JUDGMENT No. JIZ.7SCr3 . GENERAL DISTRIBUTION NOT REQUIRED IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY No. VG 57 of 1987 eee GENERAL DIVISION BETWEEN: MUI LIE CHAN Applicant AND: i_' MINISTER FOR / HMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFALRS Respondent 4 MARCH, 1988 KEELY J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (RE COSTS) (DELIVERED EX TEMPORE — REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT) Costs are never any easy matter to decide on those occasions when they do not follow the event in accordance with the normal principle; the court can really only do the best it can to achieve justice in the case. Mr. Cavanough, on behalf of the applicant, has referred to the fact of the earlier hearing before Jenkinson J., which, on any view, was a necessary hearing; so that, if the court were to determine the question of costs by looking in great detail at the amount of time spent on various aspects, the whole of the Prerpos Regge costs of that hearing would have to be paid by the respondent to the applicant. As to the hearing before me, it is true that a substantial part of the argument did deal with other issues on which the applicant has not been successful; however, it is said against that, with some force, that Mr. Cavanough's client was put in the position of having to take "the proceedings and having to challenge the order. Allied to that is the fact that the underlying reason why the applicant was forced to take the proceedings and, indeed, the reason why she has been successful is the very matter upon which there was considerable debate before me when counsel appeared for the respondent minister. That matter, which is dealt with in the reasons for judgment, arose out of the misleading statement made to the applicant on behalf of the respondent that she was required to make an election between two courses of action; as to that statement it was very properly conceded by counsel for the respondent, at the hearing before me, that it was a statement which was simply not correct as a matter of law. Taking all of those matters into account, and recognising that 1t is not a matter in which there can be any precision, in my opinion the proper course is for the court to order that the respondent pay to the applicant twa thirds ot of her costs of and relating to the proceedings. I have decided that that course is preferable to one of ordering that the respondent pay to the applicant the whole of the costs of the earlier hearing and a very substantial proportion of the costs of the hearing before me. In my opinion, as a matter of broad judgment, an order for the respondent to pay to the applicant two-thirds of the totality of her costs of the proceedings - that is, of all hearings and all necessary steps in them — would be fair and just in all the circumstances. I certify that this and the preceding two pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Mr. Justice Keely. Associate: Marne cr) Date: 4 March, 1988. (