PRISCIPAL CATCHWNORDS Industrial Law - Conciliation and Arbitration Act 15304 - appeal from order - whether appellant bound by award - whether properly named as party to award - whether award able to be challenged in Federal Court. Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1504 s.b60(1) Briqinshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) oO C.L.R. 336 Re Transport Workers (Transport Commission, Tasmania) Agreement 1547 (1553) 78 C.a.R. 44, 11954) 91 C.L.R. 159 Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association v. Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia (No. £) (1563) 5 F.L.R. 103 Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia v. Cocks 11968) 12 F.L.R. 138 R. v. Commonwealth Industrial Court Judges; Ex parte Cocks (1968) 121 C.L.R. 313 RK. v. Coldham and others; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union (1983) 39 A.L.R. 259 ROUNDSTREET PTY. LTD. v. JOHN BROWN V. No. 15 of 1586 EVATT, NORTHROF AND KEELY JJ. 29 JANUARY 1987 MELBOURNE we tay, Nee ~ocirm BS rT ch ke PUSTEALER 'adie sont ts SPEGAL GOLD DF & @ fex) IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V. No. 15 of 1326 ese ewe INDUSTRIAL DIVISION BETWEEN : ROUNDSTREET PTY. CTD. Appellant 'Rhespondent) and JOHN BROWN Respondent (Applicant) COURT: EVATT, NORTHROP AND KEELY Jo. DATE: 29 JANUARY 1987 PLACE: MELBOURNE MINUTE OF ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT the appeal be dismissed. (Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with in 0.36 of the Rules of Court.) IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY j. No. 15 of 1986 <a . INDUSTRIAL DIVISION BETWEEN oe ROUNDSTREET PTY. LTD. Appellant (Respondent) and JOHN BROWN Respondent (Applicant) COURT: EVATT, NORTHROP AND KEELY Jd. DATE: 23 JANUARY 1327 PLACE: MELBOURNE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT EVATY AND NORTHROP Jd. The question raised by this appeal is whether Roundstreet Pty. Ltd. ("the appellant") was, between 22 May 1981 and 1 March 1983, bound by the Transport Workers' (Passenger Vehicles) Award 1978 ("the 1978 Award"). The 1978 Award was a consent award made under 5.28 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ("the Act") in settlement of a dispute between the Transport Workers Union of Australia ("the T.W.U.") and a number of employers engaged in interstate passenger transport operations. One of the employers named as a party to the 1378 Award was Australian ba ' Pacific Tours Pty. Ltd. ("Pacific Tours"). Under sub-section 28(4) of the Act, the 1978 Award is binding on each of the parties to the Award and upon:- "(c) an employer who 1S a successor to, or an assignee or transmittee of, the business of such a party, including a corporation that has acquired or taken over the business of such a party." On 30 June 1983, Pacific Tours changed its name to Roundstreet Pty. Ltd. and thus the appellant 1s the successor to Pacific Tours. In March 1985, John Brown ("the respondent"), a member of the T.W.U., filed four applications under s.119 of the Act seeking the imposition of penalties upon the appellant for alleged breaches or non-observances of the terms of the 1978 Award. On 26 April 1985, the Court ordered that the four applications be consolidated and that:- "The question whether the (appellant) was, between the 22nd May 1981 and Ist March 1983, bound by (the 1978 Award) be decided separately from all other questions in the consolidated matters and before the trial of those other questions." On 19 March 1986, the Court, constituted by a single Judge, answered that question as follows:- "Between 22nd May 1981 and lst March 1983, the (appellant) was bound by the (1978 Award)." The appellant has appealed from that order. las The issue sought to be raised by the question was whether Pacific Tours had been properly named as a party to the 1978 Award, the appellant contending that it had never been served with the log of claims upon which the 19738 Award had been made and that in any event, no person had been properly authorised to consent to 1t being named as a party to the 1978 Award. There was a lengthy hearing before the trial Judge. In his reasons for judgment, the learned trial Judge expressed three opinions:- 1. The appellant, even though the respondent to the applications, carried the legal burden of proving that Pacific Tours was not a party to the 1978 Award; 2. that an advocate, not being a member of the legal profession, appearing for a party in proceedings before the Concaliation and Arbitration Commission is taken to have authority to enter into a settlement on behalf of that party, unless some limit on his or her authority has been communicated to the other Side; and 3. that the Court, in all probability, Was prevented by sub-section 60(1) of the Act from examining whether Pacific Tours was a proper party to the 15378 Award where, as in this case, it appeared from the face of the Award that it was a party to the Award. In the present case, the learned trial Judge held that he need not decide the third matter because he had gone behind the 1978 Award and found that Pacific Tours was properly named as a party to the 1978 Award. In doing that, he did the very thing which, in our opinion, sub-section 60(1) of the Act prevents him from doing. Having come to that opinion, it 15 not necessary Tor us to express an opinion on matters 1 and 2, but it as desirable that some brief comments be made concerning each of them, As far as question 1 is concerned, it must be remembered that the applications were for the imposition of a penalty under s.119 of the