G.M. (North Melbourne) Holdings Pty Ltd v. Young Kelly Pty Ltd & Ors [1986] FCA 205
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
COPYRIGHT - infringement of applicant's copyright in plan of
Melbourne - plan used as pre-costing guide for courier service -
whether reproduction of substantial part of applicant's plan -
whether directors liable for company's breach of copyright.
TRADE PRACTICES - misleading or deceptive conduct - false
statements that respondent responsible for creation of applicant's
plan - whether directors involved in conduct under s.75B Trade
Practices Act 1974.
Copyright Act 1968 ss.10,13,14,31,36
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s.32
Trade Practices Act 1974 ss.52,75B,80,82
G.M. (NORTH MELBOURNE) HOLDINGS PTY LTD v
YOUNG KELLY PTY LT, NOEL WILLIAM YOUNG and ALLAN KELLY
No. VG 240 of 1985
Woodward J.
Melbourne
27 May 1986
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY No. VG 240 of 1985
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN :
G.M. (NORTH MELBOURNE) HOLDINGS PTY LTD Applicant
and
YOUNG KELLY PTY LTD, NOEL WILLIAM YOUNG
and ALLAN KELLY Respondents
MINUTES OF ORDER
COURT : Woodward J.
DATE: 27 May 1986
PLACE: Melbourne
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant and the respondent Allan Kelly have leave
to file and serve short minutes of orders sought in
accordance with these reasons for judgment.
2. The matter be adjourned to a directions hearing on a
date to be fixed.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36 of
the Federal Court Rules.)
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
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VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG 240 of 1985
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GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN :
G.M. (NORTH MELBOURNE) HOLDINGS PTY LTD Applicant
and
YOUNG KELLY PTY LTD, NOBEL WILLIAM YOUNG
and ALLAN KELLY Respondents
COURT: Woodward J.
DATE: 27 May 1986
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is acclaim by a company, which runs a courier
service, against a former employee, his business associate, and
the company of which they are now both directors and which
competes directly with the applicant. The claim relates to a plan
or map of Melbourne designed by the applicant, and used by it, its
independent carriers and its customers, to determine the cost of
each delivery.
Put very simply, the plan depicted a regular hexagonal
grid or matrix overprinted on an outline map of inner and suburban
Melbourne. The cost of a particular delivery was calculated by
locating the hexagons in which the pick-up and delivery suburbs
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were located, and counting the number of hexagonal units crossed
in travelling between the two. The charge was, generally
speaking, based on a particular rate per unit crossed.
It is not disputed that the respondent company derived
from the applicant's plan a similar one. The applicant, however,
alleges that the second-named respondent, Mr Young, has falsely
claimed to have played a substantial part in the design of the
applicant's plan and to be entitled to make use of it as he sees
fit. It says that this amounts to false or misleading conduct
within the meaning of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. It
also says that it holds the copyright in its plan (which was
finally not contested by the respondents) and that its copyright
has been infringed by the production and use of the respondents'
plan. Both claims, under the Trade Practices Act and the
Copyright Act 1968, have been strenuously defended, the latter on
the basis that what was copied from the applicant's plan was a
minor, and not a substantial, part of it.
A third claim, of breach of copyright of the applicant's
"Terms and Conditions of Contract", is not denied by the
respondents, who say the breach should sound in nominal damages
only.
Most of the hearing has been taken up with the question
of breach of the applicant's copyright in its plan. I shall deal
with that major issue first. All that I need say of the Trade
Practices Act claim at this stage is that I am satisfied that the
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claim is genuine and has some substance - sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court to deal with the associated copyright
matter (see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 5.32).
In the course of these reasons for judgment I shail
refer generally to "the applicant", although I am conscious of
the fact that there have, at all relevant times, been two or three
related companies conducting somewhat different courier
businesses, using the same map with different titles on it. Each
of these companies has changed its corporate name more than once,
but they have generally traded under the names of "Golden
Messenger", "Integrated Transport Services" and "Cameo Transport".
