Parmar, D.S. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1986] FCA 567
Federal Court of Australia
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V. No. G 349 of 1986
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GENERAL DIVISION
DHANBIR SINGH PARMAR
(also known as DENNIS PARMAR
also known as DENNIS SINGH) Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS Respondent
COURT: NORTHROP J.
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1986
PLACE: MELBOURNE
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There is a motion before the Court that
interlocutory orders be made restraining the respondent from
enforcing an order of deportation against the applicant, Mr.
Parmar, and for an order that the applicant be released from
the detention centre at Maribyrnong. I shall deal first with
the question of whether an interlocutory order should be
made.
- 3DECI986
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA _f
RAI' CIPAL f
fb:
The facts of this case are somewhat unusual. Mr.
Parmar is an Indian of the Sikh persuasion. He first entered
Australia on 16 March 1983 pursuant to a temporary entry
permit for one month. He did not comply with the terms of
that entry permit and remained in Australia until December
1985 when he was apprehended and was deported in January 1986
pursuant to the provisions of the Magration Act 1958 ("the
Act"). He arrived back in Australia on 20 April 1986 on
transit to Fiji and was granted a temporary entry permit for
24 hours to enable him to stay in Australia until he could
catch the ongoing flight to Fiji. Again, he ignored the
conditions of that entry permit and remained in Australia
until he was apprehended on 28 August 1986.
A deportation order was made on 24 September 1986.
On 3 October 1986 an application was made to this Court for
an order of review under the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act 1977. The decisions sought to be
reviewed in that application were the decisions that the
applicant be refused a temporary entry permit, that the
applicant be refused resident status and that the applicant
be deported.
The directions hearing fixed by the application was
31 October 1986. One makes a comment that it is strange that
there was such a long delay between the time of the issue of
the application on 3 October 1986 and the first directions
hearing when regard is had to the fact of the existence of
the deportation order which, under s.20 of the Act, has to be
executed. I read that sub-section:-
"20. (1) Where the Minister (in this case a
delegate) has made an order for the deportation of
4 person, that person shall, unless the Minister
revokes the order, be deported accordingly."
One would have thought that the existence of the deportation
order was such as to warrant immediate steps for at least the
preparation and application for interlocutory relief, pending
the execution of that deportation order, until this
application could be heard. Yesterday, 22 October, the
deportee, the applicant, was notified that he would be
deported at 11.00 p.m. today and as a result the present
motion was taken out and notice given to the Australian
Government Solicitor on behalf of the respondent.
To some extent, the speed at which the matter has
come on has made it more difficult to resolve the questions,
but this is a case where the reasons for the decisions have
been given pursuant to 3.13 of the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 and it is on those reasons,
together with affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant,
and affidavit by Mr. Parmar and an affidavit by Filomena
Basile, which form the basis of the present application fora
stay,
Before going further, reference should be made to
what I described earlier as the unusual features of this
case. Under s.16 of the Migration Act, a person who enters
Australia and is not an Australian citizen and who, at the
time of entry, is or was a person being a person who has been
deported from Australia shall, notwithstanding 3.10, be
deemed to be a prohibited non-citizen unless he is the holder
of an entry permit endorsed with a statement that the person
granting that permit recognises him to be a person referred
to in this sub-section. There was no such endorsement on the
24 hour temporary entry permit given to the applicant when he
entered Australia on 20 April 1986. As a result of s.16, at
all times since then the applicant has been a prohibited
non-citizen.
In the reasons for decision under s.13 of the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, findings on
material questions of fact are set out. I do not propose to
deal with all of those, but it is clear that there was a
statement to the effect that the applicant had a romantic
relationship in Australia with Mrs. Filomena Basile, an
Australian citizen; that it ensued for three months and that
Mrs. Basile was his fiancee and that they had planned to
marry on 20 September 1986. There are also statements in the
reasons to the effect that during a conversation with Mrs.
Basile on the morning of the day that the applicant was
apprehended, she claimed she had never slept with the
applicant and later on that day during an interview at the
offices of the Migration Department again statements are said
to have been made by her that they were not cohabitating, but
were planning to get married.
In giving the reasons why the deportation order was
made, the person making the decision referred to the fact
that the applicant was a prohibited non-citizen by virtue of
sub-section 16(1)(c)(v) of the Act, which I mentioned
earlier, and his earlier history of being deported as
recently as January of this year and that he accepted there
was a relationship with Mrs. Basile, but made no reference to
the fact that they were living together in cohabitation.
