Sprod, H.G. v. Repatriation Commission [1985] FCA 617
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Repatriation - claim for pension on ground of incapacity caused
by essential hypertension - hypertension said to be result of
stress suffered during war service - essential hypertension not
arising until 1960's more than 15 years after service completed -
evidence that stress may cause fluctuating (labile) hypertension
and that this may eventually lead to essential hypertension -
whether AAT had correctly applied onus of proof provisions of
Repatriation Act 1920 ~ whether any conclusion open to AAT other
than that it could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
there were insufficient grounds for allowing the appeal to it -
AAT jurisdiction to disturb earlier acceptance by Commission of
psychoneurotic reaction as a cause of incapacity.
Repatriation Act 1920, ss. 47(2) and 107VZZ2B
HENRY GUILLAUME SPROD v. REPATRIATION COMMISSION
No. G226 of 1982
Coram: Davies, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ.
Date : 13 December 1985
Place: Sydney
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 226 of 1982
)
GENERAL DIVISTON )
ON APPRAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEALS TRIBUNAL GENERAL
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION
BETWEEN : ; HENRY GULLAUME SPROD
, Appellant
AND: THE REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
CORAM: Davies, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ.
DATE: 13 December 1985
MINUTE OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 2
November"be set aside, the appeal to that Tribunal be allowed,
the applicant's essential hypertension be accepted as a
condition attributable to his war service and the applicant's
claim for a pension be granted.
3. The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
i
Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the
Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G.226 of 1982
)
GENERAL DIVISTON )
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
TRIBUNAL GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
BETWEEN : HENRY GUILLAUME SPROD
Applicant
AND 3 REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CORAM Davies, Lockhart, Sheppard JJ
13. December 1985
DAVIES J : This is an appeal from a decision of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal which refused the claim of the
applicant, Henry Guillaume Sprod, to a pension under the
Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth) in respect of hypertension. The
appeal is limited to questions of law but one issue in the appeal
is whether, on the evidence before the Tribunal, it was, asa
matter of law, open to the Tribunal to reject Mr Sprod's claim.
The relevant provision with respect to proof was that
contained in s.47(2) of the Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth), which in
substance provided for a finding in favour of the veteran unless
there was satisfaction "beyond reasonable doubt" to the contrary.
There was evidence before the Tribunal that labile or
fluctuating hypertension may result from a person's response to a
nervous or emotional state including anxiety and that persons
with labile hypertension often develop essential or sustained
hypertension. There was also evidence from reputable medical
practitioners of good standing that, in their opinion, a nervous
or anxiety state which contributed to labile hypertension over a
period of years may contribute to the ultimate development of
essential hypertension in that person. See the report and
evidence of Dr M.D. Esler, and the report and evidence of Dr E.
Schiller. In his report dated 24 February 1981, Dr Schiller
said :
"Clinical experience suggests that blood pressure
elevation, in both normal and hypertensive
subjects, occurs with anxiety and with increased
emotional and physical demands. Investigations
have shown a positive relationship between blood
pressure variability and scores on measures of
emotional lability. ...
In the light of the evidence, the answer to your
question is that stress can cause or contribute to
essential hypertension in a susceptible
individual."
Dr Esler gave this evidence, inter alia,
"In essence, what I want to suggest to youis...
that the existence of high blood pressure for the
first time in 1968 could not be connected with any
stress that he suffered during his war service
ending in 1945?---No, I would not conclude that
way with such certainty. I would suggest that
continuing anxiety, if in fact that was the case
and the anxiety existed from service; could
possibly trigger and perpetuate hypertension in
latter years.
ooene
That really is the crux of your opinion about the
psychosomatic cause for essential hypertension, is
not it. It is the crux of your - I do not use the
word offensively - theory as to essential
hypertension anda psychosomatic cause for it,
that the more often there are transient rises as a
result of an anxiety state or some other
psychosomatic cause, so the more frequent the
transient rises are and the longer the transient
rises exist the more likely it is to give rise to
essential hypertension?---That is true. My view
of the evolution of hypertension is that it comes
on over years and blood pressure peaks with
stimuli such as this, triggering peaks is a
mechanism, yes."
Dr Schiller gave this evidence, inter alia,
"Indeed, you do not contend for any greater
proposition than that essential hypertension can
be caused where stress, applied over a long period
of time, causes a gradual rise in hypertension?---
That is right.
aeons
I take it you disagree with Dr Finlayson, do you,
that there is no relationship - when he says there
is no relationship between psychiatric conditions
and hypertension in our present state of
knowledge?---No, I would not agree with that."
On the other hand, there was evidence that many reputable
medical practitioners hold the contrary view. Thus, in evidence
to the Tribunal, Dr D.T. Kelly said
",.. There is no evidence that acute stress in
humans will produce permanent hypertension or
indeed is there any that I am convinced of that
stress at any time after which blood pressure has
been measured to be normal will result in
essential hypertension in later years."
Dr Kelly subsequently limited his reference to "no evidence" by
referring to the "difference between an authority and accepted
scientific acceptance". Dr D. Brender also said, ina report,
that there is "no evidence that transient hypertension occurring
in times of stress may later become persistant (sic)".
The opinion held by medical practitiomers such as Dr Kelly
and Dr Brender may well be correct - save that their use of the
term "no evidence" in the scientific rather than the legal sense
is not helpful in the repatriation context - but that is not to
say that their view disproves beyond reasonable doubt the
contrary view held by other reputable medical practitioners.
This is so because it is accepted that a nervous or anxiety
response may play a part in labile hypertension, because patients
with labile hypertension often develop sustained hypertension and
because the causes of essential or sustained hypertension have
not been definitively established by the medical profession.
Indeed, the mechanism which causes the development of essential
hypertension is still very much a Matter for debate.
Necessarily, the view expressed by Dr Esler and Dr Schiller, both
eminent practitioners, was not shown to be an irresponsible view.
In these circumstances, in my opinion, the evidence did not
and could not establish beyond reasonable doubt that anxiety,
nervous tension or stress may not contribute to the development
of essential hypertension. As Aickin J, with whom Gibbs CJ,
Stephen and Mason Jd agreed, said in Repatriation Commission v
Law (1980) 147 CLR 635 at 651,
",.. Although the medical reports were in conflict,
no challenge appears to have been made to the
standing or expertise of any of the medical
experts. In that situation it is difficult indeed
to see how the Tribunal could properly have been
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the reports
A similar
in O'Brien v Repatriation Commission (1984) 1 FCR 472 and on
appeal by the High Court of Australia (1985) 59 ALJR 363.
Federal
p.499
In the
High Court of Australia, Gibbs CJ, Wilson
favourable to the applicant were wrong."
view was taken by both the Federal Court of Australia
Court of Australia, Keely and Fitzgerald JJ said, at
"Thus, it may mot be established beyond reasonable
Goubt that incapacity or death is not 'connected
with' war service either because there is material
which points positively to a cause .of the
incapacity or death which is or might be so
'comnected' (as, for example, in Law's case,
Byrne's case and Morcombe's case), or because of
some inadequacy in the material to show the
absence of a connection."
cited this passage and went on to say, at p.367
"... it seems to us to be impossible to lay down
the law by saying that if the material in a
particular case does not provide some positive
inference in favour of the requisite connection
between death or incapacity and war service then
the Commission or Review Tribunal as the case may
be must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
there are insufficient grounds to grant the claim.
To require the material to satisfy any prescribed
test expressed in positive terms in favour of
granting a claim tends to undermine the 'heavy
burden of disproof' : per Toohey J. in Law v.
