CATCHWORDS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - wyersons aggrieved - foreign film approved by Censorship Board and registered by Chief Censor ~- film alleged to be blasphemous - standing of Ministers of Religion to challenge approval and registration - applicants possessing more than "intellectual or emotional" interest - locus standi considered. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Peview) Act 1977 REV. FR. WALTER OGLE and REV. FR. JOHN O'NEILL Appellants - and - JANET STRICKLAND at all materral times Chief Censor of the CENSCPRSHIP BOARD constituced oursuant ia) the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 - and - KENNETH BARTON. DAVID HAINES, GRAHAM WOOD, DEEORAH EHRLICH, WILLIAM SALTER, BRONWYN BCEKENSTEIN, WILLIAM HUME, ADRIAN CAPNELUTTI, UNA JOANNA DOWNER, ANDREE MARGARET WRIGHT, EVE MILDPEN constituting with the First Respondent the CENSCRSHIE BOARD constituted oursuant to the CUSTOMS '"CINEMATOGRAPH FIITMS) REGULATIONS 1955 Second Respondents - and - PAN AMEPICAN PPODUCTIONS PTY. LIMITED Third Respondent FISHER, LOCKHART & WILCOX JJ. SYDNEY 13 FEERUAPY 19287 IN THE FEDEPAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION ) ) No. G 264 of 1986 ) ) ON APETAL FROM A STNGLE TT IESE Sea ae FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN REV. FR. WALTER OGLE and REV. FR. JOHN O'NETLE Appellants - and - JANET STRICKLAND at all material times Chief Censor of the CENSORSHI BOAPT constituted pursuant co the CUSTOMS {(CINEMATOGRAPH FIEMS) REGULATIONS 1956 First Pespendent - and - KENNETH BARTON, DAVID HAINES, GRAHAM WOOD, PEBORAH "EHRLICH, WILLIAM SALTER. BRONWYN BOEKENSTEIN, AILLIAM HUME, ADRIAN CARNELUTTI, UNA JOANNA DOWNEP, ANDREF MARGARET WRIGHT, EVE MILDREN constituting with the First Pespondent the CENSOPSHIP ROARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGPAP FILMS) REGULATIONS 195 6 Second Respendents - and - ray a' PAN AMERICAN PRODUCTIONS FTY. LIMITED Third Respondent MINUTES OF ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER : FISHER, LOCKHART & WILCOX JU. WHERE MADE : SYDNEY DATE OF ORDER : 13 FEBRUARY 1987 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 9° Note: The avpeal be allowed. The order of the primary judge of 4th April 13286 he + rescinded, the motion of the first and second oD respondents seeking dismissai of the ovreceaedings be dismissed, and the matter be referred hack to the primary jucgge or a judge of this Court for the further hearing of the application. The orders for costs py the primary judge be set aside and the first and second respondents ovoay the costs of the appellants of the motion and of this apveal. No order as to costs of the third respondent. Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of che Federal Court Rules. at IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTPALTIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT PEGISTRY GENERAD DIVISION ) ) ) No. G 264 of 1986 ) ) ON APPEAL FROM A SZNCLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA BETWEEN: REV. FR. WaLTER OGLE and REV. FR. JOBN O'NETLL Appellant wa - and - JANET STRICKLAND at ail Material tames Chief Censor of the CENSORSHIP BOARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS 'CINEMATOGRAPHY FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 First Respondent - and - KENNETH BARTON, DAVID HAINES, GRAHAM WOOD, DEBORAH EHRLICH, WILLIAM SALTER, BRONWYN BOEKENSTEIN, WILLIAM HUME, ADRIAN CARNELUTTII, UNA JOANNA DQWNER, ANDREE MARGAPET WRIGHT. EVE MILDREN constituting with the First Fespondent the CENSORSHIP POARD ecnstituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FIEMS) REGULATIONS 1956 Second Respondents - and - PAN AMERICAN POPODUCTIONS PTV. LIMITED Third Respondent ae REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CORAM: Fisher, Lockhart and Wilcox Jd. 13 February 1987 Fisher J.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft form the reasons for judgment of Lockhart J. I agree with his conclusions the orders he proposes and generally with his reasons. Tf have alse read with great interest the reasons for judament cof Wilcox J. It was conceded before us that if the appellants in this matter had a "special interest" an the sense in which those words have been used by the High Court they qualified as 'B 1D Yr un ny n u "aggrieved" for the ecurpose of the Administrative Dec in ep [s) n Ur (Judicial Pevirew) Act 1977. In arriving at my conclusion, namely that this appeal should be allowed, I adopt the armeroath of Stephen J. in Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limzted (1922) 149 C.L.R. 27. At page 42 cf that case Stephen J., when speaking of the question whether the appellants had a sufficient "special interest" tc azive them standing to sue said: "As the law new stands 1t seems rather to involve in each case a curi1al assessment of the importance of the concern which a plaintiff has with oarticular subject matter and of the closeness of that plaintiff's relationship to that subject matter. 3. ... Courts necessarily reflect community values and beliefs, according greater weight tc, and perceiving a closer proximity toa plaintiff ain the case of some subject matters than others. The outcome of doing = so, however rationalized, will, when no tangible proprietary or possessory rights are in question, tend to be determinative of whether or not such a special interest exists as will be (sic) found standing to sue." In these circumstances it 15 not surprising that minds may differ when determining whether a "special interest" has been established. The curial assessment which Stephen J. perceived as involved requires value judgments to be made, in particular when assessing matters of weight anc proximity. Thzs Court is required to make for itself such assessments and ludaments, even ip circumstances such as the present when, as I see 1t, the trial ra judge correctly identified the celevant princivles of law. As Gibbs C.J. said in the Onus case at page 26; "The cule is obviously a flexible one since, aS was eointed out in that case, (the Australian 'Tonservati Foundation case) the question what 1s a sufficie anterest will vary according to the nature cf t subject matter of the litigation." The respondents agreed when before the trial judge that each of the appellants was a minister of religion charged with the duty of teaching and fostering Christian beliefs according to the scriptures. He said in this regard: "Notwithstanding their special position as ministers of religion, IT do not think that they stand in any different position from countless cther members of the community who, with varying degrees of commitment, profess the Christian faith. That circumstance, coupled with the absence of any threat to any a proprietary or possessory interest, persuades me that there 15 no conclusion open other than that standing to sue should be denied." With respect to the contrary view cf the trial judge I tand in a different ul am of opinion that the appellants do positien from other member cof the community who rrofess the Christian faith. I attach significance to the fact That 32 priests and teachers their interest and their activities are not limited merely to professing the Christian faith. Their arterest in my opinion extends beyond that of other menrers af munity whose limzted concern creuld Ee fairly descrtbed as oniy "intellectual or emotional", which words were a Fh c la{ o ira] tn o aa Wi rt cy rm t o.38 of the Onus case. The vocation and professicnai calling of the appellants being mere than an Pr a or fi an t Of a rt c i be oO La itt A o rt H. Q a] p Hn na n a ba a bal uy pel c rr Bd @5 greater weight ts he Given to their interest in the subject matter of the film and in the question whether it 1s blasphemous. They have, in the words of Stephen J., a "closer proximity" to this subject matter than other members of the community. This interest in my view sheuld be reccgnized by the Courts. I am confirmed in this ovinion for the following further, although not necessarily relevant, reason. If these appellants nave not sufficient standing to have reviewed the decision of the respondents the only persons who could have such standing, apact from the Attorney General wouid, be these with a commercial interest in the decision. Such an interest could prompt Aa challenge facilitate or deny There are sound grounds that unfortunate. to the La . the finding of blasphemy =a as to screening of the film so to restrict in this country. standing would