CATCHWORDS ria, \ * PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - TRADE PRACTICES - Application to strike out statement of claim - whether representation as to future promises or conduct can be misleading or deceptive - especially if alleged damage is that representation erroneous - whether representation implied by law can be misleading or false. Trade Practices Act 1974: ss 51A, 52 and 53 CEDRIC CONSTRUCTIONS PTY. LIMITED Applicant -v- ELDER'S FINANCE & INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED First Respondent ELDER'S LENSWORTH FINANCE LIMITED Second Respondent G 475 of 1986 CORAM: Einfeld J. DATE: 17 June 1988 PLACE: Sydney \ IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL DIVISION NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY CORAM: DATE: PLACE: E No. G 475 of 1987 eed Between: CEDRIC CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LIMITED Applicant And: ELDER'S FINANCE & INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED First Respondent ELDER'S LENSWORTH FINANCE LIMITED Second Respondent Einfeld J. 17 June 1988 Sydney MINUTE OF ORDERS The amended Statement of Claim filed in these proceedings he struck out. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent. Liberty to apply on four (4) days' notice within the next fourteen (14) days as to any other orders which should now be made. Settlement and entry of these orders is dealt with in accordance with Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL DIVISION No. G 475 of 1987 NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY Between: CEDRIC CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LIMITED Applicant i ELDER'S FINANCE & INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED First Respondent ELDER'S LENSWORTH FINANCE LIMITED Second Respondent CORAM: Einfeld J. DATE: 17 June 1988 PLACE: Sydney REASONS FOR JUDGMENT In October 1986, Cedric Constructions Pty Limited (the applicant) commenced an action against Elder's Finance & Investment Co Limited (Elders) and Elder's lLensworth Finance Limited (Lensworth) seeking relief under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the Act) on the basis of allegedly misleading, deceptive and false conduct under sections 52 and 53 of the Act. In April 1987, the applicant filed an amended statement of claim. Before me now is a Notice of Motion filed on 6 May 1987 by Elders seeking that: 1. the amended statement of claim be struck out, and 2. the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to Order 20 Rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules. In order to understand the case made for this summary relief, it is necessary briefly to summarise the allegations in the amended statement of claim. This is a very confused and confusing document. It appears that the applicant is a builder and building-project developer. In about 1984 the applicant sought to borrow funds of the order of $1.7 million. For this purpose, the applicant alleges that it was introduced to Lensworth as an adviser in this regard who advised and arranged a loan facility from Elders. Lensworth is described as a finance company and Elders as a merchant banker. On or about 5 April 1984, Elders lent the applicant $1.7 million in Australian dollars or in a foreign currency nominated by the applicant. On 30 April 1984, the amount involved was reduced to $1,650,000 and was further reduced to $1,575,000 on 4 July 1984. On 19 December 1984, the facility was increased to $1,805,000. In all these cases, although the sum of money alleged to have been then borrowed under the loan facility from Elders by the applicant is expressed in Australian dollars, in fact the loan was able to be converted into any combination of currencies adding up to the then equivalent of the Australian dollar amount stated. By 4 April 1985, the applicant's loan under the facility amounted to $A705,000 and 225,200,000 Japanese yen. On 3 April 1985 the applicant and Elders entered into a deed designed to settle what was then said to be a dispute about foreign exchange losses. The consequences of that deed were that on various terms not now relevant in detail, Elders was released from any liability for these losses but the loan facility, albeit in a new form, was continued. In the ensuing months the loan was converted into various denominations of foreign currencies. On 13 June 1985, the Australian dollar loan was reduced to $470,000, converted to 810,280 Swiss francs for 92 days and, on 7 August 1985, at the request of the applicant, further converted to $0S344,493. The Japanese yen loan was, on maturity on 4 July 1985, converted to 2,312,353 Swiss francs. The applicant alleges that at the time when or just before the loan facility was first entered into in April 1984, and again at the time when it was varied by deed on 3 April 1985, and between those two dates, Elders' representatives made the following representations to the applicant, namely that :- 1. the applicant could obtain 'through the first respondent' (Elders), advice on foreign currency transactions and loan management procedures; 2. by taking Elders' advice, the applicant would be 'better placed to reduce interest obligations and to obtain capital appreciation on foreign currency dealings'; 3. Elders would monitor and advise the applicant concerning foreign exchange dealings so as to limit the risks of the applicant and take advantage of foreign