Act. Normally, the applicant in proceedings of that kind has the legal burden of proving that the respondent to the proceedings was bound by an award. In the present case, the production of the 1978 Award showing Pacific Tours as being an employer party to that Award and the admission that the appellant was the successor of Pacific Tours, is sufficient to prove that the appellant is bound by the 1978 Award. The shifting onus to rebut that conclusion then rested on the appellant. For instance, evidence that the 1978 Award had been superseded by another award before 22 May 1981, if accepted, would have been sufficient to establish that the appellant was not, between 22 May 1981 and 1 March 19383, bound by the 1978 Award. In the present case, and contrary to the provisions of sub-section 60(1) of the Act, much evidence was led in an attempt to prove that the appellant was in law not a party to and thus not bound by the 19738 Award. If it were relevant, that would not place the legal burden of proof upon the appellant. A consideration of who carried the legal onus of proof in other types of proceedings 1s beside the point. In proceedings under 5.119 of the Act, the legal burden remained with the applicant in those proceedings. The degree of satisfaction required to satisfy that onus is to be found by applying the principles enunciated in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336 per Dixon J. at pp.360-363. At the end of all the evidence, there had to be considered the provisions of the Award, the naming of Pacific Tours as an employer party to the Award, the fact that Pacific Tours and the appellant had for many years observed the terms of the 1973 Award. All these facts support a finding that the appellant was bound by the 1978 Award. It was not necessary for the réspondent to lead any further evidence. Very cogent evidence would be needed to negative the conclusion that the appellant was bound by the 1978 Award. Likewise, the second question should not have been considered. The opinion expressed on that question formed part of the reasoning supporting the finding that the appellant had not discharged the onus resting upon it an proving 16 was not bound by the 1578 Award. Sub-section 60(1) prevents this question arising on the facts of this appeal. No final opinion 1s expressed on this question but a warning 1S given that a principle of law applicable in legal proceedings before a Court and with respect to members of the legal profession bound by the ethics of the2r profession and subject to disciplinary action by being members of professional bodies, does not necessarily have any application with respect ta persons appearing before tribunals, not being Courts, and who, prima facie, are not members of the legal profession and thus not subject to the disciplinary procedures of professional bodies. As stated earlier, it is our opinion that sub-section 60(1) of the Act prevents this Court in these proceedings from considering whether Pacific Tours was validly a party to the 1978 Award. We agree with the reasons of Keely J. with respect to this question and have nothing further to say. We would dismiss the appeal. spp pe EWI a EO I certify that this and the Ave (S) preceding pages ara a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the L Goneurable Mr. Justice aN a and we Beno rede Ree. Sombie hoork way reo Fsan-Vooo— 34 pain haat Dated: Fi\ 37 IN THE FPEDEPAGL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) VICTORIA DISTPICT REGISTRY No. V15 of 1986 ) ) ) INDUSTRIAL DIVISTON ) a BETWEEN: ROUNDSTREET PTY. LTD. Appellant AND: JOHN BROWN Respondent CORAM: EVATT, NORTHROP and KEELY JJ 29 JANUARY, 1987 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT KEELY J.: This is an appeal from a judament of a single judge of the court (Gray J.). John Srown filed four applications under s. 119 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (the Act) for the imposition of penalties upon Roundstreet Pty. Ltd. «(the appellant) for alleged breaches or non-observances of terms of the Transport Workers' (Passenger Vehicles) Award 1978 (the award). On 26 April 1985 the court ordered that each of the four matters be consolidated and that the question whether the respondent (the present appellant) was between 22 May 1981 and 1 March 1983 bound by the award should be decided separately from all other questions in the consolidated matters and before the trial of those other questions. In its points of defence the appellant admitted that Australian Pacific Tours Fty. Ltd. was between 22 May 1981 and 1 March 1983 a named respondent to the award and that that company changed its name to Roundstreet Pty. Ltd. on 30 June 1383; however. it contended that the company had been invalidly named as a respondent to the award because 1t had not been "a party to any industrial dispute in settlement or part settlement of which" the award had been made. In his judgment Gray J. ordered that the preliminary question be answered in the following terms: "Between 22nd May 19981 and lst March 1983, the respondent was bound by the Transport Workers' (Passenger Vehicles) Award 1978". Leave to appeal against his Honour's judgment was given on 2 May 1986. Various submissions relating to the appellant's contention that the company had been invalidly named as a respondent to the award were advanced both before Gray J. and before the court on appeal. The respondent to the appeal submitted that it was not open to the Federal Court "to determine whether or not the appellant was validly bound by Cthe award]". That submission was based upon s. 60(1) of the Act