be I agree with the orders proposed by Lockhart J. I certify that this and the & preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment cf Mr Justice Fisher. ~ > oe ote eee Se Associate Lated: 13 February 1987 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) COURT: DATE: GENERAL DIVISION ) ) No. G 264 of 1986 ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN: AND: REV. FR. WALTER OGLE and REV. FR. JOHN O'NEILL Appellants JANET STRICKLAND, at all AND: Material times Chief Censor of the CENSORSHIP BOARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 First Respondent KENNETH BARTON, DAVID HAINES, GRAHAM WOOD, DEBORAH EHRLICH, WILLIAM SALTER, BRONWYN BOEKENSTEIN, WILLIAM HUME, ADRIAN CARNELUTTI, UNA JOANNA DOWNER, ANDREE MARGARET WRIGHT, EVE MILDERN constituting with the First Respondent the CENSORSHIP BOARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 Second Respondents PAN AMERICAN PRODUCTIONS PTY. LIMITED Third Respondent Fisher, Lockhart and Wilcox JJ. 13 February 1987 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LOCKHART J. The Reverend Father Walter Ogle is a priest of the Anglican Church in Australia and The Reverend Father John O'Neill 1s a priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia. They claim that a film titled "Je Vous Salue Maria" ("Hail Mary") is blasphemous and they seek to challenge decisions of the Censorship Board and of one of its members relating to the importation of the film into Australia. Underlying the making of the decisions is a finding by the Censorship Board that the film is not blasphemous. The two priests ("the appellants") instituted these proceedings for review of the decisions claiming that they should be set aside by the Court on various grounds available under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ("the Judicial Review Act"). The learned trial Judge held that they had no standing to sue and dismissed the application. They appeal from that decision. The appeal raises an important question concerning the standing of persons to bring proceedings in this Court under the Judicial Review Act. Sub-section 5(1) of that Act provides that "a person who is aggrieved" by a decision to which the Act applies may apply to this Court for a review of the decision. It 1s said against the appellants that each of them lacks standing to bring the case because they have no interest beyond that of ordinary members of the no 3. public. The appellants claim that, as they are ministers of religion, 1t 1s their vocation to teach and foster Christian beliefs and that it 1S part of their duties to reject or repel blasphemy which attacks the very foundation of their faith. They say that their special position as ministers of religion places them in a position different from that of other members of the community and entitles them to sue. That is the question for decision. It falls to be considered in the background of administrative law where the expression "person aggrieved" and other like expressions are used in statutes to define a person's standing to sue. Some analysis of the development of the law in this area 1S called for. In cases involving the determination of private rights questions of standing rarely arise. It 1S in civil cases with a public element that a person's standing to sue arises. Proceedings for review of decisions of inferior courts and public officials are proceedings which involve the public. interest. They include proceedings for the issue of the prerogative writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus (to mention the principal ones) = and applications under the Judicial Review Act for the review of decisions of an administrative character made under Commonwealth enactments. The standing of persons to bring public interest proceedings 1s defined by various formulae in different statutes. It is useful to examine some of them. Expressions commonly used in statutes to Getermine standing to sue are "person aggrieved", "person interested" and "person with affected interest". The particular expression with 4. which this case 1s concerned 1s a "person who 1s aggrieved". It has long been recognised that these formulae for determining standing to sue should not be given a rigid or inflexible meaning. They are flexible words which derive their meaning and take their colour from the context in which they appear and the nature of the particular statute concerned. As Lord Hewart C.J. said in Seven Oaks Urban Council v. Twynam (1929) 2 K.B. 440 at pp. 443 and 444: "But as has been said again and again there is often little utility ain seeking to interpret particular expressions in one statute by reference to decisions given upon Similar expressions in different statutes which have been enacted alio intuitu. The problem with which we are concerned 1S not, what is the meaning of the expression 'aggrieved' in any one of a dozen other statutes, but what is 1ts meaning in this part of this statute? It 1s a little important to see what this part of this statute 1s dealing with." One must therefore approach an examination of the meaning of an expression such as "person aggrieved" with those observations of Lord Hewart C.J. in mind. An examination of the authorities also shows that, as administrative law has evolved, the Courts have shown a discernible, though not always consistent, tendency to construe these expressions liberally. The words "person aggrieved" received a restrictive interpretation over a century ago in Ex parte Sidebotham [1880] 14 Ch.D. 458 where James L.J. said at p. 465, in relation to s. 71 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (Eng.) which empowered courts to make orders in relation to a "person aggrieved": "But the words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who 1s disappointed of a benefit which he might have received 1f some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." This interpretation was generally accepted for many years, though Lord Esher said, as early as 1887, in Ex Parte Official Receiver In Re Reed, Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 174 at p. 178 that the definition of James L.J. was not an exhaustive definition. A wider interpretation was placed upon the words "any person aggrieved" by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierre Sarr N'Jie [1961] A.C. 617 where a question arose as to the meaning of that expression in the context of the West African (Appeal to Privy Council) Order In Council 1949, s. 31 of which provided: "Nothing in this Order contained shall be deemed to interfere with the right of His Majesty upon the humble petition of any person aggrieved by any judgment of the Court to admit his appeal therefrom upon such conditions as His Majesty in Council shall think f1t to impose." Their Lordships rejected the submission that a person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance in the sense attributed to 1t by James L.J. in Ex parte Sidebotham (supra). Lord Denning, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, said at p. 634 (a passage which has been cited with approval and applied in many subsequent cases): "But the definition of James L.J. 18 not to be regarded as exhaustive. Lord Esher M.R. pointed that out in Ex parte Official Receiver, In re Reed, Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 174, 178. The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who 1S interfering in things which do not concern him: but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests." Another expression "person who feels aggrieved" also appears in statutes, but my research shows that it tends to be treated interchangeably with "person aggrieved": see for example National Trust of Australia (Vic) v. T. & G. Mutual Society [1976] V.R. 592 and Dalton v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 60 A.L.R. 783 at p. 797. The expression "person interested" also appears in various statutory contexts: see the Designs Act 1906 s. 28; Lands Acquisition Act 1955: ss. 13 and 39; Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904: ss. 62, 108 and 143; Bankruptcy Act 1966: ss. 35, 75, 167, 108, 300, 303 and 307 and The Environment Protection (Sea) Dumping Act 1981: s. 33. The words "person with affected interest" are used in some statutes as the test for determining standing to apply for applications for injunctions to restrain breaches of certain provisions of the Companies Act 1981 (Cth) (s. 574) and the Securities Industry Act 1980 (Cth) (ss. 42 and 