60 | 1487 oor IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) JICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG419 GENERAL DIVISTON } Cl Pr Ww co m BETWEEN: SLORIA TURIN Applicant AND: CHRISTOPHER JOHN HURFORD Respondent CORAM: Jenkinson J. PLACE: Melbourne DATE: 6 March, 1387 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The Court is moved on behalf of the applicant for an order restraining the execution of an order for the deportation of the applicant which was made on 26 February 1987. The proceeding in which that motion is made is a proceeding which was originated by the filing of an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 for the review of a much earlier administrative decision by the respondent himself, that is to say the Minister, a decision to refuse to grant the applicant an entry permit. The decision is expressed in the originating document to be a decision refusing the grant of resident status, which in lay language is perhaps not an inaccurate way of describing it. young woman whose siblings have Philippines. several years ago and at first nu icr ry be th int ai c a crbef he fu a rh c be ioe c fam entry permit making her presenc substantial time she has been a prohibited non-citizen within the meaning of that expression in the Migration Act and in the latter part of last that is to say the decision which is the subject Minister for would not be occasions af the originating Immigration and Ethnic application, was made Affairs personally that by the granted a permit which would in substance cede to her status. roceadings ty originating indefinitely, which before th application na c ia] c Lad one might filed call in on the middle of February this year during the those hearings it was pointed out to the applicant, and to a man who has interested himself on her behalf and who is said to be anxious to live with her in this country, by the judge, Mr. Justice Woodward, that it was likely that a deportation order would be made in the not too distant future. And it.was explained that an undertaking had been given on behalf of the respondent Minister that any order for deportation which might be made against the applicant would not be carried into execuktion until the expiration of seven days from the day on which the deportation order was served on the applicant. His Honour explained carefully to the applicant that it la would then be essential, if she were to have any hope of remaining ar cL i] a in this country after the making of the deportation or , bhat the Court for an order restraining ation order. And that has been done. seized of such a motion of which His Honour pointed cub also to the applicant that it would be necessary for another originating application to b filed. It would be necessary for another proceeding to be instituted for an order of review in respect of the anticipated deportation order. No such application has been filed. Mr. Ketelhohn appears for the applicant in the presently constituted proceeding and the notice of motion includes notice of a motion for an order granting leave to amend the existing application. And Mr. Ketelhohn has 50 moved today. He seeks an erder giving the applicant leave to amend the originating application to add an application toa ravyiew the decision to deport which was made, as Mr. Justice Woodward had anticipated it would be made, on 26 There is I think great conceptual difficulty in having an originating application comprehend an application for review of a decision not made until after the filing of the originating application. It was suggested on behalf of the applicant that the $200 filing fee would be a great obstacle to her instituting a fresh proceeding by filing a further originating application, but there is not any actual evidence either that the fee would have to be paid immediately or that she simply does not have the $200. If I had thought that injunctive relief should be granted, the jurisdiction to grant it is not, as a matter of ut cr tr oO rict law, dependent upon the existence of a proceeding for an oeder of review in respect of the decision concerning which injunctive relief is to be granted. The applicant has not only nad the warning and advice of Mr. Justice Woodward to enable her be evaré grounds justifying the grant cf an injunction; she has im) mm r also had the advantage of a statement by the delegate who made the decision to deport, a statement in pursuance of s.13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 of the reasons ray tr i) for that decisicn. Mr. Ketelhohn has put forward two possibl grounds of attack on the decision to deport. One relates to the earlier decision, a decision not to grant an entry permit. The ui decision not to grant the permit was contradictory of the recommendation by the Immigration Review Panel that an entry permit for a certain period and for a certain purpose ought to he granted. But the mere circumstance that the decision of the person in whom the discretionary powers are vested to grant or refuse an entry parmit is in contradiction of a recommendation by an administrative advisory body such as the Review Panel is no basis for any supposition that the decision not to grant the permit might be wrong or made in error. The other ground of attack suggested was that the deportation order did not specify any place as the place to which the applicant is to be deported. Tt was submitted thakt it was held by Mr. Justice Gray co be arguable that a deportation order constitute an effective exercise of the statutory power to deport. But the decision of Mr. Justice Gray to which Mr. Ketelnohn referred was given before two judges of the Court in separate decisions at a later time came to the conclusion that such a deportation order - that is to say, a deportation order lacking any specification of a place to which the deportee is to he carried - is mot for that reason invalid. They were considered decisions. icy They were concerned to resolve the legal question at trial, and now that those two judges have reached those decisions, particularly in circumstances in which it has not been submitted or argued that either of those judges were in error in their reasoning, it is no longer possible to say, as it would have heen possible to say before those decisions had been given, that there is an arguable case for the proposition that lack of a designated place of deportation invalidates the exercise or the purported exercise of the power to deport. This is a case in which, if there be any argument fit for consideration in support of an application for an order of review, there has been sufficient time to formulate the argument and to present it. No such argument has been presented to me and therefore there appears to me to be no basis on which an injunctive order restraining execution of the deportation order om could be justified. rs that I make are that the motion im Accordingly, the ord of which notice is specified in paragraph 3 of the notice of motion filed 4 March 1987 be dismissed, and that the motion of which notice is specified in paragraph 2 of the said notice of motion be dismissed. I certify that this and the & the Reasons for Judgment here JENKINSON. preceding pages are a in of the Honourable Mr. dJustic Dated: 6 March, 1987