Oldfield, G. v. Secretary to the Department of Primary Industry [1988] FCA 133
Federal Court of Australia
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CATCHWORODS
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL - Appeal - failure of Tribunal
make recording or notes of counsel's submissions - whether "error
law" - Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 - 5.33.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act ss.33, 44
Ex parte Wood (1889) 6 WN (NSW) 78
Ex parte Reid (1943) 43 SR NSW 207
Klopper v Hogg C1961] WAR 932
Caratti v Commissioner of Police £19741 WAR 73
GEOFFREY OLDFIELD v SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRY
NO. WAG 72 of 1987
BOWEN C.d., FORSTER AND LEE Jd.
PERTH
14 APRIL 1988
to
of
IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
JUDGES MAKING ORDER
or
DATE OF ORDER
NO. WAG 72 of 1987
ON APPEAL from the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
constituted by Mr R.D. Nicholson
Deputy President
GEOFFREY OLDFIELD
Applicant
and
SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
PRIMARY INDUSTRY
Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER
BOWEN C.J., FORSTER and LEE Jud.
14 APRIL 1988
ey
WHERE MADE : PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant's appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
eee ee
NO. WAG 72 of 1987
ON APPEAL from the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
constituted by Mr R.D. Nicholson
Deputy President
BETWEEN: GEOFFREY OLDFIELD
Applicant
and
SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
PRIMARY INDUSTRY
Respondent
CORAM: Bowen C.J., Forster and Lee JJ.
14 April 1988
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal ("the Tribunal") constituted by a Deputy President
against the Tribunal's refusal to grant an extension of time for
lodging an application to that Tribunal for the review of a
decision.
The applicant was and is a professional fisherman
engaged in the bluefin tuna fishery. Persons 50 engaged are
allotted a quota of fish which they may catch ina particular
season. One element in the calculation of the quota is the "best
catch" in a single season. The applicant had allotted him a quota
of 23.782 tonnes of southern bluefin tuna. He applied to the
Department of Primary Industry to review the quota allotted to him
on bases which it is unnecessary to examine for present purposes.
This application was refused by one Core a delegate for the
purpose of the Minister of Primary Industry. This refusal was
conveyed to the applicant by a letter dated 11 March 1985 from
Core which contained the paragraph "If you are not satisfied with
this decision you may, subject to the provisions of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, make application to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal in the capital city of your State,
for a review of that decision. Applications should be lodged in
writing within 28 days of receipt of this letter".
By application dated 9 March 1987 the applicant applied
to the Tribunal for an extension of time for lodging an
application for review of the decision of which he complains. The
ground stated in this application was, "The applicant was not
informed of his right to appeal from the decision and has only
recently become aware that he had such a right". In view of the
explicit paragraph in Core's letter quoted above this reason lacks
force as was conceded before the Tribunal and before us by counsel
for the applicant. It was submitted to the Tribunal that the
applicant misunderstood the extent of his right to have the
decision reviewed by the Tribunal and also that he was not in a
financial position to engage a legal practitioner and pursue his
case.
Before going to the grounds of the appeal before us it
is necessary ta mention that one of the difficulties about this
case is that there is no transcript of the proceedings before the
Tribunal, nor have we had the benefit of any notes which may have
been made by the learned Deputy President. The lack of a
transcript is the basis of one of the grounds of appeal and is of
direct importance to the two other grounds.
Pursuant to s.44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Act 1975 ("the Act") the appeal to this Court from the Tribunal
may be only ona matter of law. The objective correctness or
otherwise of the decision is not a matter for us to consider.
The notice of appeal, as amended, recites three
questions of law said to be raised on the appeal. Two were
deleted at the outset of the hearing before us and the remaining
question, question 2(ii) was, "Did the Tribunal err in law in that
it based its decision on evidence and submissions which were not
put before the Tribunal?"
The grounds pleaded in the notice of appeal less two
which were abandoned at the outset of the hearing are as follows :
"(b) The Tribunal erroneously said in its decision
that it was argued on behalf of the Respondent
that Australia's treaty obligations with Japan
and New Zealand would be prejudiced if the
Applicant was granted an extension. No such
submissions 'were put to the Tribunal by the
Respondent.