149). Aliso, a person has a right of appeal under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the administrative review of a decision 1f his "interests are affected" by the decision: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s. 27. It 1S important not to shackle the interpretation of these expressions by importing concepts from other statutes in which they appear involving different subject matter and objects, especially when the expressions have received judicial interpretation not intended to have general application or, indeed, application beyond the particular words in the particular context of the particular statute concerned. Before turning to the Judicial Review Act itself I shall discuss two decisions of the High Court upon which considerable reliance was placed by the parties in argument before us. The first of these 1s Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v. The Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493 where the Australian Conservation Foundation challenged the validity of certain decisions relating to the Banking Foreign Exchange Regulations and to certain administrative procedures under the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) in the context of a proposal by a company to establish and operate a tourist resort in central Queensland. Aickin J., who heard the case at first instance, held at p. 508 that the Foundation had no standing to sue because it was not "adversely affected in some way to an extent greater than the public generally". On appeal to the Full Bench of the High Court, Gibbs J. said at pp. 530-531: "I would not deny that a person might have a special interest in the preservation of a particular environment. However, an interest, for present purposes, does not mean a mere intellectual or emotional concern. A person 1s not interested within the meaning of the rule, unless he 1s likely to gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a principle or winning a contest, if his action succeeds or to suffer some disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance or a debt for costs, if his action fauils. A belief, however strongly felt, that the law generally, or a particular law, should be observed, or that conduct of a particular kind should be prevented, does not suffice to give its possessor locus stand. If that were not so, the rule requiring special interest would be meaningless. Any plaintiff who felt strongly enough to bring an action could maintain it." His Honour held that the Foundation had no special interest in the preservation of the relevant environment in central Queensland and none in the exchange control transactions. Stephen J. reached the same conclusion as Gibbs J. for substantially the same reasons. Huis Honour said at p. 539: "An individual does not suffer such damage as gives rise to standing to sue merely because he voices a particular concern and regards the actions of another as injurious to the object of that concern. That 1t 1s a body corporate rather than an individual which seeks to do so cannot of itself alter that position; the fact that that body corporate has as 1ts main object the voicing, and encouragement in the community, of just such a concern no doubt ensures that what it does to give effect to such an object will not be ultra vires; it will not otherwise improve its position." His Honour regarded the Foundation as in substance basing its right to sue on a concern regarding threatened detriment to the environment and this was not sufficient to give it standing. ra Mason J. took a similar view to Gibbs J. and said at p. 548: "In this difficult field there is one proposition which may be stated with certainty. It is that a mere belief or concern, however genuine, does not un itself constitute a sufficient locus standi in a case of the kind now under consideration." Murphy J. dissented and held that the Foundation had standing to bring the proceedings. The later decision of the High Court 1s Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Limited (1982) 149 C.L.R. 27. Section 21 of the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic) provided that a person who wilfully or negligently defaced or damaged or otherwise interfered with a relic or carried out an act likely to endanger a relic should be guilty of an offence. Section 2 defined the terms "archaeological relic" and "relic" to include a relic pertaining to the past occupation by the Aboriginal people of any part of Australia whether or not the relic existed prior to the occupation of that part of Australia by people of European descent and specifically included any Aboriginal deposit, carving, drawings, skeletal remains and anything belonging to the total body of material relating to that past Aboriginal occupation of Australia. Two persons who claimed to be descendants and members of the Gournditch-jmara Aboriginal people and custodians of the relics of those people according to their laws and customs brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria for the purpose of preventing Alcoa of Australia Limited from carrying out on land which it occupied works which, it 10. was claimed, would interfere with Aboriginal relics on that land and in particular would be a breach of s. 21 of the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that the two persons had no standing to sue. On appeal to the High Court Gibbs C.J. said that, although the two private citizens who brought the action could not show that any right of their own had been infringed, nevertheless they had an interest in the subject matter of the action greater than that of other members of the public and greater than that of other persons of Aboriginal descent who are not members of the Gournditch-jmara people. The appellants and other members of the Gournditch-jmara people would be more particularly affected than other members of the Australian community by the destruction of the relics. The appellants claimed that, in common with other members of the Gournditch-jmara people, they were the custodians of the relics according to the laws and customs of those people, that the relics were of cultural and spiritual importance to them and that they used the relics to teach their children the culture of their people. His Honour said that the case was not one in which a plaintiff sues in an attempt to give effect to his beliefs or opinions on a matter which does not affect him personally except insofar as he holds beliefs or opinions about it. Stephen J. reached the same conclusion and the essence of his Honour's reasoning 1s to be found at p. 42 where he said: "As the law now stands it seems rather to involve in each case a curi1al assessment of the importance of the concern which ae plaintiff has with particular subject matter and of the closeness of that plaintiff's relationship to that subject matter, The present appellants are members of a ll. small community of aboriginal people very long associated with the Portland area; the endangered relics are relics of their ancestors' occupation of that area and possess for their community great cultural and spiritual significance. While Europeans may have cultural difficulty in fully comprehending that significance, the importance of the relics to the appellants and their intimate relationship to the relics readily finds curial acceptance, It 1s to be distinguished, I think, and will be perceived by courts as different in degree, both in terms of weight and, in particular, in terms of proximity, from that concern which a body of conservationists, however sincere, feels for the environment and its protection. Courts necessarily reflect community values and beliefs, according greater weight to, and perceiving a closer proximity to a plaintiff in the case of, some subject matters than others. The outcome of doing so, however rationalised, will, when no tangible proprietary or possessory rights are in question, tend to be determinative of whether or not such a special interest exists as will be found standing to sue." Mason J. said at p. 43 that the relics had great cultural and spiritual significance for the Gournditch-jmara community, the members of which are the guardians of the relics according to their laws and customs, and they use the relics. His Honour agreed with Gibbs C.J. that the appellants had a special interest in the preservation of the relics sufficient to support locus stand1. Murphy, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ. reached the