The first two names are still in use. Mr Young has at times
worked in different parts of the overall structure. But it seems
that nothing turns on these differences or changes and it is
therefore convenient to treat "the applicant" as a single entity
for present purposes.
By way of background to the copyright claim, it is
relevant to note that Young commenced work for the applicant, as
sales manager, in August 1977, just as the plan was about to be
published. He was chiefly responsible for putting the new costing
system into operation and introducing it and the plan to
customers. He now makes no claim to have been involved in the
plan's design or production. In late 1981 he left the employ of
the applicant and went to work for a firm called Elite Couriers
('Elite') which soon afterwards brought out a plan markedly
similar to the applicant's. The applicant sued Elite for breach
of copyright and Elite consented to judgment against it. Young
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co-operated with the applicant to secure the judgment against
Elite on the understanding that he could in due course be
re-employed by the applicant.
He was re-employed in about March of 1983 and worked
first as a salesman and later in his former position of sales
manager (though now subordinate to a marketing manager,
Mr McKenzie) until he suddenly resigned in March 1985. The
managing director of the applicant, Mr Schorer, gave evidence that
before re-employing Young he gave him, in effect, a lecture about
his responsibilities to the applicant if he should again leave its
service. This included reference to the applicant's copyright in
its plan. He was corroborated in this by Mr McKenzie, who was
present at the interview. Young denied that anything like this
was said but, having observed Mr Schorer in the witness box and
bearing in mind the Elite incident, I have no hesitation in
accepting that such a lecture was given - though it has little
direct relevance to the issues I have to determine.
It is clear that when Young left the applicant he took
with him one or more copies of its plan. It is also clear that he
wanted to use the concept behind the plan but, having learnt from
the Elite experience, hoped to do so without making himself or his
newly-formed company liable for infringement of copyright.
Whether, in the event, he succeeded, is the main question which I
have to determine.
The applicant's plan has a number of distinctive basic
features, apart from additional characteristics such as its
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colour, title, size and any further information printed on it.
The plan itself has the following features:
(a) its boundaries -
Craigireburn to the north,
Kalorama, Kallista, Belgrave and Berwick to the east,
Frankston to the south, and
Laverton, Deer Park and Sydenham to the west;
(b) its scale;
(c) its depiction of the outline of Port Phillip Bay and the
mouth of the Yarra River (copied, by arrangement, from a
Melway map);
{d) the marking of a number of main roads, apparently to
assist in following the plan;
{e) the over-printing of the complete pattern of hexagons,
each of which is numbered for ease of reference; and
(f) the placing of selected names of suburbs within those
hexagons, with the result that a large number of
hexagons (particularly in outer areas) contain no names,
many contain one or two, and some contain up to five or
six names.
In comparing the respondents' plan with the applicant's,
it is convenient to deal with each of these characteristics and
features in turn.
Additional characteristics
(i) The applicant's document is dark green and black (or in
some cases dark green and light green); the respondents' is
yellow and black.
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(ii) The applicant's document is titled "THE GOLDEN GRID
SYSTEM" (or "THE INTEGRATED PRE-COSTED TRANSPORT SYSTEM" or "THE
CAMEO PRE-COSTED TRANSPORT SYSTEM"); the respondents' is titled
"BEELINE COURIER SYSTEMS Pre Costing Guide Map".
(iii) The applicant's document measures approximately 43.5 cm
by 50 cm; the respondents' is 29.5 cm by 34.5 cm.
(iv) The applicant's document gives an index of suburbs in
alphabetical order, telephone numbers to ring and the logo and
full name of the company concerned; the respondents' merely gives
its own telephone numbers and logo.
