» rds 1 Limited Distribution CATCHWORDS TRADE PRACTICES — misleading or deceptive conduct - respondents establishing same business of applicants in an area where applicants have no reputation or goodwill - applicants' business name unregistered - strong evidence of infringement by respondents of applicants' copyright. - INJUNCTIONS - interlocutory — whether prospects of final success a relevant factor in balance of convenience where in a commercial sense the interlocutory application will determine the issue finally. INJUNCTIONS — interlocutory — mandatory - high degree of assurance required. Business Names Act 1962-1979 (Qld.) Trade Practices Act 1974 s.75B LINDSAY WILLIAM RONALD & ANOR. V. BRETDAY PTY. LIMITED & ORS. QLD NO.G39 of 1987 SPENDER J. BRISBANE, 24 APRIL 1987 —~ 29 aR [9g7 FEDERAL cour . AUSTRALIA. CE PRincip, REGIS pene aott IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISTON QLD. G39 of 1987 ee ee BETWEEN : LINDSAY WILLIAM RONALD and YVONNE LOWRY Applicants BRETDAY PTY. LIMITED, NORMAN EDWARD STOECKEL, JANINE MAREE ROWE, RODNEY NORMAN STOECKEL and MOYA HOLMES Respondents MINUTE OF ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER: SPENDER J. DATE OF ORDER: 24 APRIL 1987 , WHERE MADE: BRISBANE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for injunctive relief he refused. 2- The first, second and fifth respondents pay the costs of the application. NOTE: Settlement and Entry of Orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALTA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISTON QLD. G39 of 1987 BETWEEN : LINDSAY WILLIAM RONALD and YVONNE LOWRY. Applicants BRETDAY PTY. LIMITED, NORMAN EDWARD STOECKEL, JANINE MAREE ROWE, RODNEY NORMAN STOECKEL and MOYA HOLMES Respondents: DATE OF HEARING: 16 APRIL 1987 DATE JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 24 APRIL 1987 COUNSEL: for the applicants Mr. J.P... Rivett for the respondents Mr. J.C. Sheahan T. MACDERMOTT ASSOCIATE TO SPENDER J. SPENDER J. BRISBANE 24 APRIL, 1987. rm IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF" AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY QLD. G39 of 1987 GENERAL DIVISTON BETWEEN : LINDSAY WILLIAM RONALD and YVONNE LOWRY Applicants BRETDAY PTY. LIMITED, NORMAN EDWARD STOECKEL, JANINE MARER ROWE, RODNEY NORMAN STORCKEL and MOYA HOLMES Respondents SPENDER_J. BRISBANE 24 APRIL, 1987. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The applicants seek the following interlocutory orders:— 1. An order restraining the respondents from using in any way in the course of or in connection with a business or trade the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions" or any name which includes the words "Word of Mouth" or any other name which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions" or "Word of Mouth". 2. An order that the first respondent do forthwith lodge with the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs Queensland, a statement of the kind which is ordained by Section 12(3) of the Business Names Act 1962-1979 of the said State and in the form prescribed notifying the ~~ - " - fF hw TO ea said Commissioner that it has ceased to carry on business in the said State under the business name "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions".. 3. An order that the respondents do forthwith destroy upon oath all signs, notices, promotional or advertising material of any kind whatsoever, letterheads, business cards, papers or documents of any description whatsoever in their possession or in the possession of any of their servants, agents or suppliers which include the words "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions" or "Word of Mouth" or which have on them an emblem being a line drawing of a rose positioned diagonally across the page with the bloom at the top left hand side and superimposed thereon a digital telephone inside a rounded black square. 4. An order that. upon written request being made by the applicants the respondents and each of them do forthwith notify the said Commissioner for Corporate Affairs of their consent to the registration pursuant to the provisions of the Business Names Act 1962-1979 of a business name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" in the names of the applicants or their nominees. The first respondent, Bretday Pty. Limited, (""Bretday") was incorporated on 28 May 1982 and, from 6 April 1985, its registered office has been Suite 5, 10 Strathaird Road, Bundall on the Gold Coast. On 1 November 1986, Bretday applied for registration of the business name "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions" pursuant to the Business Names Act 1962-1979 (Qld.). The application states the nature of the business to be business promotions. Originally, the place of business in Queensland was said to be Argyle Place, Argyle Street, Breakfast Creek,. Brisbane, but that place of business has been altered to Office 3, 27 Stoneham Road, Stones Corner, Brisbane. it ' if' 3. The application dated 1 November 1986, signed