same conclusion in separate reasons for judgment. Brennan J. said at p. 74: "R plaintiff must show that he has been specially affected, that 1S, 1n comparison with the public at large he has been affected to a substantially greater degree or in a significantly different Manner. It 1S not necessary to show that the plaintiff 1s uniquely affected; there may be some others whose interests may be affected in like manner." a 12. It was argued before us on behalf of the appellants that, just as the relics in the Onus Case (supra) had great cultural and spiritual significance to the Gournditch-jmara people, so here the repelling of blasphemy to maintain the sanctity of the Christian faith has great spiritual significance to the appellants as ministers of religion. The Judicial Review Act is an important part of Commonwealth legislation in the field of administrative law to scrutinise administrative decisions and actions of Commonwealth Ministers, officials and statutory bodies. It confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear and determine applications by "a person who 1s aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies", 1.e. decisions of an administrative character made under Commonwealth enactments. Sub-section 3(4) defines the expression by an inclusive definition which reads as follows:- "In this Act - (a) a reference to a person aggrieved by a decision includes a reference - (1) to a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision; or (21) an the case of a decision by way of the making of a report or recommendation - to a person whose interests would be adversely affected 1f a decision were, or were not, made in accordance with the report or recommendation; and (b) a reference to a person aggrieved by conduct that has been, is being, or is proposed to be, engaged in for the purpose of making a decision or by a failure to make a decision includes a reference to a person whose interests are or would be adversely affected by the conduct or failure." considered by Ellicott J. 13. The meaning of the expression "a person who is aggrieved" was in Tooheys Limited v. Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 36 A.L.R. 64. His Honour said at p. decisions of Full Courts of this Court: "The words 'a person who 1s aggrieved' should not, in my view, be given a narrow construction. They should not, therefore, be confined to persons who can establish that they have a legal interest at stake in the making of the decision, It 1s unnecessary and undesirable to discuss the full import of the phrase. I am satisfied from the broad nature of the discretions which are subject to review and from the fact that the procedures are clearly intended in part to be a substitution for the more complex prerogative writ procedures that a narrow meaning was not intended. This does not mean that any member of the public can seek an order of review. I am satisfied, however, that 1t at least covers a person who can show a grievance which will be suffered as a result of the decision complained of beyond that which he or she has as an ordinary member of the public. In many cases that grievance will be shown because the decision directly affects his or her existing or future legal rights. In some cases, however, the affect may be less direct. It may affect him or her in the conduct of a business or may, as I think is the case here, affect his or her rights against third parties (see F. Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 16 A.L.R. 623; 138 C.L.R. 283)." 79: This approach of Ellicott J. has been adopted in subsequent see Ricegrowers Co-Operative Mills Limited v. Bannerman (1981) 38 A.L.R. 533 at pp. 539, Ve Moss (1983) 49 A.L.R. 533 at p. 554. 540; Lamb The importance of not giving the expression "a person who 1s aggrieved" a narrow meaning is readily perceived when regard 1s had to the wide range of decisions under Commonwealth enactments which are 14, susceptible to review under the Judicial Review Act and to the continually expanding field of Commonwealth law. As statutes, regulations, ordinances and other laws of the Commonwealth are continually emerging from the draftsman's pen, the definition of the words "a person who 1S aggrieved" must be as applicable for future, as it 1s for current, enactments. There are sound reasons why the expression should not be extended to include a member of the public who does not have a grievance which he or she will suffer beyond that which he or she has as an ordinary member of the public. Otherwise, anyone at all could apply for review of a decision under a Commonwealth enactment and for a statement under s. 13 of the Judicial Review Act of the findings on Material questions of fact and the reasons for the decision in question even though the decision may not affect the person beyond being merely emotionally or intellectually concerned or interested in the decision. The right to request a s. 13 statement 1s conferred by that section upon "any person who 1s aggrieved by the decision" (sub-s. 13(1) and sub-s. 3(4)). Burdens on Government departments and Instrumentalities would be imposed at increased cost to the public purse if an applicant for a statement of reasons under s. 13 did not have some interest in the decision in the sense to which Ellicott J. referred in Tooheys' Case (supra), especially as the person who made the decision 1s obliged to provide the statement to any person entitled to 1t without cost to the person seeking 1t. 15. I do not say that, 1f anybody at all has standing to bring applications under the Judicial Review Act, the "floodgates" will open and the Court will be swamped with cases. This argument has been advanced on numerous occasions and rejected: see, for example, Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410 per Farwell L.J. at 423; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Limited v. The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth (1912) 15 C.L.R. 182, per Griffith C.J. at pp. 189-191 and Barton J. at pp. 202-4; and Phelps v. Western Mining Corporation Limited (1978) 33 F.L.R. 327 per Deane J. at pp. 333-334. It is an argument without substance and reality. There are real constraints which would discourage people from instituting proceedings whose only interest 1S strong views or feelings. The burden of costs, including the risk of orders for costs being made against them 1f they lose, and the power of courts to control their own proceedings, including power to dismiss proceedings or strike out pleadings 1f they are vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of process are examples of some constraints. If the Judicial Review Act had provided that "any person" had standing to seek review of administrative decisions under Commonwealth enactments it may be that any member of the public could apply. Parliament conferred the right to seek an injunction under s. 80 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 on the Attorney-General, the Trade Practices Commission and "any other person". It is now settled that those words confer the right to sue on any member of the public, whether a consumer or not: World Series Cricket Pty. Limited v. Parish (1977) 16 A.L.R. 181; Phelps v. Western Mining Corporation Limited (supra); Glorie v. W.A. Chip & Pulp Co. Pty. Limited (1981) 1 16. T.P.R. 84. Parliament has used words of limitation, however, in sub-s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Act; the words "a person who 1s aggrieved" do not mean the same as "any person". This case 1s concerned with three decisions which were made by members of the Censorship Board ("the respondents"); constituted Pursuant to the Customs (Cinematograph Films) Regulations. The regulations were made under the Customs Act 1901. The three decisions were to grant a licence to import the film, to approve its registration and to register it pursuant to the regulations. Until a film has been registered in accordance with Part II of the regulations 1t shall not be delivered from the control of Customs. The Censorship Board is constituted by regulation 5 and it consists of the Chief Censor, the Deputy Chief Censor and other members (reg. 5(2)). Part II relates to the importation of films and advertising matter. The importation of a film 1s prohibited unless a licence to import it has been granted under the regulations by the Chief Censor or an officer on his or her behalf (reg. 9(1)). The grant of a licence under the regulations 1S subject to the conditions and requirements specified in the regulations and to such conditions and requirements as are specified in the licence (reg. 10). A f1lm shall not be delivered from the control of Customs until it has been registered in accordance with Part II (reg. 11). Regulation 13, so far as 18 presently relevant, provides that a film shall not be registered if, in the opinion of the Board, the film 1s blasphemous, indecent or obscene. 