(a) Boundaries
The eastern and western boundaries of the applicant's
and respondents' plans are identical. The northern boundary of
the respondents' plan stops one unit (about 4 kms) short of the
northern boundary of the applicant's plan. The only suburb
included in the latter and not in the former is Craigieburn. The
southern boundary of the respondents' plan extends two units
beyond that of the applicant, and adds Mt Eliza, Moorooduc and
Mornington.
(b) Scale
There was evidence from an expert witness that the scale
of the respondents' plan is 1 : 135,000 whereas the applicant's is
1: 140,850 - which is 4.3% smaller. This evidence escaped
attention at the time it was given and in final addresses, but it
is clearly wrong. The scale of the applicant's plan is some 50%
larger than the respondents'. For example, the distance from
Williamstown to Frankston, 1n a direct line, is some 18 cm on the
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respondents' plan and 27.5 cm on the applicant's. My own rough
calculations give scales of about 1 : 200,000 for the respondents'
plan and 1 : 130,000 for the applicant's. These are based on the
expert's other evidence, which I accept, that the width of the
units marked on the applicant's plan varies between 3.464 and
3.64 km apart, while the units on the respondents' plan are
approximately 3.6 km apart.
(c) Port Phillip Bay and Yarra River
I accept evidence, given for the respondents, that the
Bay outline and Yarra River mouth on their plan was obtained from
a Readers Digest Atlas. It differs, as to details, from the
applicant's plan. It is also slightly wider, when blown up to
approximately the same scale as the applicant's plan. However it
is interesting to note that the way in which it is set on the
document, which gives a precisely vertical north point, is the
same in each case. This 1s the way the Melway map, and therefore
the applicant's plan, is presented. The Readers Digest map has
north several degrees left of vertical, so it seems clear that the
respondents' Bay outline has been skewed through several degrees
so that it conforms on the page with the applicant's Bay outline.
(ad) Main Roads
A number of main roads are marked on the applicant's
plan and some of them are named. It is not clear to me why they
are marked, unless it is to help in the finding of suburb names,
because charges are based on the rather arbitrary placing and
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grouping of suburbs into units and not on the precise location of
pick-up or delivery sites. There are no roads marked on the
respondents' plan.
(e) Hexagons
The units used in the applicant's plan are fairly
uniform hexagonal shapes. I say "fairly uniform" because it is
apparent that there are some divergences in size. In measuring
rows of ten hexagons in different parts of the plan, I have found
the measurements vary from 27 cm to 27.5 cm. It seems that this
is likely to be due to the use of photography in the process of
reproduction - which tends to distort distances slightly,
particularly at the outer edges.
The units in the respondents' plan are dots. Again
there is some distortion, and measurements of ten units (that is
the space between eleven dots) varied from 17.8 cm to 18.1 cm.
As I have already indicated, expert measurement shows
that the distance on the ground between the parallel sides of the
applicant's hexagons varied from 3.464 km to 3.64 km - an average
of 3.552 km. The average distance between the centres of the
respondents' dots was 3.6 km.
(f) Suburb selection and placement
There are some 260 suburbs selected and placed on the
applicant's plan. Some of the selections are unexpected and there
are some strange omissions - notably Brunswick. Two suburbs are
included twice (Kingsville and Heidelberg). (This was said by
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Mr Schorer to have been deliberate, to catch copiers, but I have
some doubts about this explanation because of the confusion which
must have been caused. I note that the duplication is not
repeated in the latest issue of the applicant's plan.) The
grouping together of some suburbs is quite arbitrary, and the
positioning of names within the group is sometimes erroneous.
The respondents' plan
(i) has added Moorabbin Airport,
(il) has moved Sandringham one unit west, to its correct
position on the bayside, and
(iii) has moved Coburg one unit north, to its correct position
north of Moreland.
Apart from that, and the fact already noted that the
respondents' plan omits one name to the north and adds three to
the south, the selection and placement of suburbs is identical.
The respondent's plan includes the duplication of Kingsville and
Heidelberg and the omission of Brunswick. It also misspells the
names of two or three suburbs, such as "Forest Hills" instead of
Forest Hill, as does the applicant's plan.