Repatriation Commission (1980) 29 A.L.R. 64 at 74,
citing Edmund Davies J. in Coe v. Minister of
Pensions and National Insurance [19673 1 Q.B. 238
at 242. Of course, it will be seldom that the
evidence will be left in such an unsatisfactory
state as to fail to yield some indication of the
strength or otherwise of a connection between the
death or incapacity and the war service. That
indication will ordinarily be supplied by evidence
as to the cause of the death or incapacity,
including the nature of any relevant disease and
the circumstances which may give rise to it, all
of which may then be examined in the context of
the history of the member's war service. But
where the accepted material falls short of
addressing any or all of those questions - indeed,
whatever the state of the evidence may be - at the
end of the day there is only one question for the
determining body to answer : is it satisfied,
beyond reasonable doubt, that there are
In the
and Dawson Jd
insufficient grounds for granting the claim? That
is the test for which the Act provides and we do
not think it is helpful to attempt to clarify it
or improve upon it by suggesting another form of
words to express its meaning and effect. Any such
attempt is more likely to mislead."
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not adopt that
approach in the decision under appeal and, in my view, it was in
error in this respect.
Likewise, in my opinion, the Tribunal was in error in
finding that :
"21. The Applicant did not suffer from
psychoneurotic reaction which arose out of or was
attributable to war service."
The decision of the High Court of Australia in O'Brien's case,
cited above, has established that, having regard to the terms of
the reference from the President of the Repatriation Review
Tribunal to the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal,
the Tribunal was bound to accept that Mr Sprod suffered froma
nervous condition which was attributable to his war service.
I would observe moreover that, in my opinion, the Tribunal
was in error on this point having regard to the evidence that was
before it. The evidence before the Tribunal established, at
least on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Sprod developed
during his war service a condition of anxiety or nervous tension.
He was married in January 1944, and, for the first three weeks of
his marriage, he suffered from what he called impotence, a
condition from which he suffered from time to time in later years
and to which tension or anxiety may have contributed. In June
1944, he suffered from dyspepsia, again a condition which may be
caused or contributed to by nervous tension or anxiety. He was
again treated for dyspepsia in January 1945. On 26 January 1945,
it was reported that he was suffering from insomnia, irritability
and poor appetite, that he was jittery and had domestic worries.
On examination he was found to be an anxious man. A
psychiatrist's report of 30 January 1945 included the statement,
"For past two months he has had worries about his
wife's health. In June 1944 began to suffer from"
a 'burning sensation in stomach' and was treated
at C.H. at Waigrove (sic) for 6 days. About 3
weeks ago began to sleep poorly and to be
irritable - (especially by sudden noises which
make his stomach twitch). States he cannot
concentrate and that all sorts of ideas come into
his head and interfere with his concentration."
On his discharge in 1945, the examining medical officer reported
Mr Sprod to be "rather excitable" and the Medical Board reported,
"No dyspeptic symptoms at present. Thinks symptoms were due to
worry.", and "Rather excitable". The above evidence seems to me
to have established, at least on the balance of probabilities,
that Mr Sprod did have a condition of nervous tension or anxiety
which developed during the time of his war service. In these
circumstances, the Tribunal could not, I think, having regard to
the onus of proof, properly have found that Mr Sprod did not have
such a condition or that that condition was not attributable to
war service.
It is not necessary for attributability that such a nervous
state or anxiety condition be caused by or contributed to by
enemy action or by active service ina field of war. Camp life,
service discipline and interpersonal relationships between
servicemen can equally cause or contribute to its development.
As Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ said, in O'Brien's case, cited
above, at p.365 :
",.. %In our opinion, it flies in the fact of
commonsense to say that an anxiety neurosis which
is occasioned by reason of the separation of the
respondent from his wife becuase of his war
service at a time when she is in desperate need of
his company is not attributable to that war
service. It is even more surprising when tested
by the onus of proof provision."
'As the Administrative Appeals Tribunal approached these
~ -
Matters on a wrong basis, its decision must be set aside.
\
A
\
Moreover, in my opinion, on the whole of the evidence
before it, a finding adverse to the applicant was not open to the
Tribunal. It was established, at least on the balance of
probabilities, that Mr Sprod's war service caused or exacerbated
a state of tension or anxiety in Mr Sprod of which symptoms were
occasional impotence, dyspepsia, insomnia, irritability and
excitability. The evidence before the Tribunal also, in my
opinion, established on the balance of probabilities that Mr
Sprod suffered from a like condition in his civilian life from at
least 1961 onwards. The Tribunal did not make this finding but
the evidence of Dr M. Pozgniak, a general practitioner who took
over a practice in Bondi in 1960 and who commenced to treat Mr
Sprod in 1961, was that he treated him from 1961 for a condition
of stress or anxiety which gave rise to labile hypertension. Dr
Pozniak said in evidence,
"Well, as I reported I was treating the man for
stress and anxiety, symptoms of which hypertension
is one symptom not the whole disease, stomach
discomfort could be another, insomnia could be
another, irritability, and it is a whole pattern,
but I remember distinctly, Mr Sprod, only because
he had become very dependent upon medical
attention and was a very, very frequent visitor
throughout those many years '61 to '68."
This evidence is consistent with the note in Mr Sprod's medical
records of Dr Pozniak's opinion given on 29 September 1969 that,
"The appellant, Mr H.G. Sprod, began to show
symptoms of irritability, insomnia and poor
appetite, during his army service, and this is
noted on a number of occasions.
He was eventually seen by army physicians and
psychiatrists. These manifestations of nervous
disorder (disease) were evidently the first
symptoms of what became, in the post-war period, a
very labile fluctuality hypertension, which
contributed to his present condition of arterial
insufficiency, (vertebro basal artery). ..."".
Similarly, the medical records note on13 March 1971 that Dr
Pozniak reported, inter alia,
"Dates of first consultation and subsequent
attendances :-
1961-2 and on frequent occasions since.
History given by patient :- Increasing impostency
(sic), Insomnia, Psychosomatic symptoms,
Hay-Fever.
Condition found to be present :- Hypertension,
Right sided Hemiparesis, Giddiness, Lassitude,
Dermatitis.
Copy of any clinical notes :- Has been on
Vasodilators, Tranquilisers, Antihistamines of
many different types and other symptomatic
therapies."
Mr Sprod himself gave evidence to the same effect. Accordingly,
the evidence established that Mr Sprod suffered during the war
years and at least from 1961 onwards a similar state of nervous
tension or anxiety. Although Dr Pozniak did not produce his
medical records, for they had passed from him when he had later
transferred his practice, he was not shown to be a witness having
no credibility. He was a general practitioner speaking of
matters within his own knowledge and, in this respect, within his
10.
competence. It does not seem to me that his evidence could have
been rejected, having regard to the onus of proof.
Indeed, in my opinion, the evidence of Dr Pozniak
established on the balance of probabilities that Mr Sprod had
labile hypertension from at least 1961 as a result of his state
of nervousness or anxiety. In the first few years, Dr Pozniak
sought to treat Mr Sprod by treating his nervous or emotional
state. Later, it appears Mr Sprod developed essential or
sustained hypertension and was treated for that. In 1968, he had
a cerebro-vascular incident. His essential hypertension
continued from that time.
The evidence before the Tribunal did not deal adequately
with the time which elapsed between Mr Sprod's discharge in 1945
and his first seeing Dr Pozniak in 1961, although there appears
to be considerable similarity in the states reported in Mr
Sprod's medical records during the war years and that of which Dr
Pozniak spoke. Unfortunately, Mr Sprod was not asked, either by
his own counsel or by counsel for the Repatriation Commission, to
speak in any detail about the period between 1945 and 1961. But
there is some evidence which shows that Mr Spred continued to
suffer nervous tension. Thus, a note on the file of the
Repatriation Commission dated 13 July 1960, which had been
obtained from an employer from whom the Commission had sought a
report in respect of the period 1954-1956, included the comment
"(f£) State of health during employment : Despite
his good attendance (he was paid a commission and
was very keen) he was never in robust health but
was belted along by a tremendous amount of nervous
energy and desire to succeed."
il.
