wee tte eves IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G38 of 1986 GENERAL DIVISTON ON APPEAL from the General Administrative Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by Deputy President A.N.Hall, Mr. G.D.Grant and Dr.A.P.Renouf BETWEEN : WILDIA ENTERPRISES PTY. LIMITED Applicant AND: COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (N.S.W. )} Respondent CORAM: FOX, WILCOX AND BURCHETT Jd.. DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1987 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (EX TEMPORE) FOX J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which had before it an application to review a decision of the Collector of Customs. The particular matter at issue is whether certain lace fabric being imported falls under an exception to item 58.09 of Schedule 3 of the Customs Tariff Act 1982. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered the matter carefully and at length. The argument before us has, it seems to me, been one rather of fact than of law and has not in truth raised a matter of law at all. The particular words which are included as an exception in item 58.09 of the Schedule are "knitted fabrics". It was not argued, as I understood, that these words had other than their natural meaning and it was sought to show nevertheless that the particular items were not knitted fabrics. This argument raised questions of fact unless one took the matter a further distance and submitted that knitted fabrics in the phrase that I have referred to meant fabrics exclusively or wholly knitted. I do not understand that there was any such submission, but in my view it would not in any event be tenable. One has to read the language according to its ordinary meaning, not necessarily governed by what any experts might think about its meaning, although of course their evidence as to what is done in relation to the method of manufacture of the fabric is a matter of proper evidence. I would only add that on the argument I see no grounds for differing from the conclusion reached by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. My fundamental stand is that the matter is not within our jurisdiction to determine as only matters of law can be heard on appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. I would therefore dismiss the appeal, as it is called in the Act, or the application as it strictly is. WILCOX J: I agree with the order proposed by the presiding Judge. It seems to me that the appeal is governed by the principles enunciated by Mason J. in Hope v. Bathurst City Council 144 C.L.R. 1 at page 7. There his Honour pointed out that, where what was in issue was a phrase or word used in its ordinary sense, the question of the application of that phrase to given facts was ordinarily one of fact and a question of law only arose where there was an issue as to whether or not the tribunal, in the particular case, had material to enable it to reach a particular finding. In this case the relevant phrase is an ordinary term and therefore the question is whether there was material which would have enabled the tribunal to reach the conclusion it did. Having regard to the evidence to which we have been taken, I think that there was ample support for the view that the Tribunal ultimately took and that, therefore, no error of law has been shown. BURCHETT. J: I agree and have little to add. The appellant contended that a knitted fabric was a fabric either wholly knitted or at least a fabric of which the distinguishing features were produced by a knitting process, but the Tribunal did not as I read its reasons reach its views by asserting any different construction of the statutory phrase. It held on the evidence that a warp knitted fabric was in fact a kind of knitted fabric and that this fabric was a warp knitted fabric. As a question of fact the evidence plainly left this conclusion open to the Tribunal. It therefore made no error of law. and D.& R. Henderson (Mfq) See Hope v. Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 C.L.R. l Pty. Ltd. v. Forbes (Collector of Customs N.S.W.), and see also when it was on appeal as reported in (1975) 49 A.L.J.R. 335, particularly passages in both the joint judgment and the judgment of McTiernan J. at page 336. (Discussion ensued) FOX J: The appeal will be dismissed with costs. Counsel for the Applicant: Solicitors for the Applicant: Counsel for the Respondent: Solicitors for the Respondent: Date of hearing: I certify that this and the three (3) preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court. Dated: 27 February 1987 Mr R Bainton Q.C. and Mr P E King Dexter Healey & Co Mr D Yates Australian Government Solicitor 27 February 1987 Sydney