JUDGMENT, No.)'*S. 2.83505 CATCHWORDS Administrative law -— judicial review - hearing by National Crime Authority - right of witnesses to legal representation - applicants called as witnesses - retain legal practitioner who has appeared for two previous witnesses - Authority denies applicants representation by such legal practitioner -— whether applicants had unfettered right to select legal practitioner - whether the Authority had power to deny witnesses representation by that legal practitioner on the ground that representation by him might prejudice its investigation. National Crime Authority Act 1984, ss. 19, 25, 46 NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY v. A, B and D Nos. VG 480, 481 and 482 of 1987 BOWEN C.J., SHEPPARD and MORLING JJ. SYDNEY 29 APRIL 1988 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Nos. VG 480, 481 ) and 482 of 1987 ) GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN: NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY Appellant AND: A, B and D Respondents MINUTES OF ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER: BOWEN C.J., SHEPPARD and MORLING JJ. DATE MADE: 29 APRIL 1988 WHERE MADE: SYDNEY THE COURT ORDERS THAT:-— I. Each appeal be allowed. 2. In each case the orders and declaration made by Mr. Justice Northrop on 27 November 1987 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the respondent's application for judicial review be dismissed. 3. In each case the respondent pay to the appellant, the National Crime Authority, its costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before Mr. Justice Northrop. NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Nos. VG 480, 481 ) and 482 of 1987. ) GENERAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN: NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY Appellant ig A, B and D Respondents THE COURT: BOWEN C.J., SHEPPARD and MORLING JJ. DATE : 29 APRIL 1988 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT THE COURT: These are appeals from judgments of a single Judge of this Court (Northrop J.) delivered on 27 November 1987 in which his Honour set aside a decision of the National Crime Authority ("the Authority") which had the effect of denying to the respondents representation before it by a legal practitioner of their choice. His Honour declared that the legal practitioner chosen by the respondents had a right to be present at a hearing of the Authority while each respondent was giving evidence. Orders have been made forbidding the publication of the names 2. of the respondents; hence their designation by the letters A, B and D. The documents in each of the appeals are similar and it was considered by the parties sufficient to reproduce only those documents which concerned the respondent A. The relevant legislation is to be found in the National Crime Authority Act 1984 ("the Act"). It 1s convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act before coming to a consideration of the evidence, the Authority's decision and the judgment under appeal. The Authority is constituted by s. 7. It is to consist of a chairman and two other members. Section 11 provides for the functions of the Authority. Subsection 11(1) provides for its general functions and subsec. 11(2) for its special functions. Its general functions include the collection and analysis of criminal information and intelligence relating to "relevant activities" and the dissemination of that information and intelligence, inter alia, to law enforcement agencies, and the investigation, otherwise than pursuant to a reference made under s. 13 or in accordance with s. 14, of matters relating to relevant criminal activities. "Relevant criminal activity" is defined in s. 4 to mean any circumstances implying, or any allegations, that a relevant offence may have been, or may be being, committed against a law of the Commonwealth, of a State or of a Territory. "Relevant offence" 1s defined to mean an offence which involves two or more offenders and substantial planning and organization, which involves or is of a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of sophisticated methods and techniques, that is committed, or is of a kind that 1s ordinarily committed, in conjunction with other offences of a like kind, and which 3. involves theft, fraud, tax evasion, currency violations, illegal drug dealings, illegal gambling, obtaining financial benefit by vice engaged in by others, extortion, violence, bribery or corruption of, or by, an officer of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, bankruptcy and company violations, harbouring of criminals, forging of passports, armament dealings or illegal importation or exportation of fauna into or out of Australia, or that involves matters of the same general nature as one or more of the foregoing. There are certain offences which are not included but it is unnecessary to refer to these. In order to understand the nature of the Authority's special functions referred to in subsec. 11(2) it 1s first necessary to refer to ss. 13 and 14, Section 13 provides that, in the circumstances therein referred to, the Minister may, by notice in writing to the Authority, refer a matter relating to a relevant criminal activity to 1t for investigation insofar as the relevant offence is, or the relevant offences, are or include, an offence or offences against a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory. Section 14 provides for a reference to the Authority to investigate offences against State law. The special functions of the Authority provided for in subsec. 