This comment, made in the middle of the period I am now
discussing, is at least supportive of the view that Mr Sprod then
still had the condition of excitability which had been noted in
his war records and which subsequently was related by Dr Pozniak
to labile hypertension. And the considerable number of jobs
which he held during the period is also consistent with it.
The only positive evidence that the condition to which war
service had contributed totally ceased at some stage after the
war came from Dr J. Ellard, a phychiatrist, who took the
following history from Mr and Mrs Sprod
"He told me that until he had his first stroke in
1968 (he was uncertain of the date) he was very
well indeed. In particular, he had no nervous
trouble at all and life was enjoyable. He had
some trouble with his knee and other minor
physical problems but no psychological problems.
His present symptoms began with that stroke and
were exacerbated by the second one which I believe
eccurred in 1974. Both the patient and his wife
said that there has been a general but gradual
continuing deterioration in his condition and I
accepted this as soa. As part of this he has
become impotent; this appeared especially after
the second stroke.
She said before his stroke he was a happy easy
going man. His children idolized him and there
was a close relationship between all members of
the family. In particular she said that he was
'never worried about anything' and that she did
all the worrying."
This history formed the basis of Dr Ellard's evidence that no war
attributable psychoneurotic state contributed to Mr Sprod's
hypertension. But as the history was inconsistent with the
evidence given by Mr Sprod and Dr Pozniak and was not supported
by any witness it does not seem to me that it was open to the
12.
Tribunal to adopt it, having regard to the onus of proof which
the Tribunal was bound to apply. I should add, moreover, that Dr
Ellard turned his attention to battle stress or bombing stress
and found that element to be missing from the history. But, as I
have said, a psychoneurotic reaction may be attributable to war
service notwithstanding that it arises simply from camp life or
other service conditions well removed from battle and bombing.
Having reviewed the whole of the evidence before the
Tribunal, I am of the opinion that it was not open to the
Tribunal to find beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Sprod did not
suffer from a personality change resulting in nervous tension or
anxiety and some degree of excitability, that that condition
continued after war service and that it played apart in the
development of labile hypertension from which Mr Sprod suffered
in the 1960's and ultimately contributed to the essential
hypertension from which Mr Sprod suffered from about 1967.
Indeed, because of the undoubted relationship between nervous
tension, anxiety and the like and labile hypertension, this was a
stronger case for the applicant than the situation considered by
the Tribunal in Re Foulger and Repatriation Commission (1980) 2
ALD 789 and by the Tribunal in Re Byrne & Ors and Repatriation
Commission (1981) 3 ALN No.43, a decision which was upheld on
appeal to this Court (1981) 40 ALR 296.
In the circumstances, it seems to me that the proper course
is to make the order that the Tribunal ought to have made,
namely, an order directing that Mr Sprod's essential hypertension
be accepted as a condition attributable to his war service. I am
13.
reinforced in my view by the careful analysis which Lockhart J
has made of the Tribunal's reasons for decision and of the
approach which it took. I have had the opportunity of reading
the reasons prepared by his Honour. I agree with them and with
the conclusions reached by his Honour.
I would therefore order that the appeal be allowed, that
the decision under appeal be set aside and that it be ordered
that Mr Sprod's essential hypertension be accepted as a condition
attributable to war service. I would order that the costs of the
appeal be paid by the respondent and that leave be reserved to
the parties to apply for any further order as may seem meet.
certify that this and the twelve C:>)
preceding pages are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment herein of The Honour-
able Mr. Justice D4ves
Associate
pated /3 /'2/95 Ch
Cited bcabesdal ide acai atts tml a at elena Sn enn mal nadie nse Et TE ne deaeneicin taht nants,
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 226 of 1982
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
ON. APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEALS TRIBUNAL GENERAL
ADMINISTRATION DIVISTON
BETWEEN : HENRY GULLAUME SPROD
Appellant
AND: THE REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
Coram: Davies, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ.
Date: 13 December 1985
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LOCKHART J.
This is an appeal froma decision of the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT") affirming a decision of the Repatriation
Commission ("the Commission") which in effect disallowed the
appellant's claim for a pension pursuant to the Repatriation Act 1920
("the Act").
As so often happens in matters of this kind the history of
the appellant's claim for a war pension is long. The appellant
enlisted in the Australian Army on 7 August 1940 when 22 years of age.
He served in Darwin in a field regiment for about six months and later
saw active service in New Guinea from August 1942 to December 1943.
TAT a tal el Sunes snerent eeetia nn Mirela Ni anes rated bes Race hn tite LR tl acai lh Cann ret rar obithnnrepmmntntmannen aoe rtastadateahentimmmaanrrmmnubatan tant
2.
He married on 10 January 1944 whilst on leave and later returned to
war service but not to a theatre of war. He was discharged from the
army on 15 Novembmer 1945. After discharge he followed a variety of
occupations.
On 18 July 1968 the appellant claimed a pension for
"giddiness". This condition was diagnosed as vertebro-basalar
insufficiency but the claim was rejected by a Repatriation Board on 9
September 1968. On 18 November 1968 an appeal by him to the
Commission was disallowed. A further appeal was taken by the
appellant toa War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal and this
appeal was also disallowed.
On 24 February 1971 the appellant claimed a pension with
respect to incapacity from nerves, neuro-determatitis, insomnia,
hay-fever, arthritis in the right knee and impotency. On 15 July 1971
a Repatriation Board accepted incapacity from psycho-neurotic reaction
and assessed the incapacity at 10% of the general rate of pension.
This was later increased to 20%.
On 14 January 1975 the appellant lodged a claim for a war
pension pursuant to the provisions of the Act on the ground of high
blood pressure and brain-stem thrombosis. The appellant's incapacity
was diagnosed on 21 February 1975 as essential hypertension. On 6
June 1975 a Repatriation Board rejected the claim that the appellant's
incapacity from essential hypertension was war related. On 26 August
1975 the appellant appealed to the Commission pursuant to s. 28 of the
en. seabvaleaee 2 eds A a ee he ee SS eS eS Pare et Lanenane tir bens tend eee hat net ee nee ry
3.
Act and on 15 October 1975 the Commission disallowed the appeal. On
25 July 1978 the appellant appealed to a War Pensions Entitlement
Appeal Tribunal pursuant to s. 64 of the Act. The appeal came before
such a Tribunal and on 23 November 1978, following the production of
further evidence, the case was referred, pursuant to sub-s. 64(4) of
the Act to the Commission for reconsideration. On 21 June 1979 the
Commission reconsidered the case and adhered to its previous
determination. On 4 September 1980 the appeal came before the
'Repatriation Review Tribunal as if it were an application for review
under s. 107VC of the Act. During the hearing the procedures provided
by s. 107V2Z2ZB were invoked which resulted ina direction by the
President of the AAT pursuant to sub-s. 107VZZB(8) that the AAT review
"the Commission's decision. ~ On 2 November 1982 the AAT delivered its
decision affirming the Commission's decision. Pursuant to s. 44 of
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 the appellant appealed
from that decision to the Full Court of this Court.
"It is not entirely clear to me whether it is the Commission's
decision of 15 October 1975 or its decision of 21 June 1979 that was
before the AAT. The AAT identified what it perceived as the relevant
decision in the last paragraph of its reasons as the Commission's
decision of 15 October 1975. Yet there are indications in the
material before us that it was the decision of 21 June 1979 that was
before the AAT. Nothing appears to turn on this question and no
argument was addressed to us about it. I shall assume that the
relevant decision was that of 15 October 1975.
4.
In the proceedings before the AAT it was not in issue that
the appellant suffered essential hypertension. An issue fought before
the AAT was whether a condition of the appellant described as stress
or anxiety neurosis arose out of or was attributable to his war
service. Another issue before the AAT was whether there was any
connection between that stress or anxiety neurosis and the essential
hypertension the subject of the claim for a pension. It is necessary
to refer to the evidence before the AAT and to its findings in some
detail to understand the questions on which this appeal turns.
