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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. ACT G 75 of 1986
DISTRICT REGISTRY
Vee we evevrew
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : LEE ERIS CORNFORD
Applicant
AND: THE QUEEN
Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER : Neaves J.
DATE OF ORDER : 27 November 1986
WHERE MADE : Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36
of the Federal Court Rules.
IN_ THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. ACT G 75 of 1986
DISTRICT REGISTRY
weer ee
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN : LEE ERTS CORNFORD
Applicant
AND: THE QOUREN
Respondent
CORAM: Neaves J.
DATE: 27 November 1986
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by Lee Eris Cornford ("the
applicant") for bail pending the hearing of an appeal
instituted by her in this Court against the severity of the
sentences imposed upon her in the Supreme Court of the
Australian Capital Territory on 14 November 1986 for offences
against sub-s.4(2) of the Poisons and Narcotic Drugs Ordinance
1978 of the Territory.
The applicant pleaded guilty to four offences against
the Ordinance each offence being that between 1 November 1985
and 30 January 1986 the applicant supplied a controlled
substance, namely heroin, to another person. The first two
offences related to the supply of heroin to one Abdul Rahim Bin
Mohammed Subir. The recipient in each of the remaining
offences was a person whose name was unknown.
The applicant was sentenced in respect of the first
offence to imprisonment for two anda half years and, in
respect of each of the other offences, to imprisonment for
eighteen months. The sentences of eighteen months were to be
served concurrently but cumulatively upon the sentence of two
and a half years so that the applicant was effectively
sentenced to imprisonment for four years. A non-parole period
of two years was fixed.
At the same time as the applicant was sentenced the
Supreme Court also sentenced one Nebra Ann Zakharoff in respect
of four offences of supplying a controlled substance namely
heroin. As the learned sentencing judge pointed out, although
there was evidence of criminal association between the two
offenders, the individual acts of the one offender were quite
separate from the acts of the other: the element of joint
liability was entirely lacking.
Miss Zakharoff was sentenced, in respect of the first
offence charged against her, to imprisonment for three years
and, in respect of each of the other three offences, to
imprisonment for eighteen months. The sentences of eighteen
months were directed to be served concurrently but cumulatively
upon the sentence of three years. The total term of
imprisonment was, therefore, four anda half years with a
non-parole period of two years three months.
3.
It appears from the remarks of the sentencing judge
that the applicant and Miss Zakaroff had been heroin addicts
for many years although the applicant had been successfully
resisting her addiction for some time before coming to
Canberra. Miss Zakharoff came to Canbcrra at the beginning of
1985 in order to try to be placed on a methadone programme.
She lived with her mother at Hawker. The applicant came to
Canberra to live with her parents towards the middle of 1985.
She Found employment with the Australian Federal Police asa
typist.
Miss Zakharoff began to use heroin regularly and
became part of a network of heroin users who bought and sold
hervin among themselves. She made a number of trips to Sydney
to purchase heroin.
In November 1985 the applicant moved away from her
parents' home. She then renewed her acquaintance with Miss
Zakharoff whom she had known slightly in Sydney. Miss
Zakharoff enlisted the applicant's assistance and the
applicant's room was used as a repository for the heroin that
Miss Zakharoff was using and selling and for substantial sums
of money arising from the sale of heroin. Soon after the
arrangement was made the applicant began to use some of the
heroin and became involved with Miss Zakharoff in the supply of
heroin to a number of persons' in Canberra. The applicant's
room was used for the weighing and preparation of individual
packages of the drug for distribution. The sentencing judge
accepted that the amount supplied by the applicant on each of
4.
the four occasions to which the charges relate was one-fifth of
a gram.