17. The registration of a film may be granted either without conditions or subject to such conditions as the Censorship Board thinks f1t and subject to the importer giving security to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs for the observance of the conditions subject to which the registration has been granted and certain other conditions specified in regulation 19(b). Among those lastmentioned conditions 1s a condition that the film shall not, unless the consent in writing of the Censorship Board has first been obtained, be exhibited in Australia by the importer or any other person in a form other than the form in which the film has been registered (reg. 19(b)(1)). Part IV of the regulations provides for the review of decisions of the Censorship Board by a body called the Cinematograph Films Board of Review. "A person aggrieved" by a decision of the Censorship Board on a matter arising under the regulations may apply to the Board of Review to review the decision of the Censorship Board (reg. 39(1)). On the hearing of the application for review the Board of Review may confirm the decision of the Censorship Board or direct 1t to grant the permission sought by the applicant either with or without conditions (reg. 39B). Father Ogle and Father O'Neill allege that the film is blasphemous and that the respondents have, by the decisions referred to, allowed the third respondent, Pan American Productions Pty. Limited (the importer of the film), to import it. They claim that the decisions of the Censorship Board should be set aside by the Court on 18. various grounds including the grounds that the decisions were not authorised by the regulations, that relevant considerations were left out of consideration by the Board and that no person acting reasonably could have reached the decision reached by the Board if its members had properly directed themselves as to the applicable law. The respondents filed a notice of motion to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the appellants lack standing in that neither of them is "a person who 1s aggrieved" by the decisions within the meaning of sub-s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Act. The learned primary Judge determined the question of standing as a preliminary point rather than at the final hearing and held that the appellants did not have standing to pursue the application. It was agreed by counsel for the respondents before his Honour, for the purpose only of dealing with the notice of motion, that: 1. each of the appellants 1s a minister of religion charged with the duty of teaching and fostering Christian beliefs according to the Scriptures; 2. the film is blasphemous; and 3. the respondents have by their decisions allowed and permitted the third respondent to import the film into Australia and to show 1t in theatres to persons other than minors. 19. The primary Judge concluded that the appellants did not have standing to pursue the application. His Honour said: "Notwithstanding their special position as ministers of religion, I do not think that they stand in any different position from countless other members of the community who, with varying degrees of commitment, profess the Christian faith. That circumstance, coupled with the absence of any threat to any proprietary or possessory interest, persuades me that there is no conclusion open other than that standing to sue should be denied. ... Many people in the community have a concern about the screening of a blasphemous film. But that concern, in whatever depth and however genuinely and sincerely 1t may be felt, does not permit such a person to resort to the Court." Blasphemy 1S an indictable misdemeanour at common law: R. v. Ramsay 15 Cox, C.C. 231. See also the Blasphemy Act 9 and 10 Wm, ITI Ch. 32. The essence of the crime of blasphemy 1s to publish words concerning the Christian religion which are so scurrilous" and offensive as to pass the limits of decent controversy and to be calculated to outrage the feelings of any sympathiser with or believer in Christianity: R. v. Gott (1922) 16 Cr.App.R. 87. A temperate and respectful denial of the existence of God is not an offence against the law which does not render criminal the mere propagation of doctrines hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists in the manner in which the doctrines are advocated. Whether in each case this is a crime is a question of fact for the jury: Bowman v. Secular Society Limited [1917] A.C. 406. See also R. v. Ramsay (1883) 15 Cox c.c. 231. 20. In Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law 9th Edn. 1950 at p. 163 there 1s the following passage: "Every publication is said to be blasphemous which contains any contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ, or the Bible or the formularies of the Church of England as by law' established. It ius not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, 1f the publication 1s couched in decent and temperate language. The test to be applied 1s as to the manner in which the doctrines are advocated and not as to the substance of the doctrines themselves. Everyone who publishes any blasphemous document 1s guilty of ... publishing blasphemous 1l1bels." This statement of the law was approved by Lord Scarman in R, v. Lemon [1979] A.C. 617 at p. 665. It has been held not to be blasphemous to vilify any non-Christian or the Jewish religion: R. v. Gathercole (1838) 2 Lewin 237. It 1s an interesting question whether the offence of blasphemous conduct would extend to the Jewish religion or religions other than Christianity 1f the point were tested today in Australia. For further discussion on the offence of blasphemy see l Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown C.5; Tomlin's Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. 1835; The Law Dictionary, 1815; Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. 1938; Watson and Purnell Criminal Law 1n New South Wales 1971 pp. 511, 629 to 631; Bourke's Criminal Law Victoria 3rd Edn. 1981 pp. 1394, 1395, 1396; and Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn. Vol. 11 para. 1009. 21. The appellants are in holy orders in hierarchical Christian churches. As ministers of religion they are in a special position compared with ordinary members of the public in that 1t 1s their duty and vocation to maintain the sanctity of the Scriptures, to spread the Gospel, to teach and foster Christian beliefs and to repel or oppose blasphemy. Blasphemy 1s the denial of the basis tenets of the Christian faith. The doctrines and teachings of the Christian faith are of "great cultural and spiritual significance" to the appellants (to adopt the language of Stephen J. in the Onus Case (supra)) and certainly are of no less significance to Christians than were the Aboriginal relics to the Gournditch-jmara community in the Onus Case (supra). The appellants are not meddlers or "busy bodies". Nor are they people who have mere intellectual or emotional concern about the film. Their position 1s therefore different from the position which the High Court perceived the Australian Conservation Foundation to have in the Australian Conservation Foundation Case (supra). See also the judgment of Gibbs C.J. 1n Davis v. The Commonwealth of Australia, 13 November 1986 (unreported). The decisions impugned in this case have a greater effect upon the appellants than they have upon ordinary members of the public. It 1s true that the appellants have no special interests in the subject matter of the decision in the sense of legal or equitable rights or proprietary or pecuniary interests; but they are persons aggrieved because to repel blasphemy 1s a necessary incident of their vocation. To deny them standing would deny an important class in the community an effective means and procedure for challenging decisions of the kind involved in this case. 22. Whether members of the community who profess the Christian faith, but are not ministers of religion or otherwise part of the hierarchy of a Christian denomination, would have standing to bring a case of this kind is for me