-— JUDGMENT No. 9347.81. CATCHWORDS Practice and procedure - avpeal to Federal Court from judgment of Supreme Court of Victoria - anterlocutory order for security for costs made by Federal Court pursuant' to Patents Act 1952 and in default appeal be dismissed - source of power to make order - whether the Court has power to vary or set aside the order after it has been entered - whether Court has power to vary an order made by consent pursuant to an agreement entered into between the varties where such @gGveeMeNet 15 1M Che Nature of a 'real contract and where tne validity of the agreement is not challenged. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 ss.24,25,26,27,56,59 = 7 A Rotas 77 1 -F - «ft = ai Court Rusas ©.23 vr. 1,2,6, 3.355 rr.s,7, éc 36 rr.8,9,10, 0.52 rr.1,20,38 durisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments, Act 1387 5.5 Patents Act 1952 s55.6,6A,148,170 Patents Amendment Act 1976 ss.2,3,4,7 R.D. WERNER & CO. INC. and BAILEY ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS PITY. LTD. V. No. G 147 of 1987 NORTHROP J. 4 NOVEMBER 1937 MELBOURNE AX RECEIVFA = ANOV 1987 PRINCIPAL REGISTRY o N_THE ERAL COURT OF AUS IA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISTON V. No. G 147 of 1987 wwe weww ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA SRIWESA. R.D. WERNER & CO. INC. Appellant and BAILEY ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. Respondent COURT: NORTHROP J. C3 ATE : 4 NOVEMBER 1337 PLACE: MELBOURNE MINUTE OF ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT the motion be refused with costs. GO G al] rag os (Settlement and entry of Orders 1s dealt with in 0.3 Rules of Court.) IN FEDERAL COURT OF AUS IA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISTON V. No. G 147 of 1987 ON_APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA SIT oes st Soha R.D. WERNER & CO. INC. Appellant and BAILEY ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS PTY. LTD. Respondent COURT: NORTHROP J. DATE : 4 NOVEMBER 1337 PLACE: MELBOURNE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The appellant is moving the Court on notice for orders designed to relieve it from the consequences of failing to provide security for costs in conformity with an order of the Court made on 24 July 1987. If it has the power to make the orders sought, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, would so order, but the respondent contends that the Court does not have that power. It 1s necessarv, therefore, to consider in some detail whether the Court, on the facts of this matter, has the power to make the orders sought. On 2 April 1987, the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissed the appellant's appeal from opposition proceedings under tne Patents Act 1352 heard and determined by the Commissioner of Patents. For the purpose of this motion reference is to be made to the Patents Act as in operation before 1 September 1987 being the date on which the amendments made to the Patents Act by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987 came into operation; see s.5 of that Act. On 18 May 1987, the Court, as prasently constituted, grantal leave to the apeellanc ta appeal to the Federal Court from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria; see sub-section 148(2) of the Patents Act. In conformity with that leave, the appellant has appealed to this Court and I was informed from tne par tabie that the appeal 1s ready for hearing. The appeal proceeding 15 rdentified in the Registry of this Court as matter V. No. G 147 of 1987. On 24 July 1987 the respondent moved the Court on notice in the appeal proceeding for orders that the appellant rs provide security for costs. The motion was made pursuant to s.170 of the Patents Act, the relevant warts of which are set gut:- "170. If a person who - (a) wae (b) appeals to a prescribed court, neither resides nor carries on business in Australia, the prescribed court ... may require that person to give security for the costs of the ».. appeal, and in default of security being given to the satisfaction of the prescribed court ... the ... appeal may be dismissed." The motion was based on the fact that the appellant 15 a foreign company incorporated in the State of Pennsylvania in ~8. ACO carly an Weo+s- -F Rmgperso is aA - - aan Cares oe Amerirta ard i an Sue a 3s iu im Australia. The respondent was seeking security for costs in the sum of $25,000. Following negotiations between the legal representatives of the parties, an agreement was reached between them the substance of the agreement being:- 1. The respondent accept $20,000 as sufficient security for costs in relation to the appeal and the application for leave to apvoeal. Zz. The appellant pay anto Court the sum of $20,000 within 45 days from 24 July 1987 failing which, the appeal be dismissed with costs. 