CATCHWORDS CRIMINAL LAW - Sentencing - Whether cumulative sentences appropriate COURTS AND JUDGES - Bias - Reference to accused as becoming a social pest - Allegation of prejudice Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth), s.12 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss.29, 76 RAY O'SHANNASSY V. THE QUEEN Nos. ACT G 71-75 of 1985 and Nos. ACT G 88-98 of 1985 Davies, Neaves and Wilcox Jd. 5 December 1985 Canberra IN THE FEDFRAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY and Nos. ACT G 88-98 of 1985 ) ) ) ) Nos. ACT G 71-75 of 1985 ) ) ) GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY BETWEEN : RAY _ 0' SHANNASSY Appellant AND: THE QUEEN Respondent MINUTE OF ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER : Davies, Neaves and Wilcox Jd. DATE OF ORDER 3 5 December 1985 WHERE MADE : Canberra THE COURT ORDERS THAT the appeals be dismissed. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Nos. ACT G 71-75 of 1985 DISTRICT REGISTRY and Nos. ACT G 88-98 of 1985 GENERAL DIVISION ON _ APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY BETWEEN : RAY QO' SHANNASSY Appellant AND: THE QUEEN Respondent Davies, Neaves and Wilcox JJ. CORAM DATE: 5 December 1985 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT THE COURT: On 27 August 1985 the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Gallop J.) sentenced Ray O'Shannassy ("the appellant") in respect of two offences against sub-s.12(1) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth), seven offences against para.12(2)(c) of that Act, three offences against 3.29 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and one offence against s.76 of that Act. Certain of the sentences were directed to be served concurrently and others cumulatively. Effectively, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a total of 8 months and 56 days. The appellant has appealed against the sentences imposed in respect of the offences other than those imposed for the two offences against 3sub-s.12(1) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth). Section 12 of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property Act) 1971 (Cth) provides: "12. (1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, trespasses on Commonwealth premises is guilty of an offence, punishable on conviction by a fine not exceeding One hundred dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or both. (2) A person who - (a) engages in unreasonable obstruction in relation to the passage of persons or vehicles into, out of, or on Commonwealth premises, or otherwise in relation to the use of Commonwealth premises; (b) being in or on Commonwealth premises, behaves inan offensive or disorderly manner: or (c) being in or on Commonwealth premises, refuses or neglects, without reasonable excuse, to leave those premises on being directed to do so by a constable or by a person authorized in writing by a Minister or the public authority under the Commonwealth occupying the premises to give directions for the purposes of this section, is guilty of an offence, punishable on conviction by a fine not exceeding Two hundred and fifty dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or both." fons | ' Fat Sections 29 and 76 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provide: "29.Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property, whether real or personal, belonging to the Commonwealth or to any public authority under the Commonwealth, shall be guilty of an offence. Penalty: Imprisonment for two years." "76.Any person who wilfully obstructs or resists any Commonwealth officer while engaged in the discharge or attempted discharge of the duties of his office under any law of the Commonwealth, or wilfully obstructs or resists any person while engaged in the discharge or attempted discharge of any duty imposed on him by any law of the Commonwealth, or by violence or threats or intimidation of any kind interferes with, hinders or obstructs any person performing any service or function for or on behalf of the Commonwealth in the performance of that service or function, shall be guilty of an offence. Penalty: Imprisonment for two years." Each of the matters came before the Supreme Court by way of appeal from the Court of Petty Sessions of the Australian Capital Territory. Each matter was dealt with by way of re-hearing. It is convenient to identify each offence by reference to the number which the proceedings in respect of that offence bore In the Supreme Court. The two offences against sub-s,12(1) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and 2 fle, St - a er wa ey Property) Act 1971 (Cth), as to which no appeal has been lodged, were committed on 30 March 1984 and 2 April 1984 respectively. They may be identified respectively as the offences the subject of matters numbered 806 and 809 of 1984. The offence the subject of matter numbered 806 of 1984 was a trespass on premises occupied by the Industries Assistance Commission, the offence the subject of matter numbered 809 of 1984 a trespass on premises occupied by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. The