an open question which I do not find it necessary to decide. It must be kept in mind, however, that some Christian sects have little or no hierarchical structure, yet their followers are devout believers in their religious teachings. To deny them standing 1s a conclusion which would not be lightly reached, but I prefer to express no view on the question as it does not arise and was only briefly touched on in argument. It 1s useful to consider who, 1£ anybody, would have standing to challenge decisions of the kind in question here under the Judicial Review Act if the respondents are correct in their assertion that the appellants are merely ordinary members of the community; having no grievance which will be suffered as a result of the decisions complained of beyond that which they have as ordinary members of the public. Counsel for the respondents could refer to no such people. There are many denominations within the Christian church and there is considerable variation between them with respect' to hierarchical structure, division between spiritual and temporal arms and between clergy and laity. The organisation of some churches may permit clearly defined bodies to speak with authority for them on matters of religious teaching and dogma. The capacity of bodies within other churches to authoritatively state the tenets of those 23. churches may not be so clear or may not exist at all as it 18S well known that some churches or sects have little or no hierarchy and no organisation to speak with authority for them. It may, therefore, be possible to point to a body within a particular church of whom 1t could be said that it truly represents that church in the formulation and expression of doctrinal matters and hence be more readily perceived as having standing under the Judicial Review Act. But the absence of any such body in other churches or sects, the members of which are devout Christians, cannot be called in aid to deny the right of those members to apply for a review. The precise identification of the person or persons who would have standing in those circumstances may arise in some future case, but I need not decide it here. Nor does it follow that the existence of a body within a church to authoritatively determine matters of dogma would have the effect of denying 1ts priests, ministers or pastors standing to sue in this Court if they are not members of the authoritative body. The evidence does not touch the question whether there are within the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches in Australia bodies or persons who can speak with the authority of the church on questions of blasphemy. Hence, it 1S not suggested in this case that the appellants should be denied standing because there 1s some higher authority within the churches concerned to whom 1s entrusted the task of determining doctrinal questions. 24. There is much force in the view that, if people such as the appellants who are priests of the church cannot complain, there would be no effective avenue for challenging, under the Judicial Review Act, decisions by the Censorship Board involving a finding that a film is not blasphemous. The consequence of a finding by the Censorship Board that a film is blasphemous is that it is unlawful for the film to be registered. Yet the Board's finding that the film 1s not blasphemous may, in particular circumstances, be contrary to law or otherwise liable to be aside under the Judicial Review Act. It would be curious 1£ nobody, with the possible exception of the Attorney-General, had standing to challenge the finding before the Court. If, on the other hand, the Censorship Board had determined that the film was blasphemous then plainly there would be at least one person who would answer the description of a "person aggrieved", namely, the third respondent (the importer of the film) because 1t would have a proprietary or pecuniary interest. Others may have interests of this kind also, for example, the owner of the copyright in the film. It would be strange, indeed, if the decision of the Censorship Board that a film is blasphemous could be challenged under the Judicial Review Act, but a decision that 1t 1s not blasphemous could not. It 1s no answer to say that the regulations themselves provide for the review of decisions of the Censorship Board, although the existence of another avenue of appeal or challenge may be a relevant consideration for the Court in the exercise of its discretion once it is satisfied that a ground for review of the decision has been established. 25. One final matter requires attention. Decisions of the kind under review in this case have the effect of allowing a film to be imported, registered in accordance with the regulations and delivered from the control of Customs. It does not follow that the film will be shown in cinemas or otherwise used commercially. Those interested in 1ts commercial exploitation may, for example, decide not to screen the film in Australia because circumstances have changed since the making of arrangements to import it and 1t would not be profitable to do so. It seems that in the present case the film was delivered into the custody of the third respondent and subsequently screened in cinemas. Are the appellants ""aggrieved" by the decisons under challenge here or is their complaint in essence that the film should not be shown or should not have been shown to the public? Is there a suffic1rent nexus between the decisions under review and the screening of the film in Australia? It 1s an offence to publish blasphemous libel. This 1s a common law offence and 1s regulated by statute: see for example Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) s. 574 and Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) s. 469AA, Also, injunctions may be granted to restrain the publication of a blasphemous libel by the screening of a film. Whether such proceedings could be brought only by the Attorney-General or by others 1S not a question which I need to consider. I am satisfied that there 1s sufficient nexus between the decisions in question here and the subject matter of the complaint of the appellants to enable them to challenge the decisions under the Judicial Review Act. Registration of the film under the regulations and delivery of the film from the control of Customs enables the film 26. to be exhibited in Australia: sce regs. 9, 10, 11 and 19. Further, for the purposes of these proceedings it was agreed before the primary Judge and befcre us on appeal that: "The first and second respondents have by the decisions referred to allowed and permitted the third respondent to import the film into Australia and to show it in theatres to persons other than minors." I would allow the appeal; rescind the order of the primary Judge dismissing the application; dismiss the motion of the first and second respondents seeking dismissal of the proceeding; refer the matter back to the primary Judge or other Judge of this Court for the further hearing of the application; set aside the orders for costs made by the primary Judge; and order the first and second respondents to pay the costs of the appellants of the motion and of this appeal. No order for costs in favour of or against the third respondent 18S called for because 1t 18 a submitting respondent, | certify that this and the Acer y - Rove (as) preceding pages are a true copy of the " Reasons for Judgment herein peor Yoyo ir, dustice Lockhart AsSéciata Dated: \3 2-8 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G.264 of 1986 ee ee GENERAL DIVISION On appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia BETWEEN: REV. FR. WALTER OGLE and REV. FR. JOHN O'NEILL Appellants AND: JANET STRICKLAND, at all material times Chief Censor of the CENSORSHIP BOARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 First Respondent AND: KENNETH BARDON, DAVID HAINES, GRAHAM WOOD, DEBORAH EHRLICH, WILLIAM SALTER, BRONWYN BOEKENSTEIN, WILLIAM HUME, ADRIAN CARNELUTTI, UNA JOANNA DOWNER, ANDREE MARGARET WRIGHT, EVE MILDERN constituting with the First Respondent the CENSORSHIP BOARD constituted pursuant to the CUSTOMS (CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS) REGULATIONS 1956 Second Respondents AND: PAN AMERICAN PRODUCTIONS PTY LIMITED Third Respondent CORAM: FISHER, LOCKHART and WILCOX JJ PLACE: SYDNEY DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1987 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT WILCOX J: Lockhart J has set out the facts behind this appeal