JUDGMENT No. 5.15/81. CATCHWORDS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Abuse of process - Entry of order in face Of notice of motion to vary or set aside the order - Party by entering order seeking "ulterior" or "collateral advantage" - Power of Court to set aside or vary order once entered and sealed generally. Federal Court Rules; 0 35 r 7. 0 36 r 8 T.J.M, PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES) Applicant - and - A. & P. TYRES PTY. LTD. (trading as STEEL TYRE CO) First Respondent First Respondent BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. EQUIPMENT S.A.) Second Respondent KEITH JAMES PARKES Third Respondent WILHELMINA MARIA ELIZABETH PARKES Fourth Respondent BRUCE SAMPSON Fifth Respondent TERENCE JOHN GAVIN Sixth Respondent MICHAEL GLADWICH Seventh Respondent AND BETWEEN: A.R.B. ENGINEERING PTY. LTD. and BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. trading as A.R.B. PRODUCTS Cross Claimants - and - T.J3.M. PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. trading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES Cross Respondent CORAM: FISHER J. ADELAIDE 23 OCTOBER 1987 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION ) ) } No. SA G24 of 1986 ) ) BETWEEN: T.J.M. PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES ) Applicant - and - A. & P. TYRES PTY. LTD. (trading as STEEL TYRE CO.) First Respondent - and - BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. EQUIPMENT S.A.) Second Respondent - and - KEITH JAMES PARKES Third Respondent - and - WILHELMINA MARIA ELIZABETH PARKES Fourth Respondent - and - BRUCE SAMPSON Fifth Respondent - and - 2. TERENCE JOHN GAVIN Sixth Respondent - and - MICHAEL GLADWICH Seventh Respondent AND BETWEEN: A.R.B. ENGINEERING PTY. LTD. and BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. PRODUCTS) Cross Claimants - and - T.J.M. PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES) Cross Respondent MINUTES OF ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER WHERE MADE DATE OF ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT: The entry and sealing of 1987 be struck out. The motion be set down : FISHER J. : ADELAIDE 23 OCTOBER 1987 the order herein made 27 March for further submissions from counsel on the question of the costs of the proceedings. The costs of the motion be reserved. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION ) ) } No. SA G24 of 1986 ) BETWEEN: T.J.M. PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. Ttrading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES) Applicant - and - A. & P, TYRES PTY. LD. trading as STEEL TYRE CO.) First Respondent - and - BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. EQUIPMENT S.A.) Second Respondent - and - KEITH JAMES PARKES Third Respondent - and - WILHELMINA MARIA ELIZABETH PARKES Fourth Respondent - and - BRUCE SAMPSON Fifth Respondent - and - TERENCE JOHN GAVIN Sixth Respondent - and - MICHAEL GLADWICH Seventh Respondent AND BETWEEN: A.R.B. ENGINEERING PTY. LTD. and BRIGALOW PARK PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. PRODUCTS) Cross Claimants - and - T.J.M. PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. (trading as A.R.B. VEHICLE ACCESSORIES) Cross Respondent CORAM: Fisher J. 23 October 1987 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT This is a matter arising out of long and complex litigation between corporate rivals, primarily under s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the Act"). At the relevant time the applicant, which was cross-respondent to the principal proceedings and is respondent to the motion presently before the Court ("TJM"), was a manufacturer and retailer of four wheel drive accessories, trading in South Australia only in a retailing capacity, at 144 Magill Road, Norwood. The respondents and _ the cross—claimants to the principal proceedings (together referred to hereafter as "ARB") were variously a manufacturer and retailer and the South Australian distributors of four wheel drive accessories whose activities in the State centred around 114 Magill Road, Norwood. It is appropriate that the nature of the principal proceedings in which I handed down judgment on 27 March 1987 be described briefly. I take the following passages from my reasons {as yet unreported). At page 3 - "The relief sought by the various parties, as specified prior to commencement of addresses, can be shortly stated as follows: T.J.M. which allegedly was carrying on business under the name A.R.B. Vehicles Accessories sought orders against the respondents, and Brigalow Park in particular, restraining them from conducting a business in South Australia selling products under the name of A.R.B. Products or A.R.B. or using those letters other than in displaying a logo not greater than a specified size. It also sought a like order restraining them from orally representing that their business