Apthorpe, R.H v. The Repatriation Commission [1987] FCA 121
Federal Court of Australia
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Sudgement No. | a!R o>
CATCHWORDS
REPATRIATION - General rate pension - Degree of incapacity -
Whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal bound to have regard
to Guide to Assessment of Incapacity issued by Department -
Whether Tribunal entitled to consider degrees of incapacity
set out in Schedule 4 of Act - Failure of Tribunal also to
refer to Schedule 5.
Repatriation Act 1920 s.35, Schedules 3, 4, 5.
Re McPherson and Repatriation Commission (1985) 8 ALD 484,
Wicks v Firth [1983] 2 Ac 214, Hanning v Maitland [1970] 1 0B
580 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Trustees of Sir John
Aird's Settlement [1982] 1 WLR 270 referred to.
NSW G.81 fo 1986
ROBERT HARRY APTHORPE v_ THE REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Wilcox J
Sydney
23 March 1987
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NSW G.81 of 1986
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN: ROBERT HARRY APTHORPE
Applicant
AND: THE REPATRIATION
COMMISSION
Respondent
CORAM: WILCOX J
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE: 23 MARCH 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The question which arises upon this appeal concerns
the manner of assessing the degree of partial incapacity of a
veteran claiming benefits under the Repatriation Act 1920. I
emphasize the reference to that Act because the legislation
which has now superseded that Act, the Veterans' Entitlements
Act 1986, contains express provisions -- see ss.22 and 26-29
-- which deal with the subject matter of this case. But those
provisions are not relevant to this appeal, which questions
the legal correctness of a decision made by the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (Mr B J McMahon, Senior Member, and Mr S
Crawshaw and Dr M Thorpe, Members) under the previous
legislation.
Section 35 of the Repatriation Act provided that,
subject to an immaterial provision, "the rates of pension
payable ... are those specified in the Schedules". Schedules
1 to 5 inclusive dealt with pension rates. Schedule 1 set out
inter alia a basic pension rate payable on total incapacity,
with provision for additional payments in certain
circumstances. These included (cl.6) inability to earn a
living, in which case an additional payment was to be made.
That higher rate is often referred to as "the intermediate
rate". Schedule 2 contained provisions relating to the
Special Rate (or TPI) pension. Schedule 3 dealt with pensions
payable on death (Table A), total incapacity (Table B) and
partial incapacity (Table C). The terms of Table C are
important in the present case and should be set out:
"Rate of Pension Payable -- Such rate, being
less than the rate or the maximum rate, as the
case may be, prescribed by Table B of this
Schedule, as 1s assessed, having regard to the
nature and probable duration of the
incapacity, or in accordance with Schedules 4
and 5 in the cases to which those Schedules
apply."
Schedules 4 and 5 dealt with payments in respect of incapacity
occasioned by certain specified disabilities. Schedule 4
opened with the following words:
"The rate of pension payable to a member of the
Forces who is incapacitated by reason of a
disability specified in the first column of
this Schedule 1s a rate equal to such
percentage of the General Rate of pension to
which the member would be entitled under
Schedule 3 if he were totally incapacitated as
1s set out in the second column of this
Schedule opposite to the description of the
disability."
There followed a table containing a list of disabilities with
a figure alongside each item specifying the percentage of the
general rate to be assessed as applying to an applicant
suffering that disability.
The Tribunal also rejected the claim to a general
pension at a rate greater than 70%. Its decision to take that
course is the only matter under present challenge and, of
course, in that regard the applicant is limited to an appeal
upon a point of law: see s.44 of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal Act 1975.
In its reasons for decision the Tribunal dealt at
some length with the relationship between Mr Apthorpe's
decision to retire and his neck and knee disabilities; it
being by then common ground that the heart condition was not
war related. The Tribunal concluded that the retirement was
not caused by the war related disabilities alone. It then
turned to a consideration of the appropriate percentage of the
general rate.
The Tribunal noted that the Veterans' Review Board
had sought assistance, in making its assessment, from a
document, entitled "Guide to Assessment of Incapacity", which
was apparently used by Departmental Medical Officers in
assessing entitlements to general rate pensions. A copy of
this document is reproduced in the Appeal Papers in this
Court. It is dated February 1975; although there appear to
be some later amendments. The document states (para.3) that
the guidelines and the formulary set out in the document have
been drawn up to assist Departmental Medical Officers when
assessing incapacity, inter alia, after applications for the
grant of a pension or for an increase in a pension rate.