The affidavit by Mrs. Basile refers' to the
conversation of the morning of the day that the applicant was
apprehended but does not say anything about what was said on
that occasion, but in relation to the meeting at the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs later that day,
she says that she told officers of the department that she
and the applicant were living in a de facto relationship and
were to be married on 20 September 1986.
The essential basis upon which the application for
interlocutory relief is sought is that there is a conflict of
evidence between what Mrs. Basile says and the facts found by
the person making the decision based upon reports of
interviews by officers of the department. This turns on the
very narrow point of whether there was a statement to the
effect that the applicant and Mrs. Basile were cohabitating
or not.
As far as an application for an entry permit that
is not a temporary entry permit is concerned, s.6A of the
Migration Act provides that:-
"6A. (1) An entry permit shall not be granted
to a non-citizen after his entry into Australia
unless one or more of the following conditions is
fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say-
(a) he has been granted, by instrument under
the hand of a Minister, territorial
asylum in Australia;
(b) he is the spouse, child or aged parent of
an Australian citizen... ".
In a case where persons are living together in
cohabitation but not married, in law the person who is' the
prohibited non-citizen is not the spouse of the Australian
citizen, therefore paragraph (b) has no application to the
present case. This does not deny the fact that in an
appropriate case the decision maker may take into account a
de facto relationship, but that does not of itself justify
the granting of a permanent entry permit under' sub-section
(1) of s.6A.
The other ground relied on for what is described as
permanent resident status is paragraph (e) of sub-section (1)
of s.6A which reads:-
"(e) (the non-citizen) is the holder of a temporary
entry permit which is in force and there are
strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds
for the grant of an entry permit to him."
In the present case it is clear, because of the fact of 3.16
of the Act, that the Minister cannot grant a temporary entry
permit under 3.7 but he could grant such a permit under s.16
with endorsement on it and so, for the purposes of this
application, I will assume that there is power in the
Minister or his delegate to grant all necessary permits to
enable a consideration to be given to whether the applicant
should be granted either the temporary entry permit or
permanent residency under paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of
s.6A.
But despite all that, for present purposes, one
comes down to the narrow point of whether the fact that there
is no reference in the facts as set out in the reasons' under
8.13 of the de facto relationship is such as to give rise to
an issue sufficient to justify the granting of interim relief
in this case.
As opposed to that, there is the very strong
persuasive effect of the history of this matter. The reasons
why the decision was made are set out in paragraphs 13 to 22
of the s.13 reasons. In that the statement is made that it
has not been established that the couple do share a de facto
relationship and that there are serious discrepancies in
their description of the relationship and so, to some extent,
there is a question of fact which might arise there. But as
far as the present application is concerned, what I must be
satisfied about is whether there is an issue sufficient to
justify the interference of the Court to stay the operation
of the deportation order. Is there any basis to support 2
case under the Judicial Review Act?
This is a case where there may well be conflicts of
fact between what Mrs. Basile and Mr. Parmar say and what the
officers of the department say, but one must form the view,
on the affidavits, that there is a certain degree of
ambivalence in them, and having regard to the length of time
in which solicitors have been acting for the applicant, one
would have expected far more detailed material before the
Court than what is in the affidavits. In any event, this is
not a case similar to that in Kioa where there was an
allegation of facts which could be used adversely against the
applicant and which were not drawn to his attention so as to
enable the person to answer them if need be. It is a case
where on all the material a relationship between the
applicant and Mrs. Basile was recognised. The fact of the
marriage coming up in September was accepted and, in those
circumstances, I find it difficult to see any argument at
all, based upon s.5 sub-section (1) paragraph (e) of the
Judicial Review Act, as elaborated upon by sub-section (2)
that the Minister or his delegate took into account an
irrelevant consideration in exercising his discretion or
power or failed to take into account a relevant
consideration.
Accordingly, I hold that there is no basis for the
granting of an interim order staying the deportation order.
Further, in those circumstances, it is not necessary for me
to consider the second order sought in relation to the
releasing from custody.
I certify that this and the eh (5)
preceding pages are a true copy of thé
Reasons for Judgment herein of
Honourable Mr. Justice KO rop
Changs Wardle
Aseociata
Dated: 23/10/86