(c) The Tribunal erroneously said in its decision
that it was argued on behalf of the Respondent
that if the Applicant was successful then the
Southern Blue Fin Tuna Quota presently
allocated may need to be redistributed with
the consequence that the tonnage allocation of
present quota would have to be reduced. No
such submission was put to the Tribunal by the
Respondent.
(e) The learned Deputy President erred in law in
failing to ensure that a transcript of
evidence or notes of evidence were kept or
available for the purposes of an appeal."
At the commencement of the hearing two affidavits were
tendered and by consent admitted into evidence. One was that of
Graeme Adrian Payne sworn on 29 February 1988. He is a legal
practitioner who appeared before the Tribunal for the applicant by
leave as he was not then a tlegal practitioner. The second
affidavit is that of Heather Margaret Riley sworn 2 March 1988.
Miss Riley is a legal practitioner who appeared before the
Tribunal for the respondent. Both deponents give their account of
what they say took place before the Tribunal.
Mr. Payne's affidavit contains paragraph 25 which is as
follows :
"To the best of my knowledge and belief and
according to notes that I made at the end of the
hearing of the Application, Miss Riley at no time
argued that Australia's treaty obligations with
Japan and New Zealand would be prejudiced if the
Applicant was granted an extension, nor did she
argue that if the Applicant was successful then
the Southern Blue Fin Tuna Quota presently
allocated may need to be redistributed with the
consequence that the tonnage allocation of present
quota would have to be reduced."
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Tt is argued that if 1t be so that it was neither arqued
before the Tribunal that treaty ohligations could he prejudiced if
the applicant were granted an extension of time and then obtained
a further quota, nor that the bluefin tuna quota presently
allocated would need to be reduced and if those arguments were
taken into account by the learned Deputy President then a denial
of matural justice occurred because the applicant had no
opportunity of answering the arguments. As to the last point the
learned Deputy President commences the last paragraph of his
reasons with the words, "It ais the opinion of the Tribunal,
having weighed all these matters ...". Counsel for the applicant
argued that this indicates that the learned Deputy President has
accepted the arguments. We do not agree with this but if the
arguments were not put it is probably enough if he merely
considered them.
As against Mr. Payne's affidavit Miss Riley swears in
her affidavit as follows :
"3, I believe that I did put to the Tribunal the
submissions referred to in grounds (b) and (ec) of
the Amended Notice of Appeal, although I have only
a vague recollection of actually doing so."
In addition to this vague recollection Miss Riley also
deposes that both the matter of the international agreement and
the effect on other quota holders were mentioned in facsimile
messages sent by the respondent to her instructing solicitors
which messages formed part of her instructions. Copies of these
messages are exhibited to Miss Riley's affidavit from which
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ineidently 1t becomes apparent that there was no treaty between
Australia, Japan and New Zealand but an "arrangement". We do not
think the difference between "treaty" and ""arrangement" is
significant for present purposes. Also exhibited to Miss Riley's
affidavit 1s a photocopy of her notes for her submission to the
Tribunal which contains the following in her handwriting, "If
these and other applications succeed tonnage value of unit may
have to be reduced defeating the reasonable expectations of
other". The topic of the treaty or arrangement was not included
in Miss Riley's notes. She swears in her affidavit that her notes
were prepared hurriedly and that she did not have time to write
down everything that she intended to argue.
It must not be overlooked that the learned Deputy
President in his apparently carefully considered reasons says that
both of these questions were argued. Counsel for the applicant
speculated that perhaps the learned Deputy President had these
grounds put to him in another tuna quota matter concerning a man
named Kent which he heard on the same day. Kent's matter,
however, was heard after the applicant's matter and was heard by
way of a telephone hook-up. The Tribunal's decision to refuse an
extension of time to Kent was handed down immediately after the
Close of argument. There is some confusion about dates but it
appears that the Tribunal's reasons for decision in the current
matter were handed down some nine days after the hearing.
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Tf we are to conclude fhat there has been a denial of
natural justice hecause of the apparent consideration by the
Tribunal of two arguments which 14 is said by the applicant, he
had no opportunity to answer, it will be necessary for the
applicant to discharge the onus upon him of satisfying us that the
arquments were not put to the Tribunal. In view of the learned
Deputy President's specific mention in his reasons that they were
put and in view of Miss Riley's instructions, her notes and her
affidavit, we are unable to he satisfied that the arguments were
not put notwithstanding Mr. Payne's affidavit. There is therefore
no basis for grounds (b) and (c) which must be dismissed.