which provides as follows:- "Subject to this Act, an award (including an award made on appeal)- Ww ' ta' ig final and conclusive: tb) shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court: and sc) =6is not subject to prohibition. mandamus or injunction in any court on any account." The effect of that section. and of an earlier section, which was different inform but not in any way that 15 material for present purposes, has been considered in a number of reported decisions during the Last 30 years. In 1953 the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Kirby, Dunphy and Morgan JJ.) in The Transport Workers' (Transport Commission, Tasmania) Aaqreement, 1947 (1953) 78 CAR 44 (at 46) said: "Section 16(1) of the Act provides that:- "Subject to this Act, an award or order of a Conciliation Commissioner shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question, or be subject to prohibition. mandamus or injunction in any Court on any account whatever." Mr. Eggleston argued, on the basis of the decision of the Privy Council in Colonial Bank of Australia and another v Willan (1874) LR PCA 417 that it 13 within the power and duty of this Court todo so, in spite of section 16 (1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The question 13 not without difficulty, but we have formed the opinion that the principles set out in that case. which velate to the power of a Court to deal on a prerogative writ with a decision of an inferior Court, do not apply to this Court when considering an award made by a Conciliation Commziszioner, at least when on the face of it. 1t 1s made within jurisdiction. ... We therefore are of the opinion that we cannot question whether the dispute as a result of which the Conciliation Commissioner certified the agreement was of an interstate nature or not, and so consider whether or not its certification was within the Conciliation Commissioner's power." (emphasis added) The High Court made an order absolute ((1954) 91 CLR 159) prohibiting further proceedings upon the agreement and upon the order of variation made by thezr Honours. Dixon Cd., Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ. (at 173) said that their Honours had decided that they were "precluded by s. 16(1) of the Act from questioning 'whether the dispute as a result of which the conciliation commissioner certified the agreement was of an interstate character or not'", but in my opinion neither said nor implied that their Honours had erred in law in so deciding. Of course, s. 16(1) could not preclude the High Court from considering that question because of the jurisdiction conterred upon it by s. 75(v) of the Constitution. The High Court referred to the necessary limitations upon s. 16(1) of the Act, which it said (at 175) was: ",.. incapable of protecting or preserving orders made not only in excess of the powers conferred by the Act, but also in excess of the capacity of the legislature to authorize 5. the making of awards and orders in relation to industrial matters." fn 1963, in Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association v Waterside Workers Federation of Australia (No. 2) 5 FLR 103 (at 105) Spicer CJ. formed the same opinion as to the effect of the section, saying that, by reason of 3. 60(1) of the Act, the court "should, I think. treat par. (b) as a valid provision of the award". Consistently with those earlier opinions of Spicer Cd. and of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, the Commonwealth Industrial Court in Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia v Cocks and others (1968) 12 FLR 128 held that, because of the provisions of 5. 60 of the Act, it could not consider whether a clause in an award was valid - at least not where the award was "in proper form". Dunphy and Smithers JJ. (at 154) said: "Invalidity is suggested on the ground that the subject matter of that clause 1s not an industrial mattec ... We think this Court must have regard to s. 60 of the Act It does not appear possible to treat these words as referring only to awards lawfully made within the jurisdiction or the Commission. To do so would ignore the clear intent of the Act to exempt an award made in Tact, even if beyond jurisdiction, from being called in question in this Court. If an intended award were so completely beyond any possible jurisdiction that 1t could not be reasonably said to be an award, 1¢t might be arguable that there was ground for excluding that "award" from the protection of the section. But that is not this case. This award is in proper form," The dictum of Spicer CJ., which has been quoted earlier, was cited by their Honours (at 155) and by Joske J. (at 163) who, in separate veasons for judgment, reached the same conclusion. In prohibition proceedings in respect of the order made by the Commonwealth [ndustr1al Court in that case, the High Court held that the relevant sub-clause of the award was invalid (R. v Commonwealth Industrial Court Judges; ex parte Cocks (1968) 121 CLR 313). Barwick CJ.. Taylor and Owen JJ., having decided "the substantive point in the case" (i.e. that the sub-clause was invalid). said (at 321-322): "J... the Industrial Court did not decide that the clause was valid: it assumed that 10 was debarred by s. 60 of the Act from pronouncing upon the question. Whether this was Of Was not a correct assumption was not argued before us but. as at present advised, we are inclined to the view that 1t was not. It is enough to say that if the Industrial Court had pronounced in favour of the sub-clause we would have no doubt that it would be incumbent on this