Batemans Bay Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors v Elders Finance & Investments Co. & Ors [1986] FCA 377
Federal Court of Australia
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"377
CATCHWORDS
Application under Trade Practices Act 1974, s.52 - Interlocutory
injunction to restrain mortgagee from enforcing a claim to
possession or exercising power of sale - The "ordinary rule"
referred to in Inglis v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia
not applicable - Mortgagee sufficiently protected by direction
securing early hearing and condition in respect of interest ~- No
part of principal required to be paid into Court.
Trade Practices Act 1974, ss.52, 87
Inglis v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972) 126
C.LeR. 161
Harvey v. McWatters (1948) 49 S.R.(NSW) 173
-Zeutmint. Pty Ltd v. Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society
[1984] 3 N.S.W.L.R. 293
Glandore Pty Ltd v. Elders Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1984) 4
F.C.R. 130
BATEMANS BAY HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED & ORS. -V- ELDERS FINANCE &
INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED & ORS.
NSW G.288 of 1986
Burchett J.
Sydney
5 September 1986
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
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No. G288 of 1986
BETWEEN:
BATEMANS BAY HOLDINGS
PTY LIMITED
First Applicant
BATEMANS BAY
INDUSTRIAL CENTRE PTY
LIMITED
.-,+-Second Applicant...
RENLEE PTY LIMITED
Third Applicant
TOWRANG PARK PTY
LIMITED
Fourth Applicant
ELDERS FINANCE &
INVESTMENT CO LIMITED
First Respondent
ELDERS LENSWORTH
FINANCE LIMITED
Second Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDERS OF THE COURT
Judge Making Orders: Burchett J.
Where Made: Sydney
Date of Orders:
3 September 1986
THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING ORDERS, GIVES THE FOLLOWING
DIRECTIONS AND NOTES THE FOLLOWING MATTERS:
(1) Order that until further order, the Respondents, their
servants and agents be restrained from exercising their
powers under the security documents given by the
Applicants or any of them in respect of the sale of or
the appointment of a Receiver to or the taking of
possession of any of the properties the subject of such
security documents or issue of Notices under the Real
Property Act without the prior leave of this Court.
(2) Order that the final hearing of these proceedings be
fixed to commence on 22nd September, 1986 at 10.15 a.m.
(3) Direct that the sum of $50,000 be paid by the Applicants
to the First Respondents in respect. of interest, on or
before 11th September, 1986.
(4) Direct that-the First Applicant, Batemans Bay Holdings
Pty Limited, and the First Respondent forthwith jointly
direct the tenants of the Bridge Plaza Shopping Centre:
(a) To pay all sums payable as rent (including arrears
if any as at lst September 1986) due as from 4 p.m.
on Ist September, 1986, if not already paid, to the
First Respondent until further notice;
(b) To pay all sums payable as outgoings under any
lease, licence or occupation arrangement (including
arrears if any as at Ist September 1986) due as and
from 4 p.m. on lst September, 1986 to the First
Applicant, until further notice.
(5) Direct that the Second Applicant, Batemans Bay
Industrial Centre Pty. Limited and the First Respondent
forthwith jointly direct the tenants of the Batemans Bay
Industrial Centre to pay all sums payable as rent or
outgoings due, if not already paid, to the Second
Applicant until further notice.
(6) Direct that the Third Applicant, Renlee Pty. Limited and
the First Respondent forthwith jointly direct the
tenants of Renlee Pty. Limited to pay all sums payable
as rent and outgoings due, if not already paid, to the
Third Applicant, until further notice.
(7) Note that amounts paid prior to lst September, 1986 by
tenants or occupants of any of the properties the
subject of the security documents referred to in Order 1
will be held by the party to whom the payment was made,
without prejudice to the rights to be asserted to
account therefor after judgment in the final hearing by
this Court or until further Order.
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Direct the First Applicant to permit the First
Respondent to collect the rent referred to in Order 4
and that the First Respondent permit the First Applicant
to collect all the outgoings referred to in Order 5
hereof.
Note that the Applicants by their Counsel undertake to
the Court as and from 4 p.m. on lst September, 1986:
(a) The usual undertaking as to damages.
(b) That the First Applicant will apply the amounts
collected by it as outgoings pursuant to Order 4(b)
hereof for the purposes for which the same were
payable to the First Applicant.
(c) Further' that in the event of sums being received in
the future by the First 'Applicant in respect of
rent as_and from lst September 1986 for any period
.- ° after 30th May 1986 to.remit the same forthwith to
the First Respondent.