3. The costs of the application for security for costs be the respondent 5 costs in the appeal. On 24 July 1987 the Court, constituted by Ryan J., made consent orders based upon that agreement. The orders mace were as follows:- "1. Pursuant to Section 170 of the Patent Act 1952 Che Appellant shall provide security for the costs of its Application for Leave to Appeal and its Appeal herein in the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (§20,000) by paying the said sum into this Honourable Court within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order. 2. In default of the Appellant providing the said security within the said period of forty-five (45) days this Appeal is dismissed and the Appellant shall pay the Respondent's taxed costs relating thereto. 3. ihe Responaenc 5s costs of this Application shall be part of the Respondent's costs of the Appeal." Under those orders, the appellant was required to pay into Court as security for costs the sum of $20,000 on or before 7 September and in default the appeal was to be dismissed. By reason of cfircumstances whith, for sresent purposes, need not be examined, the appellant didnot pay into Court the sum of $20,000 as required by the order. On 7 September 1987 at approximately 3.55 p.m., the solicitors for the appellant iodged with the Registry of the Court a letter of credit by the appellant endorsed by the A.N.Z. Bank in the sum of $20,000. There were a number of defects in the letter of credit. The Registry took the view, quite correctly, that the lodging of the letter of credit was not a compliance with the order of the Court made on 24 July 1987. Thereupon the appellant gave notice of motion seeking orders varying the orders made on 24 July 1987 by extending the time within which the sum of $20,000 could be paid into Court. At the hearing of the motion, submissions were made with respect to the source of power under which the Court made the order of 24 July 1987. Those orders had been made by consent and no question had been raised as to the source of the power to make the order. On its face, the order stated the order for security was made "pursuant to Section 170 of the Patents Act 1952." The relevant parts of that section, as in operation at that time, have been set out. At tMat time, tne definition or 'prescriped court' as contained in s.6 of the Patents Act, did not include the Federal Court, but 5.6A provides:- , "6A. A reference in this Act to a prescribed court shall be read - {a) 1m relation to the institution of an appeal or other proceeding, as a reference to a prescribed court having Jurisdiction wath yasecest ca marbsars arising under this Act in respect of which the appeal or other proceeding is instituted; and (b) in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction, as a reference to a prescribed court exercising iurisdictzion in accordance with section 1l46.' At 24 July 1987 Part XVII, comprising sections 146 to 149 of the Patents Act contained provisions relating to jurisdiction and sowers of courts. Section 148 1s set out:- "148. (1) Subject to sub-section (2), an appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia from &% Judgment or order of a brescribed court exercising jurisdiction under this Act ofr a judgment or order of any other court in an action or proceeding referred to 1n section 113 or 1l2l. (2) Where the judgment or order of a prescribed court appealed from was pronounced or made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from decisions or directions of the Commissioner, an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia does not lie without leave of that Court. (3) An appeal lies to the High Court, with special leave of the High Court, from a judgment or order referred to in sub-section (1). (4) Except as provided in the foregoing provisions of this section, no appeal lies from a judgment or order referred to in sub-section (1)."" It should be noted that these provisions of the Patents Act were all inserted into the Patents Act by the Patents Amendment Act 1976 and came into operation ona date - hook 8 te awa = no Jeiny alae Tham Tas aay be nea ty it) Fg aT .=] cc ba F that is the commencing day for the purposes of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976"; see sub-section 2(1). See also sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Patents Amendment Act. Prior to that date, 1 February 1977, the High Court exercised a comparable jurisdiction. The scheme of these amendments show that courts exercising original jurisdiction under the Patents Act were the prescribed courts as defined in 3.5 heing essentially State Supreme Courts but that appeals from orders of those prescribed courts in matters under the Patents Act were to go to the Federal Court. Under s.6A, the Federal Court, in exercising its Jurisdiction under 5.142, 15 a prescribed court "with respect to matters arising under this Act in respect of which the appeal ... 