and has discussed the principal authorities relevant to its determination. I agree that the appellants have standing to bring their application for review of the decisions of the respondent Board members concerning the film "Je vous salue Marie". Reference was made, during the argument on behalf of the respondents, to the rules which have been developed by the courts to govern the question whether a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs should be accorded standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in a matter involving a general public interest, such as the enforcement of a statute. These rules are not directly relevant to the question raised by the present appeal: the proper scope of the words "person who 1s aggrieved" as used in ss.5, 6 and 7 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. However, as Lockhart J has pointed out, this formuls ~- which 1s used as the criterion of standing in many statutes -- is not of fixed content. The application of the formula has responded not only to varying situations at a given time but also to developing judicial attitudes as to the availability of the courts for the resolution of legal issues causing concern in the community. It seems to me desirable, in the application of this formula to cases brought under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review ) Act, that this Court does not lag behind any expansion of attitude which is occuring in respect of injunctive relief. Were the Court to do so, plaintiffs would not be barred from proceeding -~- for example, under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 -- but both the parties and the Court would be deprived of the advantages provided by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. These advantages are not merely procedural; they include the considerable flexibility of action conferred upon the Court by ss.10, 15 and 16. The most recent decision of a Full Bench of the High Court of Australia in relation to the standing necessary to obtain an injunction compelling observance of a statute 1s Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limited (1981) 149 CLR 27. [In that case the Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the proceedings notwithstanding that the conduct of the defendant did not impinge upon their legal rights or property interests. They were members of an Aboriginal grcup, the Gournditch-jmara people, to whom the relics on the defendant's land were of cultural and spiritual importance. The decision 18 one of major importance. In contemporary Australia, with its multitude of cultures and religions, it 1s likely that groups of people, concerned about a public issue, will not infrequently be able to demonstrate that the issue has, for them, special significance of a cultural or spiritual nature. "Cultural" and "Spiritual" are words of wide application. The liberalisation of standing rules evident in Onus 1S consistent with attitudes expressed in other common law countries. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] Ac 617 at p.641 Lord Diplock spoke out against a reversion "to technical restrictions on locus standi" which would "reverse that progress towards a comprehensive system of administrative law that I regard as having been the greatest achievement of the English courts in my judicial lifetime", Lord Diplock's words were quoted and applied by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in Environmental Defence Society Inc v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No 3) [1981] 1 NZLR 216 at p.220-221, the Court adding: ",.. the proceedings challenge the legality of Government action. [It 1s unrealistic to expect the Attorney-General to do this and we see no reason why 1t must be left to individuals directly affected to undertake the burden. In the exercise of the Court's discretion, responsible public interest groups may be accepted as having sufficient standing under the National Development Act." In constitutional cases the Supreme Court of Canada has gone one step further, discarding altogether the requirement of special damage or special interest. The philosophy underlying that decision was expressed by Laskin J, speaking for the majority of the Court, in Thorson v Attorney General (Canada) [No 2] 43 DLR (3d) 1 at p.18: "where all members of the public are affected alike ... and there 1s a justiciable 1ssue respecting the validity of legislation, the Court must be able to say that as between allowing a taxpayer's action and denying any standing at all when the Attorney-General refuses to act, it may choose to hear the case upon the merits". See also Nova Scotia Board of Censors v McNeil (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 632 and Minister of Justice of Canada v Borowski (1981) 130 DLR (3d) 588. There 1s no decided case which prevents this Court adopting, in the application of the formula "person who 1s aggrieved", the attitudes to which I have referred. On the contrary, the modern authorities on the statutory use of this formula -~ like the authorities on its use in relation to prerogative writs: as to which see Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport (Gummow J, 17 December 1986 not reported) -- emphasise its width and flexibility. Lockhart J has quoted a passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Gambia v N'Jie [1961] AC 617, a passage which was adopted by Gibbs CJ in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 169 at p.185 for the purpose of construing the words "person aggrieved" in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. I add a reference to Arsenal Football Club v Ende [1979] AC 1, a case in which a person in the position of a ratepayer was held entitled -- as a "person «.. who 1S aggrieved" -- to object that the valuation for rating purposes placed upon the property of the club was inadequate. The decision did not depend upon Mr Ende's own rate liability; it was impossible for him to demonstrate that the amount of his assessment would be affected in any way. The members of the House of Lords rested their decision upon his concern about rating inequities. The ground of decision was articulated by Lord Wilberforce at p.17 1n these words: "On principle, and on the history of this matter, there 1s no reason, in the absence of express limiting words, for confining grievances to demonstrable injurious effects. Uniformity and fairness have always been proclaimed, and judicially approved, as standards by which to judge the validity of rates. Indeed I believe that many men feel a more acute sense of grievance if they think they are being treated unfairly in relation to their fellow ratepayers than they do about the actual payments they have to make. To produce a sense of justice 1S an important objective of taxation policy." See also per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at pp.22, 24 and per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at p.33 In at least two Australian cases non-financial concern has been recognized as being sufficient to cause a person to be "aggrieved": see National Trust of Australia (Vic) v Australian Temperance & General Life Assurance Society Ltd [1976] VR 592, Australian Conservation Foundation v Shell Refining (Aust) Pty Limited [1983] VR 385. There need be no concern that such recognition will lead to an unmanageable proliferation of cases. In this area of the law the "floodgates" argument has been thoroughly discredited: see the Report of the Law Reform Commission, "Standing in Public Interest Litigation", ALRC 27 paras.188-196. As Professor Kenneth Scott wryly noted in his article "Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis" (1973) 86 Harvard Law Review 645 at p.674: "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom". Litigation -- in the public interest and for no personal advantage, especially against a wealthy opponent and under a costs regime requiring the losing party to pay the costs incurred by the victor -- has some similarity to marriage as described in the Book of Common Prayer: it 1s "not by any to be enterprized, nor taken in hand, inadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly". Lockhart J has pointed out that s.13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, which deals with the obligation for a decision-maker to give reasons, adopts the notion of "person who 1s aggrieved". Section 13 enables "any person who 1s entitled to make an application to the Court under section 