was known as A.R.B. Vehicle Accessories or A.R.B. generally. It did not seek any relief against A.R.B. Engineering. In the cross claim orders were sought restraining T.J.M. from carrying on business or selling its products by reference to the letters A.R.B. or the A.R.B. logo. An order was also sought restraining T.J.M. from selling A.R.B. products as T.J.M. products. Each claim was based on alleged contraventions of the Act and passing off. These competing claims evidence the fact that the contest centred on the use by the parties of the letters A.R.B. and the A.R.B. logo." At p.10 - "T.3.M named five natural persons as additional respondents to its proceedings. Mr. Parkes and his wife, the third and fourth respondents, were directors of Brigalow Park and alleged to be persons involved in that company's contravention of 5.52 of the Act. The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents who had formally (sic) been employees of T.J.M. and now as employees of Brigalow Park were also alleged to be involved in that contravention." "A further cause of action was however propounded against the latter respondents, namely that as employees of Brigalow Park they had made use of confidential information in approaching customers of T.J.M.'s business." In handing down judgment I made the following orders: "l. The application and cross-claim herein be dismissed. 2. There be no order as to costs." In my reasons I found that none of the corporate litigants had contravened the Act nor had passing off been made out as alleged in either the application or the cross-claim. Plainly, also, on those findings none of the natural persons named as respondents were found to be persons aiding or abetting any contravention of the Act. On the claim of breach of confidential information, upon a notice of motion filed by the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents seeking dismissal of the claim, I found that the Court had no jurisdiction, such claims not falling "within the scope of one controversy" as they did not arise out of a "common substratum of facts" with the principal claims. (See Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 C.L.R. 570; 46 A.L.R. 41). On these findings, the natural persons named as respondents to the application, all of whom were either directors or employees of one or another of the corporate' respondents, together with one of the corporate respondents, A & P Tyres Pty. Ltd., closely allied with its fellow respondents, were the only wholly successful respondents. None of these persons were separately represented. The claims of all of the other litigants involved were unsuccessful. Further, the litigation had, in my opinion, corporate rivalry as its essence, neither side apparently primarily concerned with the prevention of misleading or deceptive representations to the public as consumers but rather their concern was directed towards the end of business advantage. This motive behind the litigation, whilst irrelevant with respect to the substantive matters between the parties, may nevertheless be pertinent to the exercise of my discretion with respect to costs. The matter had, after a lengthy hearing, crystallized in my mind as rivalry between the two principal protagonists, TJM Products Pty. Ltd. and ARB Engineering Pty. Ltd, and the primary conclusion I had reached was that neither was entitled to the relief it sought. In the end with all these factors in mind I came to the following conclusions in my reasons with respect to costs. "On the question of costs it seems to me appropriate in all the circumstances, particularly regarding the fact that none of the parties have succeeded on its or their principal claims, that there be no order as to costs of any party." At the appointed time for delivery of judgment on 27 March 1987 no person attended on behalf of A.R.B. or any of the respondents and the order was made in their absence. On 6 April 1987 A.R.B., by its Adelaide solicitors, filed a notice of motion seeking the following orders: "1. That the Order as to costs herein of His Honour Mr. Justice Fisher made on 27 March 1987 ("the order") be varied or set aside. 2. That the order be varied or terminated by a supplementary order as to costs. 3. That the time for any appeal against the decision of His Honour Mr. Justice Fisher of 27 March 1987 be extended to 21 days after the hearing and determination of this Motion. 