The appellant gave evidence before the AAT. He said that
whilst serving with the 2/17 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery at Dobodura
in New Guinea in 1943 his unit was bombed by enemy aircraft at night
for a period of three to four months. On one occasion the appellant
was being towed with other men on a barge at sea, the toll line broke
and the appellant volunteered to stay with his sergeant on the barge.
They stayed overnight on the barge on the high seas and were aware at
all times that they were "just sitting like ducks on the water at the
mercy of any passing enemy aircraft". He said that on one occasion a
bomber, trying to land, crashed within 50 yards of himself and others
and burst into flames. He remembered:
"as if it happened yesterday the pilot struggling
in the cockpit. I immediately felt the heat of the
fire which forced me and my mates to run away
leaving the pilot to burn to his death".
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5.
He gave evidence that he was impotent for the first six
months after his marriage on 10 January 1944. He said that he became
irritable after the war for various reasons and suffered from
sleeplessness and impotence. He said that he continued to suffer from
impotence from time to time until 1968 when he had his first stroke.
A considerable body of medical evidence was before the AAT.
It consisted principally of reports of medical practitioners and viva
voce evidence given by them.
Medical evidence tendered on behalf of the appellant
consisted of two statements of 13 March and 17 August 1981 from Dr.
M.D. Esler, a highly qualified medical practitioner whose specialty is
clinical research and treatment of blood pressure. Dr. Esler gave
viva voce evidence before the AAT. His only source of information
about the appellant was the appellant's file. He never interviewed or
examined the appellant. Dr. Esler said in his report that the
appellant's hypertension was possibly psychosomatic and a consequence
of service-related stress, that stress is one cause of essential
hypertension, that the appellant's high blood pressure was more likely
to be a consequence of stress than was the case for hypertensive
patients in general. The AAT concluded that Dr. Esler had not
identified any stress or anxiety or psycho-neurotic reaction with
respect to the appellant occurring between 1940 and 1945 which it
considered referable to war service in terms of 3s. 101. The AAT said
that his views about the relationship between the appellant's
essential hypertension and of any psychosomatic process were expressed
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Kat ee ea ie atte ats ace Art A San td es al aa i nh Lat Astaire rarer aiecnenees Naame te Deiat iminls Asan,
6.
as a matter of "suspicion". The AAT gave little weight to the opinion
of Dr. Esler. The AAT noted statements of Dr. Esler that he could not
causally relate the appellant's post war emotional problems directly
to war time service, that he did not know the nature of his
personality before the war, that he was not in a position to take a
psychiatric history and that the appellant may have had a life long
problem of personality adjustment.
Another medical practitioner who gave evidence on behalf of
the appellant was Dr. Finlayson, a highIy qualified consultant
psychiatrist, who made two reports dated 27 March and 1 August 1981.
He too gave viva voce evidence. Dr. Finlayson said that the
appellant's history during war service and subsequently was of a
chronically anxious man; that leaving the army, re-entering civilian
life, disabilities from war service and adapting to a new lifestyle
with a wife and young children were factors which caused or
contributed to the appellant's stress. The AAT examined the evidence
of Dr. Finlayson at considerable length and mentioned some of his
evidence which it regarded as so unsatisfactory as to persuade it that
iat should be given but little weight. The AAT concluded that upon the
whole of the evidence it rejected the proposition that any stress
which the appellant suffered upon his marriage, for example, his so
called temporary impotence and concern over his wife's difficulties
was of such moment that it was a contribution to any ongoing condition
which was @ necessary part of the development of essential
hypertension.
OE Ly leader etal hires nae nat ere beta Ea lath ition ttaatiitinbs ntterennctdamettvet Nentere Alaa te plate iste Me ALPEN, iS ante isnnet arhaerenn in ree eri, ekmavenenliey tle
7.
Another medical practitioner who gave evidence for the
appellant was Dr. M. Pozniak, a general practitioner at Rose Bay who
first treated the appellant in 1961 and many times thereafter. He
furnished a report of 22 June 1981 and gave viva voce evidence. He
made other reports to the Repatriation Department concerning the
appellant's medical condition. Dr. Pozniak said in his report of 22
dune 1981 that in his opinion the appellant's condition of
hypertension was "the end result of nervousness, anxiety first noticed
and treated by his Army Medical officers during his active service of
which records are available in the patient's medical history records."
The AAT analysed Dr. Pozniak's evidence at some length. It weighed
Dr. Pozniak's evidence in the light of evidence from certain other
medical practitioners but does not appear to have reached any
particular conclusion about Dr. Pozniak's evidence.
The appellant called a Dr. Schiller, a specialist
cardiologist. Dr. Schiller stated that he accepted that the
appellant's psychoneurosis had been present since 1945 from evidence
in the appellant's file or from his interpretation of material in that
file. The AAT noted that Dr. Schiller did not offer an independent
personal explanation of the relationship between war service and the
appellant's present condition.
A statement was before the AAT from Dr. Shomron of 3 August
1978 stating that he and Dr. Pozniak had been treating the appellant
for hypertension since 1968. There is a further statement of Dr.
Shomron of 20 February 1979 that he thinks the psychoneurotic reaction
which was accepted as being war related would have been a factor in
the development of the appellant's hypertension. Dr. Shomron gave no
viva voce evidence. The Tribunal gave his opinion little weight.
Dr. Weiner of New York had specialist qualifications in the
field of psychiatry. He wrote two letters of 16 January and 28 July
1981 answering questions submitted to him. He did not see or examine
the appellant. The AAT noted that Dr. Weiner was of the opinion that
psychosomatic contributions to the aetiology, pathogenesis and
exacerbation of essential hypertension are a "real possibility"
receiving the support of experiments on animal models. Dr. Weiner
stated that a direct connection between the stress and somatic
reactions and military service of the appellant can neither be
asserted nor refuted. The AAT noted that Dr. Weiner did not specify
what was included in the term "military service" or what was the
source of any anxiety in the appellant which may have contributed to
the course and development of the hypertensive process or when that
contribution may have taken place. The AAT found that the basis upon
which Dr. Weiner expressed his opinion was inconsistent with the
description of the appellant's life before his stroke in 1968 as
related by him and his wife to Dr. Ellard - a medical practitioner
called by the Commission to whom I shall refer later. The AAT
analysed Dr. Weiner's statements and said that his opinions were
tentatively expressed and, although acknowledging his qualifications
in the field of psychiatry, it did not consider that his contribution
materially advanced the contentions for the appellant.
niga, Winnlea ene Luby anit" nee ede Soee tte in bene nat Na lt aha esac DES aR ans Canada rset ie teal a hctint da Bal inet Denn Heme et hee Stead memestinbenl matatdetinsacones
9.
The AAT noted certain contents of the file of the
Repatriation Department relating to the appellant including comments
by various medical practitioners at different times who appear to have
examined the appellant including Drs. Avedikian, Keily, Gunther and
White. It noted also that Mrs. Sprod, the wife of the appellant, was
not called to give evidence. The Tribunal said that the failure by
the appellant to call Mrs. Sprod or to account for her absence
rendered it less acceptable that there was any such anxiety state as
he alleged or any signs or symptoms of it prior to 1968. The
inference they drew was that any evidence she might have given would
not have supported the appellant's claim. The AAT relied on Jones v.
Dunkel (1959) 101 C.L.R. 298 in support of this statement.
A Dr. Kelly, Scandrett Professor of Cardiology at the
University of Sydney, was called by the Commission. He had carried
out intensive research and examination of hypertension in patients.
He examined the appellant on 18 May 1981. He did not think that there
was any connection between the stress suffered by the appellant during
his war years, his subsequent psychoneurosis and the later development
of essential hypertension. It was his opinion that there was nothing
authoritative to support a proposition that stress can be one of the
causes of essential hypertension.