appeals were dismissed and the convictions confirmed. In matter numbered 809 of 1984 the appellant was sentenced to serve the balance (14 days) unserved of a sentence of imprisonment for 1 month imposed on him by the Court of Petty Sessions in respect of that offence. In matter numbered 806 of 1984 a similar sentence was imposed, to be served concurrently with the sentence in matter numbered 809 of 1984. Five of the offences under para.12(2)(c) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth), offences which may be Identified respectively as being the subject of matters numbered 111, 112, 115, 116 and 113 of 1985, were committed on 12 October 1984 (2 offences), 15 October 1984 (2 offences) and 24 October 1984. Four of those offences (those the subject of matters numbered 111, 112, 115 and 116 of 1985) related to the refusal of the appellant, without reasonable excuse, to leave premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department. The other offence, that committed on 24 October 1984 (matter numbered 113 of 1985) related to the refusal of the appellant, without reasonable excuse, to leave premises occupied by the Department of the Special Minister of State. In respect of each of those offences the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 21 days, those sentences to be served concurrently with one another but cumulatively upon the sentence of imprisonment for 14 days imposed in matter numbered 809 of 1984. One of the remaining offences against para.12(2)(c) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) - matter numbered 119 of 1985 - related to the refusal of the appellant on 28 November 1985. without reasonable excuse, to leave premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department. A sentence of imprisonment for 21 days was imposed in respect of that offence, that sentence to be served cumulatively upon the sentence imposed in matter numbered 111 of 1985. The other offence against para.12(2)(c) of the Public Order (Protections of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) - Matter numbered 117 of 1985 - was committed on 23 July 1984 and also related to premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department. For that offence the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 21 = days, that sentence to be served concurrently with the sentence in matter numbered 121 of 1985 to which reference has yet to be made. i Beet i . wae be / r Wa eagtss . ae - a oan Matter numbered 121 of 1985 concerned an offence against 5.29 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), matter numbered 122 of 1985 an offence against s.76 of that Act. Those offences were committed on 30 November 1984, The first related to wilful damage done to property on the premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department. The other related to the wilful obstruction of an officer of that Department while engaged in the discharge of his duties. In matter numbered 121 of 1985 the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 months, to he served cumulatively upon the sentence in matter numbered 119 of 1985. In matter numbered 122 of 1985 the sentence was imprisonment for 21 days, to be served concurrently with the sentence in matter numbered 121 of 1985. The two remaining charges under 3.29 of the Crimes Act 1914 - matters numbered 114 and 120 of 1985 - related respectively to wilful damage to a toilet at the Civic Police Station, Canberra on 25 October 1984 and to a cell door at those premises on 4 December 1984, On the first of those charges the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 months, to be served cumulatively upon the sentence in matter numbered 121 of 1985. On the other charge the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 1 month to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in matter numbered 114 of 1985. 7. Notices of appeal against sentence were filed on behalf of the appellant only in matters numbered 111, 112, 119, 121 and 114 of 1985. However, when the appeals in those matters came on for hearing, the appellant, who appeared in person, stated that his solicitor had failed to carry out his instructions to lodge notices of appeal against sentence in matters numbered 115, 116, 113, 122, 117 and 120 of 1985. In the circumstances the Court thought it proper, pursuant to Order 52, sub-rule 15(2)of the Federal Court Rules, to extend the time within which notices of appeal in those matters might be filed and served. By consent, the hearing of the appeals in those matters proceeded at the same time as the appeals which had been duly instituted. In support of his appeals, the appellant submitted that the learned primary judge should have disqualified himself from hearing the matters under appeal as his Honour had, by certain remarks he had made on5 June 1985, disclosed bias against the appellant. It may be noted that this was not expressed as a ground of appeal in any of the notices of appeal filed on the appellant's behalf and, if the submission were to be upheld, not only should the sentences imposed on the appellant be set aside but the convictions could not stand. Notwithstanding these considerations, we have thought it proper to consider the submission. 