Capital Plumbing Service Pty Ltd v F.M.L. Assurance Ltd [1986] FCA 363
Federal Court of Australia
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t CATCHWORDS
INSURANCE - policy of life insurance - whether contract of
insurance —- whether parties proceeded past the stage of
pre-contractual negotiaton - proposal for policy of life
insurance and benefits on disablement ~ whether acceptance of
offer in proposal - whether counter-offer.
CAPITAL PLUMBING SERVICE PTY LIMITED v. F.M.L. ASSURANCE LIMITED
No. A.C.T. Gl of 1986
Northrop, Gallop and Jackson JJ.
26 August 1986
Canberra
ut
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. A.C.T. G1 of 1986
DISTRICT REGISTRY
eee eS
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL from the Supreme Court of
the Australian Capital Territory
BETWEEN: CAPITAL PLUMBING SERVICE
PTY LIMITED
Appellant
AND: F.M.L. ASSURANCE LIMITED
Respondent
MINUTES OR ORDER
JUDGES MAKING ORDER: NORTHROP, GALLOP AND JACKSON JJ.
DATE OF ORDER: 26 August 1986
WHERE MADE: CANBERRA
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay to the respondent its costs of the
appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36
of the Federal Court Rules.
y
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. A.C.T. G1 of 1986
DISTRICT REGISTRY
we ewe
GENERAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL from the Supreme Court of
the Australian Capital Territory
BETWEEN: CAPITAL PLUMBING SERVICE
PTY LIMITED
Appellant
AND: F.M.L. ASSURANCE LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM: NORTHROP, GALLOP AND JACKSON JJ.
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1986.
PLACE: CANBERRA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The appellant sued the respondent in the Supreme Court of
the Australian Capital Territory, claiming that the respondent
was the insurer and the appellant the insured under a policy of
life assurance upon the life of Colin Raymond Mills. Mr Mills
had died on 10th February 1977 and at the time of his death and
at all material times prior thereto was a director of the
appellant, a family company engaged in business in the Australian
Capital Territory.
-2-
'y
The primary Judge was of the view that no contract of
insurance had been entered into, the parties not having proceeded
past the stage of pre-contractual negotiation. Accordingly he
_gave judgment for the respondent and it is from that decision the
appellant now appeals.
The events which are said to have given rise to the
contract of insurance commenced, as the primary Judge found, in
about 1973 when the deceased and his wife met Robert Arthur
Irvine who was an employee of Federation Insurance Limited, a
company which had an association with the respondent and in at
least some respects acted as the respondent's agent. After their
first meeting and before the events to which we shall now turn,
the deceased and Mrs Mills had had some dealings with Mr Irvine
in relation to insurance.
The events critical for present purposes, however,
commence after that time and in particular on 18th October 1976
when Mr Mills with the aid of Mr Irvine prepared a document which
we shall call "the proposal" which is accepted by the parties,
although the manner in which it is completed 1s in some respects
inapt, as being a proposal by the appellant to the respondent for
insurance in respect of the life of the deceased. We say "in
respect of" because the precise nature of the policy sought to be
effected is a matter which is in issue, and to that issue we
shall now turn.
-3-
The proposal was one which in form appeared apposite to a
policy of life assurance to be effected by a family company on
the life of its principal working director. The form bore the
general description "PROPOSAL FOR LIFE ASSURANCE" and it was
divided into a number of parts including the following:-
(a) "STATEMENT BY PROPOSED LIFE ASSURED";
(b) "STATEMENT RELATING TO PROPOSER IF OTHER THAN
PROPOSED LIFE ASSURED";
(c) "PERSONAL STATEMENT to be completed by Proposed
Life Assured if Proposal 1s for ASSURANCE WITHOUT
MEDICAL EXAMINATION".
In the first of those parts there was contained a
statement as to the "Principal Sum Assured" which was that the
"Type of Assurance" was to be "LDTA with participation in
profits", that the amount of the insurance was to be $30,000.00
and that the total premium was to be $167.60. The term "LDTA"
refers to Linear Decreasing Term Life Assurance and the primary
Judge found that the meaning of that expression was:-
"that the term be 20 years, the initial term assurance be
$30,000 on death and the initial insurance on
disablement be $30,000 also with an annual decrease in
respect of each of death and disablement of $1,500. The
nature of the policy in respect of which the proposal
was made then becomes clear. For a modest premium it
was to provide the relatively large sum of $30,000 on
death or $30,000 on disablement should either of those
events take place in the first year. As each year
passed the sum payable on either of those events was
lessened by one twentieth of the original sums payable
or that proportion which each year bore to the term of
20 years proposed."