currency fluctuations to its benefit. Elders' agreement to monitor and advise in respect of foreign exchange risks was contained in the deed of 3 April 1985. The amended statement of claim alleges that in its monitoring and advising mode, Elders were under an obligation to use reasonable and due skill, care and diligence. The applicant then goes on to assert' that these representations were made fraudulently, falsely and untruthfully or with reckless indifference to their truth or falsity. It also alleges that Elders knew and intended that the applicant would rely on _ the representations and that the representations would induce the applicant to engage in foreign currency dealings through the first respondent. These assertions rely upon the applicant's implied rights under the well-known principles enunciated in Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller and Partners Limited (1963) 2 All ER 575 on the one hand and Derry v Peak (1889) 14 AC 337 on the other. The amended statement of claim further asserts that, contrary to its implied duty as a merchant banker owed to a customer to exercise the relevant skill, care and diligence, Elders refused in August 1985 to convert into American dollars the loan funds then drawn down in the form of the (approximately) 2.3 million Swiss francs. The applicant says that it sought Elders' advice on this conversion but that Elders' representatives told the applicant that although the conversion rate was favourable, the conversion could not be made. At least one of the reasons, perhaps the only one, was because it would cause the Australian dollar equivalent of the loan reckoned as at the day of or day after the deed to be in excess of the amount permitted by the loan facility. The amended statement of claim says that the applicant rejected Elders' calculations in this regard and gave instructions that the conversion was to be made. These instructions were not carried out. If conversion had been made at the then prevailing rate of exchange, the applicant says that its account with Elders would have shown a considerable surplus and would not have exceeded the limit of the loan facility. The applicant says that in this regard Elders failed to make correct calculations, failed to give the correct advice, and failed to reduce the applicant's risks or enhance its benefits by its actions or inactions at this time. This, the applicant says, amounts to _ conduct which misled or was likely to mislead or deceive the applicant within the meaning of section 52 of the Act. The applicant alleges that it suffered damage from these breaches of the Act in terms of a foreign exchange loss of some $420,000 as well as an unquantified sum for legal costs. Further damage is also alleged in that because of the failure of the first respondent to act as directed or instructed by the applicant, the applicant paid more interest to Elders than would have been required if the funds had been converted. As a result, as I understand it, the applicant says that it lost the benefit of the use of the money that was paid in interest. It seems to be suggested that Elders charged the applicant with more interest than should and would have been the case if the additional funds had been available. Possibly this is some type of net or set off calculation. The applicant launches an alternative claim that the deceptive or misleading conduct earlier referred to also constituted false and misleading statements by Elders in breach of section 53 of the Act. There then follows a further allegation of Elders' failure to use care, skill and diligence as a result of which the applicant had to take steps in relation to certain deposits as a result of which he suffered losses. This claim seems to have nothing to do with the Act. The amended statement of claim also alleges that there was a continuing course of common dealing between the parties involving certain foreign currency hedge contracts to reduce risks and losses and enhance profits. There is a specific claim in relation to one foreign currency hedge contract as a result of which the applicant allegedly became entitled to be paid money in excess of $200,000 which has not been paid. It is clear that this claim has nothing to do with any matter arising under the Act. The remainder of the amended statement of claim makes allegations against Lensworth and has therefore nothing to do with Elders or this motion. Elders attacks the allegations made by the applicant on the grounds that whatever else the amended statement of claim does, it does not raise a claim against Elders within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. It is certainly clear that if the only claims made in the amended statement of claim which can be litigated are claims based on Hedley Byrne or Derry v Peak allegations on the.one hand, or a common money or simple debt claim for moneys had and received on the other, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the action. The only matter that can give rise to the jurisdiction of the court as alleged in the amended statement of claim is any claim which successfully and properly invokes the Act. For the purposes of examining that question, it is necessary to go, first of all, to paragraphs 23 and 28 which allege breaches of sections 52 and 53 of the Act. Paragraph 23 1s in the following form: "The conduct of the first respondent referred to in paragraphs 17, 18, 21 