4. Such other orders as the Court may deem appropriate." The notice of motion indicated that it was to be heard on 9 April 1987 and was served on the same day as it was filed, namely 7 April 1987. An affidavit in support of this notice of motion was sworn by Peter William Penno, a Melbourne solicitor, on 8 April 1987. By a further affidavit, sworn on 29 April 1987, Mr. Penno deposed that the Adelaide solicitors for A.R.B. had served the notice of motion on the solicitors for T.J.M. on 7 April 1987. The affidavit in support of the motion had not been filed to this time nor was it served with the notice of motion. Mr. Penno then continued in his affidavit that his Adelaide solicitors had received on 8 April 1987 a letter from the solicitors for T.J.M., the text of which is here set out. "Dear Sirs, 8 April 1987 Re: TUM Products Pty. Ltd. vs ARB Engineering Pty. Ltd. In relation to your client's notice of motion which is to be heard before Fisher J. on the 9th April, 1987 we advise that we will be contesting the motion. Our first point is that the notice is incompetent in that it is not supported by affidavit. Our second point is that we did not not receive proper notice in order that we could properly respond. We also advise that we will be attending at the Registry of the Federal Court in order to enter the order made by Fisher J. in this matter." Mr. Penno then deposed that later in the day of 8 April 1987 his Adelaide agents were served with a sealed copy of the order made by me on 27 March 1987. It was common ground that prior to service of the notice of motion no steps had been' taken by any of the parties lodge a draft order or to have that order settled and entered in accordance with Order 36 of the Rules of this Court ("the Rules"). The sealed order was dated as entered on 8 April 1987. Further Counsel for T.J.M. did not dispute that the plain inference to be drawn from the evidence before me was that the order was caused to be lodged and entered by their solicitors on that day, after they had been served with the notice of motion. It was submitted that the entry was entirely in accordance with 0 36 rc 8(1) of the Rules. On 9 April 1987 the affidavit in support of the motion, deposing mainly to an appropriate apportionment of the costs as between claim and cross-claim, was filed and served and the parties appeared before me on the motion. I made no substantive order on the motion on that occasion, however, but adjourned the matter 60 that, among other considerations, the parties, especially the respondent to the motion 1T.J.M. served with the affidavit in support only that day, had further time to prepare full argument to put before me on the issues arising on the motion and in particular on the jurisdiction or power of the Court to vary my order at this stage. Further I made various orders regarding the filing of affidavits, the attendance of deponents of those affidavits for cross-examination and the Gelivery of lists of authorities. An order was made extending the time for appeal to 21 days after the hearing and determination of the motion or further order. The matter came before me again on 24 and 25 August 1987, on which occasion the parties addressed me only on the question of the jurisdiction or power of this Court to vary or set aside its own order in the circumstances. It is to this issue only that these reasons are addressed, the question as_ to any appropriate variation of the order for costs, should I find such jurisdiction, being adjourned to another time. Counsel for the applicants on the _ motion, A.R.B. addressed the court first on 0 35 r 7 of the Rules. The rule reads as follows: "7. (1) The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order before it has been entered. (2) The Court, where it is not exercising its appellate or related jurisdiction under Division 2 of Part III of the Act, may if it thinks fit vary or set aside a judgment or order after the order has been entered where - (a) the order has been made in the absence of a party, whether or not the absent party is in default of appearance or otherwise in default and whether or not the absent party had notice of the motion for the order; (b) the order was obtained by fraud; (c) the order is interlocutory; (d) the order is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; (e) the order does not reflect the intention of the Court; or (£) the party in whose favour the order was made consents. (3). A clerical mistake in a judgment or order, or an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or ommission, may at any time be corrected by the Court. (4). Sub-rule (2) shall not affect the power of the Court to vary or terminate the operation of an order by a supplementary order." Counsel sought to rely on sub-rule (1) of O 35 r 7 on the basis that either the motion ought to be considered in the light of the facts as they were when the motion was first properly before the Court or alternatively that the entry of the order in the face of the motion before the Court was done to thwart the Court's jurisdiction to vary or set aside its order and ought to be struck out as an abuse of the Court's process. In the alternative counsel sought to rely on paragraphs (a) and (e) of sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (4) as heads of power under which the order could be varied or set aside after it had been entered and sealed. In a later