Dr. Ellard, a highly qualified psychiatrist, was called on
behalf of the Commission. Dr. Ellard consulted with both the
appellant and Mrs. Sprod before writing a report dated 22 April 1981.
He gave viva voce evidence. He was satisfied that the appellant had
woot hake
10.
as a "psychoneurotic" person, and that his symptoms were organically
determined. He could not see any possible connection between war
service and the presence of either hypertension or vascular disease.
In viva voce evidence he said that he did not believe the appellant
had ever had a psychoneurotic reaction. After stating Dr. Ellard's
evidence the AAT concluded that it was satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant is not now suffering. from psychoneurotic
reaction and never has done so.
Dr. Brender, a consultant cardiologist, examined the
appellant on 7 April 1981 and made a report on 1 May 1981 in which he
recorded that there was nothing to suggest that the appellant had
labile hypertension or any cardio vascular symptoms due to an anxiety
state though he noted the presence of anxiety and mild depression. He
considered that the appellant's essential hypertension had "almost
certainly" arisen on the basis of a positive family history as well as
his being overweight. He would not have expected stress to have
Played any part in his symptomatology or the development of his
hypertension. He said that the opinions of Drs. Pozniak and Shomron
would have to be discounted.
After reviewing the medical evidence the AAT made various
findings of fact in respect of which it -said that it was satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt. They included the following:-
mice habs satire neta ln ntehiraternentinntetendtilitte inwisemisbinn erent siadtichs — mmen wettCAK, oe Benahtlietnee halen Lite te Malin menlet na AToal SAA rate atene Wairedbntatet Rais tain a Tdmal wean sis Prince
11.
- There. is no recorded elevated blood pressure during the —_.
appellant's war service and therefore no evidence that he was
suffering from stress;
- Whatever stress had been suffered by the appellant from
incidents on which he relied, namely, the incidents relating to the
bombing at Dobodura, staying overnight on a barge in the high seas, a
bomber bursting into flames on landing near him, his "so-called"
temporary impotence during marriage and his hitch-hiking his way from
Queensland to New South Wales towards the end of the war was transient
and had subsided before the date of his discharge from the army. This
was confirmed by the appellant's recorded blood pressure levels at the
date of his discharge;
- If the appellant's essential hypertension arose from stress,
caused by his altered lifestyle during his period of enlistment or an
altered lifestyle attributable to added family responsibilities or
being separated from his family during that period or by ongoing
lifestyle changes, that stress and resulting hypertension were matters
which related to the appellant's decision to marry and to take on
family responsibility. They were not matters related to his war
service within the meaning of s. 101 of the Act;
- The appellant during his period of enlistment and thereafter
was not a chronically anxious man, at least not until after his
cerebro-vascular accident in 1968;
% 4 ow Py Boater ep wea > afar tet eridte SN yte ery Bue
en nate EL RA ae le eR es LE Se
' —
12.
- If leaving "the army, resuming civilian life, adapting toa
new lifestyle with his wife, getting to know his wife and young baby
were factors which caused or contributed to any stress he may have
suffered, those factors and any such stress were not related or
attributable to his war service within the meaning of s. 101 of the
Act;
= The appellant did not show symptoms of significant stress
from any unsatisfactory relationship with his wife or following
marriage and the birth of his son; ,
~ Any stress which the appellant suffered from his marriage was
not a contribution to any ongoing condition which necessarily related
to the development of essential hypertension;
- The appellant did not suffer from any pre-existing incapacity
which was contributed to in any material degree or was aggravated by
conditions during his period of enlistment or by his war service;
- There were no post war stress factors resulting from any
occurrence during the appellant's war service or which arose out of or
were attributable to his war service. No stress factors were due to
any accident that occurred or to a disease or infection that was
contracted and that would not have occurred or been contracted but for
his being on war service or but for changes in his environment
consequent upon his being on war service;
oT 13.
- The appellant did not suffer from psychoneurotic reaction
which arose out of or was attributable to war service.
The AAT noted Repatriation Commission v. Law (1981) 36 A.L.R.
411 where the High Court considered para. 107VH(2)(a) of the Act and
interpreted it to mean that the Commission had to satisfy the
Repatriation Tribunal beyond reasonable doubt that all of the relevant
relationships with war service had been excluded. The AAT said that
in substance sub-s. 47(2) of the Act (which related to the Commission)
was identical with para. 107VH(2) (a) and that similar considerations
were to be followed by the AAT in deciding the present case. The AAT
Said that under sub-s. 47(2) the Commission was required to grant the
appellant's claim unless it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
there were insufficient grounds for granting it. It said that the
Same requirement applied to the AAT in its consideration of the clain.
The AAT said that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no connection or relationship between the appellant's
condition of essential hypertension and the period of his enlistment
or his war service. Any such connection or relationship could only be
described as "fanciful or tenuous".
The AAT said that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant's incapacity from essential hypertension:
- had not resulted from an occurrence that happened during the
period from the date of his enlistment to the date of the termination
of his service in respect of that enlistment;
i ar -.
Sac RE se
pa Le ett tee ie ots mem eg
Rnanerlatec
14,
- had not arisen out of and was not attributable to his war
service;
- was not due to a disease or infection that was contracted and
that would not have been contracted but for the appellant being on war
service or but for changes in his environment consequent upon his
being on war service;
~ has not been contributed to in any material degree or has not
been aggravated by the conditions of his war service.
The AAT concluded that it was satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that there were insufficient grounds for granting the
appellant's claim. It affirmed the decision of the Commission under
review.
The principal challenge' made by the appellant to the findings
of the AAT was that, although it had towards the end of its reasons
made crucial findings expressed to have been made beyond reasonable
doubt, a reading of the reasons as a whole led to the conclusion that
the AAT failed to apply the tests laid down by the High Court in Law's
Case. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the AAT made
various findings throughout its lengthy statement of reasons from
which it is manifest that the task on which it was engaged was akin to
a tribunal of fact, judging the evidence generally on the balance of
probabilities, and at the end of its reasons rolled up all its
de pet ae —_ +, F- 4 pay nt geet ay wea Make te 8 oy test re nD ae seehgt wn teh 7p ~
MEERA al te Sect aes ARG TP ES wh hw ae AER 2 SS ES oe NSC nl nani a ote Ahk me RRA aa AR ch SE CS Ml ha
15.
critical findings in the language of Law's Case. But, it was
submitted, by then the damage had been done because the findings that
were central to the case had not been made by applying the principles
of Law's Case.
Counsel for the appellant challenged most of the findings
made by the Tribunal including the findings that any stress suffered
by the appellant during his period of enlistment or thereafter was not
related to war service within the meaning of s. 101 of the Act; that
the Tribunal erred in finding that the hypertension of the appellant
was not war related; that there was no ground for drawing inferences
adverse to the appellant by his failure to call his wife to give
evidence and that reliance upon Jones v. Dunkel was inappropriate to
the AAT''s task of determining claims under the Act. It was also
submitted that it was not open to the AAT to reconsider and reject the
finding by the Repatriation Board in 1971 that the appellant suffered
incapacity from a psycho-neurotic reaction or stress and that this was
war related.
The Tribunal's decision was given on 2 November 1982. The
High Court decided The Repatriation Commission v. O'Brien (1985) 59
A.L.J.R. 362 on 27 February 1985. Counsel for the appellant pointed
to many elements of correspondence between O'Brien's Case and this
case and relied heavily upon it in support of his argument. Indeed he
submitted that this case was in all material respects on ali fours
with O'Brien's Case.
- 16.
Counsel for the Commission submitted that the AAT had
correctly applied the principles enunciated in Law's Case and applied
by the High Court in O'Brien's Case. She sought to distinguish
QO'Brien's Case on more than one ground but primarily on the ground
that in O'Brien's Case it was accepted that the veteran suffered from
an anxiety neurosis and the real issues there were what connection, if
any, existed between that accepted disability and the veteran's war
service and between that disability and the essential hypertension.