amd 22 hereof constituted conduct that was misleading and deceptive or alternatively was conduct likely to mislead or deceive the applicant within the meaning of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974." Of the four paragraphs mentioned that are said to constitute the misleading or deceptive conduct alleged, it seems to me that only paragraph 17 could so comply. Paragraphs 18, 21 and 22 do not allege representations or conduct capable of being misleading or deceptive, except that paragraph 18 repeats part of paragraph 17. Paragraph 17 says this: "At or about the time of entering into the said loan facility and at or about the time of varying the same by deed dated 3 April 1985, the First respondent represented to the applicant: (a) that the applicant could obtain through the First respondent advice on such foreign currency transactions and on loan management procedures. (b) that by taking the advice of the First respondent or its servants or agents the applicant would be better placed to reduce interest obligations and to obtain capital appreciation on foreign currency dealings. (ec) that the First respondent would monitor and advise concerning foreign exchange dealings with a view to limiting the risks of the applicant and to take advantage of foreign currency fluctuations for the benefit of the applicant." Subparagraph (c) is partly-.repeated in paragraph 18, but the rest and main thrust of that paragraph and of paragraph 21 contain implied duties or obligations. Paragraph 22 alleges a breach of the implied duties set out in paragraph 21. The particulars of paragraph 17 merely date the representations and name the representors and representees. Paragraph 28 is in the following form: Purther or in the alternative, in the premises the conduct referred to in paragraphs 16 to 22 inclusive hereof constituted false or misleading statements in respect of the supply of services or in connection with the promotion of the use of services within the meaning of s 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974." It was agreed in argument that the reference to "16" should be read as a reference to "17" as in paragraph 23. However, as I have said, nothing in paragraphs 18 to 22 could amount to statements at all within the meaning of the Act, let alone false and misleading statements. Only paragraph 17 could supply the necessary substance to the claim under section 53 of the Act. Therefore, to decide this motion in favour of the applicant requires an examination as to whether paragraph 17 can amount to representations or statements within the meaning of the two sections of the Act relied on. In substance Elders' attack on paragraph 17 was that there is no breach alleged and no damage asserted to flow from its contents. Indeed, Elders submitted that the statement of claim together with the particulars that have been supplied and which are before me make it clear that the applicant is conceding that what was represented was in fact supplied. Senior counsel for Elders pointed in particular to paragraph 8 which states, inter alia, that Elders made loans and offered and supplied services in the form of advice, monitoring, management, maintenance and administration. In answer to a request for particulars dated 28 November 1986 which sought details of the services alleged, the applicant by letter of 12 December 1986 stated that they are the services recited in the deed of 3 April 1985 and those represented by Elders in conversations with a representative of the applicant between April and July 1984. As previously noted, paragraph 17 says that the substance of these representations was that the applicant could obtain advice on transactions and procedures, that by taking the advice he would be able to improve or care for his financial interests, and that Elders would monitor and advise to that end. Elders said of these assertions: 1. that they are representations in respect of future conduct or promises and at the highest are representations as to future possibilities which by definition could not be false, misleading or deceptive; 2. that to the extent that it was some form of contractual promise, it is incapable of being broken merely because the applicant made a financial loss in various dealings as it alleges. In its request for particulars, Elders asked for details of the various representations. The applicant replied that in March and April 1984, and in February and April 1985, Elders represented that: (a) it would offer financial services that would, if followed, result in financial benefits to the applicant; (b) foreign currency dealings could have that effect with minimal risk; (c) its responsibility was to advise and act for the purpose of deriving capital appreciation; and (d) it had at its disposal a range of dealings and mechanisms that could advance the financial interests of the applicant. Put shortly, Elders says that there is and can be no loss in respect of these representations. These particulars do not support paragraph 17 in any event and are different to paragraph 17, but Elders says further that both paragraph 17 and the particulars are inconsistent with other parts of the pleadings. For example, when particulars are asked of paragraph 18 which alleges that the first respondent promised to use skill, care and diligence, the applicant says that this term is implied. Elders. says that it is impossible to have a term