by the second respondent, the Managing Director of Bretday, states that the business commenced on 11 October 1986. The business name was registered on 1 December 1986. The third and fourth respondents' are directors of Bretday. Norman Edward Stoeckel, the second respondent, in his affidavit says that the third and fourth respondents, Janine Maree Rowe and Rodney Norman Stoeckel, are directors of Bretday but "have at no stage been personally involved in the running of the business of 'Word of Mouth Public Relations'." There is no other evidence to suggest that they have been involved in any way in the events the subject of these proceedings. Counsel for the applicants submitted that it is an irresistible inference from their being directors of Bretday that the third and fourth respondents are caught by the provisions of s.75B of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Section 75B provides:- "A reference in this Part to a person involved in a contravention of a provision of Part IV or V shall be read as a reference to a person who - (a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; (b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; (c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or (d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention." vehaapows - 4. Concerning this provision, Gibbs C.J. in. Fencott v. Muller (1982-1983) 152 C.L.R. 570, at p.584; (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 317, at p.321, said:— "By the combined provisions of ss.. 75B and 82, the Parliament has made natural persons liable in damages for a contravention by the corporation only if they have been involved in the manner described by s. 75B, which, in my opinion, refers to a close rather than a remote involvement in the contravention. In the most general words of $.75B, those of par.(c), the word 'knowingly' significantly confines the operation of the provision." In Yorke v. Lucas (1983) 80 F.L.R. 143, the Full Court of the Federal Court, constituted by Bowen C.d., Lockhart and Beaumont JJ., said at p.152:- "The phrase 'knowingly concerned in' (s.75B(c)) plainly requires a mental element, namely, knowledge of the relevant facts: see Mallan v. Lee (1949) 80 C.L.R. 198 at 211. f The act of conspiring with others to effect a contravention (s. 75B(d)) necessarily involves an element of intention, requiring an agreement between two or more people to effect a proscribed act. We can discern no reason why Parliament would have intended that a section which renders natural persons liable for a contravention by a corporation should require some mental element or absence of innocence in every case to which it refers except one which itself requires in its first limb that the person was 'knowingly' concerned in the contravention. This is especially so when the word 'party' is found in accessory provisions of criminal legislation such as s. 5 of the Crimes Act 1914. The words 'party to the contravention' necessarily connote, in our view, that a person assents to or concurs "in the conduct which constitutes the contravention. He must therefore know or be aware of the essential facts or matters which must he proved to establish the "contravention." y waL * Vewe And later the Court said:— "In our opinion, the words 'party to the contravention' refer to a person who participates in, or assents to the contravention in question. To be regarded as participating in or assenting, such a person must actually or constructively be aware of the elements constituting the contravention. To our minds, it is not sufficient to render an individual. liable if he is shown to be aware of some only of those elements. Where the contravention in question relates to engaging in trade or commerce in conduct that is misleading, one of the elements involved is that the conduct is misleading. If a person sued under s. 82 for damages as a person involved in the contravention is umaware of the essential facts and matters constituting the contravention, then he lacks knowledge of an essential element of the contravention. He cannot, in our view, in those circumstances, be regarded as a party to the contravention (cf. Guthrie v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach Pty.Ltd. (1977) 30 F.L.R. 116 at 119-120, but see Taperell, Vermeesch & Harland Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (2nd ed), p.604)." On appeal to the High Court, (Yorke v. Gucas (1985) C.L.R. 661) the joint judgment of Mason A.C.J., Wilson, Deane and. Dawson JJ., included at p.670:- "There can be no uestion that a person cannot he q a P . knowingly concerned in a contravention unless he has knowledge of the essential facts constituting the contravention. In our view, the proper construction of par. (c) requires a party to a contravention to be an intentional participant, the necessary intent being based upon knowledge of the essential elements of the contravention." Brennan J. was of the same view. He said, at p.673:~- "The provisions of s. 75B should therefore be