There remains ground (e) that "The learned Deputy
President erred in law in failing to ensure that a transcript of
evidence or notes of evidence were kept or available for the
purposes of an appeal". The short answer to this ground is' that
no sworn oral evidence was adduced on either the applicant's
behalf or the respondent's behalf as deposed to by Miss Riley.
The only evidence properly so called consisted of documents
although it is certain that counsel on both sides made assertions
to the Tribunal which were treated by the Tribunal in the same way
as evidence is normally treated. Without objection from the
respondent or the Court the argument was however put that the
learned Deputy President should have ensured that a transcript was
made or that "proper"" or "accurate" notes were kept by the
Tribunal of what was said before it by counsel on both sides.
Failure to see that a recording was made for transcription or
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proper notes taken is said to have been an error of law on the
footing that where a statute under which a Tribunal is established
makes provision for an appeal a record of proceedings before the
Tribunal should be kept. We should point out that in Supreme
Courts and in this Court, although the obligation to take a
recording of sworn evidence for transcription could hardly now he
doubted, it has never been suggested that there is an equal
obligation to make a recording of counsel's addresses.
No doubt it 1s desirable that all Tribunals from which
an appeal may lie should keep a record of what takes place before
them. Whether or not there is a legal obligation to do so is
another question.
The first thing to note is that the Act does not require
that the Tribunal however constituted should keep a record of any
sort of the proceedings before it.
Section 148 of the Justices Act 1902 of Western
Australia gives parties interested in a conviction or order made
by Justices the right to have a copy of the depositions amongst
other things. This plainly imports a duty to keep at least notes
of the depositions of witnesses. No such duty express or implied
1s Placed upon the Tribunal by any provision of the Act under
which it is established.
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Section 223 of Fhe Act i5 in voart as follows
"33. ¢€1) In & proceeding mefore the Tribunal -
(a) the procedure of the Tribunal is, subject
to this Act and the regulations and to
any other enactment, within the
discretion of the Tribunal: and
(Db) the proceeding shall be conducted with as
little formality and technicality, and
with as much expedition, as the
requirements of the Act and of every
other relevant enactment and ai proper
consideration of the matters before the
Tribunal permit; and
(c) the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of
evidence but may inform itself on any
matter in such manner as it thinks
appropriate."
The cases cited by counsel for the applicant; Ex arte
Wood (1889) 6 W.N. (N.S.W.) 78; Ex parte Reid (1943) 43 S.R.
N.S.W. 207; Klopper v. Hogq £19611] W.A.R. 92 and Caratti v.
Commissioner of Police (19741 W.A.R. 73 all concern the
obligations of magistrates' courts to keep some record of what
takes place before them. Such courts are bound by the statutes
which create them and at common law to observe certain formalities
and technicalities. The procedure of the Tribunal on the other
hand is, subject to the Act and the regulations and any other
enactment, within the discretion of the Tribunal. Neither the Act
nor any regulation or other enactment provides for the keeping of
a yvecord by the Tribunal. In addition the Tribunal''s proceedings
shall be conducted "with as little formality and technicality, and
with as much expedition as the requirements ... permit".
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This provision as to informality no doubt permits a
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hearing ta b# conducted on a telephane nook-up as was the matter
of Kant.
No doubt 1t might be convenient to have a full record of
all that occurred before the Tribunal but we are unable to discern
in the authorities any positive legal obligation to do so. The
failure to do sa whether considered as a breach of natural justice
or otherwise provides no ground of appeal.
In our opinion the appeal should be dismissed with
costs.
I certify that this and the preceding
nine (9) pages are a true
copy of the Reasons for Judgment
of the Court.
Associate: Potmca Catt
Date: [Hite Apre (U8s
. il.
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. D.R. Clyne
Solicitors for the Applicant: Frank, Unmack & Cullen
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr. C.J.L. Pullin 7
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing: 2 March 1988 *!
Date of Judgment: 14 April 1988 +