The applicant's plan places the names unevenly in the
hexagons, and several different type-faces have been used. But
their allocation to the top or bottom halves of the hexagons, and
the1r sequence, has been exactly reproduced in the neat placement
of names above or below the dots on the respondents' plan.
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These factors leave me in no doubt that there has been a
copying of parts of the applicant's plan in the preparation of the
respondents'.
The artist given the task of drawing up the respondents'
plan, Mr Inns, says that he derived the names of the suburbs
himself, partly from a Melway Street Directory (which lists
suburbs) and partly from the list on the applicant's plan - which
he had been given by Young, with instructions that the plan he
drew had to be different.
Having studied the two plans I have no doubt at all
that, apart from the three sensible amendments listed above, and
the three additions to the south (for which Melway may well have
' been consulted), the selection and placement of suburbs was copied
directly from the applicant's plan. I am quite unable to accept
Mr Inns' evidence to the contrary.
Equally implausible is Mr Inns' evidence as to how he
came to have exactly the same number of units in the areas common
to both plans - e.g. 14 units in each case from Laverton to Wattle
Glen, from Eltham to Frankston North and from Port Melbourne' to
Berwick. He said that he was given no instructions as to the size
of the units (the distance apart of the dots); this was left to
his discretion. I find this quite incredible because the whole
costing system is based upon the size of the units and the
Placement and grouping of suburbs within those units.
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Mr Young said that he instructed Mr Inns to place the
dots 4 km apart. In my view, the fact that they are 3.6 km apart,
are centred on the Melbourne G.P.0. as are the applicant's
hexagons, and correspond closely with the centres of the hexagons
when overlaid on the same scale (although with some divergence
towards the outer edges, but still within their respective
hexagons) shows clearly that copying occurred.
dust how it occurred is a matter for speculation.
Mr Inns gave one explanation in an affidavit as to how he
positioned the dots, anda different explanation in the witness
box. Neither was at all convincing. I am satisfied that, in one
way or another, the size and placement of the units (by which I
mean their angles on the page and their placement in relation to
the Bay outline) was copied from the applicant's plan.
The applicant's case is pleaded on the basis that the
copyright in its plan, as an artistic work, has been infringed.
It seems clear that the Golden Messenger plan is a "drawing" for
the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968; that word is defined in
s.10 of the Act to include "a diagram, map, chart or plan".
Section 10 also defines an "artistic work" as including "a
painting, sculpture, drawing, engraving or photograph, whether the
work is of artistic quality or not".
The infringement of which the applicant complains is
based on s.36 of the Act, which provides that:
"(1) Subject to this Act, the copyright in a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is
infringed by a person who, not being the owner of
the copyright, and without the licence of the owner
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of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes
the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the
copyright."
By virtue of s.13(1), an "act comprised in the
copyright" in an artistic work "should be read as a reference to
any act that, under this Act, the owner of the copyright has the
exclusive right to do". Under s.3l of the Act, in the case of an
artistic work and so far as 1s relevant, copyright is the
exclusive right
(i) to reproduce the work in a material form, and
(ii) to publish the work.
Finally, reference should be made to s.14(1)(b) of the
Act, which provides that a reference to reproduction includes a
reference to a reproduction of a substantial part of the work.
It was tentatively argued by the respondents that there
could be no copyright subsisting in the hexagonal grid pattern
developed and used by the applicant. The hexagonal form, it was
said, is a simple geometric shape, and its use in a_ continuous
regular grid or matrix appears commonly both in nature (a
honeycomb is an obvious example) and as a man-made pattern.
That argument, which involves some consideration of the
concept of "originality" in copyright law, was not developed,
because the claim that copyright subsisted in the applicant's plan
which incorporated the hexagonal matrix, was finally not disputed
by the respondents. Nor was the fact that the applicant is
entitled to the protection of s.3l in issue between the parties.