address counsel for A.R.B. also made submissions relying on sub-rule (3) of rule 7, especially in regard to the order for costs as it applied to the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents in the principal proceedings. Several initial objections were raised by counsel for T.J.M. relying on firstly, the absence of a supporting affidavit to the notice of motion upon service of the latter (0 19 r 1(2)) and second, there being less than 3 days between service and the 10. date fixed for the motion (0 19 r 3) and no abridgement of time for such service. Upon consideration of 0 19 of the Rules I have found no requirement that an affidavit ultimately supporting the motion be served with the notice of motion. Instead I was referred to 0 14 fr 7(1), wherein a supporting affidavit is required to be served within "a reasonable time before the occasion for using it arises". To the extent that 019 r3o0r0O 14 © 7(1) may not have been complied with, however, I dispense with any such compliance pursuant to 01 r 8. I consider this appropriate in circumstances such as these where the matter was adjourned for some time and in the interim orders were made inter alia for the filing and service of further affidavit material. Before moving to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court some preliminary attempt, subject to any submissions to be put to me at a later date, ought to be made to identify any error, omission or failure in the exercise of my discretion on the question of costs. Counsel for A.R.B. drew my attention to the absence of any opportunity of either party to address me specifically on the question of costs. Further that A.R.B. was not represented at the time the order was made was said to constitute a denial of the right to be heard on that occasion. I place no reliance on this submission. However, counsel also referred to a passage in the transcript from the principal proceedings herein where the question of costs was raised by junior counsel for T.J.M. and then left to be faced up to, as he said, 'later'. It is correct to say that no later opportunity to address on the question of costs arose. ~ 11. More particularly, however, the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents to the principal proceedings were wholly successful respondents who succeeded ona motion to strike out the claims against them. Despite this they were not awarded costs nor was any consideration given to their entitlement or otherwise to costs. No submissions were made on their behalf in respect of the costs of the notice of motion. I make these comments only tentatively at this stage, subject to further submissions from counsel. However, they stand as circumstances in which the Court's express, inherent or 'incidental' jurisdiction may fall to be exercised. They certainly would have been relevant to a reconsideration by me of the order if it had not been sealed and entered prior to the hearing of the motion. I am prepared to find however that the entry on 8 April 1987 of my order of 27 March 1987 by the solicitors for T.J.M. had the effect of frustrating and was primarily intended to frustrate the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the notice of motion, which is now limited by the terms of 0 35 r 7(2). An allegation of such an intention was put forward several times by counsel for A.R.B. and not denied. Furthermore, no evidence of any 'legitimate' purpose the entry of the order might have had was adduced. Instead the proposition that T.J.M. was entitled to enter the order at "any time" pursuant to O 36 r 8(1) was propounded. The entry of the order in the face of a motion to vary or set aside that order for the purpose of frustrating consideration of the notice of motion was said by A.R.B. to be an 12. abuse of the process of the Court. Counsel for A.R.B. relied primarily on Castanho v_ Brown & Root (U.K) Ltd (1981) A.C. 557, where the filing of a notice of discontinuance was held by the House of Lords to be an abuse of process. Counsel in that matter had contended that once a party had served a summons, it's existing right to have the summons heard and determined could not be defeated by the administrative act of filing a notice of discontinuance. Alternatively it was argued that the notice of discontinuance was an abuse of process, in that it was an improper step in the circumstances even though authorised by the rules. Lord Scarman delivered the principal judgment with which all other members agreed and held on p.571: "Unless, therefore, it is possible to treat a notice of discontinuance without leave which complies with the Rules of the Supreme Court as an abuse of process (which is what Lord Parker did), the notice can not be struck out. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R. was prepared 50 to hold (p.855). Brandon L.J. expressed no opinion. Shaw L.J. however held that it was not possible. It seemed to him 'an inversion of logic to speak of an act which purports to terminate a process as being an abuse of that process'. (p.864D). I am not sensitive to the logical difficulty. Even if it be illogical (and I do not think it is) to treat the termination of legal process as an act which can be an abuse of that process, principle requires that the illogicality be overridden, if justice requires. The court has inherent power to prevent a party from obtaining by the use of its process a collateral advantage which it would be unjust for him to retain: and termination of process can, like any other step in the process, be s50 used." At page 572 his Lordship adopted the test whether, if leave to discontinue had been required, it would have been granted unconditionally. 13. In the Court of Appeal ([{1980} 1 W.L.R. 833) Lord Denning said on page 855 - "I summarised the cases on 'abuse of process' in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd (1977] 1W.L.R. 478,489-40. I said 'On the face of it, in any particular case, the legal process may appear to be entirely proper and correct'. So here the notice of discontinuance, on the face of it, is in time and correctly done without leave. 'What makes it wrongful', I added, is the purpose for which it is used'. If it is used for the purpose of the party obtaining some collateral advantage for himself, and not for the purpose for which such proceedings are properly designed and exist, he will be held guilty of abuse of the process of the court." This "inherent power to prevent a party from obtaining by the use of its process a collateral advantage" is found also in this Court in its own inherent or 'incidental' power to regulate or control its own procedures. See Parsons v Martin (1984) 58 ALR 395 at 401; Edwards Hot Water Systems v Hart (1985) 63 ALR 314 at 319. The words of Lord Scarman were adopted by Hunt J. in Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 N.S.W.L.R. 486 at p.491. In that case also the filing of a notice of discontinuance was held to be an abuse of process. His Honour in considering both the notice of discontinuance and the proceedings themselves as abuses of process made the following comments at p.492: "The legal process of a court is being abused when it is being used to exert pressure to effect an object not within the scope of the process: Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 212 at 221; 132 E.R.7 at 3; or where it is used for a purpose other than that for which the proceedings are properly designed and exist: Re Major (1955] Ch 600 at 623; or where the plaintiff in those proceedings is seeking some collateral advantage beyond 14. what the law offers: Castanho's case (at 567)." Quite plainly the discontinuance of proceedings, in both Castanho's case (supra) and Packer v Meagher (supra), is closely analogous to the entry of the order herein. Both processes were used to conclude the proceedings in an effort to deny the court jurisdiction to make an order adverse to the party concluding the proceedings. This analogy remains , in my opinion, notwithstanding the fact that some positive action was required from the Registrar before the entry of the order could be effected. Counsel for A.R.B. conceded that the Acting District Registrar, whose signature appears upon the sealed order, must have had, by virtue of the filing of the notice of motion, some constructive knowledge of the existence of the motion to vary the order. Allied to this concession, was the argument put forward by counsel for T.J.M. that in these circumstances the Court has abused its own process. The solicitors for T.J.M. had, so the argument ran, done no more than lodge the draft order, which was then entered and sealed by the Court in accordance with the Rules. I cannot accept this submission, however, as by their letter of 8 April 1987 set out herein, the Adelaide solicitors for T.J.M. make plain that they took the initiative to cause the order to be entered and sealed. Whether or not the Registrar is obliged to seal an order once entered pursuant to O 36 r 10, by their actions the solicitors for T.J.M. took steps to have the order so entered and sealed and by doing so to obtain an ulterior advantage. In such circumstances, as with the notice of 15. discontinuance in Castanho's case and Parker v Meagher, the entry and sealing of this order ought not to be allowed to remain on foot. Further, I note the words of Diplock L.J. in Hunter v Chief Constable [1982] A.c. 529 at 536, brought to my attention by counsel for A.R.B.: "It (the case at bar) concerns the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied; those which give rise to the instant appeal must surely be unique. It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power." Counsel for T.J.M., very properly referred to and relied upon the decision of the High Court in Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 