implied by law which is false or misleading. Again paragraph 19 alleges that Elders made the representations referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 fraudulently and falsely. Elders says that in truth paragraph 18 alleges no representations at all and that when particulars are asked of the assertion in paragraph 19, referring to paragraph 17, the applicant gives a lengthy answer none of which supplies any evidence of the knowledge of falsity in the so-called representations. Finally in this connection, Elders says that quite apart from the fact that future promises or undertakings cannot be false or misleading, the rest of the statement of claim in effect establishes that its representations were actually true in the sense that Elders did what it said it would do. Elders states that what the applicant is really claiming is that the advice or actions were wrong, negligent, mistaken or some such concept as a result of which the applicant lost some money. This, Elders says, does not raise a case under the Act. In any event, it says that if there was a loss because Elders did not convert the currency as instructed, the loss was not due to any misrepresentations but to breach of contract or of the Hedley Byrne or Derry v Peak-type duties. It is trite law that no claim should be struck out if despite difficulties in understanding what is being alleged and doubts about its legal cogency, it raises a genuine matter of dispute known to the law: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1948) 78 CLR 62 at 92; General Steel Industries v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125. It 1s not disputed that the applicant has in a somewhat convoluted way Pleaded some claims known to the law. Thus in this case, the principle requires not an examination whether a cause of action of some known kind has been pleaded and particularised, but whether the legal bases for the allegations made includes at least one provided by the Act, so as to vest jurisdiction in this Court. This case also does not turn on some question as to whether the pleadings and the particulars conflict as generally discussed in cases such as Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658, although there seems to me to be some such conflict in fact. There can be no doubt that the allegations in paragraph 17 of the amended statement of claim are promises or undertakings for the future. As to such representations in a case arising under section 59 of the Act, it was held by Franki J in Thompson v Mastertouch TV Service Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 487 at 495 that "... @ prediction or statement as to the future is not false ... if it proves to be incorrect unless it is a false statement as to an existing or past fact .. " I agree with Franki J that for conduct to be characterised as misleading, it is necessary to look at the facts as they existed at the time when the conduct was the engaged in and to say that, at that time, the conduct was misleading or likely to mislead. It seems to me clear that the mere fact that a corporation makes a promise which it subsequently breaks, or makes a prediction that turns out to he incorrect, does not result in a breach of section 52. Reg v_Sunair Holidays Ltd (1973) 1 WLR 1105 was a prosecution of a travel agency for misdescription in a travel brochure of facilities and services that would be available to its customers at a holiday resort. The Court of Appeal held that statements which amount to promises with regard to future conduct were not caught by section 14(1) of the UK Trades Description Act 1968 (similar to sections 52 and 53 of the Act) because when they were made they could not have the character of being either true or false. If such a promise may be construed as an implied statement of present intention, means (sic) or belief which is false at the time of making and is knowingly or recklessly made, then it may be construed as being within that Act. (See also Beckett v Cohen (1972) 1 WLR 1593, where it was said that the UK Act did not intend to make a criminal offence out of what is really a breach of warranty.) Lockhart J struck out the statement of claim in Bill Acceptance Corporation v GWA Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 242 because it depended on the proposition that there is a breach of section 52 merely if a representation as to future conduct does not come to pass. Lockhart J observed at 250: "The mere fact that representations as to future conduct or events do not came to pass does not make them misleading or deceptive, notwithstanding that the applicant has relied on them and has altered his position on the faith of them." His Honour repeated the Thompson principle that the relevant time for testing the misleading or deceptive quality of statements is at the time they were made. Hence where there are representations as to future events, Lockhart J directed that the maker must at the time of the statements not believe what was stated or have made the statements with reckless indifference to their truth. Similar views were expressed by Sheppard J in Gardiner v Suttons Motors (Homebush) Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 142 at 153. i The words "reckless indifference to truth" are picked up in paragraph 19 of the amended statement of claim in this case. But paragraphs 22 and 24 purport to state the breach of the statutory provision