1s instituted." It follows, therefore, that with respect to an appeal to the Federal Court under 5.148, the Federal Court 1s a prescribed court under s.170 which confers a power on the Federal Court to require the giving of security for costs and the making of orders dismissing am appeal if the security 15 not given. Section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 empowers the Federal Court to order an appellant to give security for costs anda power to vary any order so made. finat section is set out:- "66. (1) The Court or a Judge may order a Plaintiff in a proceeding in the Court or an appellant in an appeal to the Court to give Security For the payment -f 255255 Cuac May se awarded against him. (2) The security shall be of such amount, and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs. (3) The Court sr a Juege may reduces cr increase the amount of security ordered to be given and may vary the time at which, or manner or form in which, the security is to be given. (4) If security, or further security, is not given in accordance with an order under this section, the Court or a Judge may order that the proceeding or appeal be dismissed. (5) This section does not affect the operation of any provision made by or under any Other Act of by the Rules of Court for or in relation to the furnishing of security." It should be noted that in the present case it is not necessary to determine whether the specific power conferred by s.170 of the Patents Act excludes the general power conferred by s.56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act since the order made on 24 July 1987 is expressed to have been made under s.170 of the Patents Act; cf. Thomson Australian Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (1980) 148 C.L.R. 150 per Gibbs C.J., Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ. at pp.160-162. In the present case, the issue on this aspect of the motion relates to practice and procedure. Under s.59 of the Federal Court of Australia Act, the Judges of the Court i) empowered to make Rules of Court relating to the practice ar and procedure of the Court. One of the specific matters referred to in 5.59 15 the power to make provision for or in relation to the furnishing of security; see paragraph 59(2)(n). Order 28 contains provisions relating to security for costs. It applies to proceedings in the original Jurisdiction of the Court as well as the appellate s F ari = ar bl nu FT] i) turisdiactthion cf the Tsrurt, Bae r.i, Pul wo out: "5. (1) Where the Court orders that the applicant provide security for costs, it may order- (a) that the proceeding on any claims by the applicant for relief be stayed until security is provided; or (b) that if the applicant fails to comply with the order to provide security within the time limited in the order, the vroceeding be thereafter stayed or dismissed. (2) Subject to sub-rule (1), the Court may set aside or vary any order made under this Order. (3) Where a proceeding stands dismissed pursuant to an order under this Order, that order shall not pe set aside or varied except in special circumstances. 6. This Order does not affect the provisions of any Act of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory under which the Court may require security for costs to be given." Order 52 of the Federal Court Rules contains provisions relating to appeals. In that Order, unless a contrary intention appears, "Court" means the Court exercising 105 appellate jurisdiction, see r.l. Prior to i October 1982, 0.52 r.20 provided:- "20. Unless the Court otherwise directs no =~a-) . tr = sacha " -scoe57 he bt 7S - -~%.77 Security Tor rssis oF an agoeal T2 ths Teurt shall be required. " In Beard v. Prestige Baking Industries Pty. Ltd. (1980) 51 F.L.R. 454 the Court, as oresentivy constituted, RAeld that 'the Court constituted by a single Judge was not precluded from making an order that an appellant give security for costs of an appeal. Thereafter, 0.52 £.20 was amended by inserting the words 'or auJudge' immediately arter tne words 'the Court" where first appearing thereby making it clear that the Court, constituted by a single Judge, had power to make an order for security for costs on an appeal; see S.R. No. 217 of 1982. In the present case, I find that in making the order of 24 July 1987, the Court was exercising vowers conferred by s.170 of the Patents Act and, by implication, 0.52 r.20. Im so doing, and in the absence of specific rules in 0.52, the Court applied the practice and procedure of the Court prescribed by 6.298. - 10 - The order of the Court made on 24 July 1987 was entered on 11 September 1987; see 0.36 and ain particular rules 8, 9 and 10. Under 0.35 £.7(1), the Court may vary or Set aside a judgment or order before 1t nas been entered. tn the present case, the order of 24 July 1987 had been entered before the appellant gave notice of the motion presently before the Court. An exception to the limitation on the power conferred by r.7(1) is contained in r.7(2). The relevant parts of that sub-rule are set out:- "7. (2) The Court, wher2 it is not e@merrtising its appellate or related jurisdiction under Division 2 of Part III of the Act, may if it thinks fit vary or set aside a judgment or order after the order has been entered where - (a) ... (c) the order 1s interlocutory; (ad) ... 