In the present case there was a real question whether the appellant
did suffer from an anxiety neurosis in any relevant sense and, if he
did, whether there was any relevant connection between that anxiety
state and his war service and his essential hypertension.
Counsel for the Commission submitted that the real issue
before the AAT in this case was whether any anxiety state or stress
which the appellant may have suffered was of such a continuing or
sustained nature that it could be said to have arisen out of or be
attributable to war service and, if it could, then whether it led to
the hypertensive incident suffered by the appellant in 1968. It was
not suggested before the AAT that the appellant was hypertensive prior
to his enlistment. The evidence showed that during his enlistment and
upon his discharge in 1945 his blood pressure readings were normal.
Although the AAT did not find that the appellant did not suffer stress
during the period of his enlistment, it did find that there was no
recorded elevated blood pressure during war service such as might
indicate that he was suffering from stress. The AAT also found that
whatever stress had been suffered as a result of incidents during war
Sie AL eae act ie de tT a Nein LARRY Ak Shae SE bi lta con enn ARR ret alata all tei a tnt mi hte Std
a
17.
service was transient and had subsided before the date of discharge.
Counsel submitted that these findings were open on the evidence and
that the medical evidence supporting a link between stress and
hypertension relates only to prolonged or continuing periods of stress
which were absent in the present case. The objective evidence of
blood pressure readings of the appellant showed that his blood
pressure was normal during war service, upon discharge from war
service, in 1960 when he saw his local general practitioner and that
it was not until 1968, when he suffered a cardiac incident, that any
abnormal blood pressure readings were recorded. This sufficiently
summarises the principal submissions of the parties.
The AAT is required by sub-s. 47(2) to set aside a decision
of the Commission refusing a claim unless satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt of the negative proposition that there were insufficient grounds
for granting the claim: Law's Case. Although in its ultimate findings
the AAT used the language of sub-s. 47(2) its reasons demonstrate to
me that it did not in fact approach its task that way. It referred in
some detail to the evidence of the appellant and of the various
medical practitioners. It noted early in its reasons that the
evidence of the appellant was inconsistent with statements made by the
appellant and his wife to Dr. Ellard. It adopted the formula of
analysing the evidence of each medical practitioner, then discussing
that evidence and measuring it against the evidence of other medical
practitioners or other evidence in the case and making findings on
critical matters as it proceeded throughout its reasons. For example,
in the course of discussing the evidence of Dr. Elser the AAT said:
18.
"his written opinion finally is that the
applicant's hypertension is possibly
'psychosomatic' and a consequence of 'service
related stress'. But he does not say what in
'service' was stressful (or how closely related).
If, for example, it refers to early marriage
problems of so-called 'impotence' we do not agree
that any such stress is service related - i.e. in
the sense of qualifying under s. 101."
In the course of considering Dr. Finlayson's evidence the
AAT said:
"We do not agree that evidence supports Dr.
Finlayson's opinion that leaving the army,
re-entering civilian life, disabilities from war
service, adapting toa new life style with wife,
getting to know his wife and young baby or that he
did not know them during the war, were factors
which caused or contributed to his stress. Quite
apart from any factual considerations, we do not
think that any of the factors referred to in Dr.
Finlayson's answer could be said to he related to
the Applicant's war service.
It has not been supported by the evidence and we do
not agree with Dr. Finlayson's position that the
Applicant 'never used his intellectual potential'
or that in his 'potential for achievement' he was
'clearly thwarted' ...
Dr. Finlayson's evidence is based on what he
described as 'facts known about him', i.e. the
Applicant. In our observations what are asserted
as 'facts known about him' are not supported by the
objective evidence."
A number of other findings in similar vein were made by the
AAT about Dr. Finlayson's evidence which led to the AAT saying that
they should give but little weight to his evidence. It said:
19.
"Upon the whole of the evidence, we reject the
proposition that any 'stress' which the Applicant
suffered upon his marriage ... was of such moment
that it was a contribution to any ongoing condition
which was a necessary part of the development of
essential hypertension. An 'altered lifestyle'
- during the war -- related to added family
responsibility and being separated from his family
and any condition of 'impotence' or of worry over
his wife's housing difficulties would not, in our
opinion, be an occurrence within the meaning of s.
101(1)(a) of the Act. Nor could any essential
hypertension incapacity, to the genesis of which
those matters were contributors, be said thereby to
have arisen out of or be attributable to the
Applicant's war service."
In finally disposing of Dr. Finlayson's evidence the AAT said
in that section of its reasons:
"We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any
of these so-called post war stress factors did not
result from any occurrence that happened during
Applicant's war service or arose out of or was
attributable to his service; and, further, that any
such stress factors were not due to any accident
that occurred or to a disease or infection that was
contracted and that would not have occurred or been
contracted but for his being on war service or but
for changes in his environment consequent upon his
being upon war service."
The AAT turned then to Dr. Pozniak and approached its task in
a similar way.
When the AAT turned to the evidence of Dr. Ellard it said:
"Having regard to Dr. Ellard's qualifications, his
examination of the Applicant and the Applicant's
wife and the more extensive evidence available to
hin, we consider that Dr. Ellard's opinion
'destroys' the opinion of Dr. White, and we are
20.
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the_.._
applicant is not now suffering from psycho-neurotic
reaction and never has done so."
Then later in its reasons the AAT said:
"At hearing before this Tribunal Drs. Avedikian,
Keily, Gunther and White and Mrs. Sprod were not
called to give evidence. ... The failure by the
Applicant to produce evidence from her or to
account for her absence, in our view, renders it
less acceptable that there was any such anxiety
state; or any signs or symptons of it prior to e.g.
1968. The inference we draw is that any evidence
she may have given would not have supported
Applicant's claim. See Jones v. Dunkel ... And the
statements attributed to her by Dr. Ellard, to
which later reference is made remain without
qualification."
These are some examples of the course adopted by the AAT in
its reasons of examining the evidence, assessing witnesses and making
findings sequentially. I have the firm impression that the AAT
analysed the evidence as if it were judging a civil cause, hearing
evidence from witnesses and resolving conflicts, generally on the
balance of probabilities, taking into account the impression made upon
it by each witness, weighing his evidence, comparing it with the
evidence of other witnesses and making findings as it proceeded with
its task step by step until the end when it stated its findings as
conclusions reached beyond reasonable doubt. This approach goes to
the heart of the matter because, if the Tribunal had in fact
approached its task on the basis that it was bound to set aside the
Commission's decision unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the
negative proposition that there were insufficient grounds for granting
the claim, it would have approached its task by a fundamentally
different method.
al.
The statement of the AAT's findings towards the end of its
reasons which are expressed to have been made beyond reasonable doubt
manifests again that the Tribunal approached its task in the manner
indicated by me. It appears to me from those findings of the AAT that
it in fact reversed the statutory onus of proof when it should have
approached the matter on the basis that it had to be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt of the contrary propositions.
These considerations are sufficient in 'themselves to lead to
the appeal being allowed; . but there is another matter which
independently leads to the same result.
Part IIIB of the Act provides for the review of decisions of
the Commission by the AAT. The applicant or the Commission during the
hearing of a proceeding before the Repatriation Review Tribunal under
Part IIIA of the Act may apply to that Tribunal requesting that the
decision of the Commission to which the proceeding relates be referred
for review by the AAT. The person making the application is required
to furnish to the Repatriation Review Tribunal a statement of the
reasons for making the application (sub-s. 107VZZB(3)). The
Repatriation Review Tribunal shall then adjourn the hearing of the
proceeding before it and shall refer the application to the President
of the Repatriation Review Tribunal (sub-s. 107VZZR(4)). The
President of the Repatriation Review Tribunal shall then consider that
application requesting a review and shall if he considers that the
decision the subject of the application involves an important
anna ahh tse camara lamers nite cnaetiiraCitheee aan thiMiehatles ta fasrimnSisdeanbnatinnsinston erstanowinel tua? taeTdnrtn camlan them Crttiemeeitaimestsitiinmsta tives. Led, ee nme tte
22.
principle of general application with respect to entitlement to or
-assessment of pension under the Act refer the decision to the
President of the AAT together with a statement of his reasons for so
concluding and particulars of any submissions made in support of the
application with a request for a review by the AAT of that decision
(sub-s. 107VZZB(7)). Where the President of the AAT receives a
request under sub-s. 107VZZB(7) for a review by the AAT of a decision
he shall direct the review of that decision by the AAT in accordance
with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (sub-s.