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The question that I must therefore decide is whether the
Beeline plan reproduces a substantial part of the applicant's
plan.
There is no guidance in the Copyright Act as to what
amounts to "reproduction of a substantial part" of a work. The
authorities make it clear that the degree of reproduction is a
question of fact for the court to decide, and that its
determination involves two aspects: first, there must be an
actual copying of the protected article, and secondly, that the
offending work must closely resemble the original (see Ancher,
Mortiock, Murray & Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [£19711 2
NSWLR 278 and Copinger and Skone James on Copyright llth Ed.,
1971, paras 406-408).
The two aspects or "limbs" of the test overlap somewhat,
and obviously the degree of close resemblance may be indirect
evidence that copying in fact occurred. However, the two aspects
"are distinct 1n point of principle and they must be considered
with this distinction in mind .... It is only after making a
finding, either on direct evidence or by inference, of copying ...
that significance will attach to the degree of similarity" (per
Street J in the Ancher, Mortlock case at 284).
It is not disputed that in this case some copying has
occurred. Senior counsel for the respondents conceded in his
address that "there has been to an extent an actual copying.
There is no question of that."
- 14 -
However, whether the respondents' plan so closely
resembles the applicant's as to amount toa reproduction of a
substantial part is strongly contested.
It has been said that "the question whether [a person]
has copied a substantial part depends much more on the quality
than on the quantity of what he has taken" (per Lord Reid in
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd £1964] 1 WLR
273 at 276 and see also Edwards v S.W. Hart & Co (1983) 49 ALR 605
per Franki J at 622-4 and Geographia Ltd v Penguin Books Ltd
£19853 FSR 208 at 219). The question must also be approached by a
careful examination of the whole of the original and offending
works. In the case of works that can be considered "compositions"
or "compilations", such as here where it is alleged that some
aspects of the applicant's plan have been taken or reproduced and
others either abandoned or significantly altered, it can be
misleading to examine each component separately and determine
whether copyright exists in it, and whether it has been
substantially reproduced.
As was said in Hogg v Scott (1874) LR 18 Eq 444 at 458,
"the true principle in all[Ecases of composite
works] is, that the Defendant is not at liberty to
use or avail himself of the labour which the
Plaintiff has been at for the purpose of producing
his work - that is, in fact, merely to take away
the result of another man's labour", (see also Lord
Hodson in Ladbroke's case at 286-7).
This approach was adopted by Whitford J in the
Geographia case, who noted "that avery great deal of skill,
labour and expense was involved in the production of the LCalleged
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infringing] map", (at 219 and at 209-10, citing with approval a
passage in an American map case, General Drafting Company
Incorporated v Andrew 37 F 2d 54).
Another matter considered of some relevance in the
Geographia case, was "whether having regard to the quantity and
quality of the information taken there has been any real prejudice
to the interests of the copyright owner" (at 219).
A comparison with decided cases dealing with, for
example, the reproduction of musical works or architectural plans,
will be of limited value in deciding a case involving the copying
of maps or plans. Indeed, an examination of those cases referred
to in argument which did deal with maps, Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd
v Robinson (1917) 23 CLR 49 and the Geographia case, is itself of
no great assistance. Each case will be a matter of impression,
and will turn on the particular characteristics of the maps or
plans before the court.
T have reached a decision that in this case there has
been an infringement of copyright. Although there are obvious
differences between the two plans, the similarities I have already
discussed, and particularly the selection and placement of suburbs
in particular units a particular distance apart, lead me to the
conclusion that those aspects of the plan so closely resemble the
original that a reproduction of a substantial part of the
applicant's plan has occurred.
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The respondents' counsel emphasised that it is the form
or layout of the plan that is protected by copyright, not the
idea. That is true (see Catnic Components Ltd v Hill and Smith
Ltd £19823 RPC 183 at 223), and if Mr Young had himself, or
through Mr Inns, simply used the idea of the pre-costing system,
calculated the most appropriate unit distance for his purposes,
identified which suburbs were most commonly needed for his
business, and then placed them within the most appropriate unit on
his plan, the applicant would not have cause for complaint.
