sought were permitted, if only because the parties
have by their conduct thus far demonstrated the desirability of this
case being disposed of before the lease from the respondent to Foto
Island (N.S.W.) Pty. Limited commences to operate, and it is obvious
that, if the application before me today succeeds, it will be well
after that date before this litigation concludes. I am mindful that
notwithstanding what I have said, the issues in the present case and
the rights of appeal that exist may cause this litigation to be
unresolved by the dates 7 and 8 September 1985.
Some attempt was made in argument on behalf of the applicant
to suggest that it is not its fault that it comes so late in the day
to seek the proposed amendment to the pleadings; but I am satisfied,
having heard the argument from counsel for both parties that,
notwithstanding the direction of the Court on 30 May 1985 that the
applicant file all affidavits on which it proposes to rely on or
before 20 June 1985, those temporal constraints were not met. Indeed,
an affidavit of Mr. B.J. Rowles sworn on 17 June 1985 was not filed
until 18 July 1985, some one month after the date fixed. Much of what
is said in the affidavit of Mr. Rowles generated a sheaf of affidavits
from the respondent in response thereto which, in turn, has a bearing
upon the application for amendment made today by counsel for the
applicant.
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I therefore decline to grant the proposed application for
leave to amend the statement of claim save insofar as the matter to
which I am about to turn.
It is sought, as I said, by the applicant to joinas a
respondent Foto Island (NSW) Pty. Limited and I have already briefly
described the role performed by this company in the relevant events.
On the assumption that the case were to proceed as presently pleaded,
I can see difficulties in the Court hearing the matter without the
presence of that company as a party, and I think the desirable course
is that that company be joined. Counsel for the respondent has
informed the court that he has instructions to, if necessary, appear
for that company, and I am conscious of the fact that the defence
filed on 7 June 1985 pleads in paragraph 4 that the subject premises
were leased to Basid Holdings Pty. Limited without notice of any
rights the applicants may claim to have to continued occupation of the
premises. The lease to Basid Holdings Pty. Limited is to commence on
8 September 1985 and to subsist for a term of 5 years.
It seems to me that all parties have had knowledge for some
considerable time of the basic issue in this case relating to the
leasing to Foto Island (NSW) Pty. Limited of the shop premises.
Therefore, I propose to refuse the application for leave to amend the
statement of claim, but to allow the applicant to join Foto Island
(NSW) Pty. Limited as a respondent.
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12.
I should mention now that the applicant 'seeks also to join
Ephraim Landes as a respondent. Little has been said about that
application in argument. It seems, so far as I can glean it from the
material, that Mr. Landes is sought to be joined as a person involved
in the alleged contravention pursuant to s. 75B of the Trade Practices
Act. I am not satisfied at this stage that he is a person who should
be joined.
In the light of what I have said I will invite counsel to
make any further submissions they wish on the future conduct of the
proceeding.
1 certdy that this and the cloen (1)
preceding pases are a true copy of the
Reasons for duegmert herein of his Honour
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