Paragraph 8 contains a table setting out what are called
applicant has, with for example the loss of
two or more limbs, the loss of both eyes, the
loss of one eye together with the loss of a
leg, foot, hand or arm, the loss of both arms,
the loss of both legs and so on. These are
the types of disabilities apparently intended
by Parliament to qualify for a pension at 100%
of the general rate.
Referring to similar considerations, the
Tribunal in Re McPherson noted that the loss
of an arm or hand is equated with the
rendering of such parts of the body
permanently and wholly useless. Are the
applicant's disabilities as great as these?
It 1s clear to us that the types of
disabilities suffered by the present applicant
are nowhere near as serious as the types
described in Schedule 4 that attract 100% of
the general rate. Comparing the present
disabilities insofar as they affect all
aspects of the applicant's life with those to
which we have referred, we consider that the
present assessment rate of 70% 1s a generous
one and should not be increased."
Counsel for the applicant contends that, in reaching
that conclusion, the Tribunal fell into legal error in three
respects. First, he says, the Tribunal erred in excluding
from its consideration the "Guide to Assessment of
Incapacity"; secondly, it was erroneous for the Tribunal to
have regard to Schedule 4 of the Act; and, finally, if
Schedule 4 was to be considered, the Tribunal erred in failing
also to take account of the terms of Schedule 5.
In support of the first submission counsel refers to
a number of decisions of the Tribunal in which, in the course
of the assessment of an applicant's disability, reference has
been made to the contents of the Guide. But the fact that the
Tribunal has, from time to time, referred to the Guide in
making its assessment does not help to resolve the question
whether it erred 1n rejecting its assistance in the present
Nonetheless, I do not think that it would be an error
of law for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to have
considered the terms of the Guide in a case where it thought
that this course would assist it in assessing the degree of
incapacity of a particular applicant. It is true that the
Guide was not issued pursuant to any statutory authority and
that, at the time of the Tribunal's decision, there was no
statutory provision which required that it be taken into
account in the making of an assessment. Of course, nothing in
the Guide could be allowed to derogate from any relevant
statutory provision but it seems to me that the Tribunal was
always free, 1f 1t wished, to use the document for guidance in
the difficult task of fixing a percentage appropriate to an
applicant's degree of disability. That degree has to be
expressed somewhere along a line between nil incapacity at one
extreme and total incapacity at the other. It is almost
inevitable that any assessor will consider how much worse off,
or better off, a claimant might be. If the assessor thinks it
useful, in that consideration, to refer to a previously
formulated table, setting out different degrees of incapacity,
rather than to make comparisons ad hoc, I see no error of law
in so doing. Of course, the table should remain the servant,
not the master. No table can anticipate the circumstances of
every case. In the end, after taking into consideration such
guidance as the document may furnish, the assessor must make
his or her own judgment as to the appropriate percentage.
ll.
The second submission of the applicant, that the
Tribunal erred in having regard to Schedule 4 for comparitive
purposes, is plainly untenable. Schedule 4 is part of the
statute under which the Tribunal had to assess the applicant's
degree of incapacity. It indicated the percentage of the
general rate appropriate to be applied in the cases of
the disabilities which it specifies. To that extent the
Schedule provides a legislative assessment of disability. Had
Mr Apthorpe's disabilities fallen within the Schedule, a
particular specified percentage would have applied :
automatically and by force of the Schedule. That was not the
case, as the Tribunal correctly understood. Nonetheless the
list may provide assistance in other cases. It gives some
guidance as to the degree of incapacity intended by the
Parliament in its use of the phrase "total incapacity" in
Table B of Schedule 3; which concept is picked up by Table C
of that Schedule. As Davies J pointed out in McPherson, in
ordinary parlance a person is not "totally incapacitated"
unless he or she is in a coma. But Schedule 4 helps to 'show
that, in this legislation, Parliament had in mind that a
lesser state of incapacity may be regarded as "total". It
also helps to show the type of incapacity which it had in
mind. The items specified in Schedule 4 are comparatively
few. In many cases the incapacity suffered by an applicant
will be so different from any of the items that the Schedule
will provide no more than general guidance. On other
occasions, the disability may be so close to a specified
disability -- although not itself specified -- that a direct
comparison may be made.
13.
I certify the twelve (12)
preceding pages to be a true copy of
the Reasons for Judgment of
his Honour Mr Justice Wilcox.
' e
Associate: Come, ached
Date: 23 March
'
Counsel for the Applicant:
Solicitors for the Applicant:
Counsel for the Respondent:
Solicitors for the Respondent:
Dates of hearing:
Mr I Khan
Australian Legal Aid
Office
Ms P Fleming OC with
Mr J S Hilton
Australian Government
Solicitor
4 March 1987
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