construed as though they were defining the persons criminally liable. for contraventions of the' 6.. provisions of Pt.IV and s. 52 and for offences created by the other provisions of Pt. V." And later, "Construing s. 75B in that way, civil liability is imposed only on those who, if the particular contravention in Pt.IV or Pt.V were an offence, would be held criminally liable for it. Civil liability is thus imposed only on those who engage in the conduct prescribed by s. 75B with the state of mind which the criminal law calls mens rea." In my opinion, it is impermissible to infer that a person is knowingly concerned in a contravention by a company of the provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 or has aided, counselled, abetted, procured, induced, or has conspired with others to effect a contravention from the mere fact that that person 1s a director of that company. The fifth respondent is an employee of the first respondent and has actively engaged in its activities. There is some evidence that she has seriously slandered the business of the applicants, but no relief is sought directly on this account. The applicants, from September 1986, operated a telephone canvassing -business under the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" from premises sub-leased from the second respondent on the Gold Coast. The business name under which this business operated was unregistered, The applicants describe the nature of the business in this way:- gy e 7. "Ours is a promotional and marketing business. We reach an agreement with one er two local businesses normally involved in the hair and beauty, printing or automotive services whereby' they offer a package to potential customers at a reduced rate. The standard package which we seek to negotiate is- a combination of hair treatment and. beauty treatment totalling $300.00 in value and this is offered to potential' customers for $50.00. We canvass telephone subscribers in a particular area and sell the package for $50 which. is a fee payable to us. No other fee-is payable. by the business. The benefit provided to the business is the additional custom they obtain from the new customers we attract and the probability that these customers will become regular customers of the business." In conducting this business, a survey of the area for appropriate businesses is made, agreements entered into with businesses for the marketing of services on their behalf, and a standard agreement 1s signed by the parties. The applicants then organise the printing of promotional brochures setting out the services on offer. The brochures are consecutively numbered 1-300 so a proper record can be maintained of the sales made; the brochure printed by the applicants has a logo, being a line drawing of a rose with a bloom on the top left hand side, superimposed on which is a digital telephone enclosed in a rounded black square. Staff are then employed as telephone operators to telephone members of the public in the promotion of the offer. At the present time in the conduct of the business at Mooloolaba on the Sunshine Coast of Queensland, the applicants have ten telephones operating from 4.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. Monday to Friday, and Saturday morning from 9.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. After the 300 sales have been made, the same procedure is followed in respect of different businesses. The technique they say has been developed by themselves and has been used successfully and profitably by them since 1983. The applicants initially commenced operating in Sydney under the name "Sungrid Market Developers", which was a registered business name. The applicants operated the business in Sydney until November, 1985, when they left and commenced business in Melbourne under the business name "Word of Mouth". That business was operated for approximately six months in Melbourne, whereupon the applicants returned to Sydney in about dune 1986. The Sydney business was sold during September 1986 for $25,000.00. In September 1986, the applicants commenced business under the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" on the Gold Coast in premises subleased from the second respondent at 10 Strathaird Road, Bundall, using the same brochures that had previously been devised. At that time, the second respondent was operating a publishing business from that address and the fifth respondent was operating a publishing business called "Buyers Guide" out of the same address. The applicants say that in October 1986, they had a conversation at the Bundall office with Norman Edward StoeckeL - and with Moya Holmes, the second and fifth respondents. ¥vonne - ae Sg. Lowry in her affidavits says that she told the respondents that the applicants intended to commence business in Brisbane as soon Z as they could. On 25 November 1986, the applicants posted an ' application form for reservation of the business name "Word of ° Mouth Public Relations". They depose to the fact that they