Adamson & Anor v The ANI Corporation Ltd, (trading as Capital Motors) [1987] FCA 485
Federal Court of Australia
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TUBQMENT NoA8S nena
LIMITED DILSTRIBUTLON
CATCHWORDS
Trade Practices Act, s.52 - Practice & Procedure - Application to
strike out - Limitation period under s.82.
Trade Practices Act 1974, s.52
ADAMSON & ANOR. -V- THE ANI CORPORATION LIMITED trading as
CAPITOL MOTORS
NSW G. 136 of 1987
Burchett J.
Sydney
7 September 1987
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G.136 of 1987
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GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
ROBERT ADAMSON
First Applicant
AND:
DOROTHY HEWETT LILLEY
Second Applicant
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THE ANI CORPORATION
LIMITED trading as
CAPITOL MOTORS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.
This is a motion on notice to strike out a statement of
claim. Originally, the applicants sued three respondents, but on
22 May 1987 I ordered that the claims against two of them be
struck out. The motion was then argued on behalf of the
respondent The ANI Corporation Limited.
The statement of claim 1s not very precisely pleaded,
but the respondent's motion was argued only upon the grounds
which will appear. The applicants allege that the respondent, in
the course of its business as a motor dealer, displayed in its
2.
showroom a second hand motor vehicle with a placard indicating
that the vehicle was for sale at a particular price. The
applicants negotiated to purchase the vehicle for $15,990-00, but
instead of actually doing so, they agreed with the respondent
that the transaction would be completed by a lease finance
arrangement under which the vehicle would be transferred to
Australian Guarantee Corporation Limited by the respondent and
leased from that company by the applicants. The transaction was
carried out and the applicants obtained possession of the motor
car. These events occurred in May 1983, but in March 1987, when
the lease was about to expire and the property in the motor car
was about to be obtained by the applicants, the vehicle was
seized by the police. The applicants claim that it had been
stolen prior to their acquisition of it, and that the respondent
did not have property in it and was not entitled to sell it at
any material time. They claim (inter alia) damages for breach of
s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and for breach of contract.
Both of these claims are based on the proposition that the
display of the motor car for sale in the respondent's showroom,
and the negotiations entered into for its sale by a salesman of
the respondent, involved an implied representation that the motor
car was the property of the respondent, or that the respondent
was entitled to sell it and in a position to confer a good title
to it pursuant to such an arrangement as that in fact entered
into.
The motion to strike out the statement of claim was
supported on two grounds: firstly, that the facts pleaded could
not give rise to the implied representation alleged; and secondly
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3.
that the claim under the Trade Practices Act was barred by virtue
of s.82(2) of the Act which requires an action under (inter alia)
Part V to be commenced "within 3 years after the date on which
the cause of action accrued."
As to the first argument, I can see no substance in it
at all. I think it would clearly be open to a Judge hearing this
matter to conclude from the display of the motor car as for sale
in the respondent's showroom, and the subsequent negotiations in
which a sale price was fixed, that the representations alleged
were impliedly made; indeed I have some difficulty in
understanding how a contrary view could be entertained. That
display for sale at a price at least infers some such
representation seems to me to be confirmed by the analysis of the
problems involved from the point of view of the theory of offer
and acceptance in contract law in Fisher v. Belli [1961] 1 Q.B.
394.
The respondent's second ground encounters the obstacle
that it has been expressly held on more than one occasion that it
is not appropriate that a statement of claim be struck out
summarily as disclosing no cause of action because the parties
sued may have a defence under a relevant limitation statute:
James v. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1985) 7
A.T.P.R. 46,574; Geary Nominees Pty Ltd v. Pargas Nominees Pty
Ltd (1986) 8 A.T.P.R. 47,898; Elna Australia Pty Ltd v.
International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd (Gummow Jd.,
unreported, 16 July 1987).
4.
At the hearing, it will be necessary to determine when
time commenced to run for the purposes of s.82, and it will then
be pertinent to consider the cases cited by Gummow J. in the
decision last referred to and also the dictum of Spender J. in
Ikin v. Same & Lamborghini Tractors of Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 7
A.T.P.R. 46,812 at 46,823:
"In my opinion, the entitlement to damage
under sec.82 of the Act does not arise at a
stage where there is a potentiality of loss:
the statutory cause of action arises only
when the damage occurs."
But even if the applicants' case under the Trade Practices Act 15s
ultimately held to be barred, there can be no doubt in the light
of the authorities to which I have referred that it could not be
stigmatized as a case so insubstantial as not to give rise to a
federal matter. Therefore, under the accrued jurisdiction, the
applicants might still succeed on their claim in contract. (See
Dorotea Pty Ltd v. Vancleve Pty Ltd (Northrop, Jackson & Gummow
JJ., unreported, 15 April 1987).) On the face of the matter,
that claim appears to be strong.
For these reasons, the motion must be dismissed with
costs. I direct that the Registrar list the suit on a convenient
Wednesday in November in the Part V list for further directions.
I certify that this and the
preceding three (3) pages are
a true copy of the Reasons for
Judgment herein of his Honour
Mr. Justice Burchett.
Leo
tile Associate
Dated: 7 September, 1987.
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Counsel for the Applicants:
Solicitors for the Applicants:
Solicitors for the Respondent:
Date of hearing:
Mr. C.A. Evatt
Teakle, Ormsby
Associates
Mallesons Stephen Jagues
22 May 1987
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