11(2) are to investigate matters referred to it under s. 13 and matters referred to it under s. 14. Section 19 provides for the incidental powers of the Authority. It has power to do all things necessary to be done for or in connection with, or reasonably incidental to, the performance of its general functions or of aits_ special 4. functions, and any specific powers conferred on the Authority by the Act "shall not be taken to limit by implication the generality of this section", Under s. 20 the Authority may require information from certain Commonwealth agencies; under 5s. 21 arrangements may be made for it to receive information or intelligence; s. 22 empowers 1t to issue search warrants; and s. 24 provides for application by the Authority to be made to the Federal Court for the delivery up to the Authority of the passport of a witness. The sections to which reference has so far been made, except s. 4, are to be found in Division 1 of Part II of the Act. Part II 1s entitled, "The National Crime Authority" and Division 1 thereof, "Establishment, Functions and Powers". Division 2 of Part II is entitled "Hearings" and opens with s. 25, the construction of which is at the heart of these appeals. Subsection 25(1) provides that, for the purposes of a special investigation, the Authority may hold hearings. "Special investigation" is defined in s. 4 to mean an investigation that the Authority is conducting in the performance of its special functions. Subsection 25(3) provides that subject to subsec. (2), s. 46 applies, so far as it is capable of application, at a hearing before the Authority as if the hearing were a meeting of it. Subsection 25(2) enables the Authority to be constituted by one or more members or acting members when 1t is conducting a hearing. Section 46 is found in Division 3 of Part II of the Act. It is entitled "Administrative Provisions". Section 46 provides for meetings of the Authority. Subsection 46(8) provides, so far as it is relevant, that the Authority may 5. regulate the conduct of proceedings at 1ts meetings as it thinks fit. At the relevant time subsecs. 25(4),(5), (6), (7) and (8) of the Act were as follows:- "25.(4) At a hearing before the Authority-— (a) @a person giving evidence may be represented by a legal practitioner; and (b) if, by reason of the existence of Special circumstances, the Authority consents to a person who 1s not giving evidence being represented by a legal practitioner - the person may be so represented. (5) A hearing before the Authority shall be held in private and the Authority may give directions as to the persons who may be present during the hearing or a part of the hearing. (6) Nothing in a direction given by the Authority under sub-section (5) prevents the presence, when evidence is being taken at a hearing before the Authority, of- (a) a person representing the person giving evidence; or (b) @ person representing, pursuant to sub-section (4), a person who, by reason of a direction given by the Authority under sub-section (5), 1s entitled to be present. (7) Where a hearing before the Authority 1s being held, a person (other than a member or an acting member, counsel assisting the Authority in relation to the matter that is the subject of the hearing or a member of the staff of the Authority approved by the Authority) shall not be present at the hearing unless the person is entitled to be present by reason of a direction given by the Authority under sub-section (5) or by reason of sub-section (6). (8) At a hearing before the Authority for the purposes of a special investigation- (a) counsel assisting the Authority generally or in relation to the matter to which the investigation relates; 6. (b) any person authorized by the Authority to appear before it at the hearing; or (c) any legal practitioner representing a person at the hearing pursuant to sub-section (4), may, so far as the Authority thinks appropriate, examine or cross-examine any witness on any matter that the Authority considers relevant to the special investigation". Subsection 25(9) empowers the Authority to direct, inter alia, that any evidence given before it or the fact that any person has given or may be about to give evidence at a hearing shall not be published except in such manner, and to such persons, as the Authority specifies. Section 30 provides for the consequences of failure of witnesses to attend and answer questions at hearings. Section 31 provides for the issue by the Federal Court of warrants for the arrest of witnesses. Section 33 creates offences in relation to the giving of false or misleading evidence. Section 35 makes it an offence to obstruct or hinder the Authority or to disrupt a hearing before it. Finally, s. 51 makes it an offence for members of the Authority or members of its staff to make a record of any information or to divulge or communicate to any person any information otherwise than in connection with the performance of his duties under the Act. Furthermore, such a person shall not be required to produce in any Court any document otherwise than in the circumstances which are provided for. 7. The three respondents were called as