Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd v. Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union & Ors [1986] FCA 445
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORDS
Costs - Trade Practices Act - damages claim - claim
substantially successful - claim for solicitor and
client costs - discretion - claim rejected - costs
occasioned by amendments ~ proper order in respect of
costs of parties against whom claim dismissed
Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 s.43
MUDGINBERRI STATION PTY LIMITED v THE AUSTRALASIAN
MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION; JACK O'TOOLE;
TREVOR SURPLICE; DICK ANNEAR; PAT ROUGHAN
No. G123 of 1985
Morling J
14 October 1986
Sydney
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. Gi23 of 1985
err w
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : MUDGINBERRI STATION PITY LIMITED
Applicant
AND: THE AUSTRALASTAN MEAT INDUSTRY
EMPLOYEES UNION
First Respondent
JACK O'TOOLE
Second Respondent
TREVOR SURPLICE
Third Respondent
DICK ANNEAR
Fourth Respondent
PAT ROUGHAN
Fifth Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER : Morling J.
DATE OF ORDER : 14 October 1986
WHERE MADE : Sydney
THE COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
i. First respondent to pay the applicant's costs.
2. No order as to the costs of the second, third,
fourth and fifth respondents.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders 1s dealt with by
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G123 of 1985
wee ewer
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : MUDGINBERRI STATION PTY LIMITED
Applicant
AND: THE AUSTRALASTAN MEAT INDUSTRY
EMPLOYEES UNION
First Respondent
JACK O'TOOLE
Second Respondent
TREVOR SURPLICE
Third Respondent
DICK ANNEAR
Fourth Respondent
PAT ROUGHAN
Fifth Respondent
Morling J. 14 October 1986
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - COSTS
On 21 July 1986 I ordered the first respondent to pay
the applicant damages of $1,759,444 and entered judgment in
that sum. I then reserved the question of costs.
The applicant seeks an order that the first respondent
pay the whole of its costs, to be taxed on a solicitor and
client basis. Notwithstanding the discretion given to me by
5.43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act,1976 I do not' think
that I should order the first respondent to pay any part of the
2.
applicant's costs on a solicitor and client basis.
Counsel for the applicant submits that, if an order
for payment of costs on a solicitor and client basis 1s not
made, his client will have to bear a heavy proportion of the
costs which it has incurred. This will only be the case if
the costs charged to the applicant greatly exceed the costs
recoverable on a party and party basis. I do not think this
is a sufficient reason for making an order for costs on a
solicitor and client basis. In exercising my discretion I
must have regard not only to the interests of the applicant but
e
also to those of the first respondent.
It 1s very unusual for an order for costs to be made
on a solicitor and client basis. In my experience, such an
order has not previously been made in a case arising under the
Trade Practices Act. I do not think that the matters relied
upon in the written submissions of counsel for the applicant
justify an order that the first respondent pay costs on that
basis. It is true (as counsel for the applicant submits) that
the damage suffered by the applicant was, ina sense,
deliberately inflicted upon it by the first respondent, that
the applicant attempted to mitigate its losses and that the
first respondent persisted in its conduct in defiance of orders
of the Court. Nevertheless, the damages awarded to the
applicant were intended to cover the losses actually ancurred
by the applicant as a result of the first respondent's conduct.
Z.
I have not referred to all the matters relied upon by counsel
for the applicant in his written submissions, but none of them
persuade me that I should make an order for costs on a
solicitor and client basis.
Quite apart from opposing the applicant's application
counsel for the first respondent submit that the applicant
should be ordered to pay their client's costs of and incidental
to certain parts of the hearing. These parts are identified
in the respondents' written submissions. It is also submitted
that the first respondent should not be ordered to pay any
costs of or incidental to the preparation of exhibit $(2) which
was, in effect, a revised formulation of the applicant's claim
for damages. It 1s submitted that this exhibit contained
errors which were rectified in subsequent evidence and that the
first respondent should not be called upon to pay the costs of
and occasioned by the exhibit containing the erroneous
material.
It is true that the applicant's claim was amended from
time to time. However, there was sound reason for most of the
amendments. Some of the amendments were occasioned by the fact
that when its claim was first formulated, the applicant was
unable to make precise calculations of some of its losses,
because the current season had not finished. Other amendments
were made and additional information provided as a result of
observations made from the bench as to the possibility of
4,
making aiternative calculations of the applicant's losses. In
a case as substantial and complex as the present, I think that
1t was to be expected that the applicant would pursue a number
of matters and issues upon which 1t might not ultimately
succeed. Whilst this occurred, it remains the fact that the
applicant succeeded in obtaining a very substantial award of
damages. I do not think that I should penalize the applicant
because it did not succeed on every subsidiary issue or on
every part of its case. Taking into account all the
circumstances of the case and the way in which it was
presented, I do not think that I should deprive the applicant
of any part of its costs.
The remaining question is the proper order which
should be made in respect of the costs of the second, third,
fourth and fifth named respondents. It is true that the claim
for damages against these respondents was dismissed.
Nevertheless, they were properly joined as respondents in the
proceedings and injunctive relief was granted against them. I
am not persuaded that either the applicant or any of the
respondents incurred any additional costs by reason of the fact
that the second to the fifth respondents remained on the record
and that, at least nominally, a claim for damages was made
against them as well as against the first respondent. No
separate case was made on their behalf and no evidence was
called referable only to their position. No time was taken up
in addresses in considering their positions since counsel for
S.
the applicant conceded that the claim for damages against them
could not succeed. In these circumstances I think that I
should make no order as to their costs.
For the above reasons I order that the first
respondent pay the applicant's costs, and I make no order as to
the costs of the second, third, fourth and fifth respondents.
I certify that this and the Pour (4)
preceding pages ure's true copy of the '
Reasons ror Jvtement here fof hishenour |
if
Mr. Justice Movling. !
Dated: (4 Oct (Kb .