and damage said to flow therefrom - and they allege that the advice was given or monitoring done on or about 7 August 1985 as promised in April 1984 and 1985 but that the advice was wrong and was based on incorrect mathematical calculations. In my view, this is not misleading or deceptive conduct within section 52, or false or misleading statements under section 53, because there is nothing asserted to link the alleged lack of belief in (or reckless indifference to) the truth of the promise at the time it was made, with the alleged breach and damage. In L.E. Stack v Coast Securities No 9 Pty Ltd (1982-83) 46 ALR 451 Fitzgerald J said at 456: "However, no submission was made to me for the applicants that an innocent misrepresentation with respect to future events or conduct reflecting a belief conscientiously and reasonably held was either conduct which was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive within the meaning of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act, a false representation with the meaning of s 52(aa), or a false and misleading statement within the meaning of s 53A. It would be appropriate at this interlocutory stage, and not inconsistent with any submission made before me on behalf of either applicants or respondent, for me to act upon a view which has been consistently adopted by a number of judges of this court that, irrespective of whether representations as to the future events or conduct constitute promises or predictions, they involve contraventions of the presently relevant provisions of the Act only if it is established that the belief of the respondent was at the time different from what was stated, or that the respondent did not believe what was stated, or was recklessly indifferent as to what was stated. Accordingly, an issue as to the respondent's state of mind at the relevant time is, in fact, central to the proceedings as it was to the proceedings in the Supreme Court." In Llo v Citico Australia Ltd & Anor (unreported 22 December 1986), Rogers J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales examined the duty of a financial adviser to a borrower in foreign currency and the standard of care required. At page 3 of the judgment his Honour said: "It is sufficient for the present to point to the incongruity of identifying the duty in terms of confidence in the movements of the foreign exchange market or what a "prudent" financial adviser would or would not do in that market. It is somewhat akin to suggesting that an adviser to a player in a game of Russian roulette would tape up the firing mechanism, unless confident that there was no bullet coming into the chamber. Similarly, venturing into the -15- foreign exchange market and from time to time becoming covered, that is to say hedged, or uncovered, that is unhedged, disqualifies the activity from having any relationship with any accepted notion of prudence. In determining the extent of the duty, it is essential to have regard to the nature of the market to which the plaintiff committed his financial future. There is no scientific basis upon which accurate forecasts can be made of movements in currency. Although some operators in the market are better equipped to give advice than others, ultimately it is a gamble. It is a gamble because unpredicable factors may have immediate and violent repercussions A rumour of the death of the United States President, the MX missile crisis, dismissal of an oil minister cannot be predicted or guarded against. Yet they may have inmense impact on the foreign currency market. De-regulation has brought in its train volatility of proportions previously unknown. As in every true gamble, returns can be very high but so can losses." In Stafford v Conti Commodity Services Limited (1981) All ER 691 at 696- 7, Mocatta J said of the duty of brokers on the London Commodities Futures Market (described by his Lordship as "notoriously wayward and erratic"): "The duty of the defendants was not in dispute between the parties. Counsel on both sides were prepared to accept what was said in Charlesworth on Negligence (6th Ed, 1977, para 1021) in relation to the liability of stockbrokers who, in this respect, it was agreed did not differ from commodity brokers: 'With regard to the customer, a stockbroker's duty lies in contract and not in tort and stockbrokers are liable for failing to use that skill and diligence which a reasonably competent and careful stockbroker would exercise.' .s. , Counsel for the defendants submitted, plainly rightly in my judgment, that a broker cannot always be right in the advice that he gives in relation to so wayward and rapidly changing a market as the commodities futures market. An error of judgment, if there be an error of judgment, is not necessarily negligent any more than has recently been said in relation to an obstetrician in a very important case recently decided by the Court of Appeal ... Furthermore, what is stated in that case is that the hazards of childbirth are such that the fact that a child eventually is brought into this world suffering from infirmities cannot by itself be relied on on the basis of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur. Similarly, losses made on the commodities market do not of themselves, in my judgment, provide evidence of Negligence on the part of a broker, even if he advised both parts of the particular transaction which produced