However, that has not occurred; the most original and important
part of the applicant's work - the part upon which the whole
charging system is based - has been taken, to the prejudice of the
applicant, and consequently the applicant 1s entitled to relief.
The remedies available under the Copyright Act and
sought by the applicant are injunctions restraining the
respondents from reproducing or using in their business the grid
outline, the Golden Messenger map, the applicant's Terms and
Conditions of Contract, or any reproductions of those, an order
for delivery up of any original or infringing plans or plates in
the respondents' possession, and damages (including additional
damages under s.115(4) of the Act) or an account of profits. It
was agreed by the parties that any claim for damages should be
argued after my findings on liability are available. Accordingly,
I need not deal with that question here. It would be appropriate
for short minutes of orders for injunctions, and for delivery up
of any infringing plans or plates, to be filed and served before
the date of the directions hearing which I shall fix to determine
the further course of this action.
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I turn again to the claim made under s.52 of the Trade
Practices Act. Paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim alleged that
"The Respondents and each of them have represented
to members of the public that the grid outline and
the Golden Grid Map were created by them or one or
other of them, are owned by them and may be used by
them and others without the licence or consent of
the Applicant."
The evidence on which this allegation was based came
from Mrs Day, who met and spoke with the respondent Young about
the Beeline map in December 1985, and Mr Gordon, who was employed
by Elite when Mr Young worked there in October 1981.
Mrs Day said she was told by Young, after inquiring
about the Beeline services and the origin of its plan, that he had
thought up the idea of the Beeline map himself, and that he and
another (unnamed) person had "made up" the Golden Messenger map.
T accept from the evidence given by Mr Schorer, and as
was admitted by Mr Young himself, that Young played no part in the
design or production of the applicant's plan. As sales manager of
Golden Messenger, he introduced the plan and the pre-costed
charging system on which it was based "into the market". He did
not, however, devise the concept of the plan or "make" the Golden
Messenger plan in conjunction with another person or at all.
Mrs Day was asked to contact Young and Beeline by Mr
McKenzie of Golden Messenger. No doubt in making that request
there was a hope that Young could be tempted to make the kind of
statement he did. However, I accept Mrs Day's evidence as a
truthful and accurate account of what took place, and I accept
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that the applicant has proved the falsity of Young's statements.
It is also clear that, in making those false representations,
Young was acting on behalf of his company. In those
circumstances, the applicant has established its claim under s.52
against the first respondent. However the breach is such that it
is of no significance when compared with the breach of copyright
which I have found.
So far as the evidence of Mr Gordon is concerned, I note
that any representations that might have been made by Young,
ezrther directly or indirectly, arose before the period of
limitation prescribed by s.82(2) for actions for damages.
However, Gordon's evidence does serve to indicate a possible
propensity to claim credit for the applicant's plan, and I have
taken this into account in reaching my finding on this issue.
I need only briefly mention a further submission of the
applicant, that the s.52 claim could also be argued on the basis
that the similarities between the two plans, taken together with
Young's conduct, somehow implied that Beeline was entitled to use
or copy the Golden Messenger plan or system.
I think the applicant would have serious difficulties in
establishing that that conduct of itself amounts to misleading or
deceptive conduct. However, as I have already found in favour of
the applicant on both the copyright and s.52 claims, and as I am
prepared to grant injunctions preventing further use or
distribution of the respondents' plan, I make no finding on this
point.
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It only remains for me to consider the liability of the
iundividual respondents, Messrs Young and Kelly, the directors of
the first-named respondent. It was submitted that both were
liable for the infringement of copyright and the breach of s.52 of
the Trade Practices Act.
