Hennessey, P.G. v The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1987] FCA 772
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. 77A76.1.
IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NOS. G3294 TO 3297 of 1987
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN:
PETER G. HENNESSY
Appellant
AND:
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE: FOX J.
DATE OF ORDER: 16 DECEMBER 1987
WHERE MADE: Sydney.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The four appeals be dismissed and it confirms the
assessments in each case.
2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs.
Note: Settlement and entry or orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW _ SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Nos. G3294 to 3297 of 1987
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
CORAM: FOX J.
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 1988
BETWEEN :
PETER G. HENNESSY
we
Appellant
AND:
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FOX J.
(EX TEMPORE)
There are now before me four appeals from the refusal by
the Commissioner of Taxation of objections to assessments to
income tax made by hin.
credits of amounts due to
by him or on his behalf
question which arises in
has appeared before me in
competently.
The substantial
Assessment Act 1936 ("the
related to zone rebates.
In each case, the assessments showed
the taxpayer, taxation having been paid
under the pay as you earn system. The
each case is the same. The appellant
person and has argued his own case very
question centres around the Income Tax
Act"), s.79A and the following sections
The appellant is not himself in any of
the zones and the assessments were prepared and have been
sustained on the basis of the other provisions of the Act which
have affected him. His argument is, however, to the effect that
the Commissioner in calculating his assessment has acted contrary
to two provisions of the Constitution, namely s.51(ii) and s.99.
It is not necessary to set these out or deal separately with
them. One in terms relates to not discriminating between States
or parts of States and the other deals with preferences not being
given to one.
The appellant does not challenge the validity of 5.79A,
but rather relied on it and related provisions, and claims that
to accord with the Constitution the concessions for which it
provides must be available more broadly. It is not said or
argued that the Commissioner acted otherwise than in accordance
with the Act as, in terms, it applies to the taxpayer. He does
not seek an application of s.79A itself. Put another way, the
challenge really is to the legislation under which he was
assessed, and it is a challenge of a broad nature.
The appellant has concentrated on the assessments and he
submits that they are wrong because the Commissioner should have
acted in away which, accepting the presence (and validity) of
s.79A, would nevertheless lead to a situation in which there was
no breach of the constitutional provisions to which I have
referred. There can however be no basis on which the
Commissioner - could do as the appellant has suggested namely,
allow a rebate to the taxpayer as if he were in a zone.
Whichever way the matter is looked at, 1t does seem to
me that the appellant is in difficulties. He based himself
largely on the Commissioner of Taxation v. Clyne (1958-59) 100
CLR 246. In that case, the Commissioner sued for income tax and
demurrers were brought leading to the argument of questions
before the full High Court. So far as concerns s.79A, the
majority of the court in that case was prepared to assume for the
purposes of argument, but certainly did not decide, that it was
invalid. The taxpayer in that case, however, sought to use the
argued invalidity of s.79A to bring down the rest of the Act, or
at least all material parts of it.
The majority of the High Court held that, even if s.79A
were invalid, this would not bring down the rest of the Act and
that being so, the taxpayer in that case (he had not been
assessed under s.79A) would not have standing to argue anything
about the section. Webb J. considered the validity of the
section and held it to be valid. The taxpayer in Clyne's case
was hoping for consequences to flow, just as the appellant in the
present case is, but one was by challenge to validity, whereas
the appellant here does not challenge validity, but, on an argued
application of the Constitution, he claims a concession. This
would not only lead in effect to wholesale amendments to the Act,
but amendments which would be impossible to express or apply.
It seems to me that the taxpayer, the appellant in these
cases, does not have a sound case in law.
I therefore dismiss the four appeals and confirm the
assessments in each case.
I will order that the
costs of the appeals.
Counsel for the Appellant:
Solicitors for the Appellant:
Counsel for the Respondent:
Solicitors for the Respondent:
Date of hearing:
Date judgment delivered:
appellant pay the respondent's
I certify that this and the
three (3) preceding pages are
a true copy of the Reasons
for Judgment herein of his
Honour Mr. Justice Fox.
Associate: Mare i
Date: 16 December 1987
Mr G. Hennessy
Mr G. Hennessy
Mrs R. Sharp
Australian Government
Solicitor
Sydney: 16 December 1987
Sydney: 16 December 1987
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