The applicant has appealed, as of right, to this Court
pursuant to sub-s.24(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act
1976 against the severity of the sentences imposed on her. The
general nature of the matters which will be raised on the
hearing of the appeal sufficiently appear from the grounds of
appeal which may be summarised as follows:
(1) That the sentencing judge erred in that
he -
(a) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that the applicant
had voluntarily given herself up
to the police for the purpose of
seeking help to free herself from
addiction to heroin and
consequent involvement in heroin
dealing;
(b) failed to give sufficient or any
weight to the fact that the
applicant assisted the police in
ending the network of heroin
distribution in which she was
involved;
(c) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that the applicant
was not involved in supplying
heroin for profit, but was
involved to enable her to obtain
heroin to satisfy her addiction;
(d) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that since giving
herself up to the police the
applicant had substantially
rehabilitated herself;
(e) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that the applicant
had no previous convictions;
(f) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that a custodial
sentence would jeopardise the
rehabilitation of the applicant;
(g) failed to give sufficient weight
to the fact that the applicant
pleaded guilty.
(2) That the sentences imposed on the
applicant as compared to the sentences
imposed on Miss Zakharoff were excessive
in that they failed to reflect
adequately the differences between the
applicant and Miss Zakharoff in relation
to the seriousness of their respective
involvement therein and personal
mitigating factors.
(3) That the sentences imposed were
manifestly excessive.
It will be contended on behalf of the applicant that the
sentences imposed by the Supreme Court should be set aside
and that sentences should be substituted which do not
require the applicant to serve any, or any further, period
of imprisonment.
The applicant accepts that the principle which
governs the granting of bail after conviction and sentence
is that it will not be granted otherwise than in exceptional
circumstances . Whether exceptional circumstances exist in
any case will depend upon the facts of that case: no
gencral prescription has been, or can be, laid down. The
applicant also accepts that the onus of establishing that
such exceptional circumstances exist rests upon her.
In support of the application, counsel for the
applicant relied upon a number of matters. He referred to
the following circumstances - that the applicant had
voluntarily surrendered herself to the police; that she had
given the police information which led to the arrest of
other persons; that she had pleaded guilty to the offences;
that she had no previous convictions; that the quantity of
heroin the subject of the offences was not large; and that
the applicant's involvement was to satisfy her addiction and
not for commercial gain. Counsel placed substantial
emphasis upon the fact that the applicant between 31 January
1986 and 12 November 1986 had been resident continuously at
the Karralika Drug Rehabilitation Centre and had there
undertaken a drug free rehabilitation course. He referred
to the evidence before the sentencing judge that the
applicant had progressed to the fourth of the five levels
through which residents at that centre pass towards
rehabilitating themselves from drug dependency and to the
acceptance by the sentencing judge that there were very real
prospects of the applicant overcoming her heroin addiction.
Counsel relied on these matters to show, first,
that there was a substantial issue to be determined on the
hearing of the appeal and, secondly, that there were in this
case exceptional circumstances warranting the granting of
bail pending the hearing of the appeal.
It 1s well settled that on the hearing of an appeal
against the severity of a sentence the Court will not
interfere simply because it 15 of the view that the sentence
is more severe than it would have imposed. It will
7.
interfere only if it be shown that the sentencing judge was
in error in acting on a wrong Principle or in
misunderstanding or in wrongly assessing some salient
feature of the evidence. The error may appear in what the
sentencing judge said in passing sentence or the sentence
may itself be so excessive as to manifest error: see R. v.
Tait and Bartley (1979) 24 A.L.R. 473 at p.476.
It may be accepted for the purposes of this
application that there are matters that the applicant may
properly put to the Court for its consideration on the
hearing of the appeal. The Court cannot at this stage form
a definitive view as to the applicant's prospects of success
in her appeal but it may well be thought to be a formidable
task to convince the appeal court that this was not a case
for the imposition of a custodial sentence.
The most significant of the matters upon which
counsel for the applicant relied as amounting to exceptional
circumstances warranting the grant of bail was the
rehabilitation programme which the applicant had voluntarily
undertaken and the desirability of the applicant being able
to continue with that programme through the Karralika Drug
Rehabilitation Centre. It was said that this was in the
interests not only of the applicant but of society
generally.