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an
It should be noted that one feature which emerges from
the terms of the proposal is that it did not anywhere state that
a policy providing a benefit to the appellant in the event of
disablement of Mr Mills, as distinct from his death, was in
contemplation. The amount indicated in the proposal as the
premium would have conveyed such an indication to one familiar
with the rates of premium then applicable but it was in any event
agreed before the primary Judge that he might "take it as common
ground" that the proposal was for both a life policy and for
benefits on disablement.
We should also add that at the time of making the
proposal the appellant had in mind that it would also seek to
effect superannuation benefits for the deceased and that its
contribution in that regard would be a sum of $300.00 per year.
As we have said earlier the proposal was dated 18th
October 1976 and on 23rd November 1976 the respondent sent to
Federation Insurance Limited a memorandum in the following terms:-
"We advise that Mr C.R. Mills is medically A/OR, however,
due to his aviation pursuits Disablement benefits have
been declined.
The annual premium for a sum assured of $30,000 will now
be $138.50. Alternatively, the annual premium originally
calculated (i.e. $167.60) will now purchase a sum assured
of $36,690.
Would you please let us know the Company's intentions in
_ this connection and also obtain a letter from the Company
acknowledging that LDTA will now be "death only". "
-5-
ty
The New South Wales Manager of Federation Insurance
Limited on 26th November 1976 then sent to Mr Irvine a memorandum
stating:-
"We will appreciate your advices in terms of the
following enquiry sheet. Please complete where
indicated, detach, and return to this office."
The enquiry sheet contained the following:-
"We advise that Mr C.R. Mills has beem accepted at
ordinary rates but due to his aviation pursuits
disablement benefits have been declined.
The annual premium for a sum assured of $30,000 without
disability benefits will be $138.50. Alternatively, the
original annual premium (including disability benefits)
was $167.60 and this will now purchase a sum assured of
$36,690 without disability benefits.
Would you please obtain a letter from the Company
acknowledging that the decreasing temporary assurance
will now be a death cover only, also whether the sum
assured is to be $30,000 for a premium of $138.50 or
$36,690 with an annual premium of $167.60."
The document to which we have just referred was shown to
Mr Mills by Mr Irvine and the ultimate question for determination
is whether the communication to the appellant of the contents of
that document constitutes an acceptance by the respondent of the
offer contained in the proposal. If it did not constitute such
an acceptance, but was a counter-offer, it is not argued that any
later events gave rise to a contract as, for example, by
acceptance of the counter offer.
It seems to us clear that the learned trial Judge was
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correct in taking the view that in these circumstances no
concluded agreement had been arrived at. Whether the proposal
should or should not be treated as including the proposal for
. Superannuation benefits - the primary Judge regarded it as being
common ground before him that it should, but that appeared not to
be so before us - it is apparent that the proposal for life
assurance should be treated as a proposal for a policy of life
assurance which included, for an additional premium of about
$30.00 annually, provision for benefits on disability. That
proposal was never accepted but what was said was that the
respondent was prepared to issue a policy of life assurance
containing no provision for benefits on disability. There is
nothing in the proposal to suggest that the terms of the proposal
were to be treated as a number of separate offers, each capable
of acceptance notwithstanding rejection of the other. In these
circumstances, and notwithstanding the careful argument of Mr
Williams to the contrary, it is impossible to be satisfied that
any contract of insurance was arrived at.
It is thus unnecessary to deal with the other grounds
relied on by the respondent to support the judgment below.
The appeal should be dismissed.
fed
I certify that the six (6)
preceding pages are a true copy of
the Reasons for Judgment of
their Honours Mr Justice Northrop,
Associate: DP 4.
Date: 26 August 1986
Counsel for the Appellant:
Solicitors for the Appellant:
Counsel for the Respondent:
Solicitors for the Respondent:
Date of hearing:
"Mr Justice Gallop and Mr Justice Jackson.
Mr R.E. Williams
Snedden, Hall & Gallop
Mr P. Sheils Q.C. with
Mr Nash
Higgins Solicitors
16th July 1986
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