2" Under r.7(4), sub-rule 7(2) shall not affect the power of the Court to vary or terminate the operation of an order by a supplementary order. on " It 15 quite clear that in 0.35, the werd "Court" 15 used to describe the Court in its original jurisdiction as well as in its appellate jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondent did not dispute that the order of 24 July 1987 was an interlocutory order; cf. Pye v. Renshaw (1951) 84 C.L.rR. 58 per Dixon, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. at pp.76-77, but contended that the order had been made by the Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. He - li - contended that the appeal to the Federal Court under 5.148 of the Patents Act was to the Court in its appellate jurisdiction and that the Court, in making any order with respect tO tne practice and procedure to be applied to any step in that appeal, was made by the Court in the exercise of ats appellate jurisdiction. He argued, therefore, that the motion by the appellant was to the Court inits appellate jurisdiction and therefore the motion came within the exception contained in r.7(2) and thus the Court had no power to vary or set aside the order of 24 July 1987. He referred = £3 9.82 ¥.293 and in particular ».°2/2° ane@ compared tha eh with 0.35 r.7 which, he contended, was directed to the original Jurisdiction af the Court. Reference may be made also to 0.30 r.5. He referred to Barley v. Marinoff (1971) 125 c.L.R. 5293 in which the High court held that there was no inherent or incidental power in a court to deal further with an appeal which had been dismissed by a formal order which had been entered before an application was made to vary it. The facts of that case are set out by Menzies J. at p.521:- "The present respondent brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The present appellant was the respondent to that appeal. The appeal was determined by reason of the respondent's non-compliance with the following order made by the Court of Appeal on 10th February 19370: - 12 - 'IT IS ORDERED that the Appellant file and serve the appeal books herein on or before the 3lst day of March 1970 AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Appellant does not file and serve the appeal books herein on or before the 3lst gay of March i570 the appeai 1s to stand dismissed for want of prosecution AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of this motion be costs in the appeal of the Respondent.' This order was signed and sealed on 5th March 74 Roceal mates cree a F-72523 r 3ls- 13 . ApCeal Scosks were Fils Sls 2 fazin Dut were not served until 6th April. The appeal, therefore, in accordance with the order that had been made, stood dismissed. Notwithstanding this dismissal the Court of Appeal (1970) 92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 280, on 28th September 1970, upon fhe applicaticn sf the respondent, ordered that the filing and service of the appeal books in fact effected should be deemed a sufficient compliance with the order of 10th February 1970. It 1s against this order that an appeal has now been brought to this Court on the footing that the Court of Appeal had no power to make it, the appeal having been concluded six Months pefore the order was made." The appeal to the Hagh Court was allowed and the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was set aside. In that case, it appears that no provision Similar to 0.35 r.7(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules applied with respect to the Court of Appeal. In my opinion, the Court has power under 0.35 e.7(2)(c) to vary the order made by Ryan J. even though that order has been entered and it is not necessary to determine whether Ryan J. was, or Iam, exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. A dissatisfied party 1s able, with leave, to appeal from an interlocutory order made by the Court constituted by a single Judge. That appeal is heard - 13- and determined by the Court; see sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Federal Court of Australia Act, exercising its appellate jurisdiction. In 0.35 r.7(2), the exception described by the words 'where it \tne