were told by the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs that the name was not available as "Word of Mouth Public Relations/Promotions" had already been registered by the first respondent on the application of the second respondent. On L December they say that they could then only register the name "Advertising by Word of Mouth". That business name was registered in January 1987. ' On 1 December 1986, the applicants sold the Gold Coast business for $25,000.00. In their affidavit they say that they agreed to allow the purchasers to use the name "Advertising by Word of Mouth" or, "if we could obtain it 'Word of Mouth Public Relations' in the area covered by the '075' telephone prefix." The applicants say that they were told by Mr. StoeckeL on 20 December 1986, that the name "Word of Mouth" had been registered and "we have your promotional material which we got from your office". They say that they left the Gold Coast with the intention of setting up business in Brisbane and on the fa Sunshine Coast. On 27 January 1987, the applicants commenced business on the Sunshine Coast at 77 The Esplanade, Mooloolaba, after moving to the Sunshine Coast on 24 December 1986. The business commenced as "Word of Mouth Public Relations" and operated under 10. that name until approximately early March, when the name was changed to "Advertising by Word of Mouth" because, as they say, the only name they could. register was "Advertising by Word of Mouth" and the applicants realised that they should only operate under the registered name. On 26 February 1987, the applicants commenced business in Brisbane, operating out of an office at Strathpine. The operation of the business in Brisbane is facilitated by access to telephone listings arranged by computer by a firm called Micromations into geographical groupings. The respondents have been operating in Brisbane under the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" at 27 Stoneham Street, Stones Corner, since the second week of December 1986. The second respondent, Mr. Stoeckel, says that, shortly after the applicants commenced the business "Word of Mouth Public Relations" from the premises of Bretday on the Gold Coast, they negotiated for its sale. He says that:-— "I had applied to the Corporate Affairs Office in Brisbane for registration of the name of "Word of Mouth Public Relations" in the name of the company Bretday Pty. Ltd. at about this time. In registering the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" in Queensland Bretday Pty. itd. believed that it had the right to use that name for a business which it intended to set up in Brisbane." It is clear that, in the operation which the respondents commenced in Brisbane in December 1986, not only did they "copy: the business technique which had been developed by the ne . 2 ee ee ¢ - 7 - _oysN 2? - ete ~ on eer rey - . . bal . ~ 11. applicants, but more seriously and more importantly, they quite slavishly copied the promotional material and other Literature in which the applicants had. copyright. As regards the relief claimed by the applicants based. on breaches of copyright, the respondents, at the hearing, gave an undertaking to the Court in terms of the relief claimed in paragraph 3 of the Notice of Motion. It seems clear beyond argument that the use of such material by the respondents at the same time as the applicants were carrying on a business in Brisbane using that material, was conduct which would clearly constitute a contravention of s.52 and would indicate at least an association between those two businesses. As a consequence of the undertaking given by the respondents, all that remains to be determined is whether the applicants are entitled to prevent the respondents using the name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" in association with their telephone canvassing business in Brisbane. There is no monopoly on ideas. However one might disagree with the business morality of the respondents in appropriating the business ideas and techniques developed by the applicants, and however one might think that that conduct really amounts to "reaping where they haven't sown", in my opinion there was no lawful impediment to the respondents setting up an identical business in Brisbane to that which the applicants were aha 12. operating on the Gold Coast. The: business is essentially local. At the core of its operation is the method of telephone canvassing for customers for local businesses. Inherent in the operation is the requirement that the telephoning be confined to a single STD district. I am not satisfied that at the time the respondents set up their business in Brisbane, there was reposing in the applicants any goodwill or reputation in the words "Word of Mouth Public Relations" in the Brisbane area. This conclusion is determinative of the narrow issue left for adjudication. Deane and Fitzgerald JJ. said in Taco Company of Australia Inc. v. Taco Bell Pty.Ltd. (1982) 42 A.L.R. 177 at p.202:- "Irrespective of whether conduct