C.L.R.529 where Barwick C.J. pointed to the entry and drawing up of an order in a proceeding operating as a bar to any further consideration of that proceeding. The Chief Justice said at p.530: "Once an order disposing of a proceeding has been perfected by being drawn up as the record of a court, that proceeding apart from any specific and relevant statutory provision is at an end in that court and is in its substance, in my opinion, beyond recall by that court." At the conclusion of his reasons the Chief Justice did however say on p.531: "The finality of the order dismissing the appeal does not seem to me to partake of injustice in the circumstances or to call for any departure from well 16. settled principles, themselves essential in my opinion to the due administration of our system of law." Menzies J., with whom Barwick C.J. and Owen J. agreed, echoed these sentiments, but qualified them in the following terms at pp.531-2: "This appeal is not concerned with the power of a court to alter orders in pending litigation. It is concerned with the power of a court to make an order in litigation which, without an error or lack of jurisdiction, has been regularly concluded and is no longer before the court. To recognize the problem is, I think, to solve it. However wide the inherent jurisdiction of a court may be to vary orders which have been made, it cannot, in my opinion, extend the making of orders in litigation that has been brought regularly to an end." (emphasis added) In my opinion, the circumstances in which the litigation was in this matter brought to anend here enables Bailey v Marinoff to be distinguished. Should it apply without qualification the Court would be restrained by its own process from finding that that which would otherwise restrain it is an abuse of the process of the Court. This is the "illogicality" which must be overridden to which Lord Scarman referred in Castanho's case (supra) at p.571. If the Court were 50 restrained the intended ulterior advantage of the abuse would be achieved. Counsel also referred to Gamser v The Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145 and Goodwin v Southern Tablelands Finance Co. Ltd. (1968) 42 A.L.J.R. 309, the latter considered by Barwick C.J. to be "correct and conclusive" of the question raised in Bailey v Marinoff (supra). Neither authority however takes the matter further. 17. It is possible and proper, in my opinion, to distinguish each of these three cases on the ground that the entry of the order herein in the circumstances amounts to an abuse of the Court's process. The power of the Court to prevent an abuse of its process, even in this a statutory court, is a "well settled principle" from which this Court ought not, on the strength of the authorities before it, to depart. This power must exist to be effective as long as an abuse of process is on foot. Any matter therefore in which such an abuse is found shall not be "regularly concluded" until the abuse is rectified. To rectify the abuse of process in this matter, the entry and sealing of the order ought to be struck out. I am also satisfied in my view that this is, in the circumstances, the proper course to adopt because there are relevant matters for consideration on some aspects of the order for costs. Further, I refer generally to Connelly v D.P.P. [1964] AC 1254 and with respect adopt generally what Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest said on page 1301; "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. I would regard them as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process." Following from this the Court may exercise the express power to vary or set aside the judgment or order conferred upon it by O 35 r 7(1) of the Rules in circumstances where, ex hypothesi, the judgment or order has not been regularly entered. I find therefore that the Court has jurisdiction to vary 18. or set aside the order made on 27 March 1987, upon the entry of the order being struck out as an abuse of the process of the Court. Further, in so far as I have already found deficiencies in my order for costs, being one of the orders in the order so entered, I find that the jurisdiction to vary or set aside that particular order ought to be exercised. Accordingly I make the following orders: l. The entry and sealing of my order of 27 March 1987 be struck out. 2. The motion herein be set down for further submissions from counsel as to the question of costs in the principal proceedings. 3. Costs of the motion be reserved. I certify that this and the17 preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Mr Justice Fisher. AN Associate = -(_+-te-Ce 5 Dated: 23 Cyswbar 1982 19. Date of Hearing : 24 and 25 August 1987 Counsel for Applicants on Motion Mr. N. Lucarelli Solicitors : Finlaysons Mr.J. Mansfield Q.C. & Mr. Greenwell Counsel for Respondents on Motion Solicitors : Norman, Waterhouse & Mutton