witnesses before the Authority which was conducting a special investigation as a result of references to it under ss. 13 and 14 of the Act. It is sufficient to refer to certain parts of the reference under s. 13. The matter referred and the particulars in relation to it were as follows:- "MATTER The nature and scope of any illegal activity, the identity of the persons involved and the nature of their involvement disclosed by the circumstances or allegations described below or otherwise revealed by investigations into those circumstances or allegations. PARTICULARS PURSUANT TO SUB-SECTION 13(2) (a) The general nature of the circumstances or allegations constituting the relevant criminal activity is activity by a group or groups of persons including inter alia persons identified to me by the Authority on the 11 March 1986 and associated persons and companies suggesting offences involving: (i) the importation and distribution of narcotic substances; (ii) bribery or corruption of officers of the Commonwealth or officers of a Territory; (iii) widespread financial and business activities including activities associated with illegal gambling, tax evasion, and violence; (b) The offences referred to above are, or include, offences against laws of the Commonwealth or of a Territory; (c) The purpose of the investigation is: (i) to ascertain whether any or what relevant offences (including any offence deemed to be a relevant offence pursuant to s. 4(2) of the National Crime Authority Act 1984) ave been or are being committed 8. against laws of the Commonwealth or of a Territory; (i1) to identify the offender or offenders; (111i) to assemble evidence that would be admissible in the prosecution of the offenders; (1v) to furnish that evidence to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia or of the State of New South Wales or to the relevant law enforcement agency for the prosecution of those offences". Pursuant to s. 25 of the Act the Authority embarked on a hearing. The Authority was constituted by the Chairman. It gave directions pursuant to subsec. 25(9) prohibiting and restricting the publication of material obtained at the hearing. A witness summoned to give evidence was represented by a legal practitioner while he was giving evidence. The same legal practitioner appeared for the spouse of the first witness when the spouse gave evidence. It then emerged that each of the respondents in these appeals was to be called to give evidence and that each had instructed the same legal practitioner who had represented the first witness to represent each of them. After hearing submissions from counsel assisting the Authority and the legal practitioner who sought to appear for each of the three respondents, the Authority decided that the legal practitioner would not be allowed to appear for the respondents. It was in respect of this decision that each of the respondents sought judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. 9. Before coming to deal with the terms of the judgment below and the submissions of the parties, it is necessary to make some reference to the Authority's decision which was made on 19 August 1987. The decision is included in a volume, the publication of which is restricted pursuant to an order made by Northrop J. on 2 October 1987. However, it is agreed by the parties that the decision itself might be referred to without the order being infringed. Amongst other things the Authority said:- "I do not quarrel with the general proposition that a witness in proceedings before the Authority should be able to choose his own legal representative. But to say that there is an entitlement to appear for more than one witness merely because more than one witness requires that particular legal practitioner to appear is an entirely different proposition. In my view, the Authority does have the power to regulate the conduct of its own proceedings, and this includes the power to refuse to allow a legal practitioner to appear for more than one witness. A witness summoned to appear before the authority has a right to be represented by a legal practitioner, but not a right to _ be represented by any legal practitioner in all circumstances. The right, in other words, is not absolute. There reposes in the authority a discretion to decide whether to allow a particular legal practitioner to appear for a particular witness at a hearing before the Authority. Such an interpretation of section 25(4)(a) is supported by the nature of the functions of the authority as set out in the provisions of the act generally and in specific provisions such as those relating to secrecy and confidentiality, for example section 51 and sub-sections 25(5) and (9). The discretion also arises out of the Authority's inherent power to which I have 10. referred to regulate and control its own Proceedings and the conduct of those participating in the proceedings. In my view, a witness in these proceedings May properly be deprived of his chosen legal representative when the administration of justice becomes impossible in a practical sense. For example, I am unable to accept that sub-section (4) of sect1on 25 means that the authority must allow a lawyer himself the subject of investigation by the authority, to appear for the very witnesses the authority wishes to examine to determine whether that lawyer's activities were improper or otherwise. That would be absurd". The Authority also said that it was entitled to conduct its investigation in such a way as to avoid the premature disclosure of the information at its disposal. It added:- "It is my clear view that while in normal cases, as I have already mentioned, a person should be free to have the legal practitioner of his choice, the circumstances which prevail here make this course inappropriate. For the reasons I have already advanced it is my view that there is no absolute right in this regard. A discretion reposes in the authority to allow or disallow such representation". After referring to the relationship between subsec. 