the loss." These statements make clear the circumstances in which the applicant's assertions are made. A merchant banker says it will advise an investor on foreign currency transactions and loan management procedures. He promises to monitor the actual and prospective dealings. The banker says in one or more particular cases that the investor would in the banker's opinion he better off, though not necessarily immediately, reducing interest obligations and obtaining capital appreciation. These matters all require the judgment of the banker in very uncertain areas of prediction, even guesswork, albeit as informed as possible. If it eventuates that the banker is wrong, especially if it is because his mathematical calculations are the reason for the error, it seems to me impossible to assert that the banker's initial undertakings were or could be construed as misleading or deceptive. In this area of commercial activity, the concepts of falsity, misleading or deception do not appear to me to be readily available. Nor, it seems to me, will Justice Lockhart's persuasive extension of the concepts ordinarily he available in relation to future undertakings, where on any view of the activity under examination, there are necessarily involved considerable risks and unpredictabilities beyond the control of the alleged offender. There may be cases where fraud or reckless indifference can be proved. But I cannot see how this can be done merely by assertion as at the time of the promise, and by breach later through error of judgment or miscalculation, with damage calculated on that basis. The applicant also placed reliance on section 51A of the Act. This provides: "1. For the purposes of this Division, where a corporation makes a representation with respect to any future matter (including the doing of, or the -17 - refusing to do, any act) and the corporation does not have reasonable grounds for making the representation, the representation shall be taken to be misleading. 2. For the purposes of the application of sub-section {1) in relation to a proceeding concerning a representation made by a corporation with respect to any future matter, the corporation shall, unless it adduces evidence to the contrary, be deemed not to have had reasonable grounds for making' the representation. 3. Sub-section (1) shall be deemed not to limit by implication the meaning of a reference in this Division to a misleading representation, a representation that is misleading in a material particular or conduct that is misleading or is likely or liable to mislead." Section 51A is really an evidentiary provision. In effect, it deems as misleading any representation as to future matters unless the corporation produces evidence to establish that it had reasonable grounds for the representations. Sub-section (1) has nothing to do with this case, because it does not deal with the truth or otherwise of the representations here involved. Nothing in the amended statement of claim suggests that there were no reasonable grounds for the statements made by Elders' representatives. Indeed the applicant itself alleges that the representations relied on were carried out. Undertakings of the type referred in paragraph 17 and 18 cannot be misleading. As alleged in paragraphs 19 and 20, the test as to whether a representation is misleading must be applied when they are made not when they are broken. Their breaking or non-execution provides per se no evidence at all that they were misleading at the time they were made. In addition, to qualify for the protection and relief offered by the Act, the representations must mislead or deceive or be likely to do so. These representations were acted and relied on. They deceived or misled no one. a, 4 Sub-sections (2) and (3) also do not assist the applicant because they say nothing to constitute any of the relevant representations as misleading, deceptive or false. This section was introduced into the Act in 1986, after all the events in this case had occurred. A question therefore arises as to whether it could apply to this case. In view of my earlier views of the applicability of its terms, it is not necessary to rule definitively on this matter, and I have not examined the question in detail. However, it seems to me that at least sub-section (1) can not be given a retrospective operation to cover representations as to future conduct made before it came into operation. In other words, the section applies to representations made after its introduction, not to reprresentations made pre-enactment but with post-enactment consequences. I therefore conclude that the amended statement of claim does not dislcose a cause of action under the Act and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain. I therefore strike out the amended statement of claim and order the applicant to pay Elders' costs. I give the parties liberty to apply on four (4) days' notice within the next fourteen (14) days as to any other orders that should now be made. H j | certity that this and the SEVENTEEN Cl precoding p-o>% are a true cary of the Recasons for Judgment herein of his Honour Mr Jusice E.nferd Assoqate Hichelina Dated 17 JUNE Counsel and solicitors for the applicant Counsel and solicitors for the first respondent Mr. R.W. Parker, QC and Mr. Bennett instructed by Lincoin Smith & Company Solicitors Mr. D. Horton, QC and Mr. A.J. Bannon instructed by Westgarth Baldick Solicitors