(d) That subject to the right of the Applicants by way
of appeal or stay, in the event of this Court in
its judgment after the final hearing holding that
the Applicants or any of them were or was in
default entitling the Respondents or any of them to
possession under any security document given to the
Respondents or either of them the Applicants will
not oppose orders for possession and to enforce
possession being made in the Supreme Court
proceedings, including costs on the Summons but not
60 as to preclude argument as to the costs of
interlocutory proceedings in the Supreme Court,
provided that such consent is not a bar to an
application by the Applicants or any of them
pursuant to the exercise of discretion by the
Supreme Court of New South Wales as to the period
for which writs of possession, once able to be
issued, should lie in the Registry of the Supreme
Court before being so issued.
Note the undertaking of Christopher Lee Clarkson to the
Court by his Counsel, without admission, that he will
not permit the First Applicant to reduce the services to
or jeopardize the continuation of the running of the
Bridge Plaza Shopping Centre pending determination of
the subject proceedings or until further Order.
Direct that:
(a) Each of the Respondents file a defence and any
cross-claim on or before 5th September, 1986.
(12)
(13)
NOTE:
(b)
(b1)
(c)
(d)
Ce)
(f)
Each of the Applicants file any reply and any
defence to cross-claim on or before 10th September,
1986.
The Applicants are directed to raise, either by
reply or amendment to the Statement of Claim, any
defences to be relied on in respect of the First
Respondent's claim to possession.
Each party give discovery (with verification) and
simultaneous inspection not later than 12 noon on
12th September, 1986.
Subpoenas be returnable on 12th and 18th September,
1986.
Motion for security for costs, if any, to be filed
and sérved by 4 p.m. Friday 5th Séptember 1986 for
hearing on a date to be fixed by the Registrar.
wae oe. -
Notices to produce be returnable 12th September,
1986.
Liberty to any party to apply on 24 hours notice.
Costs of the application for interlocutory relief be
reserved to the hearing.
Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36
of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G288 of 1986
ee ewe we
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
BATEMANS BAY HOLDINGS
PTY LIMITED
First Applicant
BATEMANS BAY
INDUSTRIAL CENTRE PTY
LIMITED
ure Second Applicant
RENLEE PTY LIMITED
Third Applicant
TOWRANG PARK PTY
LIMITED
Fourth Applicant
ELDERS FINANCE &
INVESTMENT CO LIMITED
First Respondent
ELDERS LENSWORTH
FINANCE LIMITED
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.
Arising out of transactions in respect of a very large
borrowing, and the execution of mortgage documents, there are on
2.
foot, 1n this Court and in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
respectively, proceedings in which the applicant seeks relief
under s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and upon other causes
of action, and the respondents seek an order for possession
pursuant to the powers conferred by the documents. The matter
came before me upon an application for interlocutory relief
including orders restraining the respondents from exercising
their power of sale or appointing a receiver or taking possession
of the properties the subject of the mortgages given by the
applicants.
After the application had proceeded some distance, it
was accepted by all parties that it was desirable the principal
proceedings in this Court should be heard at an early date. By
consent the matter was fixed for hearing commencing on 22
September 1986. Ultimately, although certain ancillary
questions remained in dispute, and were settled by me when short
minutes in differing forms were brought in by the applicants and
the respondents, there was no dispute that a sufficient prima
facie case for relief had been made out, or that the balance of
convenience favoured relief upon appropriate terms. The issue
on which counsel for the respondents took their stand was their
assertion that the appropriate terms should include a requirement
that the amount claimed under the securities be paid into Court,
or at least that an amount of $1.4 million be paid. The
respondents relied on Inglis v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of
Australia (1972) 126 C.L.R. 161. In that case Walsh J. at p.164
said:
"A general rule has long been established, in
relation to applications to restrain the
exercise by a mortgagee of powers given by a
mortgage and in particular the exercise of a
power of sale, that such an injunction (i.e.
restraining the mortgagee pending the
hearing of proceedings brought by the
mortgagor) will not be granted unless the
amount of the mortgage debt, if this be not
in dispute, be paid or unless, if the amount
be disputed, the amount claimed by the
mortgagee be paid into Court."