25(3) and s. 46 of the Act, which provides for meetings of the Authority, the Authority said that 1t was not necessary to rely on the relationship between the two provisions for the purposes of reaching its conclusion, but that s. 46 and the express reference to it in s. 25 reinforced its conclusion that it had power to refuse to permit a particular legal representative to appear for the respondents. It concluded its reasons by saying that it did 11. not intend to allow him to appear for the respondents. Northrop J. began his consideration of the problem by emphasizing that there was no suggestion of any impropriety on the part of the legal practitioner. No such suggestion was made by counsel for the Authority before us. The essential paragraphs of the judgment under appeal are as follows:- "Section 25 of the Act, read in the context of the nature of the special functions of the Authority, makes it clear that the Authority is exercising investigatory functions of an administrative nature of a kind where privacy and confidentiality is of the utmost importance. Sub-section 25(5) is consistent with the policy of the Act. It is equally clear that s. 25 confers rights upon a legal practitioner, representing a person giving evidence at a hearing before the Authority under s. 25, to be present at the hearing while the witness is giving evidence. That right is stated in absolute terms. The section states expressly that the legal practitioner 1s entitled to be present while the client is giving evidence. The right to ask questions 1s conditional; see sub-section 25(8). Nevertheless, there must be some limitation on the right of the legal practitioner to be present while the client is giving evidence. Counsel for the applicants, quite properly in my opinion, conceded some limitation. Thus, if the legal practitioner so conducted himself so as to prevent the Authority from proceeding with the hearing, he could be excluded. This power to exclude persons for that reason 1s common to all meetings and to proceedings before tribunals' generally, including courts of law". His Honour then went on to discuss some authorities in which 12. zt was held that a magistrate hearing committal proceedings had power to order the removal of counsel from the Court and to refrain from hearing him further in the proceedings if the magistrate considered that course necessary 1n the interests of justice; see Ex parte Cory (1864) 3 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 304 and Bell v. Norton, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Lee J., 10 August 1983, unreported. His Honour then continued:- "That line of authority illustrates a limitation which is imposed on what appears to be an absolute right. In the present case, the Authority asserts the existence of another limitation on the right of a legal practitioner to be present at a hearing under s. 25 of the Act when the client of that legal practitioner is giving evidence as a witness at that hearing. The limitation claimed arises from the nature of the hearing and the need for confidentiality of what occurs at that hearing". After reference to a number of the provisions of the Act and some further authorities his Honour said:- "Sub-section 25(4) of the Act confers on a witness a privilege or right in the nature of a facultative power to be represented by a legal practitioner at a hearing under s. 25. Where a witness exercises that privilege or right, the legal representative has a statutory right to be present at the hearing while the client 1s giving evidence; see sub-sections 25(4)(a), (6)(a} and (7). In addition, if by reason of special circumstances, the Authority consents to a person who is not giving evidence being represented by a legal practitioner, that legal practitioner has a statutory right to be present at the hearing while another person is giving evidence; see sub-sections 25(4)(b), (6)(b) and (7). Those statutory rights cannot be affected by a direction under sub-section 25(5). In form, the statutory right is stated to be in the legal practitioner, but the same statutory right is 13. conferred on the person who has chosen or instructed the legal practitioner. The power of the legal practitioner to ask questions 15s conditional; see sub-section 25(8)". His Honour then came to the reliance placed by counsel for the Authority on the provisions of ss. 19, 25 and 46 of the Act and to the submission of counsel that the Authority was entitled to conduct 1ts special investigation in such a way as to avoid the premature disclosure of information. His Honour also referred to a submission that the Authority, like a tribunal or court, had power to regulate the conduct of its proceedings and