The infringement of the exclusive right given under s.31
of the Copyright Act to reproduce a copyright work is a tort (Ash
v Hutchinson and Co (Publishers) Ltd £19361 Ch 489). It is
actionable in a civil suit on the application of the copyright
owner (s.115(1) of the Copyright Act).
The applicant has succeeded in its infringement claim
against the corporate respondent. However, the personal liability
of directors, arising from the commission of a corporate tort, is
a complex and burgeoning field of law. In White Horse Distillers Ltd
v Gregson Associates Ltd £19841 RPC 61 (a passing off case), Nourse J
in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice summarised
{at 91) the principles of liability found in a Canadian patents
decision, Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising
Manufacturing Company Inc (1978) 89 DLR 195, as follows;
"Before a director can be held personally liable
for a tort committed by his company he must not
only commit or direct the tortious act or conduct
but he must do so deliberately or recklessly and so
as to make it his own, as distinct from the act or
conduct of the company. It is unnecessary for him
to know, or have the means of knowing, that the act
or conduct is tortious. It is enough if he knows
or ought to know that it is likely to be tortious.
The facts of each case must be broadly considered
in order to see whether, as a matter of policy
requiring the balancing of the two principles of
limited liability and answerability for tortious
acts or conduct, they call for the director to be
held personally liable."
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Whilst it was not strictly necessary for him to so
decide, Nourse J found (at 92) "much to be said" for the "Mentmore
test" which "correctly represents the law of England".
Nourse J's decision was recently considered by the Court
of Appeal in C. Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd £19853 1 WLR
317 (a copyright case). After a careful analysis of the relevant
authorities, Slade LJ (with whom Cumming-Bruce and O'Connor LdJd
agreed) questioned the universal application of the Mentmore
principles to all torts, and particularly any requirement that a
plaintiff prove a particular state of mind or knowledge on the
part of a director of a company when the commission of the tort
did not itself require such proof (as in the case of a copyright
infringement action).
Whatever the correct position be in Australia, I am
satisfied that the applicant has made out its case against
Mr Young. Young not only specifically directed Mr Inns to carry
out the tortious conduct of reproducing the applicant's plan, he
did so at least recklessly and knowing that it might be an
infringement of copyright, although hoping it would not. The act
was his own, as well as that of the corporate respondent.
On the other hand, I find that Mr Kelly, who was' rather
belatedly called to give evidence after the applicant's final
submission, acted neither recklessly nor deliberately in relation
to the reproduction; nor did he authorise, direct or procure the
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infringing act. He was in many ways a "silent partner", providing
capital and marketing advice, and was not directly involved in the
production of the first-named respondent's plan.
In relation to the claim against Young and Kelly for the
breach of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act, it was submitted that
they were both "involved in" the contravention within the meaning
of s.75B of the Act.
The interpretation of that section has recently been
considered by the High Court in Yorke v Lucas (1985) 61 ALR 307.
I need not discuss the law or the facts in any detail, but simply
say that the evidence clearly shows that Young knew of the falsity
of his statements when he engaged in the offending conduct, and
that he is thereby liable to be enjoined and, subject to argument
as to the triviality of the breach, to an award of damages under
ss.75B, 80 and 82 of the Act.
There was, however, nothing to show that Kelly was
involved in the production of the Beeline plan or that he knew or
approved of Young's statements. The claims against him must fail.
I shall reserve all questions of costs for the
directions hearing to be held on a date to be fixed.
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I certify that the twenty-one (21)
preceding pages are a true and
accurate copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of
The Hon Mr Justice Woodward
CAS pe
Associate
Dated: 27 May 1986
Dates of hearing: 21, 22 and 23 April 1986
Counsel for the applicant: Mr A.C. Archibald QC and
Mr P.J. Cosgrave
Solicitors: Mills, Oakley and McKay
Counsel for the respondents: Mr J.G. Larkins QC and
Mr M.T. Bevan-John
Solicitors: Ambrosy and Fox