But in Inglis's Case there was no attack upon the
validity of the mortgage transaction itself. The mortgagor
sought to set off a claim for damages for breaches of contract,
for defamation, for fraud, and for conspiracy. Walsh J. at 163
makes it clear that the amount of the mortgage debt was not in
dispute. In Harvey v. McWatters (1948) 49 S.R.(NSW) 173 (a
decision affirmed on appeal to the High Court, as appears from a
note in 50 S.R.(NSW) 321) Sugerman J. at 178 said:
"There is a distinction between what I have
called the ordinary case (by which he meant,
as is shown by an earlier passage at 174, a
case where the only dispute relates to the
amount due or the mode of exercise of the
power) and the case in which the existence of
the power of sale or the question whether it
is exercisable at all is in question. The
present case is of the second class. What is
called the ordinary rule applies to cases of
the first class, and to those cases only."
He held (at 178) as regards cases of what he called the second
class: "The terms may be moulded so as to require payment in of
4.
so much only as suffices to give adequate protection to the
mortgagee."
Subsequent decisions have drawn attention to the
distinction stated by Sugerman J., and I cannot believe it was
overlooked by the High Court in Inglis's Case, especially as both
Walsh J. and Barwick C.J. there made it clear that what they were
F ~ speaking about was a "general rule" only, a designation which _in
--... . —-itsel£ suggests the rule is.a rule "which may be said to._apply_
mee 'orlly in the ordinary case" (see Harvey v. McWatters, at 174). If
the rule admitted of no exceptions, it could not properly be
called a general rule.
Both cases were referred-to in the decision of the Court
of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Zeutmint Pty
Ltd v. Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society [1984] 3
N.S.W.LeRe 293. A number of relevant authorities (not all of
which accord the general rule any automatic application) will be
found listed in the headnote to the report of that case. The
judgments in the Court of Appeal do not suggest that Harvey v.
McWatters is not still good law. Although the general rule I am
discussing was not in terms applicable, Samuels J.A. at 299-300
considered the question there before the Court in the light of it
and said:
"Finally, one has to look generally at the
situation of the parties, bearing in mind
that the Court should be hesitant to take any
step which would set the security at naught.
For the reasons that I have mentioned I do
5.
not think that the imposition of the
condition as to payment in is necessary in
the circumstances of this case to protect the
respondent, nor do I think that its deletion
would rob the respondent of the protection
which it has a right to have from its
security."
In this Court, Harvey v. McWatters has been followed by
Morling J. in Glandore Pty Ltd v. Elders Finance & Investment Co.
Ltd. (1984) :4- F.CseR. 130. Morling J. -pointed
out two
~~considerations which-are also apposite -in the present case: that -
there was no evidence the property the subject of the security
was falling in value,
seeking
agreement in such manner as the Court thinks fit"
included "an order varying the terms of
At 135 Morling J. said:
"It is clear on the authorities that if the
present case be regarded as one in which the
mortgagor's real claim against the mortgagee
is for damages only, interlocutory relief
should be granted only upon terms that the
amount of the mortgage debt is paid into
Court. The general rule referred to in
Inglis' Case would apply in such a case. But
1f 1t be not regarded as such a case, it is
open to the Court to grant the relief sought
upon such terms other than payment of the
full amount of the mortgage debt into Court
as the Court thinks appropriate."
He held the matter fell within the second class of case
by Sugerman J. in Harvey v. McWatters and said at 135:
"I think the proper approach is to mould an
order so as to ensure adequate protection to
the mortgagee and to otherwise do justice
between the parties during the period pending
the final hearing."
and that the relief the applicant was
the loan
{see 135-6).
discussed
He did not require any part of the principal debt to be paid into
Court pending the hearing, but in the circumstances of that case
he required outstanding interest to be paid by a date which he
fixed, being approximately a month after the date on which he
delivered judgment.
In my view. having regard particularly to the wide
powers of the Court to grant relief under s.87 of the Trade
Practices Act .1974., -which the applicants have invoked in the
present case, I also am not constrained by the terms of the
general rule on which the respondents rely. In all the
circumstances of this case, including the absence of evidence
that the security is falling in value and the close proximity of
the final hearing, as well as the availability of certain rental
and other payments to the respondents in or towards payment of
interest outstanding or to accrue due, I consider the appropriate
terms are those set out in the short minutes which I have
approved. These include a term as to the payment of $50,000.00
within ten days in respect of interest. For the foregoing
reasons, I granted the interlocutory injunctions which are
contained in the short minutes.
I certify that this and the
preceding five (5) pages are a
true copy of the Reasons for
Judgment herein of his Honour
Mr. Justice Burchett.
tia ay Associate
Dated: 5 September, 1986.