107VZZB(8)).
It will be remembered from my earlier statement of the facts
"that on 24 February 1971 the appellant claimed a pension with respect
to incapacity from various conditions including a nervous condition.
On 15 July 1971 the Repatriation Board accepted incapacity from
psycho-neurotic reaction and assessed it at 10% of the general rate.
This was later increased to 20% with respect to all disabilities
following a successful appeal by the appellant to a War Pensions
Assessment Appeal Tribunal. On 2 December 1974 the appellant claimed
a pension for incapacity from high blood pressure and claimed it on
the basis that it was the result of his accepted disabilities. A
Repatriation Board rejected incapacity from hypertension. On 26
August 1975 the appellant appealed to the Commission. On 15 October
1975 the Commission disallowed the appeal stating in its reasons that
it accepted the opinions of departmental medical officers that:
a - ee ee eet em eens ~ - -—
"essential hypertension has not been caused by the
effects of, or the treatment for the appellant's
accepted service-related disability, nervous
condition."
On 25 July 1978 the appellant appealed to a War Pensions Entitlement
Appeal Tribunal against the Commissioner's decision with respect to
essential hypertension. On 21 June 1979 the Commission reconsidered
the case and adhered to its previous decision. In its reasons the
Commission stated that it found that the senior departmental medical ~
officer had "satisfactorily answered the points raised in the further
evidence" and that:
"the Commission finds that there is a hypothesis
that stress plays some kind of indeterminate role
in hypertension. The Commission finds that this
hypothesis remains speculative and the Commission
cannot find in speculation ground for rational
doubt or ground for drawing reasonable inferences
which would favour the granting of the clain.
Thus, it has not been shown that stress in general
terms causes the disease essential hypertension.
Nor has it been shown that in this particular case
war service, the stress of war service or any of
the accepted disabilities including psychoneurotic
reaction have been responsible for the development
of the subject incapacity."
At the request of the appellant's representative his case did not come
before the Repatriation Review Tribunal until 4 September 1980 when
the appellant applied pursuant to sub-s. 107VZZB(3) requesting that
the decision of the Commission be referred for review by the AAT. The
hearing was then adjourned in accordance with sub-s. 107VZZB(4).
\
\
etme heeteneememenine . maniitiih sims had nd ee ~ - ad . —
24.
: The statement of reasons accompanying the appellant's
application to the Repatriation Review Tribunal requesting a review by
the AAT of the Commission's decision included the following
statements:
"In its decision dated 21st June 1979 the
Repatriation Commission indicated that it had
adhered to its previous determination to the effect
that the veteran's 'essential hypertension' was not
war-related." .
The question in issue is whether a war-caused
psycho-neurotic reaction was a factor in the
development of the member's present hypertension.
The principles involved are as follows:-
1. Whether in the light of the available medical
evidence showing a relationship between the
member's accepted disability of
psycho-neurotic reaction and the subsequent
development of hypertension, the Repatriation
Commission could be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there are insufficient
grounds for granting the application."
The President of the Repatriation Review Tribunal sent to the
President of the AAT, in accordance with sub-s. 107VZZB(7), a
Statement of his reasons for concluding that the decision of the
Commission involved an important principle of general application with
respect to entitlement to pension under the Act. That statement of
reasons dated 8 December 1980 included the following statements:
"This case concerns the relationship between war
service and essential hypertension. In particular,
it has been claimed by and on behalf of the
Applicant that incapacity for psychoneurotic
reaction, which has been accepted as being due to
his war service, has been a factor in the
development of his hypertension.
tat Llactate bOI rt Ae RA mS ay Waa te acne et AE Sm tie KhaeleS Ine beatae Karlin Bete Se natn Mri nes att ntenailenatemeiins Sten nikon tm
25.
I have considered the application and I conclude
that the decision of the Commission involves the
following important principle of general
application:
Whether, in a case concerning incapacity from
hypertension, where there is evidence of stress on
service and evidence that stress is a factor in the
development of hypertension, the Repatriation
Commission could have been satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there were insufficient
grounds for allowing the appeal. ..."
The President of the AAT then directed the review of the
Commission's decision by the AAT in accordance with the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 pursuant to sub-s. 107VZZB(8).
The decision of a Repatriation Board of 15 July 1971 accepted
the incapacity of the appellant from psychoneurotic reaction as
necessarily involving the finding that the appellant's anxiety state
or stress was related to or connected with his war service. This
relationship between the appellant's condition of stress as being war
related was assumed at all relevant stages of the process which led to
the review of the Commission's decision of 15 October 1975 by the AAT.
It was not the subject of challenge and was not a matter included
within the reference to the President of the AAT from the President of
the Repatriation Review Tribunal. In my view the AAT had no
jurisdiction to review that particular matter. Yet it is plain that
the AAT did regard as an issue before it whether the stress or
psychoneurotic reaction suffered by the appellant was attributable to
war service. The AAT should have accepted that the appellant's
anxiety state or stress was attributable to or aggravated by his war
26.
service. If this had been accepted then the question before the AAT
would have been whether there existed the requisite connection between
that state of stress and the hypertension which formed the basis of
the appellant's claim under the Act. This is an independent reason
for allowing the appeal.
There remains the question whether the matter should he
remitted to the AAT for further hearing or whether this Court should
itself determine the 'matter, as was done in O'Brien's Case by granting
a pension. \
Appeals from decisions of the AAT to this Court are limited
to questions of law (sub-s-~~44(1) of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal Act 1975) and this Court should not assume the functions of
the AAT as a fact finding body. However, in certain cases this Court
can be in a position to find that a conclusion adverse to an appellant
could not reasonably be entertained. This was the course adopted by a
Full Bench of this Court and affirmed by the High Court in O'Brien's
Case. This case is closely parallel to O'Brien's Case. Counsel for
the appellant said that it was indistinguishable from it. Although I
think this goes too far, nevertheless the similarities between the two
cases are striking and I am reinforced in the views which I have
formed in this matter by O'Brien's Case. In my opinion if the AAT had
properly instructed itself it could not have been satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there were insufficient grounds for granting the
claim. Davies J. in his reasons for judgment has stated the reasons
which led him to conclude that this Court should itself determine the
27.
matter and not remit it to the AAT. I agree with what his Honour said
on that question.
I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the AAT,
order that the appellant's essential hypertension be accepted asa
condition attributable to his war service and order that the
appellant's claim be granted. The Commission should pay the
appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court. Any party should be at
liberty to apply. ,
| certity that this and the fren Si (26)
preceding pages are a true copy of the
Reascns for Judgment herein cf his Honour
Mr. Justice Lockhart.
Rewtn Darle
Associate
Dated. 1344 Lecowber, G85,
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G226 of 1982
~wweww
GENERAL DIVISTON
ON _ APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
TRIBUNAL GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
BETWEEN:
HENRY GUILLAUME SPROD
Applicant
AND:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
CORAM: Davies, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ.
DATE : 13 December 1985
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHEPPARD J.: In this matter I have had the advantage of reading ~
the judgments to be delivered by Davies and Lockhart JJ. I agree
in their conclusion that the appeal should be allowed, the
Tribunal''s decision set aside, and, in lieu thereof, a decision
substituted allowing the appeal from the decision of the
Commission dismissing the applicant's claim for a pension.