8. To understand what is put by the appellant certain further facts need to be stated. On 28 March 1985 Gallop J. commenced the hearing of a number of appeals by the present appellant against his convictions for offences of trespassing on Commonwealth premises contrary to sub-s.12(1) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) and of refusing to leave Commonwealth premises when directed to do so contrary to para.12(2)(c) of that Act. On that date his Honour dismissed the appellant's appeal in matter numbered 809 of 1984 (veferred to above) and confirmed the conviction against him but deferred passing sentence until the other appeals had been heard. Hig Honour then proceeded to hear matter numbered 806 of 1984 also referred to above. The appeal in that matter was dismissed and the conviction confirmed, sentence again being deferred. The hearing of a further four appeals then proceeded, The taking of evidence in respect of those appeals had not been concluded on 28 March 1985 and those appeals, as well as those in which the hearing had not then commenced, were adjourned until 5 June 1985. ony On 5 June 1985 his Honour continued the hearing. In the result all the remaining appeals were allowed and the convictions and sentences set aside. His Honour then heard submissions as to the appropriate penalty to be imposed in respect of the two offences (matters numbered 809 and 806 of 1984) against sub-s.12(1) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth). Counsel for the Crown tendered a copy of the appellant's convictions. With the exception of one conviction, the appellant agreed that what was tendered correctly recorded his convictions. The one conviction that the appellant did not acknowledge was then removed from the list. His Honour commented that the convictions recorded since 1974 included 27 convictions under the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property Act 1971 (Cth) for refusing to leave Commonwealth premises, 20 convictions under that Act for trespass on Commonwealth premises anda substantial number of convictions for such offences as disorderly behaviour, malicious damage to property and being found without lawful excuse on premises. After hearing the appellant's submissions on penalty his Honour said: "Mr O''Shannassy, what I am minded to dois to adjourn all these cases, that is, adjourn the sentencing of these two matters until 9 July. I will give some thought to what the appropriate sentence is in the meantime but you appreciate that you are getting beyond being simply a crusader for 10. social justice. You are becoming a social pest because you are going too far in your crusades. Do you understand that?" The appellant said: "I understand what you are saying but I do not agree with you." His Honour continued: "No. I would not expect you to. But I am telling you that your record indicates that you are becoming a social pest, if you are not already a social pest. And whatever your motivation and however altruistic your motives may be you may have to pay the penalty for carrying on these crusades in the way that you do." The matters were then adjourned until 9 July 1985. When those matters and the appeals to the Supreme Court in the matters which are the subject of the present proceedings in this Court and two other appeals were called on for hearing on that date the appellant referred to the words used by his Honour on5 June 1985 and set out above and submitted that his Honour should disqualify himself from hearing the further appeals then pending before the Court. After hearing submissions on the point his Honour declined to disqualify himself from proceeding with the hearing. re » 7 peat ll. The circumstances in which a judge should disqualify himself on the ground of bias "by reason of some pre-determination he has arrived at in the course of the case" were considered by the High Court in R. v. Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 C.L.R. 248. In a joint judgment Barwick C.J. and Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ. said (at pp.262-3): "The view that a judge should not sit to heara case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might reasonably suspect that he was not unprejudiced and impartial, and that if a judge does sit in those circumstances prohibition will lie, is not only supported by the balance of authority as it mow stands but is correct in principle. It would be wrong to regard the observations of Lord Hewart C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy £1924] 1 K.B. at p.259 as meaning that the appearance of justice is of more importance than the attainment of justice itself: cf. Req. v. Camborne Justices; Ex parte Pearce £1955] 1 Q.B. at p.52. However, his statement of principle, which was recently reaffirmed in this Court in Stollery v. Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 C.L.R. 509, at pp.518-519 does go to the heart of the matter. It is of fundamental importance that the public should have confidence in the administration of justice. If fair-minded people reasonably apprehend or suspect that the tribunal has prejudged the case, they cannot have confidence in the decision. To repeat the words of Lord Denning M.R. which have already been cited, 'Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: "The judge was biased."'" The question is whether it has been established that it might reasonably be suspected by fair-minded persons that Gallop J. might not bring to the resolution of the questions before him a fair and unprejudiced mind. As has been said, the _remarks on which the appellant's submission was founded were Ty 12. made immediately following the parties' addresses on the question of penalty for the two offences of which the appellant had been convicted during which reference had been made to the appellant's long record of convictions for similar offences. The remarks cannot reasonably be taken as indicating that his Honour had any preconceived idea that the appellant was guilty of the offences of which he had been convicted by the Court of Petty Sessions and in respect of which appeals were then awaiting hearing in his Honour's list or had prejudged any issue that might arise in those appeals. The material on which the appellant relies falls far short of establishing to our satisfaction that a reasonable observer would have been justified in suspecting that the learned judge was biased. Indeed, it is clear that his Honour expressed himself in forceful language with a view to encouraging the appellant to change his attitude. His Honour did this, in advance of imposing sentence, s0 as to give the appellant an opportunity to indicate an intention to reform. The appellant's submission is rejected. The appellant also submitted that the sentences of imprisonment for 4 months in respect of the offence of wilful damage to the premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department on 30 November 1984 (matter numbered 121 of 1985) and the offence of wilful damage to the toilet at the Civic Police Station on 25 October 1984 (matter numbered 114 of 1985) were excessive. 13. In relation to the first of those matters the primary judge said: "CAIt about 10.25 a.m. on 30 November 1984 the appellant entered the foyer of the Robert Garran offices occupied by the Attorney-General's Department. He wanted to hand out leaflets which he had in his possession to members of staff. Mr Phillips, the Director of Special Projects, was summoned to the reception area. He came and spoke to the appellant and he called the police. At about 10.45 a.m. two police officers came and spoke to the appellant and the appellant left the premises. At about 10.55 a.m. he returned and was pacing up and down in the reception area for quite some time. He appeared to be getting quite agitated. At about 12 noon he went to the security door giving access to the southern building of the Robert Garran offices, put down a satchel which he was carrying and pushed hard against the glass security door. The security doors are electronically automated and are controlled by the receptionist in the foyer area. Having rattled the door to the southern building, the appellant then exerted some force and moved the door to the left. It was heard to make a click and it came open at its right hand end. The appellant then put his hand into the space between the door jamb and the door and forced it open about two feet and entered the southern building. The door had been working perfectly all morning. After the appellant had forced it open the receptionist tried to close the door but the electronic automation would not work. Damage was done to the mechanism of the door which was repaired the next day at a cost of $234.75. When spoken to by police subsequently about the damage to the door and toid that he had damaged the door, the appellant replied 'What door?'. The appellant agreed that he later returned to the foyer area and after a time went up to the electronic door, put his hands against it and, according to him, applied minimal pressure. To his surprise it opened and he then pulled it open eta. ». Bh urn, Oe BY eh E9, POE Sa. 14. further with his right hand and again was surprised to find that it moved easily.... He Ethe appellant] denied that he told the police that the door downstairs was locked and maintained that he believed that the door was inoperative when he opened it. He denied in evidence that he shook the door.... Asked whether he cared or not whether he damaged the door, his answer was that it was not uppermost in his mind whether he damaged the door or not. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both offences were committed by the appellant and where his evidence differs from that of Mr Phillips or any other prosecution witness in relation to these two appeals, I reject the evidence of the appellant and accept the evidence of the prosecution witnesses." The other offence to which his Honour referred was the offence of wilfully obstructing an officer of the Attorney-General's Department while engaged in the discharge of his duties. In relation to the offence of wilful damage to the toilet, the primary judge said: "This is an appeal against conviction for an offence of wilful and unlawful damage to Commonwealth property to wit one toilet on 25 October 1984. The facts are that on that day the appellant was brought to the Watch House at the Civic Police Station and after certain formalities Sergeant Simpson, the sergeant in charge of the Watch House, ordered that the mattress be removed from cell 8 and the appellant was placed in that cell at about 11.30 a.m. At 12.50 p.m. Sergeant Simpson went to the cell and observed that the toilet in the cell was blocked and the cell flooded. Sergeant Simpson asked the appellant what he had done, to which the appellant replied that he did not know that the toilet was blocked and that water was running all over the floor. The appellant then flushed the toilet again. Sergeant Simpson took the appellant out of cell 8 and placed him in cell 10. 15. At about 1.30 p.m. Sergeant Simpson went to cell 10 where he noted that the toilet in cell 10 was blocked and that there was water onthe floor. When asked what had happened the appellant said, 'This toilet is blocked too. I don't know how it happened. Something funny seems to be happening here'. Sergeant Simpson felt inside the toilet and took hold of a singlet but it slipped from his grasp. Later ona singlet and two paper plates were recovered from the toilet in cell 10. When the appellant was asked what had happened to his singlet he made no reply. What he did say was words to the effect, 'You people are stupid. All you have todo is treat people with a bit of civility and they will treat you the same'. The toilet in cell 8 was unblocked by removing therefrom a toilet roll and other paper. The appellant was put back in cell 8. It was established in cross-examination that the appellant had been 1n the Watch House cells previously on 9 May 1984 when Sergeant Simpson was again the Watch House sergeant. On that occasion he had pushed a blanket down into the toilet, blocking it, and then had flushed the toilet and thrown the mattress provided on the floor into the wet area caused by the flooded toilet. He asked for another blanket and was given another one and proceeded to do the same thing with that blanket. Consequently when he was brought to the Watch House on 25 October 1984 Sergeant Simpson asked the appellant for his word that he would not cause any damage to Commonwealth property. The appellant refused to give his word. As a_ result Sergeant Simpson removed the mattress from cell 8 and provided no blankets for the appellant. It should be noted that on the evidence the cells in the police station are air-conditioned and that the subject events took place in the middle of the day. The mattress had also been removed from cell 10 at the direction of Sergeant Simpson before the appellant was placed in that cell. The appellant gave evidence that he had made many complaints to the Ombudsman about the way he had been treated by the police, particularly Sergeant Simpson. Ultimately, the Ombudsman declined to investigate his complaints any further. The appellant frankly admitted that when placed in cell 8 he requested a mattress and two blankets and that these were refused unless he was prepared to give 16. the assurance asked by Sergeant Simpson. The appellant regarded it as outrageous and oppressive that he should be asked to give such an assurance and he refused to do so. He proceeded to bang on the doors of the cell with his boots to attract attention. His boots were then taken away from hin. He continued to sing out loud for blankets and a mattress but the police would not respond. He therefore took the toilet roll and stuffed it down the toilet so as to block it. He quite deliberately caused a lot of flooding. When they took him to cell 10 he used his singlet to do exactly the same thing in just as deliberate a way. He also put two paper plates down the toilet in cell 10. He frankly admitted that he rendered both toilets inoperative and asserted his belief that his actions were fully justified in the circumstances. It was not contended that the toilets were not 'damaged' within the meaning of section 29 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In any event I hold that you damage a thing if you render it imperfect or inoperative (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th edition, and the cases there cited). There is no doubt that the appellant wilfully and unlawfully damaged the property belonging to the Commonwealth. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed and I shall deal with the question of penalty later. I regard this as a bad case of malicious damage. The appellant has gone too far in twice blocking the toilets. It was not unreasonable in my view to require the assurance sought by Sergeant Simpson in the light of the history of similar behaviour on an earlier occasion. I note that the magistrate took a fairly serious view of the offence as reflected in the sentence of four months' imprisonment." The principles upon which this Court will interfere with a sentence imposed for a criminal offence are now well settled. It is sufficient to refer to the oft-cited passage in R. v. Tait (1979) 46 F.L.R. 386 at p.388: 17. "An appellate court does not interfere with the sentence imposed merely because 1t 15 of the view that that sentence 1s insufficient or excessive. It interferes only 1f it be shown that the sentencing judge was in error in acting on a wrong principle or in misunderstanding or in wrongly assessing some salient feature of the evidence. The error may appear in what the sentencing judge said in the proceedings, or the sentence itself may be so excessive or inadequate as to manifest such error (see generally, Skinner v. The King (1913) 16 C.L.R. 336, at pp.339-340: R. v. Withers (1925) 25 S.R. (N.S.W.) 382, at ».394: Whittaker v. The King (1928) 41 C.L.R. 230, at p.249; Griffiths v. The Queen (1977) 137 C.L.R. 293)." The sentences of imprisonment for 4 months imposed in respect of each of the offences under discussion were clearly well within the range of sentences appropriate to the circumstances as found by the primary judge. The appellant has not made out a case warranting the Court's intervention. It cannot be said that the sentences were erroneously imposed or manifestly excessive. Indeed, in our opinion, the appellant has had such a long history of convictions for trespass upon, for failure to leave, and for damage to, property that the sentences imposed were entirely appropriate. The appellant wishes his motives to be regarded as altruistic and his offences as being in the public interest. But he has breached the law and has done so constantly. The appellant further submitted that the primary judge had fallen anto error in directing that a number of the sentences imposed should be served cumulatively. He submitted 18. that his Honour should have directed that all the sentences be served concurrently. It may be taken as a general principle that when a person is convicted of several offences arising out of the same facts the sentences should normally be concurrent and when the offences are entirely distinct they should normally be cumulative. There 1s, however, no hard and fast rule either way: R. v. Carey (1975) 11 S.A.S.R. 575 per Bray C.d. at p.577. It cannot be said that all of the offences for which the appellant was sentenced on 27 August 1985 arose out of the same facts or out of the same transaction. The series of offences under para.12(2)(c) of the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) relating to the refusal of the appeliant on 12 and 15 October 1984 to leave the premises occupied by the Attorney-General's Department were treated by the primary judge as a group and the sentences thereon made concurrent with one another on the basis that they all arose from a course of conduct pursued by the appellant in relation to his demand for legal aid to enable him to defend certain proceedings pending against him at Goulburn and for transport to that city to attend court. Those offences were, however, quite distinct from any of the other offences of which the appellant was convicted. His Honour included in that group the 19. offence of refusing to leave the premises of the Department of the Special Minister of State on 24 October 1984. It would, it seems, have been open to his Honour to treat this offence separately from the others but, as he did not do so, no further consideration need be given to that question. The sentence for the offence of refusing on 28 November 1984 to leave the premises occupied by the Attorney-General''s Department was alsa directed to be served cumulatively. That offence related to a separate and distinct campaign by the appellant that the Federal Government should accept responsibility for the transportation to Canberra upon their release from New South Wales prisons of prisoners convicted in the Australian Capital Territory and serving their sentences in those prisons. The other sentences which were directed to be served cumulatively were the offences of wilful damage to Commonwealth property the circumstances of which have already been detailed. Those offences were again quite separate and distinct from the other offences for which the appellant was sentenced. We are satisfied that, in the circumstances, it was clearly open to the primary judge to impose cumulative 20. sentences and that no error has been disclosed in the sentencing process. For the reasons set out above the appeals should be dismissed. I certify that this and the preceding 19 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court. V2, A ences Ya Dated: 5 December 1985 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY Nos. ACT G 71-75 and G 88-93 of 1985 GENERAL DIVISION weve weve nw BETWEEN : RAY 0' SHANNASSY Appellant AND: THE QUEEN Respondent CORRIGENDA The heading to the Reasons for Judgment of the Court delivered 5 December 1985 should be amended by substituting "Nos. ACT G 88-93 of 1985" for "Nos. ACT G 88-98 of 1985". A similar amendment should be made to the heading to the order of the Court and to the reference to the proceedings on the Catchwords page. The Reasons for Judgment of the Court should be amended by substituting on page 5 line 12, "28 November 1984", for Lib ibe E, Fox "28 November 1985". Associate to Mr Justice Neaves 17 January 1986