the power of a tribunal to conduct proceedings, in appropriate circumstances, in private. His Honour said that those powers were not disputed, but that the extent of the powers vested in the Authority were to be considered in the light of the specific rights conferred on witnesses and their legal representatives by s. 25 of the Act. His Honour said, "... that right is expressed in absolute terms". The critical conclusion reached by his Honour was expressed as follows:- "In essence, the existence of the power claimed on behalf of the Authority is based on sections 19, 25 and 46 of the Act. In my opinion, the existence of the power to conduct its proceedings at a hearing under s. 25 as if the hearing was a meeting of the Authority under s. 46 of the Act is not sufficient to deny the express right conferred by s. 25 of the Act upon a legal representative appearing for a witness at the hearing". His Honour also said:- "In my opinion, the power conferred by s. 19 14. of the National Crime Authority Act 1s not sufficient to overcome the statutory right conferred on the legal practitioner, and implicitly upon a witness, by s. 25 of that Act. It follows that the Authority had no power to make the decisions sought to be reviewed. In these circumstances, it 1s not necessary to consider whether the Authority, if it had that power, exercised properly the discretion that would have arisen if it had the power claimed". The paragraphs from his Honour's judgment which we have set out sufficiently show the submissions which were made to him by counsel for the parties. Substantially similar submissions were relied on before us. The question is whether the right conferred by subsec. 25(4) of the Act upon a witness to be represented by a legal practitioner is absolute or qualified and, if qualified, whether the Authority was empowered in the circumstances of this case to refuse the respondents the right to choose the legal practitioner, who had represented another witness, as their legal representative. If there be a qualification, it may arise because of a consideration of the Act as a whole and the combined effect of a number of its provisions or from the nature of the tribunal and the extent to which it has power to control proceedings before it, or from a combination of both. We begin our consideration of the matter by saying that ina number of places in his judgment, and also in the declaration made by him, his Honour has said or implied that the Act confers a "statutory right" on a legal practitioner to be present at a hearing to represent a witness who has retained him for this purpose. In our respectful opinion s. 25 confers no rights upon legal practitioners; the rights it confers are conferred upon 15. witnesses. Nothing turns on this point but the statement 1s made un a number of places and, in our respectful view, it is erroneous. In expressing this view we are not unmindful of the provisions of subsections 25(6),(7) and (8). But the right which is conferred is conferred by subsection 25(4) on the witness. The later subsections are 1n aid of that right, but they do not themselves confer independent rights on legal practitioners. As his Honour said in the course of his reasons, it would be impossible to read subsec. 25(4) as a provision conferring an absolute right in all circumstances on a witness to have present a legal representative of his choice. His Honour's view of the extent of this qualification is, however, in our opinion, too restrictive. The example he gave, which we concede was not intended to be exhaustive, was conduct on the part of the legal practitioner which prevented the Authority from proceeding with the hearing. We agree that 1t would have power to exclude such a person, but the power is in a sense expressly recognized by s. 35 which makes unlawful conduct which disrupts the hearing. A starting point for the consideration of the problem is the nature of the Authority and of its functions. It is concerned with investigating, either generally on its own initiative, or specially on references to it pursuant to ss. 13 or 14 of the Act, a wide range of serious criminal activity, or suspected criminal activity, in the community. The powers it has are expressed in wide terms and it is clear that the legislature intended its powers to be extensive and far reaching. Even without s. 19 there could be no doubt, notwithstanding the 16. provisions of subsec. 25(4), that the Authority had power to regulate its own proceedings with a view to ensuring that they were not prejudiced, or exposed to the risk of being prejudiced, by the conduct of any person, whether involved in a hearing before it or otherwise. Section 19 15 a critical provision. The section expressly says that none of the specific powers conferred on the Authority is to be taken to limit by implication the generality of it and it must not be read down when subsec. 