Evidence was given before the sentencing judge by
Mrs Zsuzsa Reiner, the Acting Co-Director of the Karralika
8.
Drug Rehabilitation Centre, as to the treatment and
counselling available at the Centre. Mr Reiner on 20
November 1986 swore an affidavit which has been filed on
behalf of the applicant in the present proceeding. In her
evidence to the Supreme Court Mrs Reiner said that the
applicant had had difficulty with the programme at' the
beginning but that she had coped well. She said that the
applicant had reached the fourth of the five levels in the
programme since the end of January 1986 though she could not
remember the exact date. In her affidavit she says that
that level was reached on 1 October 1986. In the Supreme
Court she expressed the view that the applicant would reach
the final level in the programme, known as "Candidate Out"
level, within a month from the date on which the evidence
was given, namely 10 November 1986. However, par.8 of her
affidavit sworn on 20 November 1986 reads -
"In my opinion Lee's rehabilitation will be
complete if she is enabled to return to Karralika
to finish the program. If she were able to
return to the program I would anticipate we would
assess her for about a month after returning to
the program and then, if appropriate, encourage
her to obtain employment outside the program,
continue to live at Karralika. At a later stage,
depending on her progress, she is likely to reach
'Candidate Out' Level which is the level at which
residents are involved in a program to
re-intergrate them with the community with the
support of Karralika. That stage involves the
person either living at Karralika or away from
Karralika with weekly counselling sessions and
support from Karralika."
In the Supreme Court Mrs Reiner expressed the
Opinion that a custodial sentence would jeopardize the
applicant's full rehabilitation because the continuous
9.
counselling provided at Karralika would not then be
available to her. She summarised her view thus:
"If she goes to gaol she does not have access to
us and the gaol environment would not be one
which would really help her."
Mrs Reiner has, in her affidavit, again expressed the view
that imprisonment would jeopardize the overall prospect of
the applicant being cured of her drug addiction.
It is apparent from his remarks on sentencing that
the sentencing judge took into account Mrs Reiner's
evidence. He said that he was particularly aware of the
high risk that the applicant would face of being exposed to
the use of heroin if a custodial sentence were imposed. His
Honour referred to the submission that had been put to him
by counsel with, as his Honour said, considerable force that
the interests of the community lay in the rehabilitation of
the applicant and not in the confirmation of her drug
addiction which had been said by counsel tobe a likely
consequence of her being sent to prison. However, weighing
all of the circumstances his Honour concluded that a
custodial sentence was the only appropriate sentence.
While recognising that the question before me on
the present application is not the same as that before the
sentencing judge, I am bound to have regard to his Honour's
view that the seriousness of the offences called for a
custodial sentence. Conscious as his Honour was of the
10.
importance to the applicant and to the community of the need
for rehabilitation, his Honour was unable to regard that
circumstance as requiring that a sentence other than a
custodial sentence be imposed. Can it, in the
circumstances, be regarded as providing the exceptional
circumstance necessary to warrant the granting of bail?
Counsel for the applicant has urged upon me
everything that could be said in favour of the granting of
bail. I have given anxious consideration to the matters put
to me and to the evidence concerning the applicant's
rehabilitation. In the result, however, I do not find those
matters or that evidence sufficiently compelling to warrant
acceding to the application. In particular, the evidence
does not satisfy me that there is such a likelihood of
jeopardy to the progress which the applicant has made
towards her rehabilitation since January 1986 arising from
her imprisonment pending the hearing of her appeal as to
warrant the exceptional step of granting bail.
The application is, therefore, refused.
I certify that this and
preceding 9 pages are
true copy of the Reasons
for Judgment herein of the
Honourable Mr Justice
Neaves.
Vue Rawr
Associate
Dated: 27 November 1986
11.
Counsel for the applicant : Mr T.H. Brewster
Solicitor for the applicant : Legal Aid Office (A.C.T.)
Counsel for the respondent : Miss M. Quirk
Solicitor for the respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions
Date of hearing : 25 November 1986