The applicant's record of service discloses that he suffered
a number of stressful incidents during his war service. He was
in Darwin for four months and New Guinea for nineteen months. In
the words of a note dated 30 January 1945, which forms part of
his record, he was "(n)ot in action but subjected to a fair
, 2.
amount of aerial bombing". On 26 January 1945 it was said that
he was then suffering from insomnia, irritability and a poor
appetite. He had been "jittery" for two months and was "getting
worse". Some at least of his then condition was due apparently
to domestic worry.
Particular incidents in which the applicant was subjected to
stress are described in the judgment to be delivered by Lockhart
J. and I need not refer to the detail of these.
The evidence of Dr. Esler and Dr. Schiller referred to in the
judgment to he delivered by Davies J. is to the effect that in
their opinion stressful incidents may cause elevated blood
pressure in some individuals. The effect is usually transitory.
After the effects of the stress are over, the blood pressure will
return to normal. The doctors' evidence also establishes that it
is possible that in some cases stress causing elevated blood
pressure of this kind may eventually over a period precipitate
essential hypertension, the condition from which the applicant
suffers. That part of the evidence was the subject of
substantial challenge and contradiction, but as I read the
Tribunal's decision, it did not reject Dr. Schiller's and Dr.
Esler's evidence in the sense of putting it aside altogether.
What it did do was to discount it both because of concessions
made by the doctors in their cross-examination and because of
what it considered to be the substantial weight of contrary
medical opinion called in the case.
Much was made by counsel for the Commission of the absence of
3.
evidence of any abnormal blood pressure reading before 1960, some
fifteen years after the applicant's service concluded. But the
fact is that in 1945 at discharge, the applicant's blood pressure
was recorded as being 130/85 which Dr. Schiller thought was
higher than normal for a twenty-seven year old man. He was
pressed in cross-examination about this statement. He resiled
somewhat from what he had said in his report, but maintained that
it was "borderline" for the applicant's age group. By 1960 the
applicant's blood pressure was recorded as being 150/88.
Dr. Schiller said:-~
"Like Prof. Kelly, Dr. Brender suggests Mr. Sprod
did not have labile or other hypertension. He
did: he had a reading of 150/88 at the age of 42.
The fact that his blood pressure at the age of 27
was 130/80 in no way constitutes negative
evidence; raised blood pressure mostly develops
above the age of 30 years, and as pointed out
earlier by Dr. Edgley, a blood pressure of
130/80, is if anything slightly above the average
for a man in the mid-twenties."
The applicant's primary submission is that, as a matter of
law, it was not open to the Tribunal to hold that it was
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there were insufficient
grounds for allowing the appeal; sub-sec. 47(2) of the
Repatriation Act 1920. In my opinion this submission should he
upheld. Notwithstanding the various findings made by the
Tribunal, I do not myself perceive how, in the light of the real
possibilities raised by the evidence of Dr. Esler and Dr.
Schiller, the Tribunal could have reached its ultimate conclusion
of satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt. In reaching this
o>
4.
conclusion I have taken into account the fact that, as earlier
noted, some at least of the stress from which the applicant
apparently suffered during his war service was caused by domestic
worry over the plight of his wife. It is established by the
decision of this Court in O'Brien v. Repatriation Commission
(1984) 1F.C.R. 472 that stress of this kind is nevertheless
stress which arises as a result of war service; see per Keely and
Fitzgerald JJ. at p. 483. Counsel for the Commission relied on
differences which there were between the factual situation in
O'Brien's case and in this one. Undoubtedly there are
differences, but the evidence nevertheless established, in ny
opinion, that stress suffered by the applicant as the result of
domestic problems was due to war service.
It follows, in my opinion, that the appeal must be allowed.
There is no occasion to send the matter back to the Tribunal. We
should ourselves order that the appeal to the Tribunal he
allowed. My conclusion in this regard is based on the fact that,
upon the evidence which was led before the Tribunal, no other
conclusion was open than that it ought not to have been satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that there were insufficient grounds for
allowing the appeal.
Two matters remain to be mentioned. I am in agreement with
the separate reasons given by Lockhart J. for the allowance of
the appeal. A comprehensive reading of the Tribunal's decision
discloses, in my opinion, that it in substance cast an onus on to
the applicant, an onus which he did not bear. I would allow the
appeal for that reason also, but that of itself would not lead to
5.
the reversal of the Tribunal's decision. If that were the only
ground, the matter would-need to be remitted to the Tribunal to
be heard again.
Finally, I should mention a submission made by counsel for
the applicant which was based on the provisions of s. 107VZZB of
the Repatriation Act. Pursuant to sub-sec. (7) thereof the
President of the Repatriation Review Tribunal may, in the
circumstances there mentioned, refer a decision of the Commission
to the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal with a
request for a review by that Tribunal of the decision. On 8
December 1980 the President of the Repatriation Review Tribunal
wrote to the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
informing him that he had considered the application and
concluded that the decision of the Commission involved an
important principle of general application, namely:-
"Whether, ina case concerning incapacity from
hypertension, where there is evidence of stress
on service and evidence that stress is a factor
in the development of hypertension, the
Repatriation Commission could have been satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that there were
insufficient grounds for allowing the appeal."
On 15 July 1971 a Repatriation Board had accepted that the
applicant was suffering incapacity from psychoneurotic reaction.
The degree of incapacity was assessed, first of all at ten per
cent. This was subsequently increased to twenty per cent.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of this incapacity, the Tribunal
found that the applicant was not in fact suffering incapacity
from psychoneurotic reaction.
\
'
x
. 6.
In the submission of counsel for the applicant the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction to disturb that finding. The only matters
before it were those arising from the reference to it by the
President of the Repatriation Review Tribunal. These did not
raise the question of whether the applicant was suffering
incapacity froma psychoneurotic reaction. In my opinion the
matter is concluded against the Commission by the decision of the
High Court in Repatriation Commission v. O'Brien (1985) 59
A.L.d.R. 363. Of the similar submission made in that case Gibbs
XN .
C.d., Wilson and Dawson JJ. said (p. 365):-
\
"In the present case, the reference was confined
to the five decisions of the Commission whereby
on each occasion the respondent's claim for a war
pension based on his essential hypertension was
rejected. The decision of a Repatriation Board
in November 1961 accepting the respondent's
anxiety neurosis as due to war service has never
been challenged by way of appeal. The same is
true of the decision of a Board in 1970 which
raised the assessment of his disability in
respect of that neurosis from nil to 20 per cent.
Whether or not the Commission considered it
desirable todo so, in our opinion it was not
open for these earlier decisions to be reviewed
and reversed in the course of considering the
respondent's claim based on his hypertension.
Neither of these earlier decisions were embraced
within the reference to the President of the AAT.
The AAT therefore had no jurisdiction to review
either of those decisions: Administrative Appeals
Tribunal Act, s. 25."
The submission made by counsel for the applicant based on
5.107VZZB must therefore be upheld. It should be understood that
it is upheld not because of any application of the concepts of
res judicata or issue estoppel to Proceedings before an
administrative tribunal, as was suggested at one stage in
argument, but because of an absence of jurisdiction.
. 7.
As in the case of the second ground of appeal, the upholding
of this ground would not itself have led to the making of an
order by this Court that the applicant's appeal to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal should be allowed. It alone
could only have led to the matter being remitted to the Tribunal
to be heard again. For reasons earlier given, however, I agree
in the reasons of the other members of the Court that, not only
should the appeal be upheld; an order should also be made which
will have the effect of granting the applicant the pension which
he seeks.
1 certify that this and the 6 preceding
pages are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment herein of The Honourable
Mr Justice Sheppard. / <a. ' pw
Associates
pated "2 DECE/74ER 198 5-
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