25(4) is being construed. Section 19 provides that the Authority has power to do all things necessary to be done for or in connection with, or reasonably incidental to, the performance of 1ts general functions or of its special functions. Whether something is necessary to be done for any of these purposes requires the Authority to exercise a judgment. A consideration of its reasons, some of the paragraphs of which have been earlier set out, shows that this matter was the subject of anxious consideration by it. It was well aware of the importance to the respondents of legal representation and of their right, in normal circumstances, to choose their own legal representative. But it could see that representation by the same legal practitioner of the earlier witnesses and of the respondents, all of whom were apparently to be examined about the same or similar matters, could lead to a situation where additional information obtained from one witness was disclosed to another. The Authority's fear in this regard was not at all based on any suggestion of impropriety or anticipated impropriety on the 17. part of the legal practitioner. But it was concerned that the legal practitioner would, if it had not prevented his doing so, have ultimately represented five witnesses each questioned on Matters which were related to matters asked of the other witnesses. In the normal course the expectation would be that the legal representative would confer with the witnesses before they gave their evidence. He would have a fairly clear idea of what the nature of the investigation was, what matters concerned the Authority and the general thrust of the questions which were likely to be asked. He would be under a duty to each of the respondents to represent them adequately. On the other hand, he would be unable, because of the secrecy provisions of the Act, to disclose to them what he had learnt at his previous appearances. The question whether the legal representative, by accepting the retainers of each of the respondents, would place himself in a position of conflict between his duty to his clients and his duty to the Authority including his obligations under the Act, was not to the point. What the Authority feared was that a legal practitioner anxious to do his duty to his clients might, quite unintentionally, perhaps subconsciously, reveal to one or more of the respondents matters which would forewarn them of what they might expect to be asked. That is the sort of risk which concerned the Authority and which persuaded it that it should refuse to allow the legal representative to appear. The question 1s whether, that being the situation, the Authority in all the circumstances had the statutory power to do as it did. We think that the essential nature of the Authority and the functions with which 1t has been entrusted, when considered along 18. with s. 19 of the Act, lead to the conclusion that the power exists. We also regard subsec. 46(8) as a further factor reinforcing this conclusion. It may seem strange that a provision dealing with meetings of the Authority should be relevant to the problem, but subsec. 25(3) expressly applies s. 46 to hearings. It was therefore intended to have some application. In a sense it does not add much to the considerations we have mentioned. It expressly provides for what we think would have been the position in any event, namely, that the Authority has power to regulate the conduct of its proceedings as it thinks fit. This does not mean that it may ride roughshod over other provisions of the Act or that it has an absolute discretion to conduct its proceedings in any way it thinks fit. It must always bear in mind all relevant provisions of the Act and the essential purposes for which it is acting. But, subject to those matters, the Authority in our view, is entitled to regulate its proceedings to avoid a situation arising where the confidentiality of information obtained by it may be exposed to the risk of disclosure. Once one concedes, as counsel for the respondents quite properly did, and as the learned primary Judge has said it was proper to do, that the right is not absolute and must be qualified to some extent, the respondents' argument is faced with a problem. To what extent 1s the apparently absolute right to be qualified? In our opinion the only answer one can give is that it will be qualified to empower the Authority to refuse to permit a particular legal representative to appear 1f it concludes on reasonable grounds and in good faith that to allow the 19. representation either will, or may, prejudice the investigation which it is obliged to carry out pursuant to the terms of its statute. We think that no other answer can be given to the question. The extracts from the Authority's decision which we have quoted show that it acted within the bounds of this mandate. We should add that the construction we have put upon the Authority's power does not work any injustice to a witness called before it. The witness may still be represented by any legal practitioner of his or her choice save a practitioner excluded by the Authority for good reason. In the result we have reached the conclusion that in each case the appeal should be allowed, the orders and declaration made below set aside and the application for judicial review dismissed. In each case the respondent must pay the Authority's costs both of the appeal and of the proceedings before Northrop J I certify that this and the preceding eighteen (18) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court. vw Aesa C4 om Jo 27 A erel / eee 20. Counsel for the Appellant: Solicitors for the Appellant: Counsel for the Respondents: Solicitors for the Respondents: Date of Hearing: Mr. S. Charles, Q.C. with Mr. E.J. Lorkin Australian Government Solicitor Dr. J. Bleechmore Ellinghaus & Linder 30 March 1988