5 in relation to the decision" to seek reasons. His Honour refers to the possible burden on government of too broad an entitlement to reasons. This concern was also voiced by the Law Reform Commission which recommended, in para.269 of 1ts report, that, notwithstanding its proposed liberalisation of the standing criterion used in s.5, the formula "person aggrieved" should continue to be used for s.13 purposes. The recommendation of the Law Reform Commission was only a provisional one, in the sense that the Commission suggested that 1t would be appropriate at a future date to consider the application to s.13 of any new criterion adopted for s.5. I agree that the situation ought to be monitored. If 1t should happen that an expanded reading of "person who 18s aggrieved" causes a significant increase 1n the number of applications for reasons under s.13, there may be a case for amendment of the section so as to ease any unreasonable burden. But it seems to me that this 1s highly unlikely. People without a material interest in a decision are unlikely to put themselves to the trouble of making a request for reasons unless they are, at least, giving serious thought to embarking upon legal proceedings. In practice, this means unless they are prepared to go to the trouble and expense of obtaining legal advice; without which most would be unaware of the terms of s.13. I suspect that time will prove the ground to remain as dry under the floodgate marked s.13 as under that marked s.5. The more substantial worry about a liberalised interpretation of the standing criterion used in s.5, from the policy viewpoint, 1s whether the abandonment of a requirement that the plaintiff have at risk a legal right or some material interest will lead to an inadequate presentation of the issues to the court. The courts are entitled to insist upon a plaintiff who will adequately represent the case sought to be made, in the public interest; a plaintiff who, in the words of Brennan J, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Baker v Carr (1962) 369 US 186 at p.204, has "such a personal stake 1n the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 11llumination of difficult constitutional questions". As this passage reveals Baker v Carr was a constitutional case; but, of course, the need 1s the same in any case. However, to assume that competitive instincts are aroused only by concern for material wealth would be to ignore history. Much of the progress of mankind has been achieved by people who have sacrificed their own material interests in order to champion ideals against fierce resistance. The recent Australian experience 1s that, in cases where ideologues have been able to gain access to the courts, cases have been hard fought and professionally conducted. I 10. illustrate the point by referring to ten reported cases, 1unvolving diverse issues arising in different parts of Australia and a variety of plaintiff groups: Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177, Sinclair v Maryborough Mining Warden (1975) 132 CLR 473, Benjamin v Downs [1976] 2 NSWLR 199, Attorney General (Vict); ex rel. Black v Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 146 CLR 559, Glorie v WA Chip & Pulp Co Pty Limited (1981) 39 ALR 67, Tasmanian Wilderness Society v Fraser (1982) 42 ALR 51, Kivi v Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1982) 47 LGRA 38, Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319, Fraser Island Defenders Organisation Limited v Hervey Bay Town Council (1982) 51 LGRA 94, Prineas v Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1984) 53 LGRA 160. In half of these cases the plaintiffs were wholly successful; in some others substantially so. In all of them the issues were fully and competently presented on behalf of the plaintiff. There was no want of "concrete adverseness". Reference might be added to the participation of voluntary groups in planning appeals and to the Aboriginal land cases, including Millirrpum v Nabalco Pty Limited (1970) 17 FLR 141, Koowarta, and the various Northern Territory Aboriginal land claims -- several of which have been fought to the High Court ~- in the result of which no individual plaintiff has had an interest other than as an occupant, and custodian for the time being, of traditional land. a 11. However, notwithstanding this record, cases occasionally arise in which a person who presents as plaintiff 1s manifestly incapable of representing in an adequate way the interest which he or she espouses. The answer to that problem 1s not to deny standing to the many in order to cope with the few; but rather to refuse the claim of the few on discretionary grounds. This 1s the solution which was recommended by the Law Reform Commission in its recent report. In the present case, there 1S no reason to doubt the capacity of the appellants adequately to represent the interest of those who oppose the distribution of the subject film. The adoption of the view that the Court should recognize as "a person who 1s aggrieved", for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, at least those who would, in the same cause, be accorded standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief means that the present appeal must succeed. The appellants have no difficulty in demonstrating that the issue which they seek to litigate has a significance to them, of a spiritual kind, which 1s Significantly different from the importance of the issues to members of the community generally. The facts alleged by the appellants have yet to be investigated. However, as is agreed on behalf of the respondents, they must be taken as correct for the purposes of this appeal. They include claims by the appellants that they 12. hold as tenets of their faith views about God, Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary which are denied by the subject film. Details of these alleged denials are set out in the affidavit of the second appellant, Rev. Fr. John O'Neill. Moreover, 1t is alleged, the denial takes the form of blasphemy. This means, as Lockhart J has explained, that the allegation 1s that the film makes its denials in such a scurrilous and offensive form as to pass the limits of decent controversy and to outrage the feelings of committed Christians. The appellants are committed Christians. They are susceptible, therefore, to an offence and to an outrage which would not be shared by non-believers. Upon their case they, with other believers, have suffered from the release of the film a damage different in kind from the general damage which 1s suffered by all members of the community when the law 1s breached. And this special damage arises out of matters of spiritual concern. As it happens the appellants are also priests; that 1s they are persons who have dedicated their lives and their talents to the propagation of beliefs some of which, they claim, are denied by the film. If 1t were necessary for them to do so, they would, I think, be entitled in relation to standing to rely upon the frustration of their professional activities which, on their case, the film will occasion. But I prefer not to rest my decision upon this additional factor. It seems to me that the damage they claim to sustain as Christians is enough. 13. In my opinion the appeal should be allowed. Por the appellants formidable obstacles remain. The facts have yet to be established. If the appellants' case is proved, a question will arise as to the type of relief which is now appropriate to be given, having regard to the fact that the film has been released for exhibition -- and has actually been exhibited -- un Australia. But these are matters for the trial. The appellants should be recognized as persons aggrieved by the decision of the respondents and allowed to take the matter to trial, I agree with the orders proposed by Lockhart J. I certify this and the twelve (12) preceding pages to be a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Mr Justice Wilcox. : . . onus - — 97 fit ~ Associate: _? Oe ae elles a -- — ——— io 4 Date; 13 February 1987 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R P Meagher QC with Mr D L Warren Solicitors for the Applicant: Forshaws Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mrs P Fleming QC with Mr P Comans Solicitors for the First and Second Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor Appearance for Third Respondent: Mr G Penny (Solicitor) Solicitors for Third Respondent: S D Ratner & Co Date of hearing: 24 October 1986