Court, 2.5 not exercising 10s appellate or related jurisdiction under Division 2 of Part III of the Act" describe the Court when hearing an appeal, or the related jurisdiction under s.26 or 5.27. In other words, the grounds contained in 0.35 ¥.7(2) cannot be used as grounds of appeal. The words are not used to prevent for example, an interlocutory order made by a Full Court exercising appellate jurisdacticn, being varied or set as2r32 bv a Pall Tsurt exercising appellate jurisdiction after that interlocutory order has been entered. In the present case, I am exercising the same jurisdiction that Ryan J. exercised. It is noted that one of the other grounds specified in 0.35 r.7(2) is that "(b) the order was obtained by fraud." An appellate Court must have power to set aside an order made by it which was obtained by fraud even though the order has been entered. The true position 15 illustrated by Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v. Mudginberri Station Pty. Ltd. (1986) 65 A.L.R. 683 especially per Gray J. at p.688:- - 14- "It is clearly established that a judgment procured by the fraud of one party to a proceeding May be set aside at the suit of the other party, and that it is appropriate to institute a separate proceeding for this purpose. The authorities are conveniently collected in McHarg v Woods Radio Pty bta Ciszt+dj VLR 436 at 437. ft 15 appropriate to refer also to Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed, vol 26, para 560. There can be little doubt that the Federal Court of Australia possesses an inherent power to strike down its own judgments obtained by fraud, and to do so in a separate proceeding. Sections 5(2) and 23 of the Federal ne —— = - " s de 7A7R —y -=s - - =e wee ee Tsurt of Australia Act 197¢ undcouctedcly caccy these powers. This proposition was not disputed by any of the respondents in the present proceeding." In the present case, the appellant has proceeded by way of motion. That is a competent procedure to follow. Counsel for the respondent contended further that the Court had no dower to vary the order made by Pvan J. since 1t was a consent order made to give effect to an agreement entered into between the appellant and respondent and, in the absence of agreement, the Court had no power toa vary chat consent order unless :t was establisned thac the agreement on which it was based was, for some reason, vitiated so as to render the agreement void or voidable. Counsel relied upon a number of authorities including Harvey v. Phillips (1956) 95 C.L.R. 235. In that case, a claim for damages was compromised. Thereafter, Harvey applied to set aside a judgment given in pursuance of that compromise. She failed. The main issue in that case concerned the authority of counsel, but at pp.243-4 the Court, Dixon C.J. and McTiernan, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. said:- - 15 - "But in the case of a compromise which is made within the actual as well as apparent authority of counsel a court does not appear to possess a discretion to rescind it or set it aside. The question whether the compromise is to be set aside depends upon the existence of a ground which would surfice to render a simple contract void or voidable or to entitle the party to equitable relief against it, grounds for example such as 1llegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a Material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake, undue influence, abuse of confidence or the like. The rule appears rather from positive S240 -Menrs tne gr cunds ble sult ice cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 26, 2nd ed., pp-84, 85); but there is a dictum of Lindley L.Jd. which is distinct enough: '... mor have I the slightest doubt that a consent order can be impeached, not only on the ground of fraud but upon any grounds which invalidate the agreement 1t BMPP255e5 tn a MOrs Isrmal wav 'than «stal To my mind the only question is whether. the agreement on which the consent order was based can be invalidated or not. Of course 1f that agreement cannot be invalidated the consent order is good': Huddersfield Banking Co. Ltd. v. Henry Lister & Son Ltd. (1895) 2 Ch. 273, at p. 280." See also Stann v. Starwell Pty. Ltd. (1984) 1 Q.R. 29. The authorities show that a distinction 1s draw between those cases where a consent order is based upon what has been described as a "real contract" and where a consent order means no more than "the parties hereto not objecting." This phraseciogy was used by Lord Denning M.R. to draw a distinction between the many cases where in matters of practice and procedure consent orders are made which subsequently are varied by the Court without a challenge to the "agreement" upon which the consent order was made. In Wilkshire v. Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 9 A.L.R. 4325, an the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Muirhead J. held that the Court had an inherent or incidental power to - 16 - set aside a consent order which was procedural only. In a case where judgment in default of compliance with a consent order had been entered, the Court of Appeal varied the consent ordec witnouc considering wnetner tne agreement on which 1t was based was vitiated; see Siebe Gorman & Co. Ltd. v. Pneupac Ltd. £19821 1 All ER 377. In that case, Lord Denning M.R. said at p.380:- "We have had a discussion about 'consent orders'. It should be clearly understood by the profession that, when an order 1s expressed to be made 'by consent', it is ambiguous. There are two Meanings +o the wordt 'hy consert'. That waz observed by Lord Greene MR in Chandless-Chandless v Nicholson £19423 2 All ER 315 at 317, £19423 2 KB 321 at 324. One meaning 1s this: the words 'by consent' may evidence a real contract between the parties. In such a case the court will only interfere with such an order on the same grounds as it would with any other contract. The other Meaning 15 tnis: the words Dy consent May mean 'the parties hereto not objecting'. In such a case there is no real contract between the parties. The order can be altered or varied by the court in the same circumstances as any other order that 1s mada by the court without the consent of the parties. In every case 1t is necessary to discover which meaning 15 used. Does the order evidence a real contract between the parties? Or does it only evidence an order made without obligation? We were referred to several cases. In Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Son Ltd €18953 2 Ch 273, there was a consent order dealing with a large amount of machinery and plant. Everyone nad agreed that it should be sold on certain terms. That was clearly a contract between the parties with which the court would not interfere except on the same grounds as any other contract. In Purcell v FC Trigell Ltd, £19713 1 QB 358 the correspondence (which is set out in the facts of the case) showed that there was a real contract agreed between the parties that, unless a Particular order for interrogatories was complied with, the matter should be struck out. In that case I said that the court has a discretion to vary or alter the terms of the order for interrogatories, even though made hy consent. - 17 - There is a case mentioned in The Supreme Court Practice 1982, vol 1, p 16, para 3/5/13, namely Australasian Automatic Weighing Machine Co v Walter C18913 WN 170. That concerned an order by consent to transfer shares. Again it was a case in which there was a real contract between the parties. Equaiiy, in Intervaie Group of Companies Ltd v Knighton £19763 CA Transcript 302, Bridge LJ, after analysing all the facts, came to the conclusion - 'that there was here an unconditional binding contract in law between the parties that the order of 10 r aeaprt aA te wa 7 abr aary shaula te TAGS, AS Lt wal, Scarman LJ added that, in the circumstances of the case, 'from Bridge LJ's analysis of the facts, there was here a contract'. The most recent case Was im the same category: see Chanel Ltd v F_W Woolworth & Co Ltd £19813 1 All ER 745. It seems to me that all those rases ran be, and should be, explained on the basis that there was a real contract between the parties evidenced by the order which was drawn up." His Lordship held that on the facts before the Court of Appeal, the consent order meant "the parties hereto not objecting", that there was no "real contract" between the parties and thus the consent order could be varied. In the present case, on the facts contained in the affidavit faled on behalf of the respondent, an agreement had been entered into between the parties. That agreement was made on 22 July 1987. The terms of the agreement have been set out earlier in these reasons. In my opinion that agreement constituted an unconditional contract in law between the parties that the consent order be made. The agreement was a "real contract" between the parties. Pursuant to that agreement, the order was made by Ryan J. on 24 July 1987. The order does not, on its face, state that it - 18 - was made by consent but there is no doubt it was so made. There 1s no material before the Court to challenge the validity of the agreement pursuant to which the order was made. In these circumstances, the agreement is not vitiated and the Court has no power to vary the order made on 24 July 1987. - In these circumstances, it 1S not necessary to consider the application of 0.28 ¢r.5 and in particular sub-rule 5(3). The motion should be refused with costs. I certify that this and the Séventeen (17) | preceding pages are a true copy of the j Reazons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Mr. Justice RM NorrHRror » Shorr P L201 Associate