Re Spratt, T.J. v. Ex parte Wilde, W.J. & Ors [1986] FCA 235

CATCHWORDS

BANKRUPTCY - compromise of suit by trustee - no permission or leave - claim above §20,000 - whether saved by s.135(4) - meaning of "good

faith" - whether notice of failure by trustee - relevance of ignorance of law.

Bankruptcy Act, 1966 ss.58(3)(b), 134(2), 135(1), 135(4)

Re Timothy John Spratt Ex Parte Wilson Joseph Wilde and Ernest George Harris & Ors

Qld. E207 of 1983

PINCUS J. BRISBANE 11 JUNE 1986

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA ) GENERAL DIVISION ) QLD E207 of 1983

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN ) DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )

RE: TIMOTHY JOHN SPRATT

A Bankrupt

EX PARTE: WILSON JOSEPH WILDE and ERNEST GEORGE HARRIS & ORS

Trustees/Applicants

AND: JANELLE KAYE SPRATT

First Respondent

AND: PB. & S. DECO OUARRIES PTY. LTD.

Second Respondent

AND: ROBEPT WILLIAM PEACH

Third Respondent

AND: JOHN ROBERT REES

Fourth Respondent

MINUTES OF ORDEP

JUDGE MAKING ORDER: PINCUS J. DATE OF ORDER: 11 JUNE 1986 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. It be declared that the compromise made on or about 28 February 1985, to which the respondents were parties, 15 not invalidated by the failure of the fourth respondent to obtain the permission or leave required by s.135(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) GENERAL DIVISION ) QLD E207 of 1983

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN } DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )

RE: TIMOTHY JOHN SPRATT

A Bankrupt

EX PARTE: WILSON JOSEPH WILDE and ERNEST GEORGE HARRIS & ORS

Trustees/Applicants

AND: JANELLE KAYE SPRATT

First Respondent AND: P. & S. DECO QUARRIES PTY. LTD.

Second Respondent

AND: ROBERT WILLIAM PEACH

Third Respondent

AND: JOHN ROBERT REES

Fourth Respondent

PINCUS J. 11 JUNE 1986

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These reasons relate to a further hearing of an application in relation to which I gave a preliminary judgment on 19 February 1986. I shall not repeat what I said in my earlier reasons for judgment. The question then left unresolved, by agreement of the parties, was whether the facts fall within