Court, 1f it considered the provision to be beyond the authority of the Commission, to hold that the Industrial Court had acted without jurisdiction. " It appears from that passage that the High Court did not hear any argument as to whether the Commonwealth Industrial Court was correct in assuming that 1t was debarred by s. 60 of the Act from pronouncing upon the validity of the clause. Barwick CJ,. Taylor and Owen JJ. were "as at present advised. ... inclined to the view that 1t was not" a correct assumption. That tentative view, however. referred to a clauge which Kitto J. said (at 325) "on 1ts face travels into an area in which the Commission had no power to tread ..." (emphasis added). On my reading of the reasons for judgment, none of the Justices of the High Court in that case expressed even a tentative view that the Commonwealth Industrial Court was not debarred from considering the validity of a provision in an award which on its face appears to be within power. The following passage from the reasons for judgment of Kitto J. (at 325-326) is apposite: "The mode of reconciliation ... is to interpret s. 60 as validating, so far as it can validate 1t constitutionally, any award provision which is outside the power of the Commission if on its face it appears to be within power and is in fact a bona fide attempt to act in the course of the relevant authority. vee Cl. 30(1)(a) on its face travels into an area in which the Commission had no power to tread, ... pertaining only to relations between employers and persons who aré not their employees. ... For this reason s. 60 could not constitutionally have an operation which would validate cl. 30(1)(a) in its application in respect of non-employees, even 1f on 1ts true construction it affected to do so. Equally 3. 119 considered by itself, being construed so as to be constitutionally valid, cannot be interpreted to mean that a penalty may be imposed for a breach of something which, though appearing as a term of an award, is not one that in its nature is capable of being included as part of the settlement of an industrial dispute in the constitutional genze of the expression. (emphases added) Iam therefore of opinion that the learned juages of the Commonwealth Industrial Court were not precluded by the provisions of 5s. 60 or by any other consideration from investigating the question whether the application they were being asked to give to cl. 30(1)(a) was one which carried it beyond the authority of the Commission under the Act and beyond the power of the Parliament to authorize." In my opinion Kitto J., in saying (at 326) that the Commonwealth Industrial Court was "not precluded by the peovisions or s. 60", was referring only to a situation where the award provision "on its face travels into an area in which the Commission had no power to tread" (see p 325). In the present appeal, the award provision that the appellant is bound by the terms of the award 15 plainly not such a provision. On the contrary, as Mason ACJ. and Brennan J. said in Rk. v Coldham and Ors; ex parte Australian Workers' Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 at 418, the "three conditions are fulfilled '... namely that the purported exercise 15 a bona fide attempt to exercise the power, it relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and 1t 1s reasonably capable of being referred to the power (i.e. does not on its face go beyond the power) ...' to use the words of Kitto J. in R. v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) (1967) 118 CLR 219 at 252-3". In my opinion s. 60(1) of the Act provides that in those circumstances such a provision AL cannot be challenacd, nee can 103 vatidity be called in question in this courk. That opinion 15 consonant with tne fa) c ct Heds Pe) fay wi " uy qa a Fy Dp p a , p Lay rh G c m nee has pecn made; the appcllanr 3s counsel have tarled to sertuade me that the High Vourt has said anything tc the contrary in Ccocx 7) case (supra?. Becaus] of the originai jurrsdiction conrerred upon the Hign Courh 67 3s. 'Siv) or the ec oO nstiftucion to grank a WE1it of prohibition, che appetiant 15 mot left without a comedy; the buracn o: praoar would fall upon the appellant aif tT brought such a peocacding. In my opinion s. 50(1) of the Act untends that. subject to such a proceeding in the High Court, of an appeal or an application for variation under the Act, tne awacd shail not be challenged or cailed 1n question in this court or in any other courc. On the material in this case, s. 40 precluded Gray J. FEOM WiVIne any other answer to the preliminary question and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed. Having reached that conclusion, 16 15 not necessary to consider the other submissions which have been advanced, including the written submissions filed by the parties arter the hearing of this appeal, and in my opinicn 21t 13 unassirable to express an opinion on them. I certiry this and the preceding eight pages to be a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Me Justice Keely. Associate : AWWW VY. Date : Tanna] ATTACHMENT A Title of Action RGUNDSTREET PTY. LTD. v. JON BROWN File Number : V. No. 15 of 1986 Dates of Hearing : 12 and 13 November 1386 Judgment Delivered : 29 January 1387 Counsel for Appellant : Me. M.d. Bowling 9.C. and Dr. C. Jessup Solicitors for Appellant : Messrs. Freehill Hollangdale and Page, 4ith Level, Nauru House, 80 Collins 5Street, MELBOURNE. VIC. 3000 Counsel for Respondent : Mr. J.B. Barnard Q.C. and Mr. R. Hinkley Solicitors for Respondent : Messrs. Phillips Pox, 451 Bourke Street, MELBOURNE. VIC. 3000