produces or is likely to produce confusion or misconception, it cannot, for the purposes of s.52, be categorized as misleading or deceptive unless it contains or conveys, in all the circumstances of the case, a misrepresentation. The difficulty which will commonly arise in as.52 case is in determining whether the conduct contains or conveys, in all the circumstances, a misrepresentation ..." They then advanced a number of propositions as affording guidance, the first two of which are relevant in the circumstances of this case. Their Honours said:- "First, it is necessary to identify the relevant section (or sections) of the public (which may be the public at large) by reference to whom the. question of whether conduct is, or is likely to be, misleading or deceptive falls to he tested (Weitmann v. Katies Ltd. (1977) 29 FLR 336, per. Franki J. at 339-40, cited with approval. by Bowen an . Ghee Wie - SENMAL ET. 13. CJ and. Franki J in Brock v. Terrace Times Pty. Ltd. (1982) 40 ALR 97 at 99; [C1982] ATPR 40-267 at 43,412). Second, once the relevant section of the public is established, the matter is to be considered by reference to all who come within it, 'including the astute and the gullible, the intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well educated as. well as the poorly educated, men and women of various ages pursuing a variety of vocations': Puxu Pty.Ltd. v. Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty. Ltd. (1980) 31 ALR 73, per Lockhart J. at 93: see also World Series Cricket v. Parish, supra, per Brennan J. (16 ALR at 203)." At the time the business was set up in Brisbane by the respondents, it is not open on the present evidence to conclude that any relevant section of the public would be likely to be misled or deceived by the conduct of the respondents in carrying on their business. The complaint of the applicants, in their counsel's forceful submission, is that the respondents 'stole' the business of the applicants. While in the colloquial sense that might be true, there was in my view no business in Brisbane of the applicants at any relevant time such as to preclude the respondents lawfully from carrying ona telephone canvassing business, identical with that which the applicants carried on at the Gold Coast, in Brisbane, provided the applicants' copyright was not infringed. As to the failure by the applicants to register the business name "Word of Mouth Public Relations" used in the business conducted on the Gold Coast, I respectfully agree with, the conclusion of Jenkinson J. in Aspar Autobarn Co-operative ~- Fy "mehr 14. Society Ltd. vw. Dovala Pty.Ltd. £19863 ATPR 40-727, where his Honour concluded that registration by the respondents of the expression "Autobarn" did not afford in itself an answer tc the claim that the use of that word had constituted breaches of ss.52, 53(c) or 53(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974. In that case, his Honour concluded that the reputation and goodwill for the protection of which the applicants had sought the Court's exercise of its injunctive power,.did not owe their existence, although substantial enhancement of their values was owed, to deliberate contraventions of the Business Names Act 1962 (Vic.) by the applicants. His Honour concluded at p.47,939 that, in ail the circumstances of this particular case, the consequences of those contraventions were not of a kind which could have constituted a substantial impediment to the granting of interlocutory injunctive relief. In Epitoma Pty.Ltd. v. Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union and Others (No.2) (1984) 54 A.L.R. 730, the Full Court of the Federal Court (Sheppard, Morling and Beaumont JJ.) held, at p.734:- "In an application for an interlocutory injunction, the court must inquire first whether there is a serious question to be tried (see Australian Coarse Grain Pool Pty.Ltd. v. Barley Marketing Board of Queensland (1982) 46 ALR 398; 57 ALJR 425; Tableland Peanuts Pty.Ltd. Vv. Peanut Marketing Board (1984) 52 ALR 651; 58 ALJR 283, per Brennan J. at 284)." In cases of this kind, — the applications for interlocutory relief are often substantially determinative of the ' wep ot - final issue. In my opinion, wheré that' is the case, that is a 15- factor which has to be considered in assessing the balance of convenience. In N.W.L. Ltd. v. Woods £19793 1W.L.R. 1294, Lord Diplock at p. 1306 said:— "My Lords, when properly understood, there is in my view nothing in the decision of this House in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. £19753 A.c. 396 to suggest that in considering whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction the judge ought not to give full weight to all the practical realities of the situation to which the injunction will apply. American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., which enjoins the judge upon an application for an interlocutory injunction to direct his attention to the balance of convenience as soon as he has satisfied himself that there is a serious question to be tried, was not dealing with a case in which the grant or refusal of an injunction at that stage would, in effect, dispose of the action ' finally in favour of whichever party was ' successful in the application, because there would be nothing left on which it was in the unsuccessful party's interest ta proceed to trial." ¢ He later said at p. 1307:- "Where, however, the grant or refusal of the interlocutory injunction will have the practical effect of putting an end to the action because the harm that will have been already caused to the losing party by its grant or its refusal is complete and of a kind for which money cannot constitute any worthwhile recompense, the degree of likelihood that the plaintiff would have succeeded in establishing his right to an injunction if the action had gone to trial, is a factor to be brought into the balance by the judge in weighing the risks that injustice may result from his deciding the application one way rather than the other." In Pacific Hotels Pty.Ltd. Vv. Asian Pacific International Utd. £19861 ATPR "40-730, I 'referred to this , question and a number of. cases," particularly those™"passing. off" ~ ete Se Tvs ow . ' coo iN & iad ie i * Brkt cases where the practical commercial realities refusal of an interlocutory application are considered as 16, of the. grant or being relevant in determining the balance of convenience aspect of the application: see also the observations of lord Denning M.R. Fellowes & Son v. Fisher £19761 1 Q.B. 122 at pp. 133-5. in In this case, the applicants seek inter alia mandatory injunctions. In State of Queensland v. Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 A.L.R. 243, Gibbs C.J. said at 245:- "It is a very nice question where the balance of convenience lies in the present case but in the end two considerations have inclined me in favour of the view that I ought not to grant = an interlocutory injunction at the present stage. The first of those considerations is that what is sought is a mandatory injunction. In Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris 019701 A.C. 652, the House of Lords held that the grant of a mandatory injunction is never made as of course and that a factor to be taken into consideration is that the defendant has not behaved unreasonably but only wrongly. According to Halsbury's Laws of England vol. 24, para 948, the position regarding the grant of a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application is as follows: 'A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing, but, in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, if the case is clear and one which the court thinks ought to be- decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one which can easily be remedied, or if the defendant attempts to steal a march on the plaintiff, such as where, on receipt of notice that an injunction is about to be applied for, the defendant hurries on the work in respect of which complaint is made so that when he receives notice of an interim injunction it is completed, a mandatory .injunction will. he granted on an interlocutory application.' Megarry J. stated the principle in Shepherd 'Homes Ltd. v. Sandham ~ C19714 1 Ch. 340 at 351, in. the 2 aNd 17. following words: *~...on motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court is far more reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction than it would be to grant a comparable prohibitory injunction. In a normal case the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear tht the injunction was rightly granted; and this is a higher standard than is required for a prohibitory injunction.' In my view this case lacks the high degree of assurance that should exist for the grant of a mandatory injunction. The present position is that each party has registered a business name which includes the phrase "Word of Mouth" and each party is able to carry on the business of telephone canvassing for local businesses under a name which includes that phrase. In my opinion, the applicants have not established that they had a reputation or goodwill in the Brisbane area in that name at any relevant time so as to he entitled to prevent the respondents from carrying on business under a name incorporating that phrase. , For the reasons I have given, I refuse the application for injunctive relief. Notwithstanding that I refuse the relief sought by the applicants, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the conduct of the respondents prior to the making of the present application and the undertaking in respect of the claims in copyright, I think the appropriate order to make by way of costs is that the first, second and fifth respondents pay the costs of the application. ! certify that this and the iS preceding . "pages, are etre copy of the reasons for | - , : "=fudgment herein of His Honour - - . ae "Mr. Justice Spender eDeat : ne : [23a hae